



Aging Studies | Volume 17
To Gert – in loving memory
The series is edited by Heike Hartung, Ulla Kriebernegg and Roberta Maier-
hofer.
Hanne Laceulle (PhD), born in 1975, obtained her doctorate “cum laude” at the 
University of Humanistic Studies in Utrecht, the Netherlands, where she cur-
rently works as an Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Life Course and Art of 
Living. In 2017, she received the European Network in Aging Studies (ENAS) 
award for the best PhD thesis.
Hanne Laceulle
Aging and Self-Realization
Cultural Narratives about Later Life
An electronic version of this book is freely available, thanks to the support of 
libraries working with Knowledge Unlatched. KU is a collaborative initiative 
designed to make high quality books Open Access for the public good. The 
Open Access ISBN for this book is 978-3-8394-4422-1. More information 




Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Na-
tionalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at 
http://dnb.d-nb.de 
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No-
Derivatives 4.0 (BY-NC-ND) which means that the text may be used for non-commer-
cial purposes, provided credit is given to the author. For details go to
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
To create an adaptation, translation, or derivative of the original work and for commer-
cial use, further permission is required and can be obtained by contacting rights@
transcript-verlag.de 
Creative Commons license terms for re-use do not apply to any content (such as 
graphs, figures, photos, excerpts, etc.) not original to the Open Access publication and 
further permission may be required from the rights holder. The obligation to research 
and clear permission lies solely with the party re-using the material.  
© 2018 transcript Verlag, Bielefeld
Cover concept: Kordula Röckenhaus, Bielefeld
Typeset by Francisco Bragança, Bielefeld 






Chapter 1—Introduction | 11
1.1 Prologue – An exemplar of “aging well” | 11
1.2 Introducing the thematic domain and background of the study | 13
1.2.1 Lack of meaning-generating narratives about later life | 13
1.2.2 Aging in an era of self-realization | 15
1.3 Objectives of the study | 18
1.4 A hermeneutic approach | 19
1.5 Some terminological issues | 21
1.6 Positioning the study in the philosophical and gerontological field | 26
1.6.1 Positioning in moral philosophy | 26
1.6.2 Positioning in gerontology | 27
1.7 Chapter outlines | 29
Chapter 2—Living and aging in late modernity | 33
2.1 Introduction | 33
2.2 Late modernity, an era of self-realization? | 34
2.3 Features and dynamics of the late modern world | 35
2.3.1 A life of one’s own: reflexive individualization | 36
2.3.2 Living in a post-traditional context | 38
2.3.3 A globalizing world | 40
2.3.4 Structural and systemic influences on individualized lives | 41
2.3.5 Repression of meaning and morality | 43
2.3.6 The moral identity crisis of late modern man | 45
2.4 Implications for late modern aging | 46
2.4.1 A (much) longer life in a complex world | 47
2.4.2 Individualization and diversification: an old age of one’s own? | 47
2.4.3 Third Age and Fourth Age | 49
2.4.4 Structural and systemic dynamics impacting late modern aging | 52
2.4.5 Aging well as an individual responsibility | 53
2.4.6 Existential vulnerability and the fragile experience of meaning | 55
2.5 Conclusion | 58
2.5.1 Ambivalences of self-realization in late modernity | 58
2.5.2 Reframing late modern self-realization discourse  | 59
Chapter 3—Cultural narratives and counter narratives about aging | 63
3.1 Introduction | 63
3.2 Cultural narratives and counter narratives | 64
3.2.1 Cultural (master) narratives and their role in identity-building | 64
3.2.2 Damaging effects of cultural narratives | 67
3.2.3 Moral agency and the importance of recognition | 69
3.2.4 Narrative repair through agency-enhancing counter narratives | 73
3.3 Cultural narratives about later life | 76
3.3.1 Cultural and critical gerontology on the cultural positioning 
of aging | 76
3.3.2 Decline narratives | 79
3.3.3 Age-defying narratives | 81
3.3.4 Limitations of existing cultural narratives on aging | 83
3.4 Conclusion: In search of viable counter narratives about aging  | 86
Chapter 4—Self-realization | 93
4.1 Introduction | 93
4.2 Introducing self-realization | 94
4.2.1 The purpose of self-realization | 96
4.2.2 The self in self-realization | 101
4.2.3 The practice of self-realization | 106
4.2.4 The timing of self-realization | 109
4.3 Exploring the best in us | 112
4.3.1 Selected historical and philosophical interpretations 
of the best in us | 113
4.3.2 Three threads: autonomy, authenticity and virtue | 117
4.4 Self-realization and aging | 120
4.4.1 Self-realization and the shrinking of the future | 120
4.4.2 Self-realization and radicalization of existential vulnerability | 123
Chapter 5—Narrative identity and moral agency | 127
5.1 Introduction | 127
5.2 Introducing narrative identity | 128
5.2.1 Life and self as stories  | 128
5.2.2 The relation between life and narrative | 130
5.2.3 Narrative integration and unified personhood | 132
5.2.4 Narrativity and aging | 134
5.3 Three interpretations of narrative identity | 136
5.3.1 Marya Schechtman – Narrative self-constitution | 136
5.3.2 Hilde Lindemann – Narrative identity as a social practice | 139
5.3.3 Kim Atkins – Narrative identity and moral identity | 142
5.4 From narrative identity to moral agency | 145
5.5 Conclusion: composing a definition of moral agency | 153
Chapter 6—Autonomy | 159
6.1 Introduction | 159
6.2 Introducing autonomy | 160
6.2.1 Historical roots of autonomy discourse | 160
6.2.2 Harry Frankfurt: A dominant contemporary account | 162
6.3 Selected alternative accounts of autonomy | 163
6.3.1 Charles Taylor: Autonomy and the strong evaluation of desires | 164
6.3.2 Laura Ekstrom: Autonomy and the coherence of 
our value orientation | 165
6.3.3 Diana Meyers: Autonomy and the conditions of its practicability | 166
6.3.4 Relational view: Autonomy, interdependence, 
socialization and power | 169
6.4 Autonomy in the context of aging | 174
6.4.1 Harry Moody: The communicative approach | 175
6.4.2 George Agich: The phenomenological approach | 176
6.4.3 Martha Holstein and colleagues: The relational approach | 178
6.5 Evaluation of the discussed accounts on autonomy | 180
6.6 Conclusion: Towards an individuating conception of autonomy | 182
Chapter 7—Authenticity | 189
7.1 Introduction | 189
7.2 Introducing authenticity | 190
7.3 Selected philosophical accounts of authenticity | 194
7.3.1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his Romantic heirs | 194
7.3.2 Existentialist views of authenticity | 197
7.3.3 Charles Taylor’s ethics of authenticity | 203
7.3.4 Diana Meyers – Authenticity and intersectional identity | 205
7.4 Authenticity in the context of aging | 207
7.4.1 Spiritual perspectives on aging | 207
7.4.2 Existential perspectives on aging | 209
7.4.3 Art of living perspectives on aging | 210
7.5 Evaluation of the discussed authenticity accounts  | 212
7.6 Conclusion: Towards authenticity as a social and moral practice  | 215
Chapter 8—Virtue | 219
8.1 Introduction | 219
8.2 Introducing virtue | 219
8.3 Selected accounts of virtue ethics | 223
8.3.1 Aristotle: Virtue as ‘nobility of the soul’ | 223
8.3.2 Alasdair MacIntyre: Virtue as a remedy 
for the modern “moral crisis” | 226
8.3.3 Christine Swanton: Pluralistic virtue ethics | 229
8.4 Virtue in the context of aging | 235
8.5 Evaluation of the discussed virtue accounts | 239
8.6 Conclusion: Towards virtue as attitudinal concretization 
of moral agency | 244
Chapter 9—Conclusion | 251
9.1 Introduction | 251
9.2 Recapitulation of the argument | 252
9.3 Advancing older people’s moral agency | 257
9.4 Objections to the self-realization discourse | 264
9.4.1 Elitism/demandingness objection  | 265
9.4.2 Self-centeredness objection | 266
9.4.3 Social structure/social justice objection | 266
9.4.4 Western/masculine bias objection | 268
9.4.5 Moralism/paternalism objection  | 269
9.4.6 Mental/cognitive ability objection  | 270
9.5 Unanswered questions | 273
9.6 Final thoughts | 274
References | 277
Preface
What does it mean to lead a good life? This question has puzzled moral phi-
losophers for centuries. As is characteristic for all fundamental philosophical 
questions, it will never be fully answered. But finding the ultimate answer is 
not what matters; the continued quest for the meaning of a good life is of value 
because of the richness of perspectives it can open. In turn, these perspectives 
may inspire a variety of practices that are conducive to what Ricoeur (1992) has 
defined as the ethical aim of human life: ‘a good life, with and for others, in 
just institutions’. 
This phrase forms the heart of the mission statement of the University of 
Humanistic Studies in Utrecht, The Netherlands, a small university that in its 
research program focuses on the humanization of society, in order to enable 
individuals to lead a meaningful, dignified life of optimal human flourishing. 
This book is the culmination of five years of PhD-research in this unique ac-
ademic community, where I had the privilege of participating in the research 
group Aging well. This multi-disciplinary group was founded in 2008, and con-
sists of philosophers, social scientists, historians and anthropologists. In its 
research program, this group aims to apply broad humanistic questions and 
thoughts about the good life to the context of aging. Contrasting dominant bio-
medical and sociological perspectives on aging, the members of this research 
group share an interest in the social-existential dimensions of aging (Baars, 
2012a).   
By narrowing down the question about the good life to the context of aging, 
we enter the field of humanistic and cultural gerontology. In recent decades, 
this field has been engaged in a vivid search to answer the question what it 
means to age well from different disciplinary perspectives, which has resulted 
in a mature and highly relevant (sub)field of the study of aging. Ever since the 
publication of the first handbook What does it mean to grow old? Reflections from 
the humanities by Cole and Gadow in 1986, humanistic and cultural gerontolo-
gy offers much needed counterweight to the dominance of biomedical perspec-
tives in the study of aging. The growing research interest in existential, moral 
and spiritual questions concerning aging, studied from a critical, context-sen-
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sitive perspective, offers hopeful and interesting perspectives on the meaning 
of aging well in our days. It also calls attention to the importance of having 
cultural resources available to help older people experience their existence as 
meaningful and socially relevant. 
Each society, each culture has its own range of resources – stories, imag-
es, ideas, artifacts – that individuals can draw on in their own search for a 
good life. However, each socio-cultural context also harbors a variety of forces 
that may impede the optimal realization of a good, meaningful existence. As 
Edmondson (2015) has argued, cultural meaning resources for old age are by 
no means self-evidently available in contemporary modern Western societies. 
This raises the urgent question how to shape inspiring narratives and images 
of a good old age. In this book, this question is addressed from a philosophical 
perspective, inspired by the rich discourse about self-realization, or realizing 
the best in you. Since, with some exceptions, the contribution of philosophy to 
the study of aging has remained relatively modest so far, this study hopes to be 
a valuable addition to the field of humanistic and cultural gerontology.
This book could not have been realized without the help of others. Although it 
is impossible to mention everyone who has, knowingly or unknowingly, con-
tributed to the creation of this study, some people deserve special acknowl-
edgement. First of all, I am thankful to my colleagues of the research group 
Aging well at the University for Humanistic Studies. In particular, I would 
like to express my deep gratitude to Joep Dohmen, for his unconditional and 
loyal support at both the intellectual and existential level, and to Jan Baars, for 
sharing his broad knowledge of philosophy and gerontology and encouraging 
me to boldly start writing about my ideas. Second, I am very grateful to the 
European Network of Aging Studies, who has granted my work the first prize 
for Best PhD-thesis in 2017, in the aftermath of which the editors of the Aging 
Studies Series at Transcript Verlag kindly agreed to publish my work as part of 
their series. The University of Graz, the University of Humanistic Studies and 
the Dutch foundation for protestant elderly care VPSB generously contributed 
funding to support this publication. Finally, my own personal process of self-re-
alization would be impossible without my beloved friends and family, whom I 
would like to thank for their continuous loving support in good and bad times 
of my life.
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 Prologue – An e xemPl Ar of “Aging well”
Whenever I am asked what it might mean to “age well”, I think about my great-
aunt Antje. During my adolescent years, I visited her regularly and developed 
a very special bond with her. After my visits to her, I would feel enriched and 
privileged, as though she had conveyed some of her special life wisdom to me, 
even without explicitly giving me advice or telling me what to do. It would have 
been difficult for me to explain my feelings of deep connection with her, but her 
influence on my adolescent struggles to create a viable sense of identity for my-
self was certainly profound. My great-aunt died at the age of 92, quietly in her 
own home, where I had always known her. Her passing away made me feel like 
I had lost one of my main anchors in life. Admiration or adoration would per-
haps be wrong and exaggerated terms to describe my feelings for her, and yet, 
to me she represented an invaluable landmark of wisdom and life-experience. 
Up to the present day, my great-aunt represents to me a prime example of 
someone who managed to lead a genuinely good life. Since I only knew her 
as an old lady, in my mind her living well also naturally extended to being 
an exemplar of aging well. Though I am sure she would resolutely have waved 
aside any suggestion of her being a moral exemplar, she certainly has been 
one to me. When I set out on the scholarly journey of exploring the theme 
of aging well, which has resulted in this philosophical-gerontological study, I 
realized that my implicit assumptions on what it might mean to age well had 
to a large extent been informed by my experiences with my great-aunt. What 
made her so special in this regard? Despite the fact that her life had not been 
easy in many ways (which I will not elaborate on here), my great-aunt always 
managed to keep a vital engagement with life. She had clear opinions on what 
mattered to her, and was never afraid to express them. Her character was that 
of an introvert, and she once with humor qualified herself socially as a “hermit 
by nature”. Nevertheless, she had gathered a select number of true friends and 
companions. I suspect they loved being in her presence because they enjoyed 
her genuine interest in their lives, her sense of humor, her knowledge of liter-
ature, and her sometimes unconventional outlook on things. She kept a lively 
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correspondence with a number of people, in her own very distinguished style 
of writing, inquiring about their well-being, but also lecturing them on what 
she perceived as shortcomings: failing to live up to one’s principles or commit-
ments, lacking loyalty to certain people or causes where this was required, or 
trying to influence people’s choices in a moralistic or paternalistic manner. 
The biographical hardships she had survived in her life had made her a very 
resilient and opinionated woman, who wasn’t always easy on herself and on 
others. With the passing of years, I think she grew milder towards herself, and 
she maintained an attitude of quiet enjoyment in the little things in her life – 
observing birds and flowers in her garden, listening to books being read on 
tape when she could no longer read herself. In the end, I think she had learned 
the hard way to embrace life as it came, not always happy or thankful or with 
equanimity, but nevertheless with dedication and out of a sincere wish to make 
the best of it in her very own way. It was this attitude of humorous and loving 
self-acceptance, in combination with the vital involvement she maintained with 
the outside world, even when her mobility shrank due to age-related conditions, 
that for me embodied her wisdom, resilience and vitality. Looking back, these 
were the qualities which I strove to nourish myself with during my adolescent 
visits to her. I think it is also this combination of attitudes and characteristics 
that in my mind preserves her as an exemplar of aging well.
I started this study with the story about my great-aunt as my own personal ex-
emplar of aging well, because aging well can be identified as the broad under-
lying concern that connects the themes of aging, self-realization and cultural 
narratives about later life which are central to this study. Rather than focusing 
on idiosyncratic stories of aging-well exemplars like my great-aunt, however, 
this study takes a more abstract and analytical, philosophical perspective on 
the topic. In this opening chapter, I first briefly introduce the thematic domain 
this study is engaged with (§1.2), which then leads to a formulation of the prob-
lem statement, the objectives aimed at in this study and the central guiding 
research question (§1.3), and a short elaboration on the chosen approach (§1.4). 
These sections are followed by a discussion of some terminological issues that 
require clarification in advance to enable a proper understanding of the per-
spective that is developed during the main part of this study (§1.5). Finally, the 
positioning of this study in the fields of gerontology and moral philosophy is 
briefly considered (§1.6). The chapter concludes with a short preview of the out-
look and structuring of the rest of the chapters (§1.7).
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1.2 introducing the themAtic domAin And 
bAckground of the study 
This philosophical study about aging well in late modernity departs from two 
initial observations that are quintessential to understanding the background 
of its research objectives. The first observation pertains to a lack of satisfactory 
cultural narratives about later life in late modernity – satisfactory in the sense 
that they are able to provide individuals with the necessary resources to support 
a meaningful, positively valued identity as an older individual. The second ob-
servation pertains to the dominance of self-realization as a moral ideal in late 
modernity. Aging in late modernity is thus observed to take place against the 
background of a cultural ideology that strongly endorses a self-determined life 
shaped according to one’s own choices and value orientation. Below, I will dis-
cuss these two observations in turn, working towards the formulation of this 
study’s problem statement in §1.3.   
1.2.1 Lack of meaning-generating narratives about later life
“Lacking a culturally viable ideal of old age, our civilization does not really har-
bor a concept of the whole of life”, wrote Erikson (1997, p. 114). This statement 
suggests that contemporary (Western) culture and society misses something 
vital, as long as it does not include an ideal of old age that is meaningful and 
even inspiring. Erikson’s terminology of an “ideal” is interesting: apparently, 
what our culture is missing in relation to old age is an image of something to 
strive for. The term ideal is generally associated with an orientation towards 
values, which represent a horizon of possibly worthy perspectives to be attained 
in the future. Thus, Erikson’s quote seems to express that our culture lacks at-
tractive, inspirational and meaning-generating values, images and stories that 
are associated with later life. This implies that for individual persons, aging 
well is complicated by a lack of viable cultural resources on which to found 
their identities. 
Besides the lack of inspiring and meaning-generating cultural ideals of old 
age implied by Erikson’s observation, several authors in gerontology have ex-
pressed worries about the prevalence of negative or adverse cultural imaginar-
ies about later life in our contemporary, Western, late modern culture (Gullette, 
1997, 2004, 2011; Cruikshank, 2003; Andrews, 1999, 2012). In particular, these 
authors reproach the one-sided identification of later life with images and nar-
ratives of decline and deterioration. Experiencing later life as meaningful to a 
satisfactory degree – which is quintessential to aging well, I would contend – 
will expectedly be further obstructed by such negative cultural associations. 
This situation has worrying implications for the existential life-reality of aging 
individuals in late modernity.  
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The existentialist philosopher De Beauvoir concluded her seminal work La 
Vieillesse with an outcry, a fierce denouncement of the way contemporary so-
ciety treats its older people. She asked the poignant question: “What should a 
society be, so that in his last years a man might still be a man?”1 (De Beauvoir, 
1970/1972, p. 542). Improving the material living conditions of the elderly, she 
stated, is not sufficient. The fundamental problem is the lack of a culture that 
provides aging individuals with the interests, roles, and responsibilities that 
are needed to experience life as meaningful. De Beauvoir’s cultural-critical di-
agnosis that it is fundamentally a lack of meaning that haunts our aging dis-
courses in contemporary society is echoed in the historical analysis of aging in 
the Western world by Cole in his study The journey of life. A cultural history of 
aging in America (1992). Cole argues that during the course of modernization, 
Western culture has become devoid of inspiring and visible images about the 
meaning and purposes of later life. This development results in a growing lack 
of sensitivity for the moral, existential and spiritual dimensions of later life 
(Cole, 1992; Cole, Achenbaum & Carlin, 2008). Cole’s historical analysis shows 
how gradually, aging has predominantly become a biomedical health issue, 
which enforces its association with decline, dependency and nearing death. 
These associations are all negatively perceived in Western modern culture. As 
a result, aging tends to evoke anxiety, pity, insecurity, condescension, and a 
general cultural mechanism of defense. 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the cultural neglect of 
matters of meaning and morality concerning later life seems to be reproduced 
by the scientific study of aging, which in its turn influences political and policy 
discussions about dealing with an aging population. We see a strong emphasis 
on biomedical issues of health, frailty, longevity, et cetera, as well as a focus on 
the policy measures and political interventions that are required to master the 
dramatic numerical increase of the global aging population (Phillipson, 2013; 
Baars, 2006a). By contrast, mainstream gerontology generally tends to leave 
questions of meaning unanswered (Cole, Achenbaum & Carlin, 2008; Baars, 
2012a). This lack of attention for the existential dimension of later life and the 
questions of meaning associated with it extends towards the political and so-
cietal discourse about aging. Cole, Achenbaum and Carlin (2008) argue that 
consequently, we are facing a profound “uncertainty about the roles, responsibil-
ities, purposes and meanings of old age” in the late modern context (p. 241). Pre-
viously existing models of the “life cycle” that offered meaningful frameworks 
1 | Note that this formulation may unjustly raise the impression that De Beauvoir only 
spoke about older men; however, the whole context makes it clear that her analyses 
certainly applied to both older men and women alike. The original French citation reads 
‘Que devrait être une société pour que dans la vieillesse un homme demeure un hom-
me?’ (De Beauvoir 1970, 568).   
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to situate our own lives in a broader intergenerational network of meanings 
cease to be relevant in late modernity, which has made a shift towards thinking 
in terms of an individual “life course” instead of an individual-transcending life 
cycle. This life course is perceived in terms of a “trajectory in which individuals 
choose their projects and plans” (Cole, Achenbaum & Carlin, 2008, p. 242). 
Cole, Achenbaum and Carlin also note that transitions in this life course are 
typically accompanied by identity-crises, making the problem of how to uphold 
a viable, meaningful self-identity central to the lives of late modern individuals. 
The potential effects of the observed lack of a culturally viable ideal of old 
age and the dominance of negative perceptions and expectations about later 
life in our contemporary culture are severe. For example, internalization of the 
adverse cultural imaginaries surrounding old age may lead to age-anxiety in 
individual cases. But the lack of viable cultural ideals of later life and the dom-
inance of negative perceptions also expectedly influences how older people are 
treated by others, and impact which social roles and positions remain open to 
them in later life (Bolsenbroek & Laceulle, in press). Moreover, the negative 
cultural perceptions of later life will expectedly influence how politicians and 
policymakers act to organize structural societal arrangements, which in turn 
have a profound impact on the lives of older people. 
The problematic cultural dynamics surrounding aging that have been 
sketched above blur our view when it comes to acknowledging the potential 
gains of later life, for instance, in terms of personal growth, fulfillment in so-
cial relations, or meaning-generating experiences of deepening individuality. 
These are gains that can be observed in the life narratives of many older peo-
ple, alongside the inevitable confrontation with the fragility of the human con-
dition. Many of us know individual exemplars of aging well in our personal 
social circles. These are people like my great-aunt, who manage to live a vital, 
morally engaged life while integrating the hardships they suffer in their lives 
in a meaningful way. But the idea that old age may also be an enriching phase 
of life with potential for growth and development, that it can have a moral and 
spiritual value of its own, does not seem to extend itself in any convincing way 
to the late modern dominant cultural discourses on aging and later life. 
1.2.2 Aging in an era of self-realization
Individuals living in late modern circumstances are facing a cultural context 
in which a self-determined, self-directed, self-chosen biography has become a 
dominant moral ideal. The somewhat enigmatical expression “becoming who 
you are”, can be seen as exemplary for what underlies this moral ideal: devel-
oping an authentic, self-appropriated “life of one’s own”, in which we continu-
ously keep developing ourselves towards more optimal self-fulfillment. Becom-
ing who you are is seen as quintessential to navigating important life choices 
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and dilemmas in an era where previously existing, traditional sources of moral 
authority are increasingly eroding and the responsibility for deciding what a 
morally good life is increasingly rests on the individual (C. Taylor, 1991; Ferrara, 
1993, 1998). The philosophical discourse that underlies this line of thinking is 
taken up in this study under the heading of self-realization. 
Self-realization, sometimes alternatively termed self-fulfillment or self-ac-
tualization, is a complex concept with a long and rich history in Western philos-
ophy. However, in late modernity the concept of self-realization seems to have 
acquired a specific and increased importance. Due to the complex interaction 
of processes of individualization, de-traditionalization and globalization, the 
individual person is increasingly regarded as a prime source of morality and 
meaning in the late modern world (C. Taylor, 1989, 1991; Giddens, 1991). Conse-
quently, in the quest for a good life that is experienced as meaningful, realizing 
one’s own deepest aspirations and best capacities has become an almost ines-
capable call for the late modern individual. In spite of the unfathomable com-
plexity and obvious uncertainty of the world in which we live, we are stimulated 
to perceive ourselves as moral agents capable of making important choices and 
decisions regarding what truly matters to us in life. As a result, self-realization 
has acquired a new urgency and a specific status as a guiding moral ideal in 
the late modern era. As Gewirth (1998) observes, “The ideal’s prominence has 
waxed and waned at various periods of human history; but the present age has 
taken it up anew as a prime object of human striving, as a value that gives zest 
and meaning to the lives of the persons who adopt it as a central aim of their 
activities and aspirations” (p. ix). 
The late modern individualistic exaltation of a life of one’s own that has 
been analyzed by sociological thinkers like Giddens (1991), Beck (1992; Beck 
& Beck-Gernsheim, 2002) and Bauman (2001, 2007, 2008), is typical for the 
pervasiveness of self-realization as a moral ideal in the contemporary world. 
These thinkers argue that in a post-traditional context where previously self-
evident sources of identity have been eroded, the responsibility for leading a 
good life in terms of meaning and morality has increasingly been delegated 
to the individual agent. C. Taylor (1989, 2007) provides historical and 
philosophical background for this observation, sketching how during the 
process of modernization, the dominant cultural perception of the human 
being transformed from being a particle in an ordered cosmic universe 
transcending the scope of influence of the individual, to being an autonomous 
agent with the ability to control and master the external world. Although 
the late modern discourse of an authentic, self-determined life is highly 
influential and dominant as a moral ideal, it is important to note that there 
exists a considerable gap between the ideology of individual choice and self-
direction, and the empirical reality as it is experienced by many people, who 
see their opportunities for choosing impeded or blocked by the oppressive force 
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of structural arrangements, or by adverse socio-economic conditions (Baars, 
2006a). 
It is striking to note that self-realization, observed above to be one of the 
most dominant moral ideals of our times, revolves precisely around the notion 
of self-development and personal growth that is disregarded in cultural dis-
courses about aging and later life. Apparently, this moral ideal is not regarded 
as an obvious or viable conceptualization of the good life for aging individuals. 
The predominantly negative and problematic cultural positioning of aging and 
later life, as discussed above (see §1.2.1), leads to the rather unsettling conclu-
sion that the aging population seems to be excluded from participation in the 
dominant moral ideal of self-realization, especially once aging individuals be-
come vulnerable and dependent.  
Yet, given the shortcomings of existing cultural perceptions of later life, 
we might ask whether the self-realization discourse isn’t an especially prom-
ising candidate to support a transformation of the problematically gloomy and 
less than inspiring cultural profiling of aging. Couldn’t the late modern moral 
vocabulary of self-realization be translated to the context of aging in such a 
way that the negative cultural perception of old age is nuanced or refuted? Can 
the concept of self-realization provide a viable resource for cultural images and 
stories about later life that infuses this phase with the sense of meaning that 
seems to be problematically absent in its existing late modern cultural narra-
tives?
On the one hand, this seems an exciting possibility worth investigating. 
After all, it would provide access to an influential ideal of the good life for aging 
individuals. Introducing self-realization to the aging discourse as a potential 
resource for challenging problematic cultural profiling of old age could then 
contribute to a welcome improvement and expansion of aging people’s access 
to common goods and valued roles in late modern societies. On the other hand, 
serious doubts may be raised when pondering the application of the self-reali-
zation discourse to the context of aging and later life. For how does the typical 
late modern discourse on self-realization, with its emphasis on autonomous 
choice and authentic fulfillment of one’s aspirations and capacities, relate to 
the existential reality of aging, in particular the fundamental fragility of the 
human condition and the growing vulnerability one is confronted with in later 
life? Even if we reject the one-sided cultural identification of aging with de-
cline (Gullette, 1997, 2004), the fact remains that aging, for many if not all 
individuals, means a radical confrontation with the vulnerabilities that are gen-
erally intrinsic to the human condition, for instance through an increase in 
physical, mental and social frailty. In fact, the contemporary self-realization 
discourse may even complicate finding a satisfactory relation to these biograph-
ical encounters with existential vulnerability, because it implicitly relies on a 
typical late modern ideology of self-mastery and independence, which tends to 
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denigrate decline and decay. As Cole, Achenbaum and Carlin (2008) observe, 
“Rather than acknowledge these harsh realities, we [modern individuals] pre-
tend that we can master them, and we feel like failures when we do not, hence 
the elevation of physical functioning to the criteria of successful aging and the 
virulent fear and denial of frailty and dependency” (p. 247). 
Despite these difficulties regarding the application of the self-realization 
discourse to the context of aging however, it is important to emphasize that 
the impact of the moral ideal of self-realization is probably felt in some form 
in the life-reality of all individuals in late modern society, including aging peo-
ple. The ideal is expressed implicitly in many cultural artifacts, ranging from 
films and literature to advertising and newspaper articles. Moreover, it seems 
reasonable to expect that the influence of the self-realization discourse upon 
the life course of aging individuals will increase in the 21st century, when the 
generations raised with the moral appeal of an authentic, self-determined life 
grow older. This further stresses the relevance of an exploration of the value of 
self-realization discourse in the context of aging – and in particular its potential 
value in the context of aging well. 
1.3 objectives of the study  
This study departs from two premises drawn from the sociological, philosoph-
ical and cultural gerontological observations briefly introduced above: 1) that 
people nowadays live their lives in a late modern context that celebrates (a cer-
tain interpretation of) self-realization as a guiding moral ideal, and 2) that this 
late modern context lacks satisfactory cultural imaginaries about aging and 
later life, a lack which complicates experiencing this life phase as meaningful. 
The study aims at answering the question whether the philosophical discourse 
of self-realization, that plays such a dominant role in late modern ideals of a 
good life, might be reframed in such a way that it can serve as a resource for cul-
tural counter narratives about later life, forming a viable alternative for contem-
porary stereotyping and marginalizing cultural master narratives about aging. 
At the same time, this study wants to acknowledge the possible questions and 
doubts that can be raised by an attempt to suggest self-realization discourse as 
a viable meaning framework for aging well. This leads to the following formu-
lation of research objectives and guiding research question.   
The general aim of this study is to make a philosophical contribution to ger-
ontology that concerns cultural and individual meanings of later life, thereby 
providing reflections on what it might mean to “age well”. More specifically, 
this study targets the following objectives:
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• To remedy the observed lack of inspiring cultural narratives about aging 
and later life in the context of late modernity, by suggesting an alternative 
set of cultural narratives drawing on philosophical resources associated with 
the self-realization discourse
• To formulate a reframed account of self-realization, that enables us to criti-
cize the shortcomings of the late modern self-realization discourse when 
applied to the context of aging 
• To contribute a philosophical perspective on the opportunities for older 
people in our society to successfully practice their potential for moral agency 
(conceived in this study as the purpose of self-realization), as well as offer a 
reflection on how these opportunities for practicing moral agency may be 
enhanced 
In light of these objectives, this study aims to answer, as its central guiding 
question, whether the late modern discourse of self-realization can be reframed 
in such a way that it can serve as a resource for meaning-generating cultural 
narratives about later life in late modern circumstances. 
1.4 A hermeneutic APProAch
In order to address the guiding questions and objectives stated above, the rich 
philosophical tradition of self-realization will be probed for relevant sources 
that can contribute to the reframing objective of this study. As such, this study 
strives to be a contribution to aging studies from a primarily philosophical 
perspective. Despite its philosophical orientation however, this study is not 
a purely philosophical project, since it also uses insights and literature from 
gerontological, sociological and psychological origin. The acquired insights 
are drawn together in an attempt to arrive at a new synthesis that hopefully 
contributes to the purpose of reframing the self-realization discourse from the 
viewpoint of aging. 
My approach to this inquiry is a hermeneutic one, which implies that I aim 
to engage in a “dialogue” with the studied texts, adjusting and refining my 
own intuitions in the process. Generally speaking, philosophical hermeneutics 
arose as an attempt to provide an epistemological basis for the humanities that 
differed from the objectivistic take on scientific truth that is characteristic of 
the natural sciences - an objectivistic and naturalistic approach that the social 
sciences have traditionally tried to peer with. By contrast, the hermeneutic ap-
proach presents an intersubjective, dialogical perspective on truth that aims 
to offer a viable alternative scientific approach escaping the charges of both 
subjectivism and relativism (Gadamer, 1989). Thus, the hermeneutic perspec-
tive rejects the more “positivistic” approaches to scientific research. Reality is 
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not out there to be studied as it is, because how it “is” is always perceived as 
a matter of interpretation. Moreover, the hermeneutic perspective principally 
acknowledges the possibility of multiple, equally valid interpretations of the 
same reality. 
Specific to the hermeneutic approach is its emphasis on the situatedness 
of the researcher, whose prejudgments play a dominant role in the process of 
knowledge seeking. Knowledge and understanding are themselves perceived 
as situated, emerging from an intersubjective, dialogical practice between re-
searchers and the “texts” (in the broadest possible sense) they study. I can only 
understand a reality from the perspective of my own situation, but I can al-
ter my understanding by dialogically engaging with other interpretations and 
standpoints of the situation. Qualifying this study as a hermeneutic philosoph-
ical inquiry implies that I am not aiming to develop any final perspective or ul-
timate reality-claim regarding the theme of aging, self-realization and cultural 
narratives about later life. Instead, I aim to engage with the works of relevant 
philosophical and other thinkers in a dialogical way, confronting their work 
with my own initial ideas about the matter. Through this hermeneutic effort, 
I aim to provide an account of my research themes that in itself is open to con-
tinuing hermeneutic dialogue with other possible perspectives. 
The openness and exploratory hermeneutic character of this study notwith-
standing, it is important to emphasize that my approach also implies a nor-
mative philosophical engagement. In part, this engagement naturally follows 
from my own situatedness as a researcher/philosopher, which has equipped 
me with a horizon of certain intuitions, ideas, biases, preferences and the like. 
Thus, the fact that my personal normative engagement with the good of older 
people has informed my research project from the start is consistent with the 
chosen hermeneutic approach. Consequently, being trained as a humanistic 
thinker, I have inevitably been framing my research project from a humanistic 
inspiration that strives to advance a better, more humane existence for older 
people in our contemporary society. My study’s underlying concern with aging 
well implies a certain advance preconception of the good, which precludes tak-
ing a neutral view to the issues of relevance to the research question. As will 
become clear, many of the theoretical positions I take are ultimately informed 
by this normative humanistic engagement. 
I am aware that in some circles, taking such a normative position raises 
fundamental philosophical problems, for it can be seen as undesirable pater-
nalism to prefer and advance a certain understanding of the good life over oth-
ers. My standpoint on this issue is further addressed later on in this study. 
Here, it is important to point out that in my view, philosophical and scientific 
work always, to some extent, is and should be informed by the value orienta-
tion of the researcher in question. Rather than trying to bracket or exclude 
this value orientation from my work, my aspiration has been to put it to good 
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use in this study. It is my contention that, as long as it is thoroughly reflected 
upon, my normative philosophical orientation sensitizes my thinking about the 
themes of this study. The normative philosophical engagement of this study 
should thus, in my opinion, be perceived as a potentially valuable addition to 
the hermeneutic understanding of what it might mean to age well, rather than 
a troublesome obstacle to scientific quality.    
1.5 some terminologicAl issues
This chapter started with the claim that the broad overarching theme of this 
study should be sought in the question what it might mean to age well. This ter-
minology suggests that I am concerned with aging in a specific interpretation, 
which deviates from the biomedical, psychological and sociological approaches 
that play such a dominant role in the mainstream gerontological discourse. The 
perspective on aging that I develop focuses on its (experienced) meaning, both 
on the idiographic level of the individual agent’s life and on the socio-cultural 
level. Baars (2006b, 2012a) provides a distinction between three different dis-
courses concerned with aging that help clarify and illustrate the main focus of 
this study. First, there exists a discourse regarding senescence, i.e., the physical 
and biomedical aspects of aging. Second, there is a discourse regarding older 
people as a social category, focusing exclusively on the societal and economic 
effects of a growing population of older people, and the possibilities to manage 
these effects through (government) policies. Third, there is a discourse regard-
ing aging as a social-existential process of living in time. This discourse focuses on 
questions of meaning and existential experiences of aging. According to Baars, 
the scientific and societal debate surrounding aging is dominated by the first 
two discourses, at the expense of the third one. By contrast, this study specifi-
cally aims to contribute to the third discourse. 
Although the terms aging, existential dimension and meaning are applied 
frequently throughout this study, they are not explicitly conceptualized in 
the main argument. Since it is important to have a general idea of how these 
themes are understood in the context of this study, some consideration is given 
to them below.  
Aging
In societal and scientific discourse, aging is usually assumed to present a phe-
nomenon taking place during a specific phase or stage of life, with specific 
characteristics. One of the problems with this approach, however, is that the 
starting point of the phase or stage of aging is rather obscure and arbitrari-
ly coupled to a certain chronological age, for example 65 or 70. Baars (2012b) 
insightfully argues that this identification of aging with the fact that one has 
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reached a certain chronological age is problematically one-sided, and therefore 
of limited use if we want to understand individual existential experiences of 
aging and the dimensions of meaning connected with it. 
An alternative classifying criterion suggested by Baars (2006b) is the state-
ment that people enter the phase of aging at the moment society (or culture) 
starts positioning them in terms of categories associated with old(er) age. This 
emphasizes the fact that aging is a socially constituted process (Baars, 1991). 
This social constitution of aging can be illustrated by the fact that during the 
course of Western history, different groups of people have been defined by cul-
ture or society as “old” at variable ages, depending on such divergent factors 
as gender, social class, (re)productive capacities or appearance. Thane (2010) 
further distinguishes three criteria along which people are socially constituted 
as “aged” or “aging”: the chronological, the functional and the cultural. The 
chronological criterion is based upon people’s calendar age. The functional cri-
terion describes people as old depending on their capacity to perform certain 
tasks. The cultural criterion, however, classifies an individual as old according 
to the prevailing images and norms in certain cultural contexts, thereby im-
plicitly expressing this culture’s value orientation. It is this cultural criterion 
applied in the social constitution of aging which seems to be most usefully 
applicable to the understanding of aging in the current study.  
This study thus interprets aging as a socio-culturally constituted process 
of living in time. In accordance with its orientation to Baars’ (2006b, 2012a) 
third discourse, this study also explicitly perceives aging well to be concerned 
with the existential dimension of life, rather than with biological senescence 
or social status. It is important to realize however, that health issues, financial 
matters like pensions or insurance, and care arrangements at the micro-level of 
individual human lives also have an impact on experienced meaning. The mea-
ning of later life thus cannot be interpreted as solely an individual existential 
matter. Meaning has the propensity for touching multiple dimensions, and it 
permeates questions situated at macro-, meso-, as well as micro-levels.
Existential dimension
In its most general sense, the existential dimension of life pertains to the basic 
human experience of “being-in-the-world”. It relates to those elements of our 
lives that intrinsically belong to the human condition, such as our sociality, our 
vulnerability and finitude, our embodiment, and our inclination to strive for 
transcendence and meaning in our lives. Existentialist philosophers like Kier-
kegaard (1843/1959), Heidegger (1927/1996) and Sartre (1956, 1948) have emp-
hasized that people are “thrown” into a world without an inherent meaningful 
order, while at the same time, they have an incurable longing for experiencing 
life as coherent and meaningful. Since the world as such does not provide such 
coherence and meaning, people are destined to constantly search and create 
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their own order, thereby taking agential responsibility for their own lives. Ulti-
mately, the existentialists believe that people’s freedom and well-being depends 
on their ability to relate to the different domains of reality of the human condi-
tion in an authentic way. 
Van Deurzen (2002), an existentialist psychotherapist, presents the exis-
tential dimension of life in a four-dimensional model, applicable to the con-
text of counseling. Her model has the advantage that it translates the rather 
abstract views of existentialist philosophers about the human condition to the 
concrete reality of human lives. In this sense, it may help us understand what 
is entailed when speaking about the existential dimension of aging, an attempt 
undertaken in this study. Each domain distinguished in Van Deurzen’s model 
provides us with opportunities, challenges and tensions in our striving for self-
realization. Further, each domain has its own basic ideals and purposes that are 
strived for, but also its own threats, which have to be overcome in a viable way. 
It is in confrontation with these threats that people typically experience what in 
this study is termed “existential vulnerability”.
The physical domain concerns our own bodily existence, as well as the mate-
rial world around us. Applied to the context of aging, age-related ailments such 
as loss of hearing, sight, or mobility may confront us with the physical domain 
of the existential dimension of our lives. 
The social domain concerns our relationships with other people, which are 
situated in a public domain determined by cultural norms, social conventions 
and power relations that influence and co-determine people’s interdependent 
existence. Applied to the context of aging, this element of the existential dimen-
sion may show itself in loneliness due to the death of significant others like 
spouses or friends, or in finding a mode of relating to the growing dependence 
on one’s caregivers, or also in deepening contacts with children and grandchil-
dren.  
The personal domain concerns our relationship with ourselves, situated in 
an inner realm of self-reflexivity and self-knowledge. Applied to the context of 
aging, the personal domain of the existential dimension of our lives relates 
to the deepening biographical uniqueness of human life, and may show itself 
when we reflect on our own finitude, or look back on our lives to see what we 
have become (Baars, 2016). 
Finally, the spiritual or transcendent domain concerns the ideals, values and 
convictions that guide our life choices. Importantly, this transcendence need 
not be interpreted in a traditional religious sense, but may also pertain to our 
identification with guiding moral ideals or values that we believe are worth stri-
ving for. Applied to the context of aging, this domain of the existential dimen-
sion may show itself when we evaluate the purposes we have strived for in life 
and consider which purposes we still want to achieve, or when we contemplate 
what contribution we have made to the realization of those ideals and goals that 
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we perceive as highly important. In the context of self-realization, the trans-
cendent domain has heightened relevance, since self-realization presupposes, 
as we will see in this study, the ability to form a moral orientation and identify 
with ethical aims that are of utmost value to us. Existential vulnerability in the 
transcendent domain perhaps most deeply interferes with the striving for self-
realization, because it shows itself in feelings of meaninglessness, stagnation 
or withdrawal from life. 
In sum, this study’s interpretation of the existential dimension of life in-
volves those elements and experiences that either enable or impede our reali-
zation of a satisfactory relation to the physical, social, personal and spiritual/
transcendent dimensions of life. According to my argument, what is considered 
satisfactory is decided by the opportunities that this relation offers for people 
to lead a good life with and for others, in accordance with their deepest aspirations 
and best capacities, as full participating members of society, the formulation used 
in this study to describe moral agency (see §5.5). Which purposes people aspire 
to, and which goals and values they regard as meaningful, may differ signi-
ficantly depending on the situation, character disposition, social context and 
orientation of the individual, however. This underscores the moral importance 
of individual uniqueness and diversity that is a principal assumption of the 
self-realization discourse.  
Meaning
In a number of ways, the philosophical argument of this study relies on ideas 
and assumptions about the importance, indeed, the existential necessity, of ex-
periencing a certain degree of meaning in life in order to perceive one’s life as 
good (which is presupposed by the engagement with aging well). Drawing from 
its humanistic inspiration, this study also implicitly assumes the need to en-
hance the socio-cultural circumstances of people to contribute to their optimal 
realization of a meaningful life, and to alleviate the circumstances that threaten 
to result in feelings of meaninglessness. Yet, what is understood by meaning is 
not explicitly conceptualized in the main argument, which necessitates paying 
some attention to it here. 
First of all, this study is concerned with people’s subjective experiences of 
meaning. These experiences of meaning in life should thereby be distingu-
ished from metaphysical philosophical or theological discussions about the 
objective meaning of life. But what is required in order to experience this mea-
ning in life? Psychological approaches mention several aspects that need to 
be present to some degree if people are to experience meaning in their lives. 
Examples of needs suggested by these approaches include a sense of purpose in 
life, efficacy or feeling “in control”, self-worth, moral worth, comprehensibility, 
connectedness, and transcendence (Baumeister, 1991; Derkx, 2011; Smaling & 
Alma, 2009). It remains unclear whether high scores on one need could com-
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pensate for lower scores on other needs, or whether all needs have to be fulfilled 
equally in order to experience one’s life as meaningful (which would of course 
significantly reduce the possibility of experiencing meaning). 
Although such approaches based on psychological needs certainly are in-
teresting and relevant attempts to provide a description of what underlies the 
experience of meaning, they have a rather functionalist orientation that relates 
problematically to the hermeneutic approach of this study. From a hermeneutic 
point of view, it seems too simplistic to reduce the experience of meaning to a 
quantitative addition of individual psychological needs for meaning that have 
been satisfactorily met, as Baumeister (1991) in particular, seems to suggest. 
For instance, approaches of meaning based on the presence or absence of ful-
fillment of individual psychological needs seem insufficiently able to address 
the influence that the socio-cultural position of people can have on the purpo-
ses that they are (or are not) able to formulate for themselves, or on their self-
worth. Similarly, the psychological accounts make it hard to draw connections 
between questions of meaning and issues of social structure (Baars & Phillip-
son, 2013). It remains unclear, for instance, how culturally and historically spe-
cific the suggested sets of needs are, and what the structural impediments are 
to fulfilling them. A viable approach to questions of meaning should therefore 
at least be complemented with a view of how the fulfillment of these needs is 
socio-culturally mediated, and which concrete conditions need to be present in 
order for people to answer their needs for meaning.   
In accordance with the description of the existential dimension given above, 
this study therefore chooses to present meaning not in terms of a predefined 
set of needs, but as a dynamic property of experience that emerges when people 
succeed in finding a satisfactory relation towards the physical, social, personal 
and transcendent domains of life. In this account, what is experienced as mea-
ningful interacts with both the fundamental embodied nature of human exis-
tence and the fundamental socio-cultural constitution of identity. Meaning is 
perceived as an experience rooted in and flowing from the dynamic, relational 
way in which we strive for the ideals and the good at stake in each of the exis-
tential domains, while trying to find a way to overcome threats and challenges 
impeding our realization of those ideals. In this view, experiencing meaning in 
life requires existential work aimed at constantly (re)finding balance between 
purposes and threats in all four domains of the existential dimension. This 
work may, for instance, take the form of inner reflection, dialogues with other 
people, or actions that make a difference in society. In a sense, we might say 
that this existential work required to experience meaning in one’s life is exactly 
what underlies people’s striving for self-realization. 
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1.6 Positioning the study in the PhilosoPhicAl 
And gerontologicAl field
As indicated before, this study intends to make a philosophical contribution 
to the field of gerontology. Although its emphasis is on philosophical perspec-
tives, insights from other disciplines, notably gerontology, are integrated in the 
argument. Given the multiplicity of existing approaches both in moral philoso-
phy and in gerontology, however, it is clarifying to provide some explication of 
the positioning of this study in these fields. 
1.6.1 Positioning in moral philosophy
In its broadest formulation, this study is concerned with the theme of aging 
well. Since I have defined aging as a socio-culturally constituted, existential 
process of living in time, aging well can be seen as a specification of living 
well. The ancient moral-philosophical question what it means to lead a good life 
is thus implicated by the research interest in this study. This interest already 
presupposes a certain interpretation of ethics and its central concerns, which is 
important to explicate here.
When situating self-realization in the moral philosophical debate, it is clari-
fying to introduce a distinction between two types of approaches. The teleologi-
cal approaches to moral philosophy presuppose a substantive account of what it 
means to live a good life and to be a good person. The deontological, consequen-
tialist or procedural interpretations of ethics, on the other hand, focus on rules 
and principles for acting in the (morally) right way. Teleological approaches as-
sume that human beings strive for a certain purpose (telos) in their lives, which 
can either be seen as flowing from a cosmically given, meaningfully ordered 
plan (as in traditional Aristotelian virtue ethics, for instance), or as flowing 
from the self-appropriated value orientation of the individual (as is implied by 
contemporary forms of authenticity-ethics, for instance). By contrast, in deon-
tological approaches to moral philosophy, the focus is on moral duties derived 
from following the moral authority of one’s good will (as in traditional Kantian 
ethics). Alternatively, consequentialist approaches also qualify as procedural 
interpretations of ethics, such as utilitarianism, which measures the moral le-
gitimacy of actions on the grounds of their contribution to the maximization of 
good. In both cases, the focus lies on the formulation of universally applicable, 
formal ethical rules and principles that are intended to distinguish between 
right and wrong courses of action. 
It will come as no surprise that this study takes the standpoint that the 
most basic concern of moral philosophy is the question how we should lead a 
good life, and not the formulation of binding universal principles or guidelines 
for moral action. After all, this position is implied by the most fundamental 
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assumptions that underlie all versions of the self-realization discourse. Self-re-
alization, as observed later in this study, is basically about making the best of 
oneself that is possible given one’s circumstances and capacities. This orien-
tation towards moral self-development already presumes a teleological orien-
tation, since self-realization aims at an ideal purpose (becoming who you are, 
realizing the best in you, et cetera) to be reached somewhere in the future. On 
the other hand, the account of self-realization that this study advances shows 
a significant focus on the importance of translating one’s identity-constituting 
teleological orientation into action, by granting a central role to the concept of 
moral agency. Thus, while this study’s main affinity is with substantive and 
teleological, rather than procedural, approaches to moral philosophy, and it cer-
tainly does not aim to come up with universal moral rules or principles, it does 
acknowledge the relevance of paying ethical attention to acting in a morally 
right way. However, this attention should always be embedded in the overarch-
ing ethical concern with the question what it means to lead a good life (Ricoeur, 
1992; see also §5.4). 
In addition, the argument developed in this study sympathizes with those 
approaches in moral philosophy that take the context and situatedness of hu-
man beings into account, rather than developing a strictly theoretical abstract 
understanding of morality that is detached from the reality of people’s daily 
struggle to function as moral agents. In this sense, the study should be posi-
tioned in the realm of what M. Walker (2007) has called the expressive-collabo-
rative understanding of morality, which is presented as the opposite of so-called 
theoretical-juridical models (p. 7-14). Importantly, the expressive-collaborative 
view perceives morality as something that emerges and is continuously trans-
formed in the context of human moral practices. A similar position on ethics 
and morality is defended in the reframed account of self-realization that this 
study develops.  
1.6.2 Positioning in gerontolog y
Gerontology is the scientific study of aging in all its facets. Consequently, many 
disciplines co-exist in gerontology, with corresponding and sometimes conflict-
ing perspectives on reality and very different approaches to acquiring knowledge. 
The third edition of the Handbook of theories of aging (Bengtson & Settersten, 
2016) gives a variety of scientific perspectives on aging, ranging across biologi-
cal, psychological, social-scientific, practice and transdisciplinary perspectives. 
Note that humanistic perspectives are rather underrepresented in this overview. 
In the diverse realm of perspectives making up the field of gerontology, this 
study can best be situated in the field of cultural and critical gerontology.   
According to Twigg and Martin (2015a), the field of cultural gerontology 
that has emerged in recent decades particularly focuses on four themes: 1) sub-
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jectivity and identity, 2) the body and embodiment, 3) representation and the 
visual, and 4) time and space. Cultural gerontology aims to “produce a fuller 
and richer account of later years [...] one that places the subjectivity of older 
people, the width and depths of their lives, at the forefront of analysis” (Twigg 
& Martin, 2015b, p. 2). This quote underscores the affinity between cultural 
gerontology and the perspective advanced in this study, which focuses on aging 
well, and thus on matters of meaning and morality, on those things people 
regard to be of fundamental importance in their lives. Cultural gerontology 
can be seen as the representative of a broader “cultural turn” in aging studies 
(Twigg & Martin, 2015a). This cultural turn has both an epistemological side, 
which is based on poststructuralist theories and focuses on the many ways in 
which culture is constitutive of our identities and our social relations, and a his-
torico-social side, which asserts that certain societal developments have made 
the constitutive role of culture in our identities and social relations much more 
prominent compared to earlier eras of history. Importantly, Twigg and Martin 
(2015b) state that the most distinguishing feature of cultural gerontology is its 
concern with meaning. In this sense, cultural gerontology is representative of 
the third discourse on aging distinguished by Baars (2006b, 2012a; see §1.5), 
which concerns itself with aging as a social-existential process, in contrast with 
the discourse on biological senescence and the discourse on old age as a societal 
issue, raising political and policy questions. The general concern with mean-
ing presupposes a relatively large input from the humanities, which further 
underscores the importance of the cultural-gerontological perspective for the 
current, philosophically oriented study. 
For the purposes of this study on self-realization and aging, cultural ger-
ontology’s occupation with the theme of subjectivity and identity in relation 
to its broader focus on meaning is of course the most important, although the 
other themes distinguished by Twigg and Martin (2015a) also have relevance. 
The focus on subjectivity and identity implies a shift of attention towards mat-
ters of agency, and away from dominant approaches in critical gerontology that 
tend to focus on social structures and the way they influence the life-reality of 
aging people (Phillipson, 1998, 2013; Baars et al., 2006). However, although 
the current study is best positioned in the cultural-gerontological field, critical 
gerontology has influenced the argument in this study as well. The awareness 
raised by critical gerontology about the impact of societal scripts and structures 
on people’s agency is indispensable for developing an understanding of self-re-
alization that is not naïve about people’s room for maneuver in formulating 
their own aspirations and value orientation in the complex and dynamic context 
of a late modern world. 
Another reason to position the current study primarily in the realm of cul-
tural gerontology is the fact that cultural gerontology (together with aging stud-
ies which seems to be its natural ally) brings into high relief the socio-cultural 
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constitution of aging that is also assumed in this study. Cultural gerontology 
and aging studies have undertaken important work in recent decades to illus-
trate how aging is in fact not the value-free biological category connected with 
our chronological age upon which societal policy seems to be based, but a deep-
ly normative, culturally influenced and socially constituted life process. We are 
being “aged by culture”, to use Gullette’s (2004) words. As embodied, socially 
constituted and “cultured” creatures, we have internalized dominant cultural 
imaginaries about old age, which necessarily shape the expectations we hold 
regarding our own later lives, and the opportunities we perceive ourselves as 
having (Andrews, 2012). When these dominant cultural imaginaries are pre-
dominantly negative and based on assumptions of decline, it creates problems 
for experiencing later life as a meaningful and integral phase of our life, with 
the potential for development, progress or “becoming” (Gullette, 2004, 2011).
It is important to note, however, that this study does not share the strong 
social constructionist position that is taken by some representatives of aging 
studies such as Gullette (2004, 2011, 2017). Socio-cultural constitution is per-
ceived as a fundamental, but not the only influence that shapes our identity. 
Principally, a study about self-realization should always account for the impor-
tant role played by people’s individual agency, which enables them to relate to 
the ways in which they are socially and culturally positioned. Also, the role 
of our embodiment should be taken into account. Consequently, though this 
study shares the cultural gerontological view that our identity is fundamental-
ly socio-culturally constituted, this social identity should always be perceived 
as formed in “an ongoing tri-partite relationship between social environment, 
human agency and the body” (Hockey & James, 2003, p. 135). Despite the per-
vasiveness and the often stereotypical character of cultural images, there is a re-
markable amount of diversity in the way these images mark people’s existence 
and identity (Meyers, 2002). Importantly, it is in this individual diversity and 
the assumed capacity of individual moral agency to resist its own socio-cultural 
positioning that the seeds for the desired transformation of oppressive, margin-
alizing or stereotypical cultural narratives can be found.  
1.7 chAP ter outlines
This study is organized along the following complex set of argumentative steps: 
clarifying the background assumptions and concepts central to this study; pro-
viding argumentative underpinnings for the claims that are assumed in the 
guiding questions and objectives of this study (regarding the shortcomings 
of cultural narratives about aging and the shortcomings of the late modern 
self-realization discourse); and formulating a viable substantiation of the alter-
native set of cultural narratives this study suggests, as well as of the reframed 
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interpretation of self-realization that such counter narratives can draw upon. A 
brief outline of the individual chapters follows below.
Chapter 2 gives an analytical sketch of the specific features of the late mod-
ern world that impact the life-reality of aging people in multiple ways. Drawing 
on both sociological and philosophical sources, it is argued that late modernity 
harbors a specific interpretation of self-realization that serves as one of its most 
dominant moral ideals – ideas about what it means to lead a good life. The typ-
ical features of this late modern interpretation of self-realization are summa-
rized, and some problems that arise when this interpretation is applied to the 
context of aging are discussed. 
In chapter 3, a theory about cultural narratives and their function in identity 
is introduced. It is argued that in the case of identity-damage by marginalizing, 
oppressive or stereotyping cultural master narratives, cultural counter narra-
tives are called for that enable people to restore their opportunities to exercise 
moral agency. Next, the discussed theory about cultural narratives is applied 
to the context of aging. Cultural gerontological discourse is probed to arrive at 
a categorization of two dominant contemporary cultural narratives about lat-
er life: decline narratives and age-defying narratives, which are then critically 
analyzed. Finally, a tentative outline of a new set of cultural counter narratives 
about aging and later life is suggested, called “narratives of becoming”. This 
alternative set of narratives is introduced as an opportunity to remedy the sug-
gested shortcomings of existing cultural narratives about aging and later life. 
The rest of the study is then dedicated to the question whether a reframed ac-
count of self-realization can be developed that might function as a resource for 
these narratives of becoming about aging and later life.  
Chapter 4 sets out to formulate a broad philosophical understanding of 
self-realization, which is presented as a process of moral self-development in 
which people strive to become who they are by realizing their deepest aspira-
tions and highest capacities. After an explication of the purpose, the underlying 
self-concept, the practice and the timing of self-realization, a short historical 
catalogue of philosophical accounts is discussed about what constitutes the 
“best” in human beings, which is at stake in self-realization. Overviewing the 
variety of philosophical accounts, it is proposed that the fabric of self-realization 
discourse is built of three interwoven threads: autonomy, authenticity and vir-
tue, all of which need to be considered and reframed to answer the objectives in 
this study. The chapter concludes with a reflection on two potentially problem-
atic issues that may arise when applying self-realization to the context of aging: 
the fact that one’s future time-perspective is shrinking, and the fact that one 
is increasingly radically confronted with existential vulnerability in later life.  
Before proceeding to a more detailed consideration of the three constitutive 
threads of self-realization identified in chapter 4, chapter 5 will first consider in 
more detail which understanding of identity matches the reframed understand-
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ing of self-realization advanced in this study. I will argue that for several reasons, 
a narrative view of identity is most suited to the purposes of this study. One of the 
most important reasons for this preference is that the narrative interpretations of 
identity that are discussed provide the opportunity to illustrate the intrinsic con-
nection between our identity and our moral orientation. This connection is vital 
to the reframed interpretation of self-realization developed in this study, the pur-
pose of which is formulated in terms of an optimization of moral agency. Chapter 
5 therefore concludes by explicating this study’s account of moral agency, which 
forms a central link between the discussed theory about cultural narratives and 
identity, and the suggested reframed account of self-realization. 
Chapter 6 explores the first constitutive thread of self-realization, namely, 
autonomy. First, a selection of relevant philosophical interpretations of this 
concept are discussed and evaluated in light of the aims of the current study. 
Then, it is discussed how gerontological discourse has so far included the con-
cept of autonomy in its reflections about aging. Finally, based on the discussion 
of the strengths and shortcomings of existing views of autonomy, an alternative 
interpretation of this constitutive thread of self-realization is proposed, that can 
contribute to the objective of reframing self-realization for its application to the 
context of aging. 
Chapter 7 discusses the second constitutive thread that weaves self-real-
ization discourse, namely, authenticity, while chapter 8 focuses on the third 
constitutive thread, namely, virtue. Both chapters follow the same structure as 
the discussion of autonomy in chapter 6: first an overview and evaluation of a 
selection of relevant philosophical accounts, then a consideration of the way the 
thread has been applied in gerontological discourse so far, and finally a propos-
al for a reframed interpretation of the concerned thread. 
In the concluding chapter 9, the overall argument of the study is shortly 
recapitulated in order to formulate an answer to the guiding research ques-
tion. This is followed by a consideration of some relevant objections that can be 
made towards the self-realization discourse in general, and a discussion of their 
possible refutation by the account proposed in this study. Finally, some sugges-
tions for further research are formulated, and the study draws to a close with 
an epilogue covering some personal reflections on the value of self-realization.

Chapter 2 – Living and aging in late modernity
2.1 introduction
This chapter intends to help us gain more clarity about the content and back-
ground of the late modern discourse on self-realization. This late modern dis-
course provides one of the starting points of this study, which aims to connect 
the theme of self-realization to the context of aging in order to explore its op-
portunities and serve as a resource for potentially inspiring cultural narratives 
about later life. Such narratives, as this study contends, are problematically ab-
sent in the late modern context. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In §2.2, I start with an initial tenta-
tive sketch of the late modern interpretation of self-realization that this study 
contests and aims to reframe. Founding this sketch are some influential so-
ciological and moral-philosophical analyses of late modernity by thinkers like 
Giddens (1991), Beck (1992), Bauman (2001, 2007), C. Taylor (1989, 1991, 2007) 
and MacIntyre (1984). The typical elements they observe as characteristic of 
the late modern outlook are discussed in §2.3.1 through §2.3.6. My next step is 
to connect the general observations about late modernity that form the back-
ground of late modern self-realization discourse to the context of aging. In §2.4.1 
through §2.4.6, a number of themes are discussed to elucidate some particular 
characteristics of aging in late modernity that are relevant from the viewpoint 
of this study. Finally, in §2.5, after a recapitulation of the different facets of the 
late modern interpretation of self-realization, it is argued that aging provides an 
excellent case to illustrate the deep ambivalences that late modern self-realiza-
tion discourse harbors. To preserve its value as a moral ideal for the context of 
aging, the late modern self-realization discourse needs to be reframed at some 
crucial points. This reframing entails an endeavor of refining, revising and 
redefining the late modern interpretation of self-realization and its constitutive 
concepts, in order to arrive at a view that better matches the context of aging.
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2.2 l Ate modernit y, An er A of self-re Aliz Ation?
The ambiguous wish may you live in interesting times, reportedly expressed to 
one’s enemies in Eastern traditions, would certainly apply to the current era. 
But how can these interesting times in which we live be accurately described? 
The term late modernity to describe contemporary times is drawn from the 
work of Giddens (1991). Just like similar terms attempting to characterize our 
current era such as reflexive modernity (Beck, 1992), or liquid modernity (Bau-
man, 2001), choosing the term late modernity suggests that modernity is not 
so much “over” (as for example the term “postmodernity” would imply), but has 
entered a new phase. In comparison with premodern, traditional settings, the 
process of modernization has brought a major and fundamental transforma-
tion of the social circumstances in which the life of the individual takes place. 
Late modernity distinguishes itself from earlier phases of modernization by 
the unprecedented dynamism through which it continuously changes existing 
social practices (Baars, 2006a). 
Following social theorists like Giddens (1991, 1994), Bauman (2001, 2007), 
Beck (1992), Beck & Beck-Gernsheim (2002), and philosophers such as C. Tay-
lor (1989, 1991, 2007) and MacIntyre (1984), late modernity is presented here 
first of all as an era with a typical focus on individual self-realization. In its late 
modern interpretation, self-realization pertains to the idea that a life consid-
ered “good” exhibits a self-chosen, authentic lifestyle, that is, a lifestyle in accor-
dance with the good, purposes or value orientations one reflexively identifies 
with. As Beck and Beck-Gernsheim underscore, a “life of your own” seems to 
be one of the most dominant ideals strived for in the context of late modernity 
(Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002, p. 22). It is important to note, however, that 
this late modern focus on individual agents and their self-fulfillment also con-
tains profound ambiguities, as is elaborated later on. Although the self-directed 
life is promoted as the best possible life, this ideal often seems to function as a 
disguise for a decisively de-individualizing ideology that is based on the domi-
nant power constellations typical of market capitalism (Baars, 2006a). 
The late modern interpretation of self-realization, that is the target of re-
framing in this study, can be characterized along general and rather tentative 
lines as follows: 
• The late modern interpretation of self-realization lays strong emphasis on 
the good life as a life of one’s own authentic choice. It conceptualizes living 
well typically in terms of a lifestyle, a set of personally appropriated habits 
and practices that assist people in the reflexive organization of life choices 
amidst the chaotic abundance of available options in late modernity.
• Late modern self-realization discourse assumes that the individual agent 
is a highly self-determined, atomistic and independent creature, who is 
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emancipated from the restrictive traditional embedding of human lives 
characteristic of premodern times. It presents individual agents as the au-
tonomous architects or directors of their own lives, who are capable of ap-
propriating an authentic value orientation as the underlying motivation for 
their reflexive life choices.
• The late modern view of self-realization tends to neglect the constitutive 
and inescapable role that social context and relationships play in one’s iden-
tity formation, focusing instead on the voluntary character of late modern 
social relationships.
• The late modern interpretation of self-realization is typically oriented to-
wards obtaining mastery over one’s life. This focus comes with a problem-
atic neglect of the uncontrollable dimensions of human life that accompa-
ny the existential dimension of the human condition. Consequently, the 
late modern interpretation of self-realization has a hard time relating to 
confrontations with the inevitable vulnerability of human existence. This 
vulnerability, according to the late modern argument, necessarily compro-
mises the success of self-realization.
This first brief sketch of the late modern interpretation of self-realization serves 
as the starting point of this study. This sketch is broadly based on a number 
of influential sociological and philosophical analyses of typical features and 
dynamics of life in late modernity, which will now be further addressed. 
2.3 fe Atures And dynAmics of the l Ate modern world
In this section, I first briefly elaborate on some characteristic features and dy-
namics of the late modern world. In succession, the themes discussed are in-
dividualization (§2.3.1), de-traditionalization (§2.3.2), globalization (§2.3.3), and 
the expression of these broad tendencies in structural and systemic influenc-
es on individual lives (§2.3.4). It will become clear how the sketched develop-
ments have resulted in an insecure and complex world, in which individuals are 
thrown back on their own resources when it comes to giving shape and mean-
ing to their lives. These observations strongly influence late modern self-real-
ization discourse’s assumption that individuals are atomistic agents destined 
to navigate the complex circumstances of late modernity on their own. Next, I 
discuss how late modernity tends to repress matters of meaning and morality, 
by sequestering them in separate realms and emphasizing that the individu-
al carries sole responsibility for them (§2.3.5). At this point, the sociological 
analyses intersect with some influential moral philosophical analyses of (late) 
modernity, represented by the work of philosophers like C. Taylor (1989, 1991) 
and MacIntyre (1984). These philosophers focus on the demise of self-evident 
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moral and spiritual frameworks and communities to fall back on, which in 
their view results in a moral identity crisis for late modern individuals (§2.3.6). 
2.3.1 A life of one’s own: reflexive individualization
According to sociological thinkers such as Giddens (1991), Beck (1992), Beck 
& Beck-Gernsheim (2002) and Bauman (2001, 2007), one of the most crucial 
processes giving shape to late modern culture and society seems to be its strug-
gle with the implications of individualization and the resulting diversity and 
pluralism characterizing society. The late modern version of the self-realiza-
tion discourse cannot be understood without acknowledging the fundamental 
influence of these individualization processes. According to the definition of 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002), individualization brings together two inter-
related tendencies. On the one hand, modernization has brought the disinte-
gration of previously existing, traditional social forms; modes of life that were 
ordained by religion, tradition or the state are breaking down and people are no 
longer automatically defined by traditional social categories such as gender or 
age. On the other hand, new demands are placed upon the individual, notably 
the requirement to lead a “life of one’s own” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002, 
p. 22). Giddens has analyzed how the typical late modern “choice biography” 
replaces the traditional standard biography. He emphasizes however, that the 
demands associated with a choice biography are by no means less constraining 
for the individual, though the pressures are of a quite different kind (Giddens, 
1991). 
Although it seems to be a generally accepted truth that modernization is 
accompanied by far-reaching processes of individualization, it is important to 
realize that our interpretation of this phenomenon deeply influences our eval-
uation of its outcomes. Elliott and Lemert (2006) distinguish three different 
interpretations of individualization, representing rather different views on the 
characteristic changes in the relation between individual identities and glo-
balizing late modern contexts. The perspective of manipulated individualism 
stresses the exploitative and dominating forces exercised by economic and bu-
reaucratic structures, as well as by the dynamics of mass culture, on the indi-
vidual life world. The perspective of isolated privatism focuses on the corruption 
of authentic individuality and the resulting narcissistic, hedonistic attitude of 
self-directed consumption and instant satisfaction of desires. Both perspectives 
seem to regard the individual agent as an isolated, powerless pawn, vulnerable 
to corrupting systemic influences, moved by invisible, structural manipulating 
forces which overrule any chance of truly autonomous control over one’s life, or 
of the development of authentic individual capacities. Consequently, self-reali-
zation, as the path towards a good life, seems to be a rather illusory undertak-
ing in these perspectives of individualization. 
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The third perspective however, termed reflexive individualization, takes a 
different angle. It stresses the way in which the dynamics of late modern soci-
ety and culture urge people to take their existence in their own hand, to become 
the architects of their own biography and realize their potential capacities as 
autonomously choosing agents. The late modern version of the self-realization 
discourse is most closely affiliated with the reflexive individualization-perspec-
tive. This perspective shares the observation that individuals are subjected to 
profound societal and cultural influences acting upon their lives. But impor-
tantly, in the reflexive individualization-view these influences strongly favor 
and even demand the development of individual capacities that are crucial for 
self-realization, such as autonomy competencies (Meyers, 1989). However, at-
taining these competencies is hardly a simple process. 
Beck (1992) sketches how, due to the dynamics of reflexive individualiza-
tion, the individual life loses the self-evident organization it had under more 
traditional circumstances. Although one might argue that individualization 
has come with an increase in autonomy, emancipation and freedom, it is equal-
ly true that the background of routines conditional for daily human activity as 
well as social interaction has evaporated into a cloud of possibilities. Late mod-
ern individuals live in a world infested with risks that form the flip side of this 
explosion of possibilities. In their striving for self-realization, they are forced to 
continuously reflect, calculate, adjust, negotiate and plan their lives. This sug-
gests that the emancipation process inherent in individualization brings the 
individual life a set of freedoms that are precarious and vulnerable at best. The 
person has “no choice but to choose” (Giddens, 1991, p. 81), but there are hardly 
any reliable guidelines about which choices should prevail.  
This brings me to the crucially important element of reflexivity which is re-
garded as characteristic of the late modern outlook by both Beck and Giddens. 
The term reflexivity points to the fact that almost all aspects of people’s lives are 
susceptible to revision in the light of new information or knowledge. It applies 
both to institutions and to individual selves (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991). While 
late modernity offers access to an abundance of information and knowledge not 
available in premodern, traditional societies, this knowledge has at the same 
time lost its self-evident authority and certainty. Although there exist an abun-
dance of “expert systems” offering their support in this process, none of them 
can claim to provide a definitive answer (Giddens, 1991). This leaves individuals 
“on their own”, overwhelmed by complex situations requesting immediate and 
sound answers, but lacking any steadfast and reliable support for obtaining 
them. Only their own reflexive deliberation and choice can ultimately serve as 
guidelines in a “runaway world” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002, p. 22).
Thus, in their efforts to manage existence, late modern individuals are ulti-
mately thrown back on the reflexive process of self-formation and can no longer 
rely on objective standards. Acquiring knowledge and making decisions is no 
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longer a matter of taking an objectifying distance and applying determinate 
rules. The irony is that subjects are expected to be their own reflective rule-cre-
ators, while the features of the late modern world make this task very complicat-
ed. The fact that the world has become so complex that it cannot be overseen in 
a rational, detached manner calls for other forms of reflexivity than the rational 
reflection that underlies more traditional models of knowledge (Lash, 2003). 
The sketched dynamics of reflexive individualization transforms individual 
biographies into personal “projects” of self-realization that are designed to ex-
press the individual lifestyle choices and value preferences underlying people’s 
identity (Hendricks & Hatch, 2009). The typical late modern reflexivity thus 
does not only pertain to questions of functional knowledge and choices, such 
as which medical expert to trust in the case of illness, or which food to choose 
for good health. It also concerns questions in the existential sphere, such as 
what makes one’s life meaningful or what relationships one feels committed 
to, which are crucial to self-realization.  
2.3.2 Living in a post-traditional context
The sketched processes of (reflexive) individualization are intrinsically connect-
ed to de-traditionalization, the tendency that traditional practices, sources of 
knowledge, religious and moral guidance and authority are eroding and losing 
their self-evident status in society. The two processes have a mutual causal con-
nection: on the one hand, due to de-traditionalization individuals are thrown 
back on their own resources when it comes to finding reliable answers to mat-
ters of meaning and morality; on the other hand, individualization processes 
have strongly contributed to de-traditionalization and continue to enforce the 
demise of traditional institutions. In conjunction, both processes can be said 
to have increased the individual freedom to shape life according to one’s own 
choice considerably, even if the realization of this freedom can be complicated 
by structural and systemic impediments (see §2.3.4). 
Tradition has always been an important source of identity. According to 
Giddens (1994), there exists an important link between tradition and the indi-
vidual’s sense of identity; a link which is inevitably torn by the process of de-tra-
ditionalization typical of modernization in general. He expresses this link as 
follows: “Tradition [...] is a medium of identity. Whether personal or collective, 
identity presumes meaning; but it also presumes the constant process of reca-
pitulation and reinterpretation noted earlier. Identity is the creation of constan-
cy over time, that very bringing of the past into conjunction with an anticipated 
future. In all societies the maintenance of personal identity, and its connec-
tion to wider social identities, is a prime requisite of ontological security. [...] 
Threats to the integrity of traditions are very often, if by no means universally, 
experienced as threats to the integrity of the self” (Giddens, 1994, p. 80). This 
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observation underscores that de-traditionalization can raise profound problems 
for the self-realization of late modern individuals, because it robs them of previ-
ously self-evident sources of identity. 
Baars (2012a) argues that modernization processes have provided individ-
ual lives with an independent and unique “biographical dimension” (p. 16), 
instead of seeing them solely as parts of a larger traditional community. As a re-
sult, modern individuals increasingly see their lives as a future-oriented devel-
opment of their unique qualities, according to their own choices, instead of as 
a standard trajectory already laid out for them by tradition, habit or convention. 
Obviously, this thought is strongly conducive to the late modern interpretation 
of self-realization. The flip side of the increased individual freedom, however, 
is a loss of self-evident, traditional, reliable certainties that the framework of 
the standard biography and the embedding in traditional communities could 
still provide. It is no longer self-evident that people spend their entire lives in 
the same location, choose the same profession as their fathers, marry someone 
from the same religious background, start a family, grow old and die after a life 
of hard work, et cetera. Life courses have become more diverse, for instance in 
matters of career development, patterns of personal relationships or education 
and learning, even though social structures tend to lag behind this develop-
ment (Baars, 2012a; Riley, Kahn & Fohner, 1994).  
Despite the strong influence of de-traditionalization on late modern lives it 
is important to realize that moral and religious traditions have not disappeared. 
Rather, people living in late modernity have to tolerate pluralism and a diversity 
of different, contradicting sources of guidance. No tradition can claim to be the 
self-evident, dominant source of epistemological and moral authority anymore, 
and this is a profound and far-reaching change compared to earlier, traditional 
and (pre)modern contexts (C. Taylor, 2007). Traditions may still play an import-
ant role in how individual people and societal subgroups perceive themselves. 
But religious and moral pluralism increasingly urges people to reflect on their 
own position and take a stand. This process of appropriation may or may not 
succeed. It is often a cause of insecurity and raises the need for self-legitimiza-
tion. For example, I find it striking how many older people I meet feel the urge 
to explain themselves if they regularly attend church services and, contrary to 
their children and grandchildren, have maintained a religious identity; where-
as this would have been self-evident in other times. 
The sketched developments confirm C. Taylor’s observations, which read 
that late modernity no longer offers a self-evidently shared horizon of values 
and meaning. Rather, each individual is destined to search for their own value 
orientation (C. Taylor, 1989; 2007; see also §2.3.6). On the one hand, this fact 
highly complicates processes of late modern identity-constitution and self-real-
ization. It therefore situates “the problem of identity” among the most complex 
and pervasive problems confronted by late modern individuals (C. Taylor, 1989; 
Aging and Self-Realization40
McAdams, 1993; Baumeister, 1986). On the other hand, however, the sketched 
developments potentially offer chances for a deeper, more authentic and per-
sonalized relation to oneself and to one’s social surroundings which can be 
conducive to self-realization.   
2.3.3 A globalizing world
The societal and cultural outlook of late modernity is also deeply determined 
by the reality of the individualized, post-traditional lives having to be lived in a 
context of rapidly expanding forces of globalization. This means that late mod-
ern self-realization takes place in a complex global context which far exceeds 
the individual’s scope of influence and control. Both the material and emo-
tional impact of globalization on individual lives is profound and far-reaching 
(Elliott & Lemert, 2006; Phillipson, 2009, 2013). 
Broadly speaking, globalization is a process of pervasive, uncontrollable and 
continuous changes with a global scope, in the political and economic as well 
as in the cultural sphere. Clearly demarcated realms of influence based upon 
local authorities are evaporating. The nation state is struggling to maintain its 
traditional sovereignty. The so-called “radical” interpretation perceives global-
ization as a historically unprecedented social transformation, with revolution-
ary consequences for economy, politics, culture and society (Giddens, 1999; 
Phillipson, 2006). 
Globalization processes tend to fundamentally transform the terms in 
which contemporary debates about the life course are formulated (Baars et al., 
2006). Previously existing influential frameworks of analysis that have been 
developed to study and interpret socio-economic and political questions re-
garding the welfare state, such as those developed in critical gerontology and 
political economy perspectives (Estes, 1999; Estes & Phillipson, 2003; Minkler 
& Estes, 1999; A. Walker, 1980, 2006; Townsend, 1981; Vincent, Phillipson & 
Downs, 2006), need to be adapted to a globalized situation.  
In his discussion of the transformation of welfare arrangements, Phillip-
son (2006) distinguishes three aspects of globalization that are particularly 
relevant to aging. First, globalization exerts its influence upon the ideological 
assumptions underlying the way aging is socially constructed. Instead of being 
constituted as a burden to national economies, aging populations are now per-
ceived as a worldwide problem, requiring nation-transcending solutions. Sec-
ond, globalization enforces a particular construction of aging which perceives 
it in terms of a new sort of risk, the responsibility for which is delegated to the 
individual realm. Third, globalization plays an important role in creating and 
maintaining global inequalities in aging.  
Although globalization processes have the potential to increase connections 
between people, for instance through the developments in information tech-
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nology, they may also lead to a loosening or even disintegration of social bonds. 
The transformation of welfare arrangements, for instance, puts high pressure 
on (intergenerational) solidarity (Phillipson, 2013; A. Walker, 1996). 
On the macro-level of societal structures and political-economic arrange-
ments, globalization makes large societal issues much more difficult to man-
age, since the traditional solutions offered by the structures and institutions of 
the nation state no longer suffice in a globalizing context (Baars et al., 2006). 
The resulting struggles can be observed daily in the newspapers, e.g., in re-
ports on mastering the economic crisis, coping with the consequences of de-
mographic developments like population aging on a global scale, or trying to 
manage global threats like environmental pollution, outbreaks of infectious 
diseases, or terrorist attacks. On the micro-level of individual lives, the reality 
of globalization can also be said to have a profoundly disorientating effect on 
people’s lives. For instance, being unable to rely on welfare arrangements that 
used to be provided by the nation state not only puts people at risk of poverty 
when they are in vulnerable socio-economic positions, it also confronts them 
with existential questions about their societal value, the strength of their con-
nections with others, and their human identity and dignity. This effect is re-
inforced by the fast pace at which their knowledge and skills get outdated as a 
result of the dynamics and complexity of a globalizing society and the immense 
and fast developments in science and technology. 
2.3.4 Structural and systemic influences on individualized lives
People living in late modern circumstances are confronted with a highly am-
bivalent situation. On the one hand, self-realization, in its late modern disguise 
of the choice biography and of a life of one’s own, is celebrated as the ultimate 
purpose to strive for in an individualized world. On the other hand, the late 
modern world harbors a variety of complex structural arrangements and sys-
temic influences restricting or complicating people’s opportunities to realize 
themselves. These influences can be traced at multiple, interacting levels: local, 
national and global, micro, meso and macro. Together with the influence of 
cultural master narratives on people’s identity-formation that I will focus on in 
chapter 3, these structural and systemic influences form a vast array of external 
forces impacting the life course; external forces that potentially complicate late 
modern self-realization profoundly. As a result of the impact of these external 
forces, the agential control over one’s own life that is one of the presuppositions 
of late modern self-realization discourse has to be constantly negotiated while 
facing a diversity of structural and systemic influences. For example, in the 
Netherlands, obtaining professional care requires getting an ‘indication deci-
sion’ from the relevant bureaucratic organization, confirming that one is en-
titled to a certain kind and amount of care. On the one hand, the care provided 
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supports people to lead their lives as they choose, thereby increasing their scope 
of agency and their opportunities for self-realization. On the other hand, the 
bureaucratic structures informing the indication procedure often do not match 
the specific individual situation. This then restricts people in their agential 
opportunities, by pushing them in a systemic framework that overrules their 
life-world reality.    
Although choosing one’s own lifestyle is heralded as a dominant moral val-
ue, late modern systemic structures and arrangements paradoxically also show 
a strong tendency towards standardizing people’s life courses and fitting them 
into dominant societal “scripts”. Such scripts present systemically framed mod-
els of “appropriate” social roles, age identities or modes of conduct for aging 
individuals (Hockey & James, 2003; Baars, 2006a). While these scripts are not 
necessarily fixed or static – they have transformed considerably with the devel-
opment of late modernity – they do present external systemic influences which 
are imposed on the life realities of older people. In this sense, a societal script 
is associated with a straightjacket, a framework aimed at fitting the divergent, 
the individual, the unique aspects of peoples’ lives into unifying, standardiz-
ing and reductionist models. The enforced retirement at a certain age which 
is common in several European countries provides an example of such social 
construction of aging (Phillipson, 2013), as does the de-individualizing identi-
fication of the frail elderly with a dependent “sick role” (Cruikshank, 2003, p. 
36).  Needless to say, structural societal “scripting” can be expected to create 
tensions with the underlying assumptions of the moral ideal of self-realization, 
with its emphasis precisely on the authentic, uniquely individual aspects of a 
person’s existence that it tries to standardize. 
Late modern individuals seem to be drawn into a compulsive demand to 
engage with lifestyles that are in fact largely prescribed by the structural dy-
namics of late modern systems, for instance an economic system character-
ized by deregulation. A good example of the latter is provided by contemporary 
discussions in the Netherlands about what is called the “participation society”, 
which aims to transfer responsibilities for care arrangements to individual peo-
ple and their social network (Newman & Tonkens, 2011). This transfer of re-
sponsibilities is presented as an ideal worth pursuing and naturally fitting the 
transformed life circumstances of late modernity. It supposedly enables people 
to gain more control over the organization of their lives. At the same time, how-
ever, this discourse of participation and individual freedom and responsibility 
functions as a cover for hardcore economic cost reduction. This puts people at 
risk of becoming the victims of imposed and restrictive images of the good life, 
instead of being truly empowered to realize their own appropriated views, de-
veloped in interaction and mutual connection with others. There is also a great 
risk that people in already vulnerable social positions, like psychiatric patients, 
disabled persons or older people lacking a satisfactory social network, will be 
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victimized by this system because they can’t live up to the implicitly expected 
standards of personal responsibility and independent agency.
It is important to note that many perspectives focusing on the structural 
and systemic impediments to the realization of a life of one’s own seem to be 
based on the evaluation of individualization processes which Elliott and Lemert 
(2006) called “manipulated individualism”. In this view, the individual agent 
is perceived as relatively powerless in comparison with the vast forces exercised 
by power structures and socio-economic arrangements. Individuals might be 
able to exert a modest amount of influence over their own life at the micro lev-
el, but the relation with structural forces is fundamentally unequal. Dannefer 
and Kelley-Moore (2009) for instance, emphasize that the relationship between 
agency and structural factors should be regarded as an asymmetrical one. How-
ever, this asymmetry does not necessarily lead to the conclusion drawn by the 
manipulated individualism-perspective distinguished by Elliot and Lemert 
(2006), which suggests that agency is basically an empty, illusory phenomenon 
that causes alienation rather than freeing people for a life of their own. Despite 
the asymmetry between agency and structure, resistance to oppressive forces 
is possible, and people’s opportunities for exercising moral agency can in fact 
be enlarged, as is illustrated in the discussion about cultural narratives and 
counter narratives in chapter 3. 
2.3.5 Repression of meaning and moralit y
The societal scripting and standardization processes influencing how the in-
dividual’s life course is organized are among the factors that expectedly influ-
ence people’s experience of meaning in their lives. Regarding this influence, 
Honneth (2004) expresses worries about late modern consumer capitalism, 
which tends to use the language of self-realization discourse to strengthen its 
own purposes. The result is that instead of truly being facilitated to develop 
authentic lives that they experience as meaningful, individuals are subjected to 
standardization processes and the compulsive demand to experiment with life-
styles. This tendency is confirmed by Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) when 
they describe individualization as “a compulsion, albeit a paradoxical one, to 
create, to stage manage, not only one’s own biography but the bonds and net-
works surrounding it and to do this amid changing preferences and at succes-
sive stages of life, while constantly adapting to the conditions of the labor mar-
ket, the education system, the welfare state and so on” (p. 4). Honneth (2004) 
argues that these lifestyles are in fact largely prescribed by the dynamics of a 
capitalistic economic system, which produces heteronomy rather than autono-
my. What on the surface seems to be an authentic existence of self-realization 
is in fact only a shallow appearance camouflaging a deep dependency upon the 
capitalistic system. This concealed dependency undermines the moral stake 
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of late modern self-realization discourse, and results in experiences of inner 
emptiness, meaninglessness and instability for the individual. 
What is touched upon here is the existential and moral dimension of life, 
addressing people’s relation to the physical, social, personal and transcendent 
dimension of existence (Van Deurzen 2002, see also §1.5). It has been discussed 
in §1.5 that experiencing our lives as meaningful relies on developing and main-
taining satisfactory relations with all those four realms. As is discussed later on 
in this study, finding a satisfactory attitude towards the existential and moral 
dimension is also crucial to my suggested reframed view of self-realization. 
Most analyses of late modernity agree that the late modern outlook gives rise to 
profound existential and moral questions, both for individuals and for societies 
at large. For instance, living in a de-traditionalized, secularized context, what is 
the meaning of one’s spiritual and religious orientation? What is the purpose 
we should strive for in life, and how do we judge whether this purpose is suf-
ficiently valuable in the absence of any broadly supported and shared common 
good? How should we perceive values like justice or solidarity in an increas-
ingly individualized and globalizing situation? How do we deal with individu-
als and groups of people who deviate from the implicit norms of autonomous 
self-determination, independence and personal responsibility put forward by 
late modern self-realization discourse? These and many other pressing ques-
tions of meaning and morality urgently confront late modern individuals. 
Sociological analyses particularly emphasize how existential and moral 
matters are typically repressed and delegated to the individual realm by the 
characteristic dynamics of late modernity. The latter’s focus on risk manage-
ment, control and individual responsibility causes uneasiness and tensions 
when confronted with the contingent, uncontrollable and often tragic existen-
tial dimension of life. Giddens speaks about the “sequestration of experience” 
(Giddens, 1991, p. 144): questions and dilemmas surrounding fundamental ex-
istential themes like death, aging, illness, insanity et cetera are being pushed 
away from sight, repressed and banned to specifically organized realms. Bau-
man’s (2008) analyses of the late modern fear of everything that represents 
the “Other”, also resonates this unwillingness and inability to address and deal 
with existential and moral matters. The potentially disturbing questions raised 
by these themes consequently disappear from the public realm and become the 
sole responsibility of the individual (Bauman 2008). At the same time howev-
er, Giddens underscores that the attempt to repress and control existential and 
moral matters never succeeds completely; the “repressed” returns in different 
disguises, raising new uneasiness and anxiety (Giddens, 1991).  
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2.3.6 The moral identit y crisis of late modern man
The position of matters of meaning and morality in late modernity has also 
been discussed from a moral-philosophical point of view. Although these moral 
philosophical perspectives take a different angle, they are closely intertwined 
with the sociological observations about the repression of meaning and moral-
ity discussed in §2.3.5. Two influential authors who have written extensively on 
the moral outlook of late modernity have been selected to feed the discussion 
in this section; C. Taylor (Sources of the self, 1989; Ethics of authenticity, 1991; A 
secular age, 2007) and MacIntyre (After virtue, 1984). An important advantage 
of their work, and the reason for selecting it, is that it presents an account in 
which the ideal of self-realization is put into a broader historical and moral 
philosophical perspective. 
Broadly speaking, both authors describe and evaluate the moral and spiritu-
al outlook of the contemporary Western world that has resulted from centuries 
of gradual modernization processes. Since Weber, it has become common to 
state that modernization is accompanied by a “disenchantment of the world”, a 
characteristic process of rationalization and decline of transcendental sources 
of value (Weber, 1922/1989, p. 30). Weber’s classic analysis plays a foundational 
role in contemporary analyses of the (late) modern world as a secular or post-tra-
ditional one (C. Taylor, 2007; Giddens, 1991). Terms like disenchantment or 
secularization describe how in the process of modernization, traditional sourc-
es of knowledge, religious and moral guidance and authority are eroding and 
losing their self-evident status in society. C. Taylor (1991) and MacIntyre (1984) 
share a deep concern about the moral uprooting plaguing late modern man, 
which has resulted from this process. As a result of complex historical, sci-
entific, societal and cultural dynamics, they argue, we have lost contact with 
the sources underlying our identity and our conception of morality, which ac-
cording to C. Taylor should be viewed as inextricably connected. This crisis 
of morality should be perceived as an identity crisis suffered by late modern 
individuals (C. Taylor, 1989). Bereft of a sense of connection with the sources 
nourishing their moral identities, individuals are at a loss when it comes to the 
legitimization of overarching value orientations and conceptions of a good life. 
In the process of modernization, there has been a growing emphasis on 
procedural approaches to morality based on formal principles. MacIntyre (1984) 
argues that moral questions and disagreements are either solved by an appeal 
to impersonal and supposedly rational criteria such as “duty” or “utility”, or 
they are considered principally interminable, because morality is reduced to a 
matter of personal emotional preference. Both C. Taylor (1991) and MacIntyre 
(1984) express worries about how morality is hereby separated from its tradi-
tional role of providing guidance in matters of value and good living. This leads 
to a general feeling of helplessness, relativism and even cynicism towards fun-
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damental ethical questions that haunt late modern individuals. Both authors 
are very critical about the atomistic anthropology of neoliberalism, which per-
ceives the individual as an isolated, self-sufficient entity, whose autonomous 
development and self-realization forms the paramount goal to which all social 
interaction processes are made subordinate. It is important to realize that this 
is a very powerful image in late modern society and is also very influential in 
the dominant late modern interpretation of the discourse on self-realization. 
MacIntyre in particular expresses worries about how the late modern em-
phasis on individual choice and personal authenticity risks losing sight of the 
way people are fundamentally embedded in a context of traditions, practices 
and social and moral communities, and are dependent on each other (Mac-
Intyre, 1984, 1999). Correspondingly, we risk losing sight of the deeper mean-
ing of the inter-human condition. Social relations are often solely interpreted in 
terms of mutual benefits or dependencies, and thereby reduced to superficial 
instrumental aspects. Alternatively, the way individual identities are socially 
constituted may be emphasized, but in such a way that the value and even the 
possibility of individuality is reduced or denied.
C. Taylor, on the other hand, emphasizes the lasting moral importance of 
the typical modern discourse of self-realization, despite his worries about the 
moral identity crisis of late modern people. He argues that, if re-interpreted 
in a different manner, the typical late modern culture of self-realization mir-
rored in what he calls the “ethics of authenticity” (C. Taylor, 1991) can still be a 
valuable ideal capable of providing moral guidance towards the good life. His 
attempt to explain the moral and spiritual outlook of (late) modern societies 
in terms of authenticity is highly relevant because it helps to legitimate the 
focus of this study on self-realization as a meaning-generating moral ideal (see 
further §7.3.3).  
2.4 imPlicAtions for l Ate modern Aging
In this section I explore how the discussed socio-cultural transformations 
associated with late modernity have had their impact on the reality of aging. 
In succession, I discuss the enormous increase in life expectancy and in the 
number of older people worldwide, with corresponding economic, political, 
social and cultural challenges (§2.4.1); the typical individualization and diver-
sification of aging trajectories (§2.4.2); the distinction between the so-called 
“Third Age”: the phase of later life associated with a fulfilling and vital lifestyle 
and embraced by consumer culture, and the “Fourth Age”: the phase of later 
life associated with inevitable decline and nearing death, which is mostly en-
countered with anxiety and rejection (§2.4.3); the structural and systemic fac-
tors that force aging people into societal scripts that do not necessarily cohere 
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with their individual aspirations and capacities (§2.4.4); the dynamics through 
which aging well has increasingly become an individual rather than a collective 
responsibility (§2.4.5); and finally, the unease that characterizes the late mod-
ern cultural response to the uncontrollable dimension of existential vulnerabil-
ity one is radically confronted with in aging (§2.4.6). 
2.4.1 A (much) longer life in a complex world
When considering the impact of the discussed features and dynamics of late 
modernity on the reality of aging people’s lives and identities, it is important 
to realize that these influences can be of very diverse kinds, some of them 
touching upon very basic life conditions, others relating to highly complex and 
elusive dynamics. One of the most basic and obvious factors influencing the 
typical outlook of late modern aging is the rise in life expectancy in the last 
century, at least in the Western world. Not only are people reaching higher ages, 
there is also a higher number of older people than ever before. This rise in life 
expectancy can be attributed to different factors, such as a decrease in infant 
mortality, an increase in hygienic circumstances, and an explosion of medical 
and technological possibilities that have transformed formerly deadly diseases 
into treatable medical conditions. Although it is important to realize that the 
concrete increase in life expectancy can still differ considerably depending on 
one’s socio-economic position in society (Dannefer, 2003; Phillipson, 2013), the 
enormous extension of life expectancy at birth that has taken place in the last 
centuries has had a huge impact on the reality of aging in late modern condi-
tions. 
On the individual level, the fact that people in general live much longer not 
only raises a variety of biomedical questions (Westendorp, 2014), but also exis-
tential questions, since the extension of later life has opened up a rather long 
phase of requesting meaningful content (Moen & Spencer, 2006; see §2.4.3). 
On the societal level, the increasing percentage of the population that consists 
of older individuals comes with profound socio-economic challenges for late 
modern societies, mostly related to how pensions and care should be financed 
(Phillipson, 2013; see also §2.4.5).  
2.4.2 Individualization and diversification: 
an old age of one’s own?
Hendricks rightly states that, “As the societal backdrop against which ageing 
unfolds undergoes change, so, too, will sense of self and perceptions of ageing 
actors” (Hendricks, 2010, p. 253). He goes on to argue that societal norms, so-
cial resources and collective ideologies concerning aging will inevitably influ-
ence how aging actors perceive themselves, their future life trajectories, and 
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their social role and position. As the pace of change in this regard hastens and 
insecurities and complexities grow, a development characteristic of late moder-
nity, the stability and consistency of people’s identities will expectedly suffer. 
In accordance with the general late modern transition from a standard bi-
ography to a choice biography, aging trajectories too are no longer pre-shaped 
along traditional lines. The fact that traditional models ordering the life course 
in three “boxes” or well-delineated periods of education, labor and retirement, 
have lost considerable ground, also affects older people’s lives. Although there 
exists a structural lag in how societal arrangements organizing the life course 
are adapting to this new reality (Riley, Kahn & Foner, 1994), the erosion of 
clearly delineated stages or boxes of life with a predictable timing and progres-
sion opens up new opportunities to shape one’s later life as well. The result 
is an enormous diversification and corresponding individualization of aging 
trajectories and lifestyles (Hendricks & Hatch, 2009). 
In many aspects, there is an evident increase in freedom and autonomy 
to organize one’s own life and old age. For instance, leisure and education 
patterns have shifted so that many activities previously reserved for younger 
people are now open to older people as well. The increase in choice options to 
organize one’s later life can also be illustrated by the time, funds and energy 
that are invested in enhancing the possibilities for aging people to lead self-di-
rected, independent lives, ranging from fall prevention programs to installing 
home automation systems monitoring people and their care needs from a dis-
tance. Admittedly, many of these inventions are stimulated with a cost-reduc-
tion agenda operating in the background, which causes skepticism about the 
value that could be ascribed to the moral language of autonomy with which 
these policies are justified.
The emphasis on a life of one’s own characteristic of late modern self-re-
alization discourse echoes in the implicit overarching ideology that underlies 
many living and care arrangements for older people. This ideology states that 
as far as possible, older people should have the opportunity to lead self-directed 
lives, travel, engage in volunteer work or leisure activities, follow education and 
undertake all sorts of activities contributing to a satisfying and fulfilling life ac-
cording to their own standards. However, there is reason for a cautionary note 
if we want to apply the late modern ideology of choice and self-determination 
to the concrete reality of older people’s lives. A variety of structural and system-
ic factors and societal scripts about aging restrict the opportunities to realize 
the envisioned old age of one’s own (see §2.4.4). Also, self-realization-related 
values such as the optimal development of personal capacities seem to have a 
stronger pull for the better-educated and younger members of society (Beck & 
Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). Many older people nowadays still live relatively tradi-
tional lives, although this number can be expected to decrease fast as the baby 
boom generation ages. This suggests that the late modern discourse of self-re-
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alization does not automatically match these people’s lives and should only be 
applied critically and with caution. Nevertheless, these people are living and 
aging in a world that increasingly endorses an ideal of individual self-realiza-
tion as its dominant image of the good life. Expectedly, this will influence the 
cultural imaginaries and narratives about later life articulating what it means 
to age well in contemporary conditions.   
2.4.3 Third Age and Fourth Age
Another typical characteristic of late modern aging is the emergence of a new 
distinction in the life course that subdivides later life into two phases; the Third 
Age and the Fourth Age (Laslett, 1989). The Third Age describes the rather 
long new period of life requesting meaningful content, created as a conse-
quence of the dramatic increase in life expectancy (see §2.4.1). In most Western 
countries, the onset of retirement for most individuals has not kept pace with 
this increased life expectancy. As a result, a new phase in later life seems to 
have emerged between the age when one retires and the onset of age-related 
physical and mental decline. The length of this new period turns out to be con-
siderable for many people. It may even equal the period of “normal”, productive 
adulthood. This Third Age is generally associated with the enjoyment of an 
abundance of post-retirement leisure options and a still vital health condition. 
Typically, the concept is associated with baby boom retirees in relatively well-off 
material circumstances and still in good health, who are culturally positioned 
in the role of active and vital consumers (Gilleard & Higgs, 2000). The ideology 
of the choice biography (with its corresponding pitfalls) is strongly present in 
the discourse of the Third Age as well. 
According to Moen and Spencer (2006), the Third Age is a rather open 
life phase, offering lots of opportunities for individual design and activity. The 
exploration of these new uncharted territories of self-fulfillment can suppos-
edly be performed in relative freedom from external constraints posed by the 
duties of labor and family life characteristic of earlier adulthood, due to the 
diversification of the life course and the loosening of traditional boundaries 
between boxes of life (see §2.4.2). However, as Gilleard and Higgs (2005) point 
out, the Third Age has also become the target of a consumerist ideology which 
unmasks this freedom as perverted by capitalist and economic values. After 
all, Third Agers represent an interesting target to sell all sorts of amenities and 
services to with promises of long-lasting vitality and youthfulness (Gilleard & 
Higgs, 2005). One of the most striking features of the Third Age discourse is 
that it strongly stimulates older people to engage in anti-aging strategies. A 
whole industry has been harnessed to help people remain as youthful and ac-
tive as possible, offering products varying from anti-wrinkle creams to Viagra. 
Aging well is increasingly identified with staying young. The corresponding 
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anti-aging ideology can be argued to offer a one-sided and problematic image 
of old age which impedes the possibilities to infuse later life with an intrinsic 
meaning of its own (Baars, 2012a; see §3.3.3). 
Though critical gerontologists point to important limitations of the Third 
Age discourse, such as its disregard for the structural power factors influencing 
late modern aging; its conjunction with the stereotyping anti-aging industries; 
and its neglect of the social inequalities inhibiting a successful realization of 
the Third Age ideals, Phillipson (2013) nevertheless admits that the Third Age 
discourse “has played an important role in highlighting the possibility for peo-
ple to shape their own ‘ageing’ in a way which was inconceivable for previous 
generations. And the idea of a ’Third Age’ of freedom from the constraints of 
paid employment undoubtedly carries many attractions. [...] the idea of people 
choosing to manage and control their own aging is important, even while re-
quiring significant social interventions if it is to be realized” (Phillipson, 2013, 
p. 49). From the perspective of this study too, the goals that the Third Age 
discourse typically engages with are valuable. These goals include, for instance, 
self-development; vital involvement in life; remaining active and healthy and 
socially connected; all purposes that deserve to be stimulated in light of self-re-
alization, despite the obvious limitations of the Third Age ideology. 
An interesting example of the merits of the Third Age discourse can be 
found in the Universities of the Third Age movement1 in which aging indi-
viduals join together to exchange skills and life experiences, and further their 
self-development by learning and teaching simultaneously. The Universities of 
the Third Age movement may also stimulate welcome investments in facilities 
for lifelong learning and intergenerational exchange. Phillipson sums up the 
many advantages associated with this interest in education: “Investment now 
in education [...] could have major benefits for individuals and for society: first, 
by playing a leading role in creating a new type of ageing for the twenty-first 
century, built around extended economic, family and citizenship roles; second, 
by supporting people planning the two decades or more beyond their main 
work careers; third, by unlocking mental capital and promoting well-being in 
later life; fourth, by supporting a range of professional and voluntary groups 
working on behalf of older people” (Phillipson, 2013, p. 160). 
Initiatives like the Universities of the Third Age form a reminder of the 
many potentialities later life has to offer. These tend to be lost from sight in the 
context of societal discourses on aging that mostly emphasize the problematic 
consequences of an aging population. From the perspective of self-realization, 
these initiatives form a welcome correction of existing cultural imaginaries 
about aging. They may help people to develop themselves, but they may also 
1 | See http://www.u3a.org.uk/
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help societies to become more aware of the potentialities that older people have 
to offer, and stimulate making better use of them (see also chapter 3).  
It is important to note however, that the attractiveness of the Third Age 
strongly relies on the contrast it represents to the so-called Fourth Age that 
follows it. This Fourth Age denotes the last phase of life and is associated with 
decline, deteriorating health and eventually death (Moen & Spencer, 2006; 
Gilleard & Higgs, 2000). Some gerontologists have criticized the fact that the 
interpretation of the Third Age as a period of self-fulfillment through leisure 
and consumption implicitly depends on the transfer of all aspects of aging that 
are perceived as negative to the Fourth Age. The positioning of the Third Age as 
a positive image of later life, a period in which one can freely engage in self-re-
alization, presupposes the contrasting positioning of the Fourth Age as an al-
most exclusively negative, deplorable socio-cultural status (Gilleard & Higgs, 
2011; Grenier, 2012). This problematic positioning of the Fourth Age mirrors 
the general late modern tendency to meet existential questions with profound 
unease, and to isolate and repress anything confronting us with the uncontrol-
lable, tragic dimensions of life (§2.3.5).
There is no fixed moment for the transition from the Third Age to the 
Fourth Age; this depends on one’s health condition. A vital 80-year old may 
still be in his/her Third Age while a 60-year-old suffering a chronic disease 
has already entered the Fourth Age and lacks the opportunity to enjoy the free-
dom and possibilities associated with the Third Age. In stark contrast to the 
abundance of possible lifestyles that the Third Age offers to aging individuals, 
the options open to people in the Fourth Age seem to be restricted to images 
of need, lack and dependency (Grenier & Phillipson, 2013). The responsibility 
for older people’s identities, in terms of life choices, shifts away from the in-
dividuals themselves and is transferred to families or care institutions. One 
might thus argue that in the Fourth Age, people are no longer considered to be 
autonomous moral agents capable of shaping their lives according to what they 
value and who they want to be, but are solely identified by their impairments. 
Grenier (2012) addresses the possible detrimental consequences of this when 
she states, “The concern is that in recognizing the Fourth Age as characterized 
by impairment, older people in this category become socially and culturally 
‘othered’ – both from society and within groups of older people” (p. 174). Where-
as Third Agers can count on some socio-cultural valuation as active and vital 
consumers, Fourth Agers, by contrast, are placed in the socially deeply deval-
ued role of being frail and vulnerable dependent “burdens”, who only consume 
expensive care. Consequently, they are also excluded from the influential ideal 
of the good life that relies on self-realization. 
However, it is important to realize that in the current study the notion of 
self-realization is developed in directions which diverge quite radically from the 
individualistic perspective typical for the late modern interpretation, a perspec-
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tive that underlies the individualistic Third Age discourse as well. The fact that 
in some cases (such as severe dementia) the transfer of responsibility for one’s 
life choices to families or care institutions may be inevitable does not neces-
sarily lead to the conclusion that the opportunities for exercising moral agency 
for frail and vulnerable older people should be as limited as they are usually 
perceived to be. It will be discussed in chapter 5 that applying a different per-
spective on the nature of the self and of moral agency that underlies the self-re-
alization discourse may nuance our view and open our minds to possibilities 
for exercising moral agency even in the Fourth Age, that are usually overlooked 
by dominant cultural discourses about aging.  
2.4.4 Structural and systemic dynamics impacting 
late modern aging
Despite the emphasis on aging in late modernity as an individualized trajec-
tory (see §2.4.2), it would be very naïve to present it as a mere individualistic, 
self-determined project. In reality, many relevant factors influencing people’s 
lives are the result of dynamics and circumstances far beyond the individual’s 
control. This study focuses in particular on the influence of cultural imagi-
naries on the identity formation and the realization of moral agency by older 
people (see chapter 3). However, structural and systemic forces, as discussed 
in §2.3.4, also have a profound impact on the life reality of aging individuals 
in late modernity. According to Hockey and James (2003), “the ‘choice’ and 
agency promised by postmodern accounts of ageing must [...] be tempered by 
the social inequalities of income and of health. These continue to produce con-
siderable variation in the experience of ageing and thus offer rather different 
prospects for individuals with respect to the changing social identities which 
accompany the ageing process” (p. 109). 
Importantly, the structural socio-economic inequalities that characterize 
the dynamics of late modern aging challenge the implicit assumption under-
lying the late modern self-realization discourse, that all individuals are the au-
tonomous directors of their own life (Dannefer, 2008; Dannefer & Uhlenberg, 
1999; Dannefer & Settersten, 2010). One’s scope of self-determination is highly 
dependent on one’s socio-economic status.  The cumulative advantage-disadvan-
tage theory (Dannefer, 2003; Crystal & Shea, 2003) states that people who grow 
up in less privileged socio-economic circumstances experience growing disad-
vantages regarding health and economic position with aging. The disadvantag-
es of a bad start in life tend to cumulate during the life course. The dramatic 
differences in (healthy) life expectancy and in the occurrence of diseases like 
obesity and diabetes between members of different socio-economic classes may 
serve as an example. The reverse is also true; people who are lucky enough to 
grow up in privileged socio-economic circumstances are more likely to age well 
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than their less fortunate contemporaries. The influence of social inequalities 
on the lives of aging people implies that the characteristic changes and transi-
tions of late modernity will have different impacts for different groups of aging 
individuals. 
Another example of the influence of structural and systemic factors on the 
lives of individuals pertains to the structuring of the life course along the lines 
of “chronometric” (calendar) age, which is characteristic of modernization pro-
cesses (Baars, 2007, 2012a, 2012b). While there has been a de-standardization 
of biographies in certain aspects (see §2.3.2), this does not mean that the struc-
turing of the life-course according to chronometric age has lessened. On the 
contrary, especially in the domains of employment and education, there exist 
powerful institutionalized structuring influences based solely upon people’s 
chronological age. This leads to a continuous process of de-standardizing and 
re-standardizing of the life course, depending on the prevailing political and 
economic realities (Baars, 2012a).
Rather than freeing individuals to organize their lives according to their 
own choices, the structuring according to chronometric age results in varia-
tions of the “standard” life course, for instance along the lines of socio-eco-
nomic status. The envisioned life course of the well-to-do elite may include a 
prolonged Third Age with plenty of opportunities for consumption and self-ful-
fillment, whereas groups with lower socio-economic status face later life on the 
threshold of poverty, often with detrimental health consequences resulting in 
an early onset of Fourth Age problems. 
A final relevant observation related to the structural and systemic influenc-
es on aging people’s lives is that phenomena associated with aging (such as 
societal withdrawal after retirement) are also often “naturalized” by scientific 
theorizing. This legitimates them as self-evident situations, instead of acknowl-
edging the fact that these phenomena are socially constituted (Baars, 1991). The 
influential but severely criticized disengagement theory in gerontology serves as 
a textbook example here (Cumming & Henry, 1961). The fact that the “natural” 
tendency to disengage presupposed by this theory may be associated with the 
social institution of retirement at 65 is totally lost from sight. Such natural-
ization deflects attention from the influence of social and political forces and 
power structures that critical gerontology tries to analyze (Baars et al., 2006). 
2.4.5 Aging well as an individual responsibilit y
An important consequence of the choice biography ideology that is typical for 
late modern self-realization discourse is that the risks associated with those 
choices have to be carried by the individual agent instead of collective institu-
tions (Beck, 1992). As Settersten and Trauten (2009) argue: “Choices now seem 
greater, but these choices seem heavier and come with unknown consequences. 
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Any fall-outs must be negotiated and absorbed by individuals and their fami-
lies rather than by governments, markets, or other entities” (p. 457). This in-
dividualization of responsibility affects the lives of aging people profoundly. 
For instance, pensions and healthcare are increasingly transforming from a 
collective responsibility, taken on by the welfare state, to an individual respon-
sibility. This contributes to social inequalities and puts pressure on solidarity 
(Phillipson, 2009, 2013; Polivka & Longino Jr., 2006). 
However, not only financial and healthcare decisions are transferred to the 
realm of individual responsibility. Existential and moral issues are also increas-
ingly perceived as matters to be solved by individual deliberation and choice. 
A good example illustrating how increased choice options of late modernity 
interact with difficult existential and moral questions that have been delegat-
ed to the personal realm is provided by Kaufman’s discussion of medical de-
cisions surrounding death and dying. Due to biomedical developments and 
technological innovations, many conditions that would have resulted in death 
in earlier times have now become chronic conditions. This situation raises dif-
ficult ethical questions, for instance about continuation or ending of treatment, 
but also existential questions related to one’s own finitude and one’s relations 
with significant others. The responsibility for these kinds of questions and the 
dilemmas they invoke is mostly placed with the patients and their social sur-
roundings (Kaufman, 2010a, 2010b). 
The emphasis on individual responsibility in late modern aging discourse 
is also illustrated in dominant models of successful aging. These models fo-
cus on health, activity and social engagement and urge aging individuals to 
conform to the standards of a self-appropriated, active, vital lifestyle (Rowe & 
Kahn, 1997, 1998; see also §3.3.3). The underlying values of these models, such 
as autonomy, self-determination, activity, independence, et cetera, are obvious-
ly highly influenced by the language of the late modern self-realization dis-
course. Problematically, however, the focus on a self-appropriated, active and 
vital lifestyle presupposes that all things threatening the realization of such a 
lifestyle, such as sickness, vulnerability and death, are kept at a safe distance. 
It is clarifying to note again the parallels between this implicit urge of the suc-
cessful aging movement to keep away from disturbing and uncontrollable ex-
istential realities associated with the vulnerability of the human condition, and 
the already discussed tendency of repression and “sequestration” of moral and 
existential matters perceived as typical of late modernity (§2.3.5). Dealing with 
existential vulnerability too, has been turned into an individual responsibility. 
Yet, as observed in §2.2, late modern self-realization discourse has profound 
difficulties in integrating this dimension of existential vulnerability in a satis-
factory manner. The inability to integrate existential vulnerability in a mean-
ingful way can be expected to exert a highly complicating influence on people’s 
chances to experience later life as a phase with value or meaning of its own. 
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2.4.6 E xistential vulnerabilit y and the fragile 
experience of meaning
In gerontological discourse, the vulnerability of later life is often discussed in 
terms of frailty. Gobbens et al. (2011) define frailty broadly as “a process involv-
ing the accumulation of physical, psychological and/or social deficits in func-
tioning which increase the risk of adverse health outcomes (functional disabili-
ties, admission to an institution, death)” (p. 47). Frailty is not so much a state as 
a process whereby disabilities increase over time. It is an important advantage 
of this definition that it includes not only physical factors but also psychological 
and social factors. This is in contrast with more narrow definitions of frailty 
that tend to focus solely on physical health and functioning (Fried et al., 2001; 
Gobbens et al., 2011). Nevertheless, even in its broader definition the frailty dis-
course in general remains strongly oriented towards adverse health outcomes. 
Importantly, however, it turns out that people scoring high on the frail-
ty indexes do not necessarily perceive themselves as frail. In fact, people tend 
to give higher ratings to their own well-being than would be expected on ac-
count of their physical and mental impairments, a phenomenon also known 
as the “disability paradox” (Von Faber, 2002; Albrecht & De Vlieger, 1999). 
There seems to be a compensation effect at work as well, because once people’s 
physical disabilities increase, they tend to place higher value on social relations 
in evaluating their quality of life and well-being (Von Faber et al., 2001). Inter-
estingly, although people tend to value their health very highly, social factors, 
such as the loss of a spouse, seem to be a more decisive reason for them to start 
perceiving themselves as frail (Verhoeven, Kooiker & Van Campen, 2011). 
This study prefers to use the term vulnerability instead of frailty. It focus-
es in particular on what I call existential vulnerability, to highlight elements 
of the human condition that are not always recognized in the predominantly 
health-oriented gerontological discourse that also underlies the frailty litera-
ture. The term existential vulnerability pertains to what Martha Nussbaum 
(2001) termed the “tragic” dimension of human existence, a dimension which 
we can never escape from because it intrinsically belongs to the human condi-
tion. To distinguish existential vulnerability from other kinds of vulnerability, 
it is clarifying to mention a taxonomy of three sources of vulnerability suggest-
ed by MacKenzie, Rogers and Dodds (2014). These sources include: 1) inherent 
vulnerability, which refers to those forms of vulnerability that are inherent to 
the human condition; 2) situational vulnerability, which refers to forms of vul-
nerability that are specific to the personal, social, political, cultural, or environ-
mental situation that people are in; and 3) pathogenic vulnerability, which is a 
subset of situational vulnerability that specifically refers to varieties of situa-
tional influences that are troublesome in a moral sense, such as abusive rela-
tionships or social oppression and injustice. Of these three, what is described 
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in this study as existential vulnerability shows most similarity with inherent 
vulnerability. By contrast, the remediable contingent forms of vulnerability 
caused by the structural and systemic arrangements influencing the lives of 
older people on the one hand (see §2.4.4), and by oppressive and marginaliz-
ing cultural master narratives on the other hand (see §3.3), are comparable to 
situational vulnerability and in some cases deteriorate into pathogenic vulner-
ability. These contingent vulnerabilities influencing the life circumstances of 
older individuals in late modernity are not related to the inevitable fragility and 
interdependence of the human condition, but to social, structural and systemic 
factors that are in principle modifiable (Baars & Phillipson, 2013). 
Typically, these contingent vulnerabilities are relegated to the realm of in-
dividual responsibility, which is exemplary of late modernity’s worrisome “ten-
dency to inflate the idea of individual independence” (Baars, 2012a, p. 149). 
This tendency results in a denial of the many ways in which human beings 
live interdependent lives and are embedded in specific socio-cultural contexts, 
which in turn complicates acknowledging the potential for value and meaning 
that later life harbors. In this sense, contingent vulnerabilities can also have ex-
istential impact. As was discussed in §1.5, the existential dimension of human 
life refers to four dimensions: people’s relation with themselves, their relation 
with other people, their relation with the world at large and their relation with 
a realm of transcendence (Van Deurzen, 2002). Importantly, it is through their 
realization of satisfactory relations with these four domains of existence that 
people are able to experience meaning in their lives. Alternatively, everything 
that may threaten or impede the meaningfulness people experience through 
the formation and maintenance of satisfactory relations with these realms falls 
into the category of existential vulnerability. 
Although there is certainly overlap between existential vulnerability and a 
broad conceptualization of frailty (the loss of a loved one, for instance, counts 
both as an instance of existential vulnerability and as an instance of social frail-
ty), in its focus on health the scientific frailty discourse tends to overlook other 
important aspects of existential vulnerability, particularly when it comes to the 
aspect of meaning and the values that are constitutive of who we are. This is 
another reason for this study to prefer the terminology of existential vulnerabil-
ity. Of course, not only elderly but human beings of every age are existentially 
vulnerable in the sense described above. Such events as illness, or the loss of 
a loved one, form an inescapable element of the human condition and are cer-
tainly not the exclusive province of later life. But although young people are 
not immune to instances of existential vulnerability, the probability of encoun-
tering such events nevertheless tends to increase with age, confronting older 
people more radically with the need for a meaningful integration of this reality 
in their lives (Baars, 2010). 
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Settersten and Trauten (2009) have expressed the increase of vulnerability 
with age in their observation that later life has a “highly contingent quality” (p. 
142). By this, they mean that the increased probability to live to a high age by no 
means guarantees how these added years will be experienced. An unfortunate 
fall resulting in a hip fracture may be the onset of a downward spiral of vulner-
ability. On the other hand, the birth of grandchildren may bring unexpected joy 
and strengthen or enrich contact with one’s children, resulting in a flourishing 
phase of grandparenthood. The balance of experiences may turn out to be pos-
itive or negative, depending on what life events one encounters and how strong 
one’s resilience to adversity turns out to be (Ryff et al., 2012). Much seems to 
depend on the successful integration of existential vulnerability and the attitude 
people develop towards it, as this study argues in later chapters.  
Obviously, existential vulnerability as described above is a phenomenon of 
all times and not exclusive to late modernity or late modern aging. But it has 
been argued that as a result of processes such as individualization, erosion of 
traditional sources of meaning and morality and the increasing focus on con-
trolling and managing risks, late modernity has a particularly hard time find-
ing a satisfactory attitude towards the existential dimension of (later) life (Cole, 
1992). In the absence of self-evident moral and spiritual sources of identity, 
relating to existential vulnerability can be expected to be a particularly complex 
task for late modern aging individuals. This study therefore advocates paying 
broader attention to existential vulnerability in the study of aging, and aims to 
make a contribution to this goal itself. However, it should be underscored that 
the contingent vulnerabilities confronted in later life that do not fall into the 
existential category remain in need of the dedicated attention of gerontology as 
well. It cannot be emphasized enough that contrary to existential vulnerabili-
ties, the contingent vulnerabilities are principally open to repair, for instance, 
by improving the life circumstances of older people. Critical gerontology right-
ly keeps stressing the importance of scientific and political efforts to remedy 
adverse living conditions, such as global social inequalities (Phillipson, 2013; 
Baars et al., 2006). Cultural gerontology, on the other hand, focuses on the 
need to replace oppressive and stereotyping cultural narratives about later life 
with more inspiring counter narratives; this is an aim the current study also 
aims to contribute to (Gullette, 2004, 2011; Cruikshank 2003; see further chap-
ter 3).    
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2.5 conclusion 
2.5.1 Ambivalences of self-realization in late modernit y
If there is one common element that can be distinguished in the diverse analy-
ses of the late modern world that were broadly sketched in this chapter, it seems 
to be the image of individuals struggling to lead a good life, in a constantly 
changing, insecure, chaotic and confusing world. Not only has the individual 
acquired the morally highly valued status of free and autonomous agency in the 
course of modernization, individuals are also increasingly regarded as the only 
resource one can eventually turn to when it comes to creating a good life for 
oneself. In the context of an insecure, complex, globalized world, individuals 
are destined to find their own – temporary and constantly changing –  answers 
to existential and moral questions and create and maintain a viable self-identity. 
Consequently, late modern conceptions of the good life that feed into the late 
modern discourse of self-realization present a strong inclination for individu-
als to develop their own life plans, projects and lifestyles. The image of people 
shaping their lives through an autonomous act of design and choice is typical 
of what is sketched in this study as the late modern version of self-realization 
discourse.
Yet the status of self-realization as a moral ideal characteristic of late mo-
dernity can only be deeply ambivalent. This ambivalence has two causes in 
particular. The first relates to the tension between the expectation of self-deter-
mining moral agency and the host of external forces exerting their influence 
on the individual; the second relates to the tension between the anthropological 
assumptions characterizing the late modern self-realization account and the 
reality of social embedding, interdependence and existential vulnerability that 
characterize human lives.
1. Late modern self-realization discourse implicitly relies on a strong and in-
dependent, self-determining image of the self. This self is expected to be 
able to reflexively consider (and constantly reconsider) its value commit-
ments, aspirations and desires, and to act upon them in order to express 
moral agency in complex practical circumstances. However, as previously 
discussed, late modernity harbors a complex assembly of structural and sys-
temic factors threatening the realization of such a strong self, an assembly 
of factors which has grown extensively complex in the course of moderniza-
tion. Moreover, dominant cultural imaginaries and narratives provide an 
inescapable context that individuals have to relate to in their identity forma-
tion, as is discussed in chapter 3. The profound impact of both structural/
systemic and socio-cultural forces on the identity formation of individual 
agents suggests that the promise of late modern self-realization discourse 
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is not as easily realizable as it seems. In fact, being the independent, self-de-
termining architect of one’s own lifestyle, on second thought, seems pro-
foundly problematic. This raises doubts about whether self-realization is 
at all possible, at least as it is presented in the late modern interpretation. 
2. The second source of ambivalence for late modern self-realization discourse 
relates to the implicit assumptions regarding the nature of the individual 
moral agent. The late modern view of self-realization relies on an account of 
human agency which can be argued to be very problematic and unrealistic. 
In particular, this account tends to disregard the socio-cultural constitution 
of human agency. 
While the complexity of the late modern world confronts us with deep anxi-
eties and uncertainties and forces us to acknowledge our interdependencies 
with others, paradoxically, the late modern moral ideal of self-realization 
suggests that we can and should take the position of an autonomous, inde-
pendent, sovereign director of our individual lives. The late modern inter-
pretation of self-realization seems unable to acknowledge the situated, so-
cially constituted and interdependent nature of human lives. This inability 
also lies at the base of its difficulty to relate to the dimension of existential 
vulnerability (see §2.4.6).
Despite these ambivalences attached to the late modern self-realization dis-
course however, it is important to realize that as a moral ideal, self-realization 
still provides us with an attractive image of what we could be, at our best. It 
provides us with an image of moral agents taking charge of their own lives, 
infusing these with value and meaning according to self-appropriated motiva-
tions and orientations. The force of this ideal, no matter how problematic its 
underlying assumptions, can be felt regardless of the question whether people 
actually succeed in attaining this ideal, or even whether it is at all realistic that 
they should do so. From the work of the sociological and philosophical authors 
that is discussed, self-realization arises as an alternative moral framework re-
placing the traditional sources of meaning and morality that have lost their 
self-evident status. This is all the more reason to take it seriously. However, 
the question relevant for the current study is whether it is a viable ideal to be 
applied in the context of aging. 
2.5.2 Reframing late modern self-realization discourse 
The case of late modern aging is highly illustrative of the way the discussed 
ambivalences of late modern self-realization discourse influence people’s lives. 
From the discussion of characteristic elements of late modern aging in §2.4, 
we have learned that both ambivalences plaguing late modern self-realization 
discourse described above also impact the reality of late modern aging. 
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• First of all, for older individuals, exercising competencies associated with 
self-realization such as self-determination and choice, is highly complicated 
by the structural and systemic arrangements organizing later life, as well as 
by the socio-cultural constitution of old age. Older people are often denied 
the agential capacities that are implied by self-realization discourse, which 
suggests that the possibility of self-realization seems illusionary in their 
case.
• Second, the problematic anthropological assumptions typical of late mod-
ern self-realization discourse poorly match the reality of vulnerability and 
frailty that is often radically confronted in aging. Consequently, late mod-
ern self-realization discourse seems to offer a rather insufficient model of 
the good life for older individuals, particularly because it falls short of pro-
viding resources for relating to the dimension of existential vulnerability in 
a meaningful way.  
The ambivalences and tensions connected with late modern self-realization dis-
course that have been discussed above can reasonably tempt us to dismiss the 
value of self-realization altogether, and particularly its application to later life. 
Would it not be better to admit that self-realization, though an attractive idea, is 
in fact very unrealistic; and that a moral discourse based on this concept cannot 
possibly provide us with the necessary resources for developing more nuanced, 
inspiring and meaningful imaginaries and narratives about later life? Why try 
to uphold the moral value of an ideal that is obviously so problematic?
This study takes the standpoint that it would be unwise to give up on self-re-
alization as a moral ideal. First of all, it would be undesirable if the ambivalences 
attached to the late modern version of self-realization discourse would result in 
the exclusion of aging people from this moral ideal. Even if the reality of many 
people’s lives seems to negate the possibility for self-realization, I think, as a 
human society we are morally obliged to cherish its underlying goals of optimal 
human flourishing and fulfillment as something worthy to strive for, both on 
an individual and a cultural/societal level. Even those who take the standpoint 
that our primary scholarly efforts should be directed towards changing social 
structures in such a way that justice and social equality are enhanced, would 
be well-advised to probe the moral orientation underlying their engagement 
with these matters. This also underscores the relevance of the self-realization 
discourse, with its focus on the development of a viable orientation to identi-
ty-constituting values. 
Furthermore, despite the formulated ambivalences, which are very real and 
should not be underestimated, we must not forget that late modern self-realiza-
tion discourse draws upon a broader philosophical discourse of self-realization 
which may provide opportunities to help us solve the identified problems. It has 
become clear that a viable conception of self-realization applicable to the context 
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of aging does need to address, and to some extent solve, two important issues 
related to the late modern view in particular. These issues need to be reframed 
to adapt the late modern self-realization discourse to the context of aging. 
1. The problematically atomistic anthropology underlying the late modern 
view needs to be revised in order to acknowledge the contextual embedding 
and social constitution of individuals, and their mutual relation of interde-
pendence with other people.
2. The problematic relationship of late modern self-realization discourse with 
the dimension of existential vulnerability, which is increasingly radically 
confronted in later life, needs to be remedied.  
It is my contention that the rich philosophical discourse of self-realization, of 
which the late modern view represents only one appearance, should be probed 
for thoughts and insights that provide the opportunity to overcome the lim-
itations of the late modern view, in particular, as they appear in the context of 
aging. My aim in the following chapters, then, is an exploration and reframing 
of self-realization and its constitutive concepts, in order to arrive at an interpre-
tation able to provide backing for the inspirational image of “life as a whole” 
that Erikson (1997) found lacking in our contemporary world (see §1.2). It is 
my hope that such a reframed interpretation of self-realization may bring us 
the needed resources to  support an inspiring, meaningful, satisfactory image 
of what it means to live a good life as an aging individual. This hope illustrates 
the normative inspiration that underlies the current study, which is fueled by 
the humanist assumption that better lives are possible if people are recognized 
as moral agents. Such recognition implies that people should be able to in-
fluence their own lives in accordance with what they find valuable and worth 
striving for, and that they should have access to valued social roles. This hu-
manistic inspiration requires upholding the conviction that moral agency is not 
an illusionary, redundant category, but a relevant ethical purpose to promote. 
Hopefully, my interpretation of self-realization in this study will convincingly 
underscore the importance, nature and conditions of such moral agency. 

Chapter 3 – Cultural narratives and 
counter narratives about aging 
3.1 introduction
“Living a life of your own”; “being your own person”; “marching to the beat of 
your own drum”; “becoming who you are”; contemporary self-realization dis-
course is replete with images and expressions that suggest a certain view of 
the self. Although rarely made explicit, this image of the self can broadly be 
described as self-reliant, independent, autonomous, atomistic and essentialist. 
It has already been pointed out that in contrast, the reframed understanding of 
self-realization that this study aims to develop presupposes the embedding of 
the self in a social and cultural context. Consequently, our identity is seen as a 
socio-culturally constituted phenomenon, rather than an essential inner “core 
self”. Moreover, our lives and selves are perceived as intrinsically interwoven 
with those of others rather than atomistic and independent. In other words, 
who we are can only be understood against the background of the social and 
cultural context of our lives. 
It follows from such a view of the self that the availability of sufficient social 
and cultural resources of identity is quintessential to a successful process of 
self-realization. As discussed earlier however (§1.3), this study is fueled by the 
observation that aging in late modernity lacks precisely those viable, inspiring 
cultural perspectives on later life that should provide aging individuals with 
resources for creating and maintaining a meaningful “age identity”. Gullette 
(2004) defines this age identity as “each person’s collection of ‘information’ 
about age and aging in general and stories about their own age and aging in 
particular” (p. 15). A further exploration of the relation between cultural narra-
tives, identity building and aging forms the theme of this chapter.
First, a general theoretical perspective on cultural narratives and their role 
in identity building is presented (§3.2.1). Also, potential identity-related prob-
lems associated with dominant cultural “master narratives” are discussed 
(§3.2.2). These problems, it is argued, can best be understood in terms of fail-
ure to recognize and accommodate people’s moral agency in different ways 
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(§3.2.3). Subsequently, ideas about how this identity damage caused by cultural 
narratives can be repaired by creating viable counter narratives are discussed 
(§3.2.4). The theory developed by Lindemann Nelson in her work Damaged 
identities, narrative repair (2001), complemented with some relevant insights 
that can be found in the work of Honneth on recognition (Anerkennung) and 
reification (Verdinglichung) (1995, 2008, 2012) form the main basis of the dis-
cussion.  The general theoretical insights on how cultural narratives and iden-
tity can be applied to the context of aging are discussed next (§3.3), drawing first 
on insights from cultural and critical gerontological thought (§3.3.1). Two domi-
nant contemporary categories of cultural narratives on aging are distinguished 
and discussed: decline narratives (§3.3.2) and age-defying narratives (§3.3.3). 
Following this, their problems and limitations are analyzed (§3.3.4). The final 
section of this chapter is dedicated to an exploration of a set of possible alterna-
tive counter narratives about later life (§3.4). In an attempt to repair the most 
important shortcomings of decline narratives and age-defying narratives, a ten-
tative outline for so-called “narratives of becoming” is sketched. This outline 
foreshadows some of the important features of the reframed version of the late 
modern interpretation of self-realization that this study advances.  
3.2 cultur Al nArr Atives And counter nArr Atives
3.2.1 Cultural (master) narratives and their role 
in identit y-building
In the context of this study, cultural narratives are defined as agglomerates of 
stories, imaginaries, meanings, representations, archetypes, views and stock 
images existing in a certain culture about a social group, for instance wom-
en, Muslims, gay/lesbian people, or aging individuals. This is a deliberately 
broad definition which includes, but is not restricted to narratives as tradition-
ally understood stories with a beginning, middle and end. Most importantly, 
my understanding of cultural narratives presents them as carriers of meaning 
in the broadest sense. Cultural narratives are disseminated in a given culture 
through various means, and they pervade our lifeworld in a sometimes con-
scious, but also often largely unconscious manner (Lindemann Nelson, 2001; 
Meyers, 1994). They provide the horizon against which we situate our own life 
narratives (C. Taylor, 1989). They supply us with a reservoir of both narrative 
form and content on which to model our own identities. Other terms that em-
phasize this function of cultural narratives are “macro narrative environment” 
(Randall & McKim, 2008), and “ideological setting” (McAdams, 1996).
From early childhood throughout life, we are constantly confronted with 
explicit and implicit cultural narratives about different aspects of our world. 
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They come to us through fairy tales or comic books, advertisements, newspa-
pers, TV shows, exemplary figures like parents or teachers, works of art and 
many other media. These cultural narratives give direction to our views and 
perceptions, inform our choices and judgments, influence which social roles 
are or are not available to us, and influence how we think and act in certain 
situations. Cultural narratives are thereby indispensable meaning-generating 
resources without which we cannot form a viable identity. Lindemann Nel-
son (2001) reminds us that “it’s neither possible or desirable to extricate one’s 
thinking to any great degree from all the clichés of one’s culture, since these are 
the understandings we share in common. If a person were to dissociate herself 
from them completely, she would no longer be able to understand either herself 
and the people around her or the workings of her society” (p. 85). Despite their 
indispensable status as identity resources however, cultural narratives may also 
severely restrict the options that are available to members of a particular social 
group to form a certain identity. This is the case if they produce and reproduce 
prejudiced sets of images and expectations that are so pervasive that they are 
very hard to counter (Meyers, 1994). The expected result is marginalization and 
oppression. Members of social groups that are thus marginalized in a given 
culture are unlikely to have the same access to that culture’s dominant ideals 
of a good life.
Any given culture harbors a diverse array of cultural narratives, but some 
narratives have a more dominant position than others. Lindemann Nelson 
(2001) describes these as “master narratives” (p. 6). She defines cultural mas-
ter narratives as “the stories circulating in our culture that embody socially 
shared understandings” (Lindemann Nelson, 2001, p. 84). The role of cultur-
al (master) narratives is expressed by De Medeiros (2005) when she defines 
them as “the stories (or story fragments) ‘told’ by a culture to communicate the 
values, expectations and attitudes of that culture” (p. 2). The quotation marks 
surrounding the word told in this definition emphasize that cultural narratives 
are very broadly perceived and do not only include traditional stories put into a 
coherent lingual form, but can also encompass more diffuse expressions, such 
as artistic expressions or media representations. 
Cultural master narratives derive their pervasive force from the fact that 
they represent convictions and expectations shared by the majority of people in 
a given context. This grants them the status of self-evident truths. Any alterna-
tive narrative challenging this truth will have to go against the tide to convince 
the majority that what they perceive as the status quo is instead a prejudiced 
standpoint. Because this is very complicated, cultural master narratives are 
strongly resistant to change. 
But cultural master narratives do not only shape our expectations about 
what is “fitting” behavior for people in general, they also influence our self-im-
age and what we expect of ourselves. Even if we disagree with them consciously, 
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our reactions may still unconsciously be influenced by these cultural narra-
tives. Critical feminist gerontologists from De Beauvoir (1970/1972) to Gullette 
(1997, 2004, 2011) have underscored, for example, how the self-image of old-
er women has become contaminated with cultural expectations about loss of 
sexual attractiveness and social invisibility. Being constantly confronted with 
either implicit or explicit confirmations of such a master narrative strengthens 
and consolidates this view and may result in internalization of the correspond-
ing image.
Cultural master narratives that express socially shared understandings 
about a certain social group inevitably affect the identities of its members. Peo-
ple always belong to different social groups at the same time. Importantly, some 
group memberships are “found”, such as our gender or our family, whereas 
others are “chosen”, such as our profession, religious affiliation or membership 
of a sports club or choir. We all negotiate our current identities in interaction 
with both our found and our chosen communities. Communities of choice, 
however, grant us the opportunity to resist harmful or limiting socio-cultural 
positioning that we are subjected to by our membership of communities that 
are given (Friedman, 1992). 
Although many master narratives are benign, some can be morally evil. 
The latter tend to “unfairly depict particular social groups as lacking in vir-
tue or as existing merely to serve others’ ends” (Lindemann Nelson, 2001, p. 
152). One only need to think of the master narratives about Jews abounding in 
Nazi Germany to appreciate their potential for damaging consequences. Yet the 
identity-restricting influence of cultural master narratives can also be much 
more subtle and even exerted with the best intentions. For example, in cultures 
where girls are culturally positioned as subservient domestic creatures, expect-
ed to bear children and be obedient wives, it is often not perceived in their best 
interest to engage in a life outside the home. Consequently, elements that could 
constitute their identity associated with obtaining (higher) education or fulfill-
ing a professional role are generally not available to them.
The range of identity resources provided by cultural narratives depends on 
a variety of factors, such as the historical and cultural outlook or one’s social 
position. The analysis of late modernity in chapter 2 suggests that available 
identity resources have become more pluralistic and insecure given the fact 
that previously dominant grand narratives, provided by religious and moral 
traditions for instance, have lost their authority over us. Navigating this plural-
ism can be cause for identity confusion, but may also harbor opportunities for 
resistance. The availability of cultural identity resources also fluctuates during 
the life course. In youth and adulthood, one may have access to resources that 
become blocked in later life. Obvious examples include the values and social 
roles our cultures attach to paid labor, which escape our reach upon (mandato-
ry) retirement. 
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In light of their typical resistance to transformation, changing cultural nar-
ratives is a very complicated task. It can never be accomplished by the simple 
act of an individual, but always requires efforts by many actors at multiple levels 
(Lindemann Nelson, 2001). The fact that transformation of cultural narratives 
can be so difficult does not mean, however, that cultural narratives represent 
static entities, or that they always offer clear and unambiguous sets of stories, 
views and expectations that raise no doubts or conflicts. On the contrary, cul-
tural narratives are dynamic, evolving and complex phenomena that exert their 
influence on our lives in many ways that are often difficult to trace. 
3.2.2 Damaging effects of cultural narratives
Let me elaborate on how cultural master narratives may exert negative influ-
ences on people’s identities according to Lindemann Nelson’s (2001) theory. 
She emphasizes that malignant cultural master narratives tend to lead to a 
certain social positioning of a (sub)group (e.g., women, African Americans, 
Muslims, homosexuals, elderly, et cetera) that is damaging to their identities. 
Typically, the people belonging to this group become identified with a limited 
number of stereotypical characteristics. For example, women are supposed to 
be caring, elderly are expected to be slower, less flexible, or dependent, African 
Americans are perceived as lazy, et cetera. Other characteristics of (members 
of) the social group that do not fit the stereotypical image presented by the mas-
ter narrative get lost from sight. This negates individual differentiation within 
the (sub)group, making individual differences (socially) invisible or irrelevant. 
It also results in exclusion from opportunities and social roles (Wolfensberger, 
2013). According to Lindemann Nelson (2001), malignant cultural master nar-
ratives can exert their oppressive, marginalizing and stereotyping effect in four 
different ways. Firstly, they can exercise an expulsive force, whereby the subject 
of the narrative is driven out of the larger society. Secondly, they can exert a 
dismissive force, whereby the subgroup is tolerated in larger society but only on 
the margins. Thirdly, they can exercise a pressive force, whereby the subgroup 
is forced into a servile position towards the dominant group. Finally, they can 
exercise the preservative force, that positions the subgroup in such a manner 
that it represents the contrasting “other” necessary to maintain the dominant 
ideology (Lindemann Nelson, 2001, p. 113). 
Lindemann Nelson distinguishes between two damaging effects that can 
be imposed on people by oppressive and marginalizing cultural (master) nar-
ratives. 
1. Deprivation of opportunity (Lindemann Nelson, 2001, p. 23-28), which de-
scribes a situation in which people are excluded from certain roles, chances 
and options as a result of the stereotypical way in which they are presented 
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by master narratives. Being a member of the group of “older employees”, for 
example, all too often means being associated with diminished strength or 
speed. This may result in being deprived of the opportunity to solicit func-
tions or tasks requiring these capacities, even if one’s individual strength or 
speed are actually quite sufficient.
2. Infiltrated consciousness (Lindemann Nelson, 2001, p. 28-34), which does not 
operate from the outside, but from within the person itself. Dominant sto-
ries and images are internalized by individuals and influence their self-im-
age and the opportunities they envision for themselves. I encountered an 
interesting example hearing my own parents and their friends say that for 
them, one of the challenges of retirement was “getting used to not being 
needed anymore”. Note that this was expressed as a completely self-evident 
fact by people with rich social lives who are valued as parents, grandparents, 
friends, volunteers and so on. Apparently the dominant cultural narrative 
that being productive in the labor market gives access to a certain good (i.e., 
being needed in society) which is lost upon retirement is so strong that it 
is internalized as an inevitable fact of life. Characteristically, people are not 
aware of the harming effect of infiltrated consciousness, because it is expe-
rienced as the “normal” state of affairs. However, this makes its malignancy 
even more serious. 
In order to free people from both categories of harm, it is required that their 
identity can be redefined in the context of alternative stories. One needs to be 
able to identify with alternative stories replacing the dysfunctional identifica-
tion (in terms of infiltrated consciousness) with dominant oppressive or restric-
tive stories, a process Lindemann Nelson describes as “narrative repair” (p. 20). 
This presupposes (re)gaining access to resources for telling and confirming al-
ternative stories, which should be provided by one’s social and cultural commu-
nities. The two harms require repair in conjunction with each other; a redefini-
tion of the self that challenges people’s infiltrated consciousness may lead other 
people to perceive the people in question differently, which in turn may result 
in an increase in opportunities that mitigate the harming effect of deprivation. 
But it works the other way around as well, because efforts to increase people’s 
opportunities are likely to influence their self-image and increase their self-re-
spect as moral agents; this should have a positive influence on reducing the 
harm brought about by infiltrated consciousness. The overarching aim of the 
redefinition entailed by narrative repair of identities is always to reclaim and 
enhance people’s moral agency. The next section further elaborates on the con-
nection between this notion and the theme of cultural narratives and identity. 
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3.2.3 Moral agency and the importance of recognition
The concept of moral agency plays a crucial role in my reframing of the late 
modern self-realization discourse. I define moral agency as the ability to lead 
a good life, with and for others, according to one’s highest aspirations and best ca-
pacities, as full participating members of a society/community. The background of 
this choice of formulation is further elucidated in §5.5. Although Lindemann 
Nelson’s (2001) discussion of moral agency as the good that is reclaimed in the 
process of narrative identity-repair is not explicitly associated with the theme 
of self-realization, I think her understanding of moral agency shows sufficient 
similarities with the one advanced in this study. 
In Lindemann Nelson’s view, our moral agency is connected to a process of 
moral self-definition that is the target of identity-repairing counter narratives. 
Moral self-definitions can be either weak or strong. In the case of weak moral 
self-definitions, a group or an individual is constructed as basically morally 
competent. In the case of strong moral self-definitions, the moral competence 
of agents is deepened by connecting it to the identity-constituting commit-
ments or priorities that give direction to the agent’s moral behavior. These need 
not be the same as those of another moral agent, but are intrinsically connected 
with one’s biography and one’s self-understanding. Strong moral self-definition 
relates our decisions in concrete situations to who we want to be (or become), 
e.g., a good father, a reliable friend, or a senior maintaining a vital involvement 
with life.   
An important implication of Lindemann Nelson’s view is that moral agen-
cy requires recognition by others that one is morally worthy to perform one’s 
desired actions freely. This condition is intertwined with the question whether 
one is given sufficient opportunities to act according to one’s moral self-defi-
nition (cf. deprivation of opportunity). But importantly, moral agency also re-
quires assessing oneself as morally able and trustworthy. The problem is that 
oppressive narratives may lead to an internalization of damaging images, so 
that the oppressive narrative affects one’s self-image and in effect diminishes 
one’s self-esteem as a moral agent (cf. infiltrated consciousness). 
In order to gain a more refined understanding of the link between social 
recognition and the repairing of socio-cultural damage to people’s identity 
and moral agency, the work of Honneth (1995, 2008, 2012) can provide valu-
able additional insights that enrich and deepen Lindemann Nelson’s (2001) 
account of moral agency. Inspired by Hegel as well as by the critical theory of 
the Frankfurt School, Honneth understands the dynamics of social conflicts 
directed towards social change in terms of what he calls a “struggle for rec-
ognition” (Honneth, 1995). He argues that it is a necessary condition for free-
dom, autonomy and self-realization that individuals feel recognized as beings 
whose aspirations, values and goals are legitimate and worthy to strive for. In 
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Honneth’s words, “Individuals achieve self-determination by learning, within 
relations of reciprocal recognition, to view their needs, beliefs and abilities as 
worthy of articulation and pursuit in the public sphere” (Honneth, 2012, p. 
46). Honneth (1995, 2012) distinguishes between three levels of inter-human 
recognition, which are all perceived as equally essential, but pertain to different 
domains of human existence. The first and perhaps most fundamental and 
basic relationship of recognition is modeled on the unconditional love between 
mother and child. Through this recognition, we learn to perceive ourselves as 
subjects worthy of being loved and cherished independent of our efforts and 
achievements. If this initial relationship of recognition fails to be established in 
human life, our personhood or subjectivity is basically flawed (Erikson, 1963; 
Winnicott, 1965). Expectedly, this also impedes our ability to lead good lives 
which is fundamental to our moral agency. 
The second form of recognition distinguished by Honneth (1995, 2012) is 
located not in the domain of primary relationships, but on the societal level. 
Essential for the ability to function as moral agents exercising our human po-
tential for freedom and autonomy, is that we are recognized and respected as 
equal members of the societal legal order. This means being endowed with the 
status of citizenship that grants us access to fundamental human rights, i.e., 
being guaranteed a just, fair and equal treatment by the institutions of society. 
Whereas love is the form of expression of the first form of recognition, respect is 
the form of expression of the second. 
The third form of recognition on the other hand, pertains to being recog-
nized as a unique person, able and entitled to strive for self-appropriated goals 
in life. This form of recognition includes the optimal development of individ-
ual potentials and acknowledgment for the striving for self-realization. Where-
as the second form of recognition requires that subjects are acknowledged as 
equals, the third form of recognition requires that subjects are valued in their 
diversity and individuality. This demands that people mutually acknowledge 
the legitimacy and value of each other’s individual strivings for meaning and 
purpose in life, and are congenial to its realization. The corresponding form of 
expression associated with this third form of recognition is termed solidarity 
by Honneth.  
Honneth’s theory of recognition (1995) helps to clarify what is at stake in the 
narrative repair of the identity-damage inflicted by cultural master narratives. 
For example, a lack of the first form of recognition, love in primary relation-
ships, may impede moral agency when parents are disappointed with the birth 
of a daughter, unable to provide her with the same love and support as a son 
under the influence of cultural master narratives that devalue women. A lack of 
the second form of recognition, equal respect in societal relationships, impedes 
moral agency when a certain subgroup in society is denied equal access to cer-
tain rights and goods, as used to be the case for the black population in the 
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United States before the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1968, or in South Africa 
during the Apartheid-regime (and sadly, some practices of lacking recognition 
for these groups continue to the current day). A lack of the third form of recog-
nition, solidarity with other people’s projects of self-realization, impedes moral 
agency by denying people the status of individuals with aspirations and capac-
ities that deserve to be valued and supported. In such a case, a subgroup may 
enjoy the same formal rights and equal position as other groups in society, but 
be denied the opportunity to strive for certain goals because these don’t match 
the dominant cultural expectations attached to the group in question. This can 
be illustrated by the case of older individuals who are forced into retirement 
although they still aspire to perform paid labor. Honneth’s trichotomy offers a 
valuable perspective to arrive at a more refined analysis of how cultural narra-
tives impede moral agency. It teaches us that restoring moral agency that has 
suffered from oppressive, stereotyping and marginalizing cultural master nar-
ratives requires the restoration of relationships of recognition at multiple levels. 
It sensitizes our mind to the question of which form of recognition is most 
urgently denied by certain cultural master narratives in a given situation, and 
at what level the moral agency of the concerned actors therefore needs repair. 
Apart from his ideas about recognition, Honneth’s (2008) analysis of rei-
fication (Verdinglichung) also helps to clarify certain damaging effects of op-
pressive and stereotyping cultural master narratives. This term describes hu-
man behavior in which fellow subjects are not treated according to their status 
as dignified human beings with the same emotions, desires, aspirations and 
rights as everyone else, but instead as objects or even commodities (Honneth, 
2005). The link becomes clear if we notice that malignant cultural master nar-
ratives tend to treat people belonging to the oppressed group as objects rather 
than subjects or moral agents (Lindemann Nelson, 2001). The most obvious 
examples of reification can of course be drawn from the history of slavery, or 
from the context of industrialization in which people came to be treated as dis-
posable anonymous laborers. But reification can also take more subtle and hid-
den shapes, by treating people as de-individualized creatures whose aspirations 
and rights are overruled. For example, the recurring political representation of 
older people as societal “burdens” weighing heavily on welfare and healthcare 
budgets could be interpreted as a case of reification.
Central to Honneth’s (2008) analysis of reification is that it disables our 
engagement with the practices that form our reality from the perspective of 
a participant. Instead, it reduces us to the status of bystander, being excluded 
from those very activities, narratives and social roles that are essential in the 
constitution of a meaningful sense of identity. Being a participant does not 
necessarily presume an activist mode of behavior, but it does presuppose that 
people are fully recognized as agents who co-constitute the practices that make 
up their living context. The importance of being able to fulfill the role of par-
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ticipant can be illustrated by an interesting perspective drawn from the context 
of disability studies: social role valorization theory (Wolfensberger, 2013; Kend-
rick, 2008, 2009; Osburn, 2006; Lemay, 1999). Social role valorization theory 
reacts to the problem of social devaluation, or negative perception, of certain 
people in society. By creating new and positively valued social roles for people, 
or restoring their access to previously available roles, it is argued that people’s 
chances to participate as full and equal members of society can be enhanced. 
This could contribute to the strengthening of their moral agency. 
An inspiring story told to me by a social role valorization expert sketched 
the case of a retired carpenter who suffered from Alzheimer’s disease. Al-
though he was well taken care of in the care institution where he resided, he 
was utterly bored and fell into depression. His children, in an attempt to try and 
tackle his boredom and depression, managed to find a carpenter who had pre-
viously worked with him. Though many of the tasks of daily living presented 
him with insurmountable problems, he proved to still be capable of performing 
some of the operations that were familiar to him from his history of working 
as a carpenter. He could thereby provide valuable assistance to his colleague. 
With appropriate support, this man could thus regain access to a valued social 
role, which enabled him to function as a valued participant again instead of a 
passive bystander. 
Honneth (2008) himself interprets the harmful effects of the phenomenon 
of reification in terms of a lack of relations of recognition, or rather a disregard 
for their fundamental role. Although an attitude characterized by reification 
can have advantages in some domains, for instance when it comes to acquir-
ing knowledge or developing technological solutions for urgent societal issues, 
problems arise when the fundamental relationship of recognition preceding 
such instrumental knowledge relations are lost from sight. The implication 
of Honneth’s view requires taking into account that relationships of mutual 
recognition are the transcendental condition for any viable human practice or 
society. Negating the importance of these relationships opens the door to mor-
ally harmful phenomena like social exclusion, discrimination, paternalism, 
oppression and neglect. If people, for instance the elderly, are excluded from 
participation, this will likely impede their moral agency. Good practices call for 
care institutions that give people their own say in how daily care is organized, 
for instance, with regard to bathing times or choice of meals. Conversely, care 
institutions where the systemic logic of efficiency decides about these issues, 
risk reducing people to “objects” of care, and thus bystanders in their own daily 
life. Besides consequences on the level of the individual life, reification may 
also have detrimental effects on society at large. After all, potentially valuable 
contributions that older people may have to make are overlooked. It follows that 
both society and aging people would profit from successful strategies to repair 
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the damaging influences of dominant cultural narratives and enhance people’s 
moral agency.    
3.2.4 Narrative repair through agency-enhancing 
counter narratives
This section will proceed to discuss Lindemann Nelson’s (2001) view about 
how identity-damaging cultural master narratives can be repaired. Transform-
ing cultural narratives that are oppressive or marginalizing requires enduring 
efforts on multiple levels. Realizing this task is not easy, given the pervasive 
influence of stereotypical and devaluing images on the dominant mindset of 
people. Replacing such mindsets often seems a very unequal battle with dis-
couragingly small chances of success. Wolfensberger (2013) aptly formulates 
the difficulty of this challenge when he states that, “One’s experiences will usu-
ally have to contradict one’s expectancies and stereotypes very powerfully, and 
almost always very consistently, in order for these latter to be defeated and re-
versed. On the other hand, it takes only few and/or weak confirmations of one’s 
expectancies and stereotypes in order for them to become well-nigh irreversibly 
embedded” (p. 58). To repair the harm done by cultural master narratives that 
are oppressive, denigrating or marginalizing, Lindemann Nelson (2001) sug-
gests the strategy of developing viable “counterstories” or counter narratives. A 
counter narrative is defined as “a story that resists an oppressive identity and 
attempts to replace it with one that commands respect” (Lindemann Nelson, 
2001, p. 6). By providing alternative stories challenging the damaging identifi-
cation with oppressive master narratives, a counter narrative can empower the 
concerned social group, by generating respect and social value for the people 
belonging to it. Although I share Lindemann Nelson’s view about the impor-
tance of empowerment, drawing on the argument about Honneth’s (1995) three 
types of social recognition I would add to her definition that counter narratives 
should not only command respect, but also enhance the opportunities for peo-
ple to engage in primary relationships of love and care, as well as acknowledge 
and facilitate each individual’s striving for self-realization.
It is important to emphasize that for Lindemann Nelson, it is not just any 
alternative story that qualifies as a counter narrative. To qualify as a counter 
narrative, a narrative has to represent a set of features: 1) it has to replace as 
well as resist an oppressive master narrative, 2) it should set out to rehabilitate 
damaged identities, 3) it should be directed towards freeing a person’s moral 
agency, and 4) it should deliberately cause a shift in the cultural understanding 
of a certain group, rather than just reflecting one. Consequently, an alternative 
story that is just a different story from the dominant master narrative does not 
necessarily function as a counter narrative. Although it might be able to repair 
deficiencies in meaning on the individual level, it does not become a counter 
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narrative unless it stretches out to the cultural level to challenge problematic 
socio-cultural positioning and actively present alternatives. 
Lindemann Nelson distinguishes three possible levels of resistance: refus-
al, repudiation and contestation. 
1. Refusal is usually limited to the individual level, when individuals deny 
that a damaging (for instance ageist) stereotype applies to them, and form 
their own alternative story to identify with. Since there is no necessity or 
guarantee of an extension of this alternative story to the cultural, collective 
level however, refusal stories cannot function as proper counter narratives; 
they remain incomplete and their reach is limited. For example, an indi-
vidual older woman may resist the stereotype of diminished sexual activity 
or beauty associated with aging on the individual level, but it may still be 
very hard for her to shrug off the internalization of these stereotypes in all 
situations. 
2. Repudiation goes a step further, not only implying identification with an 
alternative story, but also actively opposing the denigrating stereotypes in 
social contexts. The resistance remains a piecemeal activity however, limit-
ing its scope as a counter narrative to what Lindemann Nelson (2001) calls 
“patchwork forms of resistance” (p. 171). The activities of the Red Hat So-
ciety1, or the “Raging Grannies” (Caissie, 2011) might count as examples 
of repudiation of aging stereotypes. A danger of this type of resistance 
through counter narratives is that they result in the creation of alternative 
stereotypes. Because these alternative stereotypes can be easily ridiculed, 
the intended effect of repudiation is weakened and disarmed. 
3. Contestation represents the full resisting potential of a counter narrative, by 
systematically and collectively challenging stereotypes in public. Resistance 
to aging master narratives on this level is worryingly scarce in our culture. 
However, the activities of the Gray Panthers, for instance, may serve as a 
promising example. This organization publicly refutes the implicit belief 
that turning 65 means retreating to a passive role. Moreover, the organiza-
tion strives to advance the opportunities for older people to lead good lives. 
The following phrase from their mission statement expresses a welcome 
sensitivity to the importance of focusing on the moral agency and self-real-
ization of older people: “The concept of aging takes into account an individ-
ual’s growth during their entire life span, from birth to death in personal 
development, social involvement, and self-fulfillment”.2 
1 | http://redhatsociety.com
2 | www.graypanthers.org
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It is crucial that counter narratives transform both how other people think about 
the marginalized group and how members of this group think about themselves. 
The quintessential factor is the creation of new opportunities for identification 
and self-definition, which should ensure (renewed) access to socially valued 
goods and roles. As a result, components of meaning can be integrated into 
one’s life and identity that were previously unavailable due to blocking by ste-
reotyping, de-individualizing master narratives (Lindemann Nelson, 2001). 
Participant roles in valued and shared human practices can then be opened to 
people who were previously disregarded by these practices as morally inferior 
bystanders. In Honneth’s (2008) terms, this implies becoming aware of and 
strengthening the constitutive relationships of mutual recognition that sustain 
human (or better: humane?) societies in order to remedy the adverse effects of 
reification. 
Importantly, when people (or groups) are marginalized and lack recognition 
as full moral agents, this is often accompanied by social silencing. Feminist 
approaches in particular, stress that counter narratives should strengthen peo-
ple’s moral agency by making their voices heard (M. Walker, 2007; Meyers, 
2004; Lindemann Nelson, 2001). According to these authors, narratives play 
an important role as instruments that give people a voice. This can take place at 
several levels, ranging from enabling people to tell their individual life stories 
to disclosing and presenting collective histories that have been suppressed in 
dominant cultural master narratives. M. Walker (2007) distinguishes between 
three interdependent categories of narratives: identity constituting narratives 
(who am I as a moral agent), narratives about relationships (with whom am I 
connected, for whom do I feel responsible, et cetera) and narratives about moral 
value (what do I regard as valuable, what is the meaning of my narratives, et 
cetera). Together, the three forms of narratives are fundamental to what M. 
Walker terms our moral integrity.
In accordance with Lindemann Nelson’s (2001) approach, M. Walker (2007) 
emphasizes that it is crucial that people are granted an “epistemological po-
sition” which gives them access to socio-cultural resources of identity. This 
means that people should be endowed with the status of legitimate sources 
when claiming knowledgeability about matters regarding their own lives. Their 
narratives about themselves have to be taken seriously by others in order for 
them to fulfill their potential for moral agency. For example, if older people are 
culturally perceived as a-sexual creatures, or if their sexuality is regarded as de-
viant or repulsive, their activities to engage in sexual relationships are likely to 
be regarded as ludicrous or sad, instead of taken seriously as attempts of moral 
agents to create viable narratives of identity and relationships for themselves. 
As long as people are denied epistemological authority regarding their own life 
orientation and choices, problems arise if they want to aspire to a self-deter-
mined life as moral agents.
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3.3 cultur Al nArr Atives About l Ater life
3.3.1 Cultural and critical gerontolog y 
on the cultural positioning of aging
In this section, the discussed theory about cultural narratives is connected to 
the context of aging. One of the claims this study started out with was that 
existing cultural narratives about later life fall short in providing sufficient re-
sources for meaning, both on the individual and on the societal level, by pre-
senting aging in a problematic way. Initially, this claim was based on rather 
anecdotal evidence and observations, ranging from an old acquaintance repeat-
edly warning me “not to become older than 80” because she was convinced that 
everything above that age would bring sorrow and misery, to the photograph 
of an old lady in a sexy bikini posted in a Dutch Facebook group entitled the 
New Aging, suggesting that the best way to age is to keep up with youth culture 
as long as possible. These personal and random observations are confirmed, 
however, by the research and analyses of cultural and critical gerontologists, 
which will be discussed below. First, however, it should be asked whether it 
makes sense to apply Lindemann Nelson’s (2001) theory about cultural master 
narratives to the context of aging? Are older people in fact a culturally margin-
alized group in the sense her theory describes? My contention is that they are 
indeed, and that this justifies the focus on cultural (master) narratives about 
later life in the current study’s analysis of late modern aging (see also Laceulle 
& Baars, 2014). 
To begin with, according to Lindemann Nelson (2001) it is typical of be-
ing a member of a culturally marginalized group that one is identified with a 
limited number of stereotypical characteristics. For aging people this is often 
their calendar age (Baars, 2012b), but they are also identified with stereotypes 
like frailty, dependency, disability, lack of productivity, et cetera (Cruikshank, 
2003; Grenier & Phillipson, 2013). As a result of such identifications, it becomes 
difficult to acknowledge the high degree of individual diversity and heteroge-
neity that characterizes the aging population. Second, this identification with 
a limited amount of features tends to influence how people are encountered by 
others, but also how social institutions and policymakers treat them. This may 
lead to both deprivation of opportunity and infiltrated consciousness, the two 
harmful effects discussed by Lindemann Nelson (2001; see §3.2.2). In accor-
dance with this, aging people’s identification with stereotypical categories such 
as decline often leads to an overruling of their self-determination and a neglect 
of their own aspirations and life purposes, for instance in the organization of 
care arrangements (Agich, 2003). It proves to be very difficult to counter such 
stereotypical positioning. Third, aging people too are vulnerable to the dangers 
of internalization of stereotypical socio-cultural positioning sketched in Lin-
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demann Nelson’s theory. The effect of this internalization on older individuals 
is illustrated by the so-called stereotype embodiment theory (Levy, 2009). This 
presents empirical research on stereotypes about aging which suggests that 
internalization of both positive and negative age stereotypes (defined as beliefs 
about older people in general) can have either beneficial, or detrimental effects 
respectively, even on supposedly “objective” factors such as cognitive and phys-
ical functioning. According to Levy (2009), “stereotypes are embodied when 
their assimilation from the surrounding culture leads to self-definitions that, 
in turn, influence functioning and health” (p. 332). 
The three points discussed above, I believe, offer sufficient argumentation 
in favor of the application of Lindemann Nelson’s (2001) theory to the context 
of aging. One important nuancing remark with regard to her strong emphasis 
on socio-cultural construction of identities needs to be made, however. Several 
gerontological authors emphasize that, although social and cultural constitu-
tion is vitally important and very influential to the experience of aging, living in 
an aging body cannot be reduced to socio-cultural construction alone (Cruik-
shank, 2003; Holstein, Parks & Waymack, 2011). As Holstein, Parks and Way-
mack (2011) put it, “There are certain commonly shared experiences of having 
an aging body that cannot simply be written off as cultural norm: that one’s 
body may begin to hurt, that it may no longer be able to do what we expect, and 
that its appearance may change over time cannot be eliminated by any cultural 
change, no matter how significant” (p. 50).
When applying the general insights on cultural narratives and their influ-
ence drawn from Lindemann Nelson’s (2001) theory to the context of aging, 
one needs to understand how aging is culturally perceived and communicated 
in our current Western, late modern world. After all, it follows from this theory 
that our expectations and experiences concerning aging are inevitably colored 
by the prevailing cultural images and stories about later life. This theme has 
been addressed in several gerontological studies analyzing the cultural dis-
course about aging, from a mostly critical (and often feminist) point of view 
(De Beauvoir, 1970/1972; Gullette, 1997, 2004, 2011; Cruikshank, 2003; Feath-
erstone & Hepworth, 1995, 2005; Featherstone, Hepworth & Turner, 1991; 
Andrews, 1999, 2012; Calasanti, 2008; Calasanti, Slevin & King, 2006; Tulle, 
2004; Hurd Clarke, 2001; Twigg, 2004; Katz, 2010; Biggs, 1997, 1999; Blaik-
ie, 1999). Featherstone and Hepworth (1995) argue that cultural imaginaries 
about aging and old age have two functions: “first they are a cultural resource 
we draw upon to give meaning to later life [...]; and, second, [...] they provide 
important evidence of the kinds of cultural resources a specific society draws 
upon to give meaning to later life” (p. 30-31). This provides further basis to our 
claim that a discussion of cultural narratives about aging is highly informative 
regarding the meanings given to later life in our contemporary societies.
Aging and Self-Realization78
Importantly, De Medeiros (2005) suggests a discrepancy between the cul-
tural identities of aging individuals and the way they individually experience 
their aging process. Lack of attention to this distinction may lead gerontology 
to interpret certain narrative self-presentations as expressing something about 
the aging self while in fact, they are more properly interpreted as expressions 
of cultural master narratives about aging. She also cites Hazan and Raz (1997), 
who suggest that “narratives of elderly people, that is, interviews, life stories, 
and other utterances, are too often interpreted as authentic narratives of ‘old 
age’ rather than a ‘reiteration of the discourse of aging’ perpetuated by life-
course and life-cycle perspectives” (as cited in De Medeiros, 2005, p. 7). In 
response, De Medeiros suggests a conceptual model in which a distinction can 
be drawn between the self as externally presented and constantly negotiated 
in relation to cultural expectations and norms, and the “complementary self”, 
encompassing those aspects of our selves that are at odds with existing cultural 
narratives, or are silenced or suppressed by them (De Medeiros, 2005). 
In general, the critiques of existing cultural representations of aging that 
are voiced by cultural and critical gerontology have two distinct targets. On the 
one hand, there is a critique against the cultural reduction of old age to a peri-
od characterized by decline and steady, inevitable deterioration into a state of 
frailty, dependency and misery (Gullette, 1997, 2004, 2011; Cruikshank, 2003; 
Andrews, 2012; Tulle, 2004). This critique focuses on the one-sidedness of this 
monolithic identification of old age and decline which results in an overlooking 
of “possibilities of growth, renewal, change, repair and healing” (Cruikshank, 
2008, p. 150) that may also be part of later life. On the other hand, critique is 
expressed against cultural perceptions of later life that implicitly express the 
message that in order to age “successfully”, one should aim to stay young and 
avert decline as long as possible. This critique focuses, for instance, on the 
way aging people are falling prey to an anti-aging industry promising eternal 
youth, and points out that this strategy is ultimately self-effacing. It also tar-
gets the ideology that exalts the freedom and opportunities of the Third Age 
at the expense of the misery and dependency associated with the Fourth Age, 
which excludes Fourth Agers from what is perceived as “good” or “successful” 
aging (§2.4.3) (Katz, 2005, 2010; Gilleard & Higgs, 2005, 2011; Gullette, 2011; 
Twigg, 2004). In the context of this study, I have used these two broad strands 
of critique against existing cultural meanings about later life to reconstruct two 
categories of cultural master narratives about aging, which I propose to call 
decline narratives and age-defying narratives (Laceulle & Baars, 2014). These will 
be further discussed in the next two sections.  
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3.3.2 Decline narratives
Decline narratives equate the aging process with an inevitable and steady de-
cay. They draw on the assumption that aging represents a biological process of 
inescapable deterioration. We gradually lose our physical and mental strengths 
and capacities. We have less purpose to strive for in our lives. We are confront-
ed with loss and vulnerability. Eventually, we approach death. But the expect-
ed decline extends beyond the biological realm, since decline narratives often 
also presuppose a decrease in social relations and an increase in loneliness and 
dependency, as well as a self-evident loss of social roles.  The classic geronto-
logical disengagement theory (Cumming & Henry, 1961) is based on such line 
of thinking, as it argues that it is “natural” and fitting for aging individuals to 
withdraw from society and gradually accept their decline when nearing death. 
Cruikshank (2003) defines five different ways in which aging is socio-cul-
turally presented nowadays. These provide a perfect illustration of the effects 
of decline narratives on contemporary aging discourse. In the first place, aging 
is heavily medicalized. Second, forceful stereotypes associated with decline in-
fluence the way the process of aging is conceived as well as experienced. Third, 
aging is broadly perceived as frightening and deterrent, both for individuals 
and for society at large. Fourth, aging is culturally perceived as genderless and 
sexless, as well as, fifth, regarded to be unrelated to class or ethnicity. Aging is, 
in other words, conceived culturally and socially as a “great leveler”, erasing or 
making redundant all individual characteristics previously meaningful during 
the life course. 
The socio-cultural constitution of later life that is typical for decline nar-
ratives thereby tends to reduce the identity resources of aging individuals to 
a limited amount of pitiable images and roles of sickness and dependency. 
Consequently, decline narratives fail to acknowledge the individual diversity of 
the aging population. As a result, they are unable to provide social recognition 
to people’s aspirations of self-realization (Honneth’s third category, see §3.2.3) 
needed to facilitate moral agency, because acknowledging individual diversity 
is a precondition for this type of recognition. 
Importantly, decline narratives typically reinforce deep festering fears and 
anxieties about losing control over one’s life that is often perceived as one of 
the typical characteristics of late modernity (Giddens, 1991; Bauman, 2001). 
The fact that the probability of being confronted with existential vulnerability 
increases with age seems to make aging an especially disturbing phenomenon 
for modern individuals socio-culturally “programmed” to strive for autono-
mous control over their lives. 
The socio-cultural perception of what it means to fall victim to Alzheimer’s 
disease or other forms of cognitive deterioration offers a good illustration. Alz-
heimer’s disease seems to be the embodiment of everything late modern people 
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fear about aging: loss of independence, autonomy, self-determination, control, 
and ultimately one’s self. It is often presented as the ultimate counterexample if 
one dares to assume that later life can also be a period with potential for growth 
and flourishing, as I have experienced in several discussions about my work on 
aging and self-realization (see also §9.4.6). To avoid misunderstanding, there 
is no doubt in my mind that Alzheimer’s represents a horrible disease, which 
often terrifies its sufferers in the way it disorients them and seizes the elements 
that were once constitutive of who they were. Being diagnosed with Alzhei-
mer’s disease is, bluntly put, an existential tragedy for the people concerned 
(both sufferers and their loved ones). However, experiential reports from Alz-
heimer’s disease sufferers and the people working with them suggest that there 
are still possibilities for experiencing meaning in life, if one is willing to see 
them (see for instance, Kitwood, 1997; Sabat, 2001; Bruens, 2013). Sadly, these 
differentiating remarks hardly enter the common cultural perception of this 
disease, which remains one of massive misery and utter anxiety. 
This perception of Alzheimer’s, which can be seen as an example of a de-
cline narrative, tends to reduce the person to the disease. Importantly, this 
reduction hinders the realization of the social recognition needed to advance 
people’s moral agency. This happens, for instance, when the fact that people 
still have legitimate personal aspirations regarding their own future, and the 
potential to engage in certain valued social roles, is overlooked in view of the 
disease (§3.2.3). Of course, one may argue that the tragedy of Alzheimer’s is 
precisely that the disease destroys the person, leaving ultimately nothing but 
an empty shell. Although this may be true for the most advanced stages of 
the disease, it is often preceded by a gradual process of deterioration which, 
depending of course on how the condition develops, may still provide ample 
chances for self-realization and moral agency. It is my contention that under 
the influence of the anxious and grim image raised by decline narratives, suf-
ferers of Alzheimer’s (or any other feared condition associated with old age) are 
prematurely denied access to several cultural resources that could help them 
and their surrounding uphold a meaningful identity, including participation in 
valued social roles. By contrast, a viable counter narrative that contests the as-
sumptions underlying decline narratives may be able to provide victims of Alz-
heimer’s with a socio-cultural positioning that grants them more opportunities 
for moral agency for a longer time. This would require, at the minimum, show-
ing that decline is not the only reality of later life in such cases, and that even 
suffering from a condition like Alzheimer’s disease does not (or at least not for a 
long time) close off opportunities to lead a good life with and for others, accord-
ing to one’s own aspirations and capacities, participating meaningfully in one’s 
society or community – in other words, moral agency as defined in this study. 
To conclude, the most disturbing characteristic of decline narratives is 
perhaps that they reduce the diversity and potential richness of older people’s 
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life experiences to a saddening story of inevitable decay. Moreover, they rub it 
in that there is ultimately nothing we can do about our own decline. Decline 
is presented as an unfortunate fact of life that one should passively undergo, 
when the time comes. Before that time however, people are “advised” by con-
temporary cultural aging discourse to avoid decline as long as possible. This 
results in the other category of cultural master narratives I distinguish, termed 
age-defying narratives.   
3.3.3 Age-def ying narratives
Age-defying narratives oppose the exclusively negative associations connect-
ed with aging in decline narratives. Instead, they emphasize opportunities for 
prolonged vitality, social activity and resilience. It is typical of age-defying nar-
ratives that aging well is implicitly equated to staying young, or warding off the 
negative consequences associated with aging as long as possible. As Andrews 
(2012) puts it, “increasingly in western society, the old, and being old, have 
been identified by what they are not: young” (p. 388). Note that this position 
leaves the strong association that decline narratives assume between aging and 
decline intact.
Broadly speaking, the category of age-defying narratives can be divided into 
three sub-categories. All share in common the rejection of a “deficit perspec-
tive” on aging (as exemplified in decline narratives), and instead plead in favor 
of what Tornstam called a “resource perspective” focusing on the positive po-
tentials of later life (Tornstam, 2005). However, their interpretation of what it 
means to “age well” differs.  
1. The first subcategory focuses strongly on resisting decline, by emphasizing 
the importance of remaining active and productive, and taking all sorts of 
measures to ensure continuing health. This approach is exemplified in ge-
rontological approaches advancing “successful”, “healthy” or “active” aging 
(Havighurst, 1961; Rowe & Kahn, 1987, 1997, 1998; Schulz & Heckhausen, 
1996; Ryff & Singer, 2009; Knipscheer, 2010). These approaches lay a heavy 
emphasis on functional and health concerns (Depp & Jeste, 2006). Rowe 
and Kahn intended their concept of successful aging to allow for more dif-
ferentiation within the group of “normal”, that is, healthy older individuals. 
They measured “success” in aging through three interrelated factors: the 
absence of disease, the maintenance of a high level of cognitive and physi-
cal functional capacities and the active (social) engagement with life (Rowe 
& Kahn, 1998). The scientific concept of successful aging also translates 
into more popular aging discourses. In a provocative article in The Atlan-
tic published in October 2014, Ezekiel Emanuel described the activities a 
successful aging strategy may result in as follows: “Americans seem to be 
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obsessed with exercising, doing mental puzzles, consuming various juice 
and protein concoctions, sticking to strict diets, and popping vitamins and 
supplements, all in a valiant effort to cheat death and prolong life as long as 
possible. This has become so pervasive that it now defines a cultural type: 
what I call the American immortal” (Emanuel 2014). 
2. The second subcategory of age-defying narratives is more concentrated on 
successful adaptation to aging processes. These approaches focus on the 
importance of compensating for age-related losses. This can be achieved 
by maximizing one’s remaining strengths and making optimal use of 
them, and minimizing the potential harms that can be caused by inevitable 
age-related losses. Examples include Baltes’ Selection-Optimization-Com-
pensation model (Baltes, 1997; Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Freund & Baltes, 
1998) and the socio-emotional selectivity theory by Carstensen and colleagues 
(Carstensen et al., 2006; Carstensen, Isaacowitz & Charles 1999). The bot-
tom line of these psychological perspectives purports the idea that people 
maintain a sense of well-being and a positive self-concept despite loss and 
decline. In order to do this, people need to develop adaptive strategies, such 
as adjustment of aspirations and goals to fit new situations characterized by 
diminished levels of competency and mastery (Labouvie-Vief, 2009). For 
example, an inevitable loss of speed and physical strength in older workers 
can be compensated by the fact that accumulated years of experience have 
taught people to use their powers more effectively than younger workers. 
Other examples of adaptive age-defying strategies include programs of fall 
prevention in order to avoid physical dependency or memory training in 
order to delay cognitive deterioration. 
3. The third subcategory of age-defying narratives focuses on the opportuni-
ties that later life – and in particular the Third Age – have to offer for self-ful-
fillment through leisure, consumption and education. Examples of this can 
be found in the abundance of cultural expectations that are communicated 
through advertisements of anti-aging products, senior travel, and retire-
ment leisure options. All of these suggest that the prevailing associations 
between aging and decline do not have to be accepted as an unfortunate 
truth of life, but can – with the help of right products, of course – be re-
verted. This category of narratives tends to lead to so-called “commodifica-
tion”: older people are perceived primarily in their role as consumers, being 
subjected to pervasive temptation strategies of the anti-aging market. This 
market offers an endless variety of products and services aimed at warding 
off old age as long as possible. The main valued social roles left for aging in-
dividuals in these cultures are related to leisure and consumption (Gilleard 
& Higgs, 2000, 2005; Katz, 2005).
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It could be said that generally, age-defying narratives are to be preferred over 
decline narratives, given their objection to the monolithic identification of later 
life with negative images of loss, decline and misery. Age-defying narratives 
have certainly helped to challenge ageist assumptions based on decline narra-
tives. They have extended the horizon of what is deemed possible in later life 
to include opportunities that would have been unthinkable in earlier times. In 
contrast to decline narratives, age-defying narratives explicitly present later life 
as a period with many chances for living a rich, satisfying, flourishing life. In 
this regard, age-defying narratives can be perceived to offer much better op-
portunities to enhance the moral agency of aging individuals and enlarge their 
cultural repertoire of meaning and identity resources.
Nevertheless, there remain some fundamental problems attached to 
age-defying narratives that nuance this optimistic analysis and call for other 
alternatives. As Katz (2005) argues, “anti-ageism is not without problems of its 
own [...] the positive, political energies of the grey movement are dispersed and 
redeployed in the service of a commercial spirit of a senior’s market culture” 
(p. 16-17). In their concern with the economic capitalist and consumerist issues 
connected to a growing elderly population (Biggs, 2001), age-defying narra-
tives lack a genuine focus on the enhancement of people’s moral agency that 
should characterize successful counter narratives. Or at least, they reserve it for 
a healthy and wealthy minority.    
Age-defying narratives seem to replace the stereotype of the deplorable sick 
and dependent creature characteristic of decline narratives, with another, more 
positive stereotype: the healthy, active, productive, and self-fulfilling senior 
consumer. But as a stereotype, this image seems equally insensitive to differ-
ences within the aging population, and it can be equally oppressive. Moreover, 
age-defying narratives seem to transfer value frameworks belonging to youth 
and adulthood to old age, neglecting the possibility that later life may also have 
a value of its own (Cole, 1992; Atchley, 2009; Tornstam, 2005; Laceulle, 2013; 
Rentsch et al., 2013). Thus, although age-defying narratives set out to fight age-
ism and secure valued social roles for the elderly, they in fact celebrate a rather 
limited view of success and value in later life, that many older people are unable 
to live up to (Chapman, 2005; Holstein, 2011). 
3.3.4 Limitations of existing cultural narratives on aging
Let me now briefly analyze some problematic implications that arise from the 
sketch of existing cultural master narratives about later life. This analysis will 
lead to a set of conditions that viable cultural counter narratives about aging 
should answer to.
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1. The equation of aging with decline – explicit in decline narratives and im-
plicit in age-defying narratives – is so pervasive that it obscures other pos-
sible characteristics of later life. This effect is described by Gullette (1997) 
as the “default” position of decline narratives: “Culturally, default standing 
means that the subject feels an internal pressure to speak in decline terms, 
even when resistant experience or theory intervenes. [...] Alternative narra-
tive doesn’t feel as real” (p. 173-174). The association of decline with aging 
is so deeply entrenched in our cultural meaning system that we no longer 
tend to question it. As a result, profound tensions may arise between the 
meanings of aging that cultural narratives communicate and one’s private 
experience. The influence of cultural narratives can even be so strong that 
our individual experiences lose their authority for us (Lindemann Nelson, 
2001).
2. The stereotyping force of decline and age-defying narratives ignores the 
diversity existing among individuals within the aging population. Blaikie 
(1999) argues, “as each individual ages so the stock of their differentness 
from the next person increases – the older the cohort, the greater is the de-
gree of diversity and individuality to be expected” (p. 7). By neglecting this 
fact, aging people’s widely varying aspirations and capacities are also over-
looked. This hinders the full realization of their potential for moral agency 
and precludes Honneth’s third form of social recognition (1995; see §3.2.3). 
From the viewpoint of self-realization, acknowledging the unique poten-
tials of this specific individual person for flourishing, creativity and resilience 
is of course crucial. It seems, however, that neither decline- nor age-defying 
narratives are able to accommodate this insight in a satisfactory way. 
3. The implicit message that aging well is equal to staying young represents 
a severe impoverishment of cultural meaning resources. It suggests that 
later life has no value of its own, because apparently, whatever meaning can 
be given to later life has to be borrowed from youth-related frameworks. 
Again, in terms of Lindemann Nelson’s (2001) theory, this poses a lim-
itation on the moral agency of aging individuals, because it inhibits them 
from perceiving later life as a possibly attractive phase which harbors poten-
tially valuable and enriching experiences and goals to strive for. To provide 
an example: the poetry volume Body bereft by Krog (2006) describing the 
subtle delights of an aging couple’s sexuality raised protest in her country 
South Africa, because it was considered appalling and repulsive, not fitting 
the expectations one had of older women. Apparently, the culture was not 
ready to acknowledge deviations from the norms of youth. Consequently, 
the potential for meaning and identification such poetry could communi-
cate to older people – a hopeful and beautiful message indeed – is blocked 
by the cultural prejudice that all good is to come from youthfulness, even 
in later life.
Chapter 3 – Cultural narratives and counter narratives about aging 85
4. Age-defying narratives stimulate and promote active and healthy lifestyles 
as an individual task and responsibility. In the process, however, these nar-
ratives paradoxically saddle older individuals with social stigmatization 
once they prove unable to live up to the corresponding standards and fall 
prey to frailty and dependency (Katz, 2005). As a result, the share of the 
aging population that is in fact experiencing frailty are further stigmatized 
as pitiable “losers”. The irony is, of course, that given the biological reality 
of senescing processes, we will all fall into this category ultimately, which 
seems to prove that decline narratives are right after all. This makes the 
age-defying cultural narratives that dominate an important portion of the 
aging discourse in late modern societies eventually self-effacing.  
5. Both decline- and age-defying cultural narratives are empirically flawed, 
because they disregard the fact that in reality, even people suffering age-re-
lated losses often manage to lead meaningful, flourishing, creative and in-
spiring lives (Ryff et al., 2012). Holstein, Parks and Waymack (2011) aptly 
formulate this problem when they state: “The anti-aging movement gains 
what momentum it has by means of denigrating the lives of our elderly as 
they in fact live. This, we think, rather than senescence and eventual death, 
is the real tragedy. We prefer to think that there can be, and indeed are, 
virtues that are possible in and appropriate to being elderly. If we lose sight 
of those virtues, we will all be less well off.” (p. 100). The empirical inad-
equacy of existing cultural narratives is also illustrated by the “positivity 
effect” (Carstensen & Mikels, 2005). This paradox expresses the fact that 
older people tend to have a functional bias towards positive experiences. 
This results in a discrepancy between what people subjectively perceive as 
satisfying and successful old age and the scientific criteria for successful 
aging. The strong emphasis that science places on health, productivity and 
independent functioning, for instance, proves to be less important to people 
than meaningful social relationships (Torres, 2006; Reichstadt et al., 2007, 
2010; Phelan et al., 2004; Knight & Ricciardelli, 2003)
6. Neither decline narratives nor age-defying narratives provide satisfactory 
resources for people to integrate existential vulnerability into their lives in 
a meaningful way. By integration, I mean the inclusion of an experience of 
adversity in one’s life story in such a way that its reality is not disavowed, 
but neither does the situation lead to a permanent loss of vital involvement 
in life. Integration could be seen as the outcome of a process of grief over 
what is lost that restores one’s sense of coherence in life. Whereas decline 
narratives generally encounter existential vulnerability with a strategy of 
passive surrender, age-defying narratives only have strategies of rejection to 
offer. Both strategies seem hardly satisfactory in this regard. Further, since 
existing narratives seem to offer no guidance towards a possible middle 
road between these strategies, people experiencing instances of existential 
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vulnerability are poorly facilitated when they seek access to cultural mean-
ing resources to enhance their ability to lead a good life (i.e. moral agency) 
in the face of the tragic dimension of existence (Nussbaum, 2001).
It can thus be concluded that both decline- and age-defying cultural narratives 
about later life ultimately fall short in providing satisfactory resources of iden-
tity to aging individuals. They function as stereotyping and restrictive models 
of aging which block our view of the value of its own that later life could have. 
Also, they neglect diversity and hinder access to valued social roles that could 
help aging people advance and express their potential for moral agency. This 
calls for the development of viable counter narratives about later life that are 
able to enhance aging individuals’ moral agency and provide access to a richer 
array of cultural resources of identity and meaning. From the analyses so far 
the following desired features for such counter narratives can be deduced: 
• They should resist the association of aging with decline and aging well with 
staying young that is characteristic of the discussed cultural master narra-
tives
• They should offer a viable alternative that is able to:
• Acknowledge that later life can be a period with a value of its own, offer-
ing potential for growth and flourishing
• Acknowledge that later life is also a period in which one is ever more 
radically confronted with the existential vulnerability of the human con-
dition
• Provide resources to meaningfully integrate this existential vulnerabil-
ity into the narratives constituting one’s identity, so that coherence is 
restored and vital involvement with life remains possible
3.4 conclusion: in se Arch of viAble counter nArr Atives 
About Aging 
In this final part of the chapter, I propose a tentative outline for an alternative 
category of cultural narratives about later life. These alternative narratives aim 
to meet the conditions defined in the previous section: acknowledging the val-
ue of later life and its potential for flourishing as well as its reality of existential 
vulnerability, and providing resources for the integration of the latter. My pro-
posal will draw on ideas associated with the philosophical discourse on self-re-
alization (Laceulle & Baars, 2014; see further chapter 4). It thereby advances 
toward the intended formulation of a reframed discourse of self-realization that 
forms the theme of the coming chapters. Making a plausible case for a cultural 
counter narrative about later life drawing its resources from the self-realization 
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discourse, will hopefully strengthen this study’s overall argument that the ideal 
of self-realization can be fruitfully applied to the context of aging, as long as 
some crucial shortcomings of the late modern interpretation are remedied (see 
§2.5).  
The term “narratives of becoming” that I choose to describe these alterna-
tive narratives serves as a prelude to the idea of self-realization as a process of 
moral self-development, or becoming who you are (see §4.2). This terminol-
ogy also conveniently underscores the continuing search for an equilibrium 
between engaging in activities purposively furthering our growth and flourish-
ing on the one hand, while on the other hand, acknowledging the contingencies 
of life expressed in terms of existential vulnerability, which confronts us with 
the limitations of our purposive influence and control. Alternatively, Gullette 
(2011) proposes the term “progress narratives” in order to challenge the decline 
narratives that are so detrimental for an enriching and meaningful experience 
of later life. However, the notion of progress harbors an association with linear 
ascent that can misguidedly present old age as the ultimate culmination of 
development throughout the life course. Gullette does recognize part of this 
risk herself, when she states that, “Positive aging should not impose progress 
narrative on people, forcing them to deny their sorrows and the external facts 
that weigh on them. But neither should dominant culture impose decline nar-
rative as the only possible truth” (p. 165). Katz (2005) expresses the same con-
cern when he warns about a “tyrannical” positive aging culture. Apart from its 
congeniality to the self-realization discourse, this serves as an additional reason 
to prefer the term narratives of becoming over progress narratives in this study.
Broadly speaking, narratives of becoming suggest the following image of 
later life: on the one hand, they express how later life offers ample opportuni-
ties for self-realization, for instance, in the sense of growing in self-knowledge, 
improving our relationships with others, or acquiring virtues previously under-
developed in one’s life; on the other hand, they suggest that aging well means 
that we are able and willing to encounter the limitations we confront in our 
lives in a certain way. Instead of denying or rejecting our vulnerabilities, narra-
tives of becoming suggest that we would do well to face them with an attitude 
characterized by realism and practical wisdom. This should not only enable us 
to see what we can do to improve the situation, but also what lies beyond our 
control and must be gracefully accepted.
Before proceeding to discuss the advantages that narratives of becoming 
may have to offer, let me begin with two concrete examples of what the asso-
ciated image of aging well could look like in people’s lives. The first example 
introduces an older woman I once met. On becoming a grandmother, she was 
delighted and aspired to engage in activities with her grandchildren that had 
been very important in her own life, such as supporting them in sports. But 
due to severe physical ailments, she was no longer able to do this. At first, this 
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was a great disappointment to her, because she had always dreamt of being a 
vital, active grandparent and senior. The confrontation with her own physical 
fragility precluded this aspiration. However, by transforming her limitations 
in this regard into an attitude of quiet presence, she was able to provide her 
grandchildren with a peaceful and stable haven of calmness. This turned out 
to be most welcome to them, especially when it could not be provided by their 
busy parents. This realization made her aware of how her “activist” manner 
of raising her own children in the past had led her to neglect other equally 
important dimensions of being a good parent. She was able to speak about this 
with her daughter and it deepened and enriched their relationship. In the end, 
she told me that taking care of her grandchildren had taught her many things 
about her qualities and limitations as a mother in retrospect. It had deepened 
her self-insight and transformed her image of who she wanted to be.
The second example presents a man in his mid-seventies who had become 
a widower three years earlier. In a conversation, he admitted to me that this 
new social status had initially confronted him with some inconvenient truths 
about himself and his relationship with his late wife. He discovered how he 
had always taken for granted that she was the one maintaining their social 
contacts as a couple. After her death, it became clear to him that his character 
was still lacking in the qualities needed to nourish friendships. Because his 
wife had always been the one investing true attention in others, many of their 
mutual friends disappeared from his life after her demise. Being confronted 
with loneliness, at first he fell prey to self-pity and anger at the people who he 
felt had abandoned him. Gradually, however, he came to realize that the loss 
of his wife, however painful, offered him the opportunity to start working on 
acquiring the virtues of friendship that he had neglected in his life so far. So, 
by acknowledging his own limitations and the fragility of his social network, 
this man eventually gained self-knowledge and opened up new roads for moral 
self-development for himself.
What do these stories have to tell us about narratives of becoming? Which 
characteristics can be deduced from them? 
• First, the term becoming suggests a continuous developmental process that 
encompasses the entire duration of the life course. The goal of development 
is to optimize one’s ability to lead a good life with and for others (i.e., moral 
agency, see §5.5). Narratives of becoming refute the idea that development 
and growth is something reserved for youth and adolescence, and not for 
adulthood and old age. This also contributes to the rebuttal of equating ag-
ing well with staying young. In this sense, narratives of becoming express 
the idea that later life can also be a period of growth and even flourishing, 
that I have mentioned as one of the criteria for a viable cultural counter 
narrative for later life. From a self-realization perspective, the acknowledg-
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ment of growth potential is of course an essential aspect. It is not difficult 
to imagine how the absence of this has a negative impact on the possibilities 
to ascribe meaning to later life. Cruikshank (2003) has observed that in 
contemporary aging discourse, “Old women and men are seen in a utili-
tarian light of cost rather than potential. Who they can become is an unasked 
question” (p. 7; emphasis added). This further underscores the relevance of 
paying attention to the notion of becoming through the counter narrative 
suggested in this study.
• Second, the notion of becoming also expresses the dynamic character of 
moral self-development. Though it is important for identity to reach a cer-
tain degree of continuity (§4.2.2), there is no stable and unchanging status 
quo position. Who one is remains constantly open to revision. The direction 
this revision will take highly depends on the individual value orientation 
that we have acquired during our lives. It also depends on whether our sur-
roundings have a stimulating or restrictive influence. In other words, one’s 
self-realization continues for as long as one lives and is always subject to 
socio-cultural influences that can either impede or facilitate moral agency.
• Third, the striving for moral agency that is advanced by narratives of be-
coming represents both a purpose and a means at the same time. In line with 
Lindemann Nelson’s (2001) theory, I contend that counter narratives should 
aim at repairing moral agency; thus moral agency is the purpose strived 
for, the end result of a successful counter narrative. On the other hand, it 
seems clear that challenging dominant cultural master narratives involves, 
indeed requires, a strong level of moral agency to be successful. Moral agen-
cy is then perceived as the necessary means to repair damaged identities or 
enlarge the possibilities for meaningful identification. The paradox here 
is that apparently, moral agency (or the potential of it?) already has to be 
present in order to realize moral agency. The same paradox is echoed in the 
expression becoming who you are that we encounter later in the discussion of 
the philosophical discourse on self-realization (see §7.3.2). Apparently, you 
already are someone, but at the same time, you are summoned to become 
yourself. The ambivalence of this expression emphasizes that self-realiza-
tion requires a life-long process of work and practice, in order to transform 
qualities that are potentially available in one’s personal outlook into lasting, 
durable attitudes, expressing vital characteristics of one’s self.
• Fourth, narratives of becoming also advocate realism. They acknowledge 
that this developmental process need not always be easy, or proceed in 
the desired direction. While the term narratives of becoming does wish 
to emphasize the often neglected potentialities for growth that can feature 
in later life, it does not quite defend a teleological culmination hypothesis 
that assumes a linear ascent towards an ever more fulfilled and complete 
life. After all, this would present a one-sided optimism negating the ex-
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istential realities of vulnerability and loss that resembles the perspective 
of age-defying narratives. Instead, these realities need to be acknowledged 
and integrated if narratives of becoming are to supply a convincing mean-
ing-generating view of aging. 
• Fifth, through their dynamic and realistic character, narratives of becoming 
are able to answer the second criterion for a viable counter narrative about 
later life:  offering guidance for the meaningful integration of existential vul-
nerability. These narratives acknowledge that our striving towards a good 
life always includes the possibility of failure; in reaching our goals, fulfill-
ing our aspirations, becoming who we wish to be. We may frustrate our 
own purposes by succumbing to our weaknesses or following the wrong 
passions, but our self-realization can also be stymied by bad life circum-
stances beyond our control, from illness or accident to malignant socio-cul-
tural positioning. By acknowledging the fact that our striving for a good life 
is inherently vulnerable, narratives of becoming emphasize how difficult it 
can be to navigate our social and cultural world in our aspiration for self-re-
alization. However, by also acknowledging the moral importance of striv-
ing to become who we are, narratives of becoming escape the objection of 
falling prey to either passive surrender or active rejection of existential vul-
nerability. This was the critique made against decline- and age-defying nar-
ratives. The emphasis of narratives of becoming lies instead on developing 
an optimal attitude to whatever we may encounter in life and use these ex-
periences in the service of a continuing process of moral self-development.
On what grounds should narratives of becoming be preferred over decline nar-
ratives and even the more positively oriented age-defying narratives? It is im-
portant to realize that this question touches upon a fundamental overarching 
problem confronting any philosophical argument that takes a normative stand. 
Who are we philosophers to prescribe to others how to live? Who are we to 
decide that an image that equates aging well with staying young is not as sat-
isfactory, and even harmful, compared to an image proposing aging well as an 
ongoing and deepening process of becoming, of moral self-development? This 
issue, which also haunts the discourse of self-realization in general (see §9.4.5), 
is highly complex and may never find a fully satisfactory answer. Here, I restrict 
myself to the commentary that I believe we can safely say that any human being 
is basically trying to live a good life. Granted, this observation still offers room 
for many and possible contradictory interpretations of what this “good” life is, 
and does not provide criteria for an objectively justified choice between such 
interpretations. However, my definition of moral agency as the ability to lead 
a good life does suggest that cultural narratives that help to enhance people’s 
moral agency should be preferred over cultural narratives that tend to restrict it. 
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This accords with Lindemann Nelson’s (2001) analysis about counter narratives 
and their role in strengthening moral agency (see §3.2.3).   
Following this line of argument, it is important to realize that both decline 
narratives and age-defying narratives present us with problems when it comes 
to developing an age identity that is satisfactorily rich to infuse one’s experience 
of aging with meaning and value. This can be detrimental to people’s chances 
to develop and maintain their moral agency. By focusing on the importance of 
moral self-development, narratives of becoming aim to provide an alternative 
that does offer aging individuals the chance to acquire a sense of moral identity 
and the corresponding qualities of moral agency that will enable them to lead a 
good life (see §5.5). Hereby, narratives of becoming present a distinct advantage 
over the other categories of cultural narratives that have been discussed. 
In short, narratives of becoming express the moral importance of a lifelong 
process of working on ourselves in order to actualize our best potentialities. 
The developed qualities help us to function as moral agents. Importantly, this 
includes confronting existential vulnerability in a way that does not compro-
mise our vital involvement with life. The term vital involvement is inspired by 
the classic study of Erikson, Erikson and Kivnick (1986) that illustrates the 
resilience of older people beautifully. Cruikshank (2003) aptly summarizes the 
attractive perspective this offers: “Learning to be old may be the last emotional 
and spiritual challenge we can agree to take on. While aging is shrouded in 
denial or shame, it will be seen simply as defeat. [...] The promise of other ways 
to age is exhilarating, though, if we can imagine late life as the time when we 
are most fully ourselves” (p. 7). Eventually, it can be said that narratives of be-
coming perceive aging well in terms of acquiring the kind of practical wisdom 
that is expressed in the well-known creed: the courage to change what you can 
change, the strength to endure what you cannot change, and the wisdom to 
know the difference. The idea that later life can be dedicated to acquiring this 
attitude, I argue, presents a welcome addition to current cultural narratives 
about later life, and offers potential resources to generate the resisting force that 
should characterize a true counter narrative. 

Chapter 4 – Self-realization 
4.1 introduction
In the two previous chapters, two broad claims have been made: 1) that a re-
framed interpretation of self-realization, provided it is able to remedy some of 
the problems attached to the late modern interpretation, remains a valuable 
moral ideal, also for aging individuals; and 2) that such a reframed discourse 
of self-realization could offer a fruitful resource for the development of a new 
category of cultural narratives about later life, namely, narratives of becoming, 
that can counter the adverse effects of existing dominant decline- and age-de-
fying narratives. 
In chapters 4-8 the outlines of such a reframed view of self-realization are 
sketched. The intention is, first of all, to make a plausible case for a view of 
self-realization that acknowledges the social embedding and constitution of 
human beings that is disregarded by the late modern self-realization discourse. 
Moreover, I explore whether the philosophical tradition of self-realization also 
enables coming up with an account that can relate to the reality of existen-
tial vulnerability in a more satisfactory way. It follows from the previous argu-
ment that both these issues are quintessential for the creation of an account 
of self-realization that can be applied to the context of aging (see §2.5). This 
chapter makes a start with this endeavor. In §4.2, the following questions are 
addressed. First, what can be understood by self-realization in the suggested 
interpretation (§4.2.1)? Second, who is the self that is involved in self-realiza-
tion (§4.2.2)? Third, how does the process of self-realization take shape in prac-
tice (§4.2.3)? And fourth, when is self-realization manifested in people’s lives 
(§4.2.4)? From my discussion of these questions, self-realization arises as a 
process of moral self-development aimed at the realization of one’s potential 
for moral agency, which necessitates identification with a certain image of who 
we want to be, or rather become. This presupposes that we have an orientation 
toward what is valuable and worthy to us. 
Conceptualizing self-realization as optimal moral self-development implies 
that it relies on an image of what is “best” in ourselves. How this concept of 
“best” can be understood is discussed in §4.3. Probing the historical and phil-
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osophical background of thinking about self-realization makes us aware of the 
variety of ways in which the best in human beings has been conceptualized 
by different thinkers in the course of Western history. In §4.3.1, I discuss a 
selection of these views from philosophical history. In §4.3.2, I argue that from 
this brief catalogue of different conceptualizations of the best to be realized as 
part of self-realization, three main threads arise that together weave the fabric 
of the self-realization discourse as it is conceptualized in this study: autonomy, 
authenticity and virtue. These themes deserve more attention than can be giv-
en to them in the context of this chapter, and are discussed in separate chapters 
(6, 7 and 8 respectively). 
Having thus provided a starting point for the reframing of self-realization, 
the final part of this chapter (§4.4) discusses two themes that merit special 
attention because they may raise doubt about the application of the self-reali-
zation discourse to the context of aging. §4.4.1 focuses on the possible tension 
between self-realization as a future-directed endeavor, founding a teleological 
ethics, and the fact that aging confronts one with a shrinking time horizon; the 
reality that one’s past is longer than one’s expected future, and that the end of 
one’s life is approaching. §4.4.2 focuses on the possible tension between the 
endeavor to realize oneself and the reality of existential vulnerability, which is 
associated with the human condition in general, but is increasingly radically 
confronted while aging. 
4.2 introducing self-re Aliz Ation
Imagine a gardener. She tends the piece of the earth that happens to be her 
habitat year after year with effortful dedication. Her ultimate aim is a garden 
blossoming with flowers or offering rich harvests of fruits and vegetables. This 
aspiration is not realized by itself however; the gardener striving for a flourish-
ing garden needs to work hard and put in her best efforts: pruning branches 
threatening to outgrow the others, digging and weeding, watering, preventing 
her plants from burning in the sun, et cetera. The work is never finished, be-
cause even after a good season there is always the next one, with new crops 
and flowers that await fruition. Nor is the success of this garden entirely in the 
hands of the gardener herself. Infertile soil, a particularly rainy or dry season, 
insects or snails that ruin vulnerable seedlings; all threaten the ultimate flour-
ishing of the garden, and need to be dealt with by the gardener. Sometimes, 
some fertilizer or extra watering helps, but at other times, setbacks just have to 
be endured hoping for a better season next year.  
This gardener, working to realize a flourishing garden, presents a metaphor 
to illustrate the purpose and process of self-realization. Generally speaking, 
self-realization pertains to the ideal that people should make the best of them-
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selves, i.e., strive for optimal flourishing by continuously aiming to become who 
they are. The individual agent works on herself to realize her potential for flour-
ishing, just like the gardener cultivates the garden. The purpose, simply put, 
is to live the best possible life that one’s talents and circumstances allow for. 
Ethical perspectives based on self-realization are therefore concerned with the 
fundamental question in moral philosophy: how to live well (V. Gerhardt 1999). 
The focus on this basic ethical question, combined with the engagement with 
realizing the best in ourselves leads me to the contention that self-realization is 
most fruitfully understood as a process of moral self-development, exemplified in 
the expression becoming who you are (see §7.3.2).
Self-realization describes both an ideal state and the developmental process 
necessary to reach this state. Following a definition by Gewirth (1998), self-real-
ization (or self-fulfillment, in his terminology) consists in “carrying to fruition 
one’s deepest desires or one’s worthiest capacities. It is a bringing of oneself to 
flourishing completion, an unfolding of what is strongest or best in oneself, so 
that it represents the successful culmination of one’s aspirations or potentiali-
ties” (p. 3). Gewirth thus presents self-realization as a maximizing conception, 
aimed at superlatively formulated goals, representing the best, deepest, worthi-
est, et cetera, that people are able to accomplish. 
Self-realization provides the basis for a so-called teleological conception of 
ethics, where human beings are perceived as striving towards a telos, or ulti-
mate purpose. Self-realization discourse generally also reserves a special status 
for the individual moral agent, though not necessarily in the late modern atom-
istic, de-contextualized interpretation. The optimal fulfillment of the agent’s 
potential is seen as conditional for a good life. The corresponding strand of 
thinking in moral philosophy has been interpreted as ethical individualism or 
eudaimonism (Norton, 1979). The emphasis on the good life as consisting in the 
optimal development and fulfillment of individual abilities for flourishing (eu-
daimonia) further underscores my claim that self-realization is best understood 
as a process of moral self-development. 
Although what counts as a good life for us is deeply intertwined with the 
good of others, it remains important to realize that what principally underlies 
self-realization is the good of this unique individual. As Feinberg (1992) stress-
es, “My good is something peculiarly mine [...] Anything else that is good for 
me [...] is good because it contributes to my good, the fulfilments of my stron-
gest stable tendencies [...] it is logically irrelevant to the question of what my good 
is whether my good is itself ‘good’ when judged from an external position.” (p. 
325). Thus, the good that is the purpose strived for in self-realization need not 
necessarily correspond to any universal conception of good. 
At the same time, most philosophers writing about self-realization agree 
that actions and purposes that violate common “objective” standards of morali-
ty, such as the Golden Rule, are excluded as valid goals of self-fulfillment (Fein-
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berg, 1992). Also, as C. Taylor (1989) stresses, the good cannot be an individual 
creation, because we define what is good for us by positioning ourselves in rela-
tion to an individual-transcending moral horizon of culturally and historically 
developed conceptions of good. Which of these conceptions of good we choose 
to identify as ours, and how we respond to concrete situations however, remains 
an individual endeavor. As V. Gerhardt (1999) underscores, “Ich, dieses konkrete 
Ich, als das ich mich selbst erfahre, muss meine eigenen Gedanken zu meinen ei-
genen Problemen und Zwecken denken [I, this concrete I, as which I experience 
myself, have to formulate my own thoughts about my own problems and goals]” 
(p. 33, translation HL) 
As stated before, this study aims to draw on the rich and complex philo-
sophical discourse on self-realization to suggest an alternative to the late mod-
ern interpretation of self-realization. This act of reframing self-realization and 
its constitutive concepts should be able to remedy the problems that arise when 
applying the self-realization discourse to the context of aging (see §2.5.1). I will 
introduce this study’s interpretation by considering four questions: 1) What is 
strived for and (ideally) realized in self-realization? 2) Who is striving to realize 
it? 3) How is it realized?, and 4) When is self-realization manifested in peo-
ple’s lives? These questions respectively address the purpose of self-realization 
(§4.2.1), its underlying conception of the self (§4.2.2), the practice of self-realiza-
tion (§4.2.3), and the timing of self-realization (§4.2.4).  
4.2.1 The purpose of self-realization
What is the purpose strived for in self-realization? The most obvious and simple 
answer is probably: realization of the self. But what might this mean? Given the 
fact that I have defined self-realization as a process of moral self-development, 
the purpose of self-realization can be broadly defined in terms of the optimal 
fulfillment of one’s potential for moral agency. Moral agency is understood in 
this study as the practical expression of one’s moral identity or self, and defined 
as the ability to lead a good life, with and for others, according to one’s highest as-
pirations and best capacities, as full participating members of a society/community 
(see §5.5 for further elaboration). 
In the gardening metaphor, the purpose is a flourishing, blooming garden, 
yielding rich harvests of fruits, flowers and vegetables. But the purpose also 
includes the optimal development of the gardener herself as a gardener. In any 
case, the purpose represents an ideal picture, situated in the future. Its realiza-
tion is hoped and strived for, and the gardener can stimulate it by putting her 
best efforts into it; but success can by no means be guaranteed. Analogously, in 
self-realization we strive to create an ideal self, the best or at least a better ver-
sion of ourselves that we aspire to become in the future and bring to expression 
in our choices and actions. We may have dreams we identify with or aspirations 
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to become a certain person, for example, a good teacher, a successful manag-
er, a trustworthy friend, or a mentor others turn to for advice. Alternatively, 
our circumstances may prompt us to develop certain qualities in ourselves that 
were previously missing or underdeveloped, for instance, when we are con-
fronted with a sick relative who needs our caring capacities, or when a situation 
of injustice requires the courage to stand up for our rights or those of others. 
Here too, we give the development of ourselves in the desired direction our best 
efforts, but success is not guaranteed and can be stymied by various factors. 
Within my presentation of the purpose of self-realization as the actualization 
of our potential for moral agency, it is clarifying to specify two different modes 
of self-realization, described as aspiration fulfillment and capacity fulfillment 
(Gewirth, 1998). 
• Aspiration fulfillment pertains to the realization of one’s deepest desires. 
Self-realization as aspiration fulfillment does not refer to any arbitrary de-
sire, however. Instead, it is focused on our deepest aspirations, which relate 
to our desire to be a certain kind of person. This implies that it goes beyond 
having superficial pleasurable feelings or experiences. It pertains to what 
people consider as the most valuable among their desires, worthy of guid-
ing their choices and actions. For instance, if it is my deep aspiration to be a 
good friend, my desire to be there for a friend in need when she calls should 
overrule my desire to sit on the couch and watch TV, or I will stymie my 
striving for self-realization.
It is crucial for aspiration fulfillment that one identifies with a certain image 
of who one wants to be, which then guides the choice of goals to strive for in 
self-realization – who one wants to become. Such identification presuppos-
es the ability to make what C. Taylor has called “qualitative contrasts” and 
“strong evaluations” (C. Taylor, 1985a, 1989). With these terms, C. Taylor 
describes a process of ordering one’s desires along the lines of their value, 
their representation of a certain higher good worthy to strive for. A simi-
lar thought is defended in V. Gerhardt’s (1999) account of self-realization, 
which states that the ability to formulate “Grunde [grounds]”, i.e. motives 
for action that are constitutive of one’s identity, is crucial in self-realiza-
tion. Consequently, in C. Taylor’s and V. Gerhardt’s accounts aspirations 
associated with a higher ideal of the self – for instance being a courageous 
or a caring person – are perceived as higher or more worthy than other 
aspirations or motivations that lack this identity-constituting value, such as 
making a lot of money or going on vacation. 
Importantly, developing the aspirations to become a certain kind of person 
presupposes that we have access to cultural identity resources that we can 
identify with, such as inspiring stories, images and exemplars (see §3.2.1). 
Even though our aspirations are authentically our own, we cannot form 
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them in isolation from our socio-cultural context. It is this context that both 
provides us with the standards for strong evaluation (C. Taylor, 1989) and 
gives (or denies!) us access to certain options to identify with (Lindemann 
Nelson, 2001; M. Walker, 2007). Since both our self and our socio-cultural 
context are in a constant process of transformation, our identity-constitut-
ing aspirations are neither static nor monistic. Different aspirations may 
conflict with each other, and priorities among aspirations constantly have 
to be reconsidered. From the viewpoint of aging, it is also important to note 
that aspirations may change or alternate during our lives, either because 
our priorities change or because our socio-cultural context precludes cer-
tain aspirations for certain age groups (see §4.4.1). 
• Capacity fulfillment pertains to realizing the best or highest of one’s capac-
ities, ‘the best that it is in you to become’ (Gewirth, 1998, p. 59). Capacities 
are inherent latent potentialities that a person possesses, but that require 
actualization in practical contexts. Importantly, the capacities relevant here 
are those that are activated by the choice of the self, which excludes powers 
that escape our conscious control, such as breathing. These capacities en-
able us to bring about change, both in ourselves and in the world outside 
ourselves. Examples of such capacities include the ability for reason, the 
ability to learn things, the ability for compassion, aesthetic sensitivity, intu-
ition, and the ability to care for others. 
Like aspirations, capacities too relate to the ideal selves we strive to become. 
However, whereas aspiration fulfillment may vary from person to person 
and among different cultural contexts, Gewirth (1998) claims that capacity 
fulfillment pertains to more “objective goods or values” (p. 15). He defends a 
universalist conception of morality, which assumes that the ultimate criteri-
on for evaluating the moral value of goals and purposes lies in their contri-
bution to people’s generic freedom and well-being. In his view, these values 
are of fundamental importance to all human beings, regardless of their 
social and cultural background, gender, ethnicity, age, and so on. Thus, he 
states that “[...] with regard to capacity-fulfillment as achieving the best that 
it is in one to become, what is best here is whatever is found by reason to lead 
to or consist in the fullest development of freedom and well-being, within 
the limits set by the universalist morality of human rights” (Gewirth, 1998, 
p. 112). According to Gewirth, human reason is the quintessential capacity 
that helps people to distinguish aspirations, choices and actions along the 
lines of their contribution to freedom and well-being. Consequently, he per-
ceives reason as the “best” capacity involved in self-realization as capacity 
fulfillment. He claims that capacity fulfillment ultimately forms a higher 
mode of self-realization than aspiration fulfillment, because successful as-
piration fulfillment depends on the capacity for reason, in order to evaluate 
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one’s aspirations along the moral standard of their contribution to freedom 
and well-being. 
This study conceives of self-realization in such a way that aspiration fulfillment 
and capacity fulfillment both present valid modes to interpret the purpose of 
self-realization. I tend to agree with Gewirth in his contention that capacity-ful-
fillment is more fundamental because the formulation of aspirations depends 
on the possession of certain capacities. However, I do not follow him in his pref-
erence for a universalist interpretation of self-realization ethics that elevates 
reason as the most important capacity for self-realization. 
Apart from universalist views of morality, Gewirth (1998) distinguish-
es particularist views of morality, focusing on interpersonal relations of love, 
friendship, loyalty and connection, and personalist views of morality, focusing 
on the capacities for flourishing as an individual (p. 52-55). In my view, all three 
of these views of morality can principally defend equally viable accounts of 
best capacities and aspirations of relevance to self-realization. Gewirth is right, 
however, when he warns that goals and aspirations furthered by particular-
ist and personalist approaches can sometimes be at odds with basic universal 
moral principles, for example, if particularist considerations lead to xenophobic 
practices. In those cases, I agree that universal principles should function as a 
“sieve” to exclude immoral actions and purposes from the realm of self-realiza-
tion (this roughly corresponds to the view of ethics and morality formulated by 
Ricoeur (1992; see §5.4)).    
What precisely is the content of the best or highest capacities or aspira-
tions that constitute the purpose of self-realization has been conceptualized in 
many different ways in the history of Western philosophy. I will further elabo-
rate on this in §4.3.1. This study takes the position that the purpose of self-re-
alization should be seen in terms of a complex fabric of three interweaving 
threads, namely, autonomy, authenticity, and virtue (see further §4.3.2). Each 
thread represents a distinct tradition of moral-philosophical thinking with its 
own claim to ultimate validity. A viable interpretation of self-realization in the 
context of this study, I contend, should not force us to choose between these 
three threads or place them in a hierarchical order of importance, especially 
given the context of late modern moral pluralism in which it should be applied. 
Instead, I claim that a satisfactory interpretation of self-realization should be 
able to acknowledge the value and legitimacy of the purposes suggested by all 
three threads. A choice between their claims, if necessary, should depend on 
the characteristics of the specific situation asking for our moral response. The 
question what to do when one’s demented mother, unhappily housed in a nurs-
ing home, keeps asking “when will you take me home?” probably calls for the 
intuitions of particularist morality and the virtue-ethical discourse, and univer-
salist principles associated with considerations of autonomy-enhancement for 
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instance are of little use here. But the opposite can be the case when it comes to 
the question how many refugees a city should provide with housing and care in 
a situation of crisis, despite resistance from its inhabitants. 
We could argue, in fact, that certain connections can be drawn between the 
three forms of morality distinguished by Gewirth and the three threads that 
weave the self-realization discourse according to this study. A universalist view 
seems most closely associated with the discourse on autonomy (see chapter 
6), which traditionally strongly relies on the rational capacities Gewirth also 
emphasizes in his view of capacity fulfillment. On the other hand, the person-
alist view can be connected to the authenticity discourse, which brings aspira-
tions and capacities associated with personal development into high relief (see 
chapter 7). Lastly, the particularist view of morality can be argued to empha-
size considerations that show affinity with what underlies the virtue-ethical 
discourse, particularly given the latter’s emphasis on how virtue sees the good 
of the self as intrinsically interwoven with the good of the community. Ideally, 
both “goods” should be balanced in striving for self-realization (see chapter 8). 
It is also interesting to note that the three forms of morality as discussed 
by Gewirth – universalist, personalist, particularist – with their correspond-
ing understandings of the highest or best capacities of human beings, can be 
connected with the three forms of recognition defined by Honneth (1995; see 
§3.2.3). Thus, love and connectedness in primary relationships (the first form 
of recognition) corresponds to the good underlying particularist morality. Re-
spect for one’s rights and equal treatment as citizens (the second form) corre-
sponds to the good underlying universalist morality. Finally, the opportunities 
to realize one’s individual goals and potentials (the third form) correspond to 
the good underlying personalist morality. Since I have concluded that all three 
forms of recognition are indispensable for exercising moral agency (see §3.2.3), 
the different perceptions of the best capacities connected with the three forms 
of morality should be treated as equally valid according to the argument of this 
study. They depend on each other and should be strived for in combination. 
In conclusion to this section, it is important to mention that the description 
of the purpose of self-realization in terms of realizing the best in ourselves may 
easily raise the impression that it is a highly demanding goal. In a sense, this is 
true. After all, realizing a “good life” is a serious moral goal that requires ongo-
ing efforts and enduring engagement and perseverance. On the other hand, it 
would be a misconception to assume that special qualities are needed to strive 
for self-realization, or that only a well-situated, highly-educated and reflexive 
minority qualifies to partake in the striving for self-realization. On the con-
trary, both Gewirth (1998) and V. Gerhardt (1999) stress emphatically that the 
desire to lead a good life and to transcend the given facts of our natural exis-
tence by striving for self-realization is an inclination deeply entrenched in the 
human condition. This assumes that self-realization is a process that everyone 
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in possession of the minimal capacities associated with humanness can be en-
gaged with. Thus, though a small minority – for instance, people lacking basic 
consciousness of themselves, such as when they are in a coma or the end-stage 
of dementia – may be excluded from self-realization on this account, it remains 
a moral striving that is principally within the reach of the majority of people 
(see also §9.4.1).
4.2.2 The self in self-realization
Any interpretation of self-realization explicitly or implicitly draws on a certain 
understanding of the self. In chapter 2, it was discussed how the late modern 
discourse of self-realization relies on a problematically atomistic anthropology, 
presenting the individual agent as an autonomous, independent and sovereign 
director of their own life. By contrast, I argued, this study’s reframed interpre-
tation requires a conception of the self that acknowledges its situated, socially 
constituted and interdependent nature (see §2.5.2). In chapter 5, I argue in fa-
vor of a narrative conceptualization of the self, which seems most congenial to 
the purposes of this study. As a forerunner to this argument, this section will 
sketch some primary and more general considerations regarding how the self 
is understood in this study. 
The self that underlies self-realization is described by Gewirth (1998) as 
“a continuing or enduring embodied entity that is aware of itself as a distinct 
person, that can anticipate a future for itself, and that has desires on which 
it can reflect” (p. 13). Gewirth also states that the self represents “a locus of 
powers or capacities that are primed for growth or development toward an in-
herent end, which is the good of the self” (p. 8). The idea that the self is an 
embodied “locus” of capacities and/or experiences, to be found in the inner 
realm of a person, is strongly prevalent in the history of Western modern phi-
losophy, as illustrated by C. Taylor (1989). For example, Descartes’ conception 
of the “cogito” emphasizes our capacity for rationality as crucial to who we are; 
Locke associates the self with our episodic memory; and Hume perceives it as a 
bundle of experiences. Importantly however, G. Gerhardt (1989) warns against 
the essentialist conceptualization of the self often associated with such ideas 
about localization. He emphasizes that the self is not to be seen as a clearly de-
marcated entity within ourselves, but should be perceived in terms of a relation 
to oneself and one’s life. This relational conceptualization presents the self as 
being in constant dynamic transformation and without a specific locus. Thus, 
even though the self is associated with an inner realm, this does not imply that 
it needs to be purely self-directed or enclosed in itself. Returning to the garden-
ing metaphor, we can see how self-realization presupposes a self with multiple 
levels: there is a currently existing self, with certain qualities and limitations 
(symbolized by the garden that demands cultivation); there is the self we aspire 
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to become (symbolized by our plans and dreams for how our garden will bloom 
and flourish in the future); and there is the self that has the principal capacities 
to act upon itself in order to develop and grow in the desired direction (sym-
bolized by the gardener). The self-realizing moral agent, we could say, is both 
the garden and the gardener engaged in a process of self-development which 
will hopefully lead to self-improvement or realizing the best within herself (see 
§4.2.1). 
These initial reflections already introduce some important themes relevant 
for an understanding of the self in this study, such as continuity or reflexiv-
ity. Some other themes however, need to be elaborated to further enrich our 
understanding. Below, I will briefly discuss six themes that are essential to 
an understanding of the self that matches the interpretation of self-realization 
advanced here. The themes highlighted are: reflexivity, temporality, continuity, 
embodiment, social and relational constitution, and ethical/moral aim.
• Reflexivity: In most traditional views, to be a self, in the sense of qualifying 
as a human agent and having a sense of personal identity, requires that one 
is able to reflect on one’s own choices, purposes, feelings and actions. Re-
flexivity presupposes the ability to distance oneself from one’s immediate 
inclinations and feelings, to take what is called a “third-person perspective” 
and look at oneself through the eyes of another. Frankfurt (1971) argued that 
it is crucial for human personhood that one can make second-order volitions; 
i.e., one should be able to evaluate one’s own desires and decide towards 
which of them one wants to direct their behavior. The ability to reflect on 
oneself is often associated with the rational capacities of human beings, 
since it is by virtue of our reason that we are able to deliberate and make 
hierarchical orderings between our (first- and second-order) desires. But it 
can also be related to our hermeneutic and narrative capacities that enable 
us to interpret ourselves and bring meaningful order and coherence to the 
variety of experiences that make up our lives (Taylor, 1985b; see further 
chapter 5). In the latter case, reflexivity becomes a theme that not only con-
cerns the third-person perspective, but also the second-person perspective, 
since narrative identity is principally socially constituted (see §5.3.2 and 
§5.3.3). 
• Temporality: One is a self at a certain moment in time, but one is also always 
in the process of becoming another (version of this) self, that one aspires or 
has the capacity to be. Moreover, we relate to (several versions of) our past 
selves in formulating our current aspirations and evaluating our self-de-
velopment. This presupposes that we are beings with a past, present and 
future that stand in a certain relation to each other. The role of temporality 
in the self is also mirrored in the fundamental concerns that Schechtman 
(1996) relates to our personal identity. The four concerns she distinguishes 
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are 1) a concern for survival, i.e., whether or not one will continue to exist in 
the future; 2) self-interested concern, i.e., the type of interest in one’s own fu-
ture that is assumed to be rational for a person to have; 3) a concern for com-
pensation, i.e., an interest in being personally compensated or rewarded for 
hardship or sacrifice; and 4) moral responsibility, i.e., being accountable for 
one’s choices and actions. All these concerns assume that we can anticipate 
future versions of ourselves, and that we have an understanding of what 
characterized our self in the past and what characterizes it in the present. 
• Continuity: The temporality of the self also presupposes a certain amount 
of continuity or constancy over time. In order to be able to envision a future 
self, the self we strive to become, we cannot experience our past, present 
and future selves as unconnected to each other. Correspondingly, Gewirth 
(1998) emphasizes that “The self is not to be atomized into a series of dis-
crete entities. Rather, self-knowledge involves a continuous process wherein 
the later stage learns from what has been experienced at an earlier stage 
and modifies its aspirations and expectations accordingly” (p. 45). Thus, the 
notion of moral self-development inherent in this study’s understanding of 
self-realization assumes an element of continuity, even though it acknowl-
edges that our self is in a constant dynamic process of transition.
The fact that the purpose of self-realization presupposes that one identifies 
with an image of who one wants to become (see §4.2.1) also underscores the 
importance of assuming a certain amount of continuity in the self. In ac-
cordance with this, several thinkers have argued that our lives need to show 
some narrative integrity or constancy that underlies our self-understanding 
(C. Taylor, 1989; MacIntyre, 1984; Ricoeur, 1992; see also §5.2.3). V. Gerhardt 
(1999) states that: “[...] dort, wo uns eine Entscheidung ‘wichtig’ ist, [steht] der 
ganze Erwartungskontext des eigenen Daseins mindestens im Hintergrund [in 
cases where we truly ‘care’ about a choice, the whole context of expectation 
derived from our own being stands in the background]” (p. 407; transla-
tion HL). Thus, identity-constituting choices and actions require a horizon 
that encompasses our life as a sufficiently integrated whole in order to be 
intelligible, both to ourselves and to others. What is sufficient in this regard 
depends on the situation and the personal outlook of the person concerned, 
as one person may be able to cope with more fragmentation and uncertainty 
than another. However, the view defended in this study assumes that a min-
imal amount of experienced integration, as a necessary (though not suffi-
cient) condition of intelligibility and meaning, is presupposed for everyone. 
• Embodiment: A satisfactory account of the self, in the context of the inter-
pretation of self-realization suggested in this study, should also acknowl-
edge the importance of our embodied being for our experience of self (At-
kins, 2008). As phenomenological philosophers, notably Merleau-Ponty 
(1945/1962) have emphasized, we are pre-reflexively engaged with the world 
Aging and Self-Realization104
through our bodies. Before we are able to consciously reflect on ourselves, 
what we are and who we strive to be and become, before we are able to 
express who we are through language, we already have a relationship with 
the world around us through our bodily existence. Our bodies enable us to 
feel basic sensations like thirst, hunger, or cold, to grasp things, to touch, 
to move, to attract attention from our caregivers, et cetera. Our bodies are 
also the medium that enables us to relate to other people, who respond to us 
through bodily gestures as well. Our embodied being is therefore perceived 
as a constitutive condition of our personal identity, which precedes the re-
flexive capacity discussed earlier. 
Our embodied selfhood thereby also enables us to give form and meaning 
to our lived experiences, and thus apply order and coherence to our world. 
However, the world should not be perceived as passively undergoing the 
ordering activity, because according to Atkins (2008), “embodiment also 
has an ‘interrogative mode’: the body explores and discovers a world that re-
sponds to its sensing and synthesis” (p. 42). In short, our ability to act and to 
interact, our agency, we might say, is rooted in our embodied existence. But 
our bodies are also inherently vulnerable, to illness, to assault from others, 
to accidents and natural disasters, and ultimately to death. Merleau-Pon-
ty (1945/1962) has expressed our bodily relation to the world in terms of 
intentionality, which expresses a relation between the self and the (social 
and material) world characterized by mutual sensitivity and attunement. 
Only when this self-evident relationship with the material and social world 
is disrupted, as Merleau-Ponty illustrates using a case of brain damage, do 
we realize how deeply our personal identity and our navigation of the world 
depend on our embodied being and its intentional relations.  
• Social/relational constitution: In contrast to late modern self-realization dis-
course (see §2.2), this study stresses a view of the self that is embedded in 
social relations, and constituted by socio-cultural influences. Our opportu-
nities for exercising and developing moral agency, i.e., for self-realization, 
fundamentally depend on the way we are positioned in this context (see 
§3.2.3). The social and relational element of our self has been interpreted 
along various lines, which all emphasize different, but equally relevant as-
pects of our social and relational constitution. I will briefly discuss some 
examples: 
• Psychoanalytical authors like Erikson (1963) and Winnicott (1965) em-
phasized how a stable and healthy sense of self fundamentally depends 
on the availability of loving relations of basic trust with our primary 
caregivers in early childhood. 
• Mead’s (1934/2015) symbolic interactionist approach to human per-
sonhood stressed the importance of the embedding of the person in a 
context of social relationships. This can be illustrated by his distinction 
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between the I and the Me. Whereas the Me represents the self that is 
the product of social interactions, the I represents the agential, creative 
response to this symbolic social constitution of the self. According to 
Mead’s theory, the self emerges from social interactions, rather than be-
ing the precondition of these interactions. However, through the dialec-
tic between I and Me, identity is not totally socially determined, but has 
an important agential quality as well. 
• Goffman’s (1959) work on social roles argued that we perform our iden-
tities through the way we present ourselves to others and through the 
different social roles we play. This view implies that the self is not only 
socially constituted, but also a plural. It is thus more aptly described as 
a variety of context-dependent selves. After all, the way we present our-
selves to our colleagues, or to strangers, may result in a very different 
social self than the way we present ourselves to our family and friends. 
• Several philosophical authors have stressed the importance of the social 
and relational basis of our self for our moral relations with others, which 
Parekh (2008) interprets in terms of our human identity. This term re-
lates to an awareness of particular unique qualities we possess as mem-
bers of the human species, and the moral demands these qualities pose 
on our conduct and choices. The moral sensitivity to the demands of oth-
ers as well as oneself, by virtue of one’s shared membership of human-
ity, can be seen as crucial to the status of the person as a moral subject 
or a moral agent; i.e., someone who can be held accountable by others 
and accept responsibility for their choices and actions. Accountability, 
responsibility, or as Ricoeur (1992) terms it, imputability, all presuppose 
the existence of fundamental and constitutive moral relationships be-
tween the subject claiming a certain identity and the surrounding social 
world (see also §5.4).
• Ethical/moral aim: The final relevant aspect of this study’s view of the self 
is its intrinsic ethical or moral dimension. This expresses the connection 
between our identity – who we are and who we want to become – and a 
dimension of ethical and/or moral values that we identify with. Our identi-
fication with such ethical or moral aims is constitutive of our moral agency, 
which is understood in this study as the expression of our moral identity 
in concrete choices and actions. An account of the self that matches this 
study’s reframed interpretation of self-realization presupposes that we are 
beings inevitably engaged with what Ricoeur (1992) has called the funda-
mental “ethical aim” of human life: “a good life, with and for others, in just 
institutions” (p. 172).
My account of the self as intrinsically moral follows C. Taylor (1989), who 
claims that we can only understand our existence as human beings situated 
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in a moral space. C. Taylor assumes that our personal identity, i.e., our answer 
to the question of who we are, is inextricably linked to our conceptions of the 
good. Human beings can only acquire self-understanding by positioning them-
selves in relation to what is of deepest value to them. In C. Taylor’s (1989) own 
words, “To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My identity 
is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or 
horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, 
or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other 
words, it is the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand” (p. 27). C. 
Taylor’s account of moral identity lays strong emphasis on the capability of the 
individual agents themselves to form moral orientations, and to appropriate 
through their choices and actions certain values that are constitutive of who 
they want to be. However, the normative, moral or ethical dimension of iden-
tity also pertains to our attitude towards - and relationship with others. The 
identity-constituting choices we make are embedded in and influenced by our 
social relations. They also have an inevitable impact on others. Our evaluation 
and moral legitimation of our choices and actions should consider this impact. 
Moreover, the social nature of identity suggests that there is always an element 
of the other included in the self, the influence of which is constantly negotiated 
in a dynamic dialogical relationship (Ricoeur, 1992; Lindemann, 2014; see also 
§5.3.2, §5.4). 
4.2.3 The practice of self-realization
How do human beings engage in self-realization? In other words, what does 
the practice of self-realization look like? Recalling the gardening metaphor, it is 
important to note that the purpose of reaching a flourishing garden is strived 
for by engaging in a variety of activities. On the one hand, bringing about the 
flourishing of the garden is a purposive striving, planned and chosen by the 
gardener because it is a goal she values. On the other hand, it is mainly through 
a variety of other activities, like sowing, planting, digging, watering, et cetera, 
that the gardener realizes this striving. Consequently, it is often complicated to 
point at one well-defined activity that constitutes the flourishing that is strived 
for. Moreover, the gardener’s work is never finished, because she works with 
living nature, which is in continuous transition. This teaches us some impor-
tant things regarding the practice of self-realization. First, self-realization can 
appear in human lives both as a purposive striving and as an epiphenomenon, a 
by-effect of other activities. In the first case, it is a practice undertaken inten-
tionally and for its own sake, because one values the goal of self-development 
or making the best of oneself. In the second case, self-realization is the result of 
other activities. These do not have self-realization as their direct and intentional 
goal, but may nevertheless result in the actualization of one’s potential for opti-
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mal flourishing. Second, the practice of self-realization cannot be reduced to an 
activity that is clearly delineated or marked in time. Instead, it has the features 
of a continuous process and is consequently never completed.  
• Self-realization as purposive striving and/or epiphenomenon: Practicing self-re-
alization can be an intentional purposive striving when one explicitly iden-
tifies aspects of self-fulfillment as crucial to develop in order to approach 
one’s optimal self. For example, I may become aware of the fact that I con-
stantly make the same mistakes, which obstructs my striving to be a good 
mother, spouse, sister, colleague, et cetera. From this, I may draw the con-
clusion that I lack self-knowledge and need to work on myself to attain bet-
ter self-insight. When, as a result of this conclusion, I engage in activities 
explicitly intended to enhance my own self-knowledge, such as visiting a 
therapist or engaging in meditation on my own strengths and weaknesses, 
it can be said that I purposively strive to improve myself. Since this has 
the explicit aim of being able to lead a better life with and for others (i.e., 
enhancing my own moral agency), I am then, consciously and purposively, 
realizing myself.  
V. Gerhardt (1999) claims that the ability for purposive chosen action (as 
opposed to unconscious, automatically occurring behavior such as breath-
ing or falling asleep) is indispensable to define ourselves and communicate 
who we are as moral agents. Consequently, it seems that the practice of 
self-realization is necessarily mediated through purposive action. However, 
the purposive aim manifested in this action need not be self-realization as 
such, as is the case in the example given above. Our activities can also have 
another purposive aim and still contribute indirectly to who we want to be-
come. In those cases, which I suspect are more widespread than the cases 
of intentional self-realization, the practice of self-realization appears as an 
epiphenomenon. This means that it proceeds through other activities such 
as working, caring, creating things, having relationships, fulfilling social 
roles, et cetera. These activities are not intentionally aimed at self-realization 
most of the time, but self-improvement or self-development may certainly 
be their outcome. 
Reflecting on the practice of self-realization, it is crucial to note that in many 
cases our actions are only implicitly informed by who we strive to be. Fur-
ther, this underlying motivation is not a matter of conscious reflexive choice. 
Yet, insofar as our activities contribute to the realization of the deepest as-
pirations or highest capacities that represent who we want to become, they 
contribute to the practice of self-realization. For example, by honoring my 
promise to accompany my friend to a doctor’s appointment, I translate into 
action my aspiration to be a reliable friend, but this need not be a motivation 
I am reflectively aware of. It is important to note that it is not immaterial 
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which actions figure in the practice of self-realization. In order to contrib-
ute to our self-realization, our actions cannot be destructive, damaging to 
ourself or to others, or otherwise morally illegitimate (Gewirth, 1998). After 
all, it is the purpose of self-realization to optimize our moral agency, which 
is defined in this study as the ability to lead a good life, with and for others, 
according to our deepest aspirations and highest capacities, as full partici-
pating members of society (see §5.5). Any action that impedes this striving, 
for instance, by excluding other people from participation in society, by act-
ing unjustly, or by failing to live up to one’s potential as a result of laziness, 
indifference or selfishness, will also disable self-realization. The exclusion 
of morally damaging or illegitimate actions assumes that social processes of 
moral evaluation and self-legitimation are an intrinsic part of the practice of 
self-realization. V. Gerhardt (1999) stresses that it is implicit in our self-per-
ception as moral agents that we grant other people the fundamental right to 
question our choices and judge our behavior. The social interaction involved 
in this dialogical process potentially plays a fundamental role in our further 
moral self-development (see also §4.2.2). It enhances our self-knowledge 
and may cause us to revise our value orientations and the purposes we strive 
for. Again, it is only through the expression of our identity-constituting val-
ue orientation in actions that we are able to engage in these social processes 
of moral evaluation.
• Self-realization as a lifelong process: It can also be learned from the gardening 
metaphor that practicing self-realization is an ongoing process that is never 
complete or finished. This results in part from the fact that one’s image 
of who one wants to be or become, expressed in the deepest aspirations 
and best capacities one strives for, is never static but will change over one’s 
life. This constant transformation also changes the purpose one strives for 
in self-realization, although a certain coherence needs to be retained. In 
the optimal scenario, such changes prompt a person to appropriate new 
grounds and develop new aspirations or capacities that will then lead to 
flourishing in domains that were previously beyond one’s reach. Ideally, 
this process of self-development is characterized by inner growth, an in-
crease in self-insight and wisdom. The hoped for result is an enhancement 
of one’s ability for moral agency, which exemplifies a successful process of 
self-realization. 
However, there are also many cases in which the situation is less ideal. As 
a moral developmental goal strived for throughout life, self-realization is a 
process that will inevitably face ups and downs. The practice of self-reali-
zation can be characterized by severe struggles with oneself and/or one’s 
surroundings. A beneficial outcome of growth and flourishing is certainly 
not guaranteed. 
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The practice of self-realization is vulnerable to all sorts of threats, both ex-
ternal and internal to the self. For instance, if people are institutionalized 
in a long-term care facility, they may have to give up previously acquired dis-
cretionary space to decide for themselves what would contribute to the life 
they want to live and who they want to be. This loss can result in feelings of 
regret, sadness, anger or hopelessness, which, if they stagnate, impede the 
continuation of their process of self-realization. Alternatively, older workers 
may feel that their experience is no longer valued by their employer or col-
leagues. This can result in a loss of self-confidence, in frustration and with-
drawal, so that they cannot make the contribution at work that would be in 
accordance with the kind of employee they want to be. It is important to em-
phasize that such situations need not automatically be the end of self-reali-
zation. In fact, our experienced defeats and losses in life can even be made a 
part of our self-realization if we succeed in finding a viable attitude towards 
them. But this does require an adjustment of one’s self-understanding, an 
adaptation of one’s strategies for realizing certain valued aspirations and 
capacities and maybe also of one’s purposes. 
This adaptation to a new situation doesn’t always come easy. In each prac-
tical situation requiring a moral response, the constellation of aspirations 
and capacities contributing to the optimal exercise of moral agency has to be 
renegotiated. Moral self-development is a chance, but cannot be a certainty.
Although some periods of our lives may be characterized by relative stabil-
ity, there will always be the possibility of either external or internal distur-
bance of this equilibrium. When this happens, it necessitates a reconsider-
ation of the resources that we use to safeguard the coherence and meaning 
we experience in our lives. In periods of equilibrium, our striving to be-
come a certain kind of person is very often more like a silent background 
framework than a consciously experienced goal. This does not mean that 
our image of the best in us doesn’t influence our behavior. But we are not 
necessarily consciously occupied with reflection on who we want to be all 
the time. It is typically in situations where we become a problem to our-
selves, those moments of moral or existential crisis when our self-evident 
patterns of behavior and value orientations are challenged or found inade-
quate, that the striving for self-realization is suddenly felt as a moral task 
that we cannot evade; otherwise we will feel imbalanced, disturbed and out 
of sync with ourselves, our lives and the world (V. Gerhardt, 1999). 
4.2.4 The timing of self-realization
The continuous and never-ending character of the self-realization process im-
plies that there are no specific moments or phases in life that are reserved for 
self-realization. At the same time, the striving for self-realization may take a 
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different shape in different phases of life. The account of self-realization I sug-
gest in this study is that of a lifelong process of moral development. Its life-en-
compassing nature makes an ethics of self-realization particularly attractive 
when it comes to emphasizing that later life also harbors potentials for growth 
and flourishing. The gardening metaphor will again illustrate some relevant 
points. Gardening is an activity that never ends, but importantly, it does require 
different activities depending on the season. Some of these activities are flexi-
ble or repetitive, such as watering and weeding; others require a particular tim-
ing, such as planting certain crops. In spring, dead leaves and branches have to 
be removed, and new crops have to be sown. In summer, constant watering and 
weeding are needed, but summer is also the time to enjoy the blooming plants. 
In autumn, the time comes to harvest and to prepare for winter, when the soil 
rests and is restored for a new season, whereas the gardener quietly enjoys the 
fruits she has harvested and makes plans for crops and flowers to plant next 
year when the cycle of seasons starts anew. 
From the perspective of timing, three observations stand out. First, there 
is a cyclical dynamics to gardening, which follows the rhythm of the seasons, 
in which active modes of being alternate with more retired and passive modes. 
Second, some activities of gardening require a specific moment in time. The 
ancient Greeks used the term kairos, meaning the right time for something. For 
instance, a crop planted too early may be destroyed by frost, but if planted too 
late, may not bear the desired fruits. Third, some aspects of gardening also 
show a linear dynamics of continuing growth and maturation. For instance, a 
rose bush will not carry many flowers the first year it has been planted, but its 
stems will grow over the years and develop into a strong and abundantly-blos-
soming plant, provided the bush is well taken care of and the circumstances 
are favorable. The gardener herself will also gain in experience and knowledge 
about gardening, which will expectedly contribute to the flourishing of her gar-
den as well. Drawing on the analogy, I derive three relevant points about the 
timing of self-realization from these reflections: 
• First, analogous to the cyclical character of gardening, self-realization is 
continuously of relevance throughout life, yet it may appear in different 
forms in different phases of our lives. We have already encountered the 
observation that aspirations and capacities may change over the life course 
(§4.2.1), which may cause a change in how we strive to realize ourselves 
through our choices and actions (§4.2.3). Also, as was suggested earlier, cer-
tain life events or moments of moral/existential crisis may trigger a more 
active occupation with the question of who we want to be or become. At oth-
er moments, our striving for self-realization remains largely inexplicit. The 
ups and downs of life, with periods of active self-transformation alternating 
with periods of equilibrium and relative stability, suggest that the urgency 
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felt to explicitly engage in self-realization will also vary throughout life, in 
the same way as the active preoccupation of the gardener with her garden. 
• Second, the kairos aspect expresses that in some cases, self-realization re-
quires choices to be made and actions to be undertaken at a specific mo-
ment in time, without postponement. It is detrimental to our growth and 
flourishing if we force ourselves to make certain decisive choices too early, 
for instance when a musically talented child feels forced into a career as 
a violinist at an age where other future options can be kept open. On the 
other hand, we cannot keep postponing the responsibility for our lives by 
refusing to make constitutive choices. This often occurs out of fear that oth-
er roads will be closed once we make a choice. Yet such postponement will 
probably impede our self-realization. In Either/Or Kierkegaard (1843/1959) 
makes the older judge Wilhelm warn his young protégé about the dangers 
of an aesthetic lifestyle that evades making ethical choices. The latter would 
require a steadfast engagement with a certain moral ideal of the self. As 
previously discussed, self-realization requires such identification with a 
certain image of who we want to become (§4.2.1). But our true engagement 
with an ideal of the self, demands that we remain true to what we care 
about even in difficult circumstances, by letting our value orientation guide 
our decisions at crucial moments. Otherwise we compromise our self, even 
more than our moral principles (Frankfurt, 1988a) and this can be expected 
to stymie our self-realization.   
• Third, analogous to the linear character of gardening, self-realization in-
deed acquires heightened importance as we grow up and grow older. Most 
philosophical accounts of self-realization underscore that a certain amount 
of maturation is a condition for successful self-fulfillment. Aristotle’s vir-
tue ethics may serve as an example (Ethica Nicomachea; see §8.3.1)1. Young 
children first need to develop the relevant capacities to form aspirations 
about being a certain person before they can identify with them and trans-
late them into action. Adolescents struggle to find models that they want 
to identify with, as Erikson (1963) suggested in his psycho-social model of 
development. Further, maturing into adulthood and old age ideally brings 
opportunities to deepen our self-insight and reflect upon what is truly im-
portant to us in our lives. This thought has led some thinkers, for exam-
ple, Jung (1931/1995) to suggest that it is in later life that self-realization is 
most urgently of relevance. Jung stated that in midlife, we face a turning 
point in our development. Whereas the first half of life is dedicated to pro-
creation and productivity, activities oriented towards the outside world, the 
1 | In citing Aristotle, this study will follow the common convention in philosophy to 
use Bekker numbers for literal citations. Translated quotes from Ethica Nicomachea are 
drawn from the edition by David Ross (1980) that is on the reference list.
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second half of life, according to Jung, should mark a shift inwards and an 
orientation towards personal growth, maturation and ripening/deepening 
of insight and wisdom. Of course, Jung relied on the traditions of ancient 
wisdom that also tend to couple self-realization to life experience and matu-
ration, and thus, logically, to more advanced ages.  
Although I disagree with the idea that self-realization is the exclusive prov-
ince of later life or old age, let alone reserved for the Third Age, as contem-
porary cultural discourse sometimes suggests (see §2.4.3), I believe there 
is something to be said for the idea that self-realization can gain a deeper 
urgency with aging. First of all, aging comes with life experience, and al-
though experience certainly doesn’t automatically culminate in more (self-)
insight and wisdom, it does increase the likelihood of developing these 
desirable qualities that are conducive to self-realization. Second, as has al-
ready been stressed several times, the chances of being confronted with ex-
istential vulnerability increase with aging. These confrontations are likely 
to expose older people more often and with higher intensity to those very 
situations that call for explicit reflection on one’s life, on who one has been, 
is, and wants to be or become, that underlie the practice of self-realization 
(see also §4.4.2).   
4.3 e xPloring the best in us
In §4.2, I have presented self-realization, broadly perceived, as a process of 
moral self-development aimed at the realization of the best within us. This ex-
pression is further explored in this section. To start with, I should emphasize 
that the best at stake in self-realization does not represent a static end to be 
achieved, or an unchanging character trait. Instead, it represents a dynamically 
developing process. As Gewirth (1998) puts it, “The best that is ‘in you’ is not 
in you as something that is preexisting or ready-made; [...] Rather, it gets de-
veloped out of preexisting materials that can be turned in different directions 
through autonomous choice and habituation” (p. 60). Although the autono-
mous choice of the individual agent thus plays an important role, it should be 
mentioned that whatever is perceived as the best is also deeply influenced by 
socio-cultural factors, and always dependent on the particular situation and 
positioning of the individual. Note also that what constitutes the best is not 
meant to be a high bar, or static, universal standard against which people’s lives 
are measured. What counts is that they strive for the best that is possible for 
them, given their individual qualities and specific situational circumstances. 
Of course, this should not be used as an excuse not to address and improve 
external conditions that form an obstacle to self-realization, as in the case of 
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marginalizing and stereotyping cultural master narratives that impede peo-
ple’s moral agency (see chapter 3). 
A cursory glance at the history of Western philosophy teaches us that the 
best in human beings has been interpreted in very diverse and often contra-
dictory terms. All approaches share the idea that by developing the qualities 
advanced, one moves closer towards the realization of the overarching moral 
goal of a good life, however differently this is perceived. Below, I will briefly 
discuss a catalogue of historical and philosophical interpretations of what may 
constitute the best in human beings. Because the scope of this study did not 
allow for an extensive historical exploration of the genealogy of ideals of self-re-
alization, I will draw upon work done in this regard by others, notably C. Taylor 
(1989) and G. Gerhardt (1989).
4.3.1 Selected historical and 
philosophical interpretations of the best in us
The evolution of thought on self-realization can be illustrated by considering 
seminal views and ideas that arose in the course of philosophical history about 
what it means to lead a good life as a human being. G. Gerhardt (1989) has 
provided a categorization of four historical lines, each exemplifying a specific 
interpretation of the best in human beings to be actualized through self-real-
ization: 
• The eudaimonistic line: This line conceptualizes the best in terms of the 
classical Aristotelian conception of happiness or eudaimonia. Self-realiza-
tion involves the actualization of potentialities inherent in human nature, 
the capacity for reason being the highest among these. 
• The naturalistic line: This line perceives human beings as most strongly 
motivated by their natural needs, which presents self-preservation as the 
best to be strived for. Reason, highly valued in the eudaimonistic line, is 
seen as functional but relatively powerless compared to the natural instinct 
for self-preservation. The naturalistic line also acknowledges that an indi-
vidual’s natural needs can be in conflict with the needs of others or with an 
indifferent or hostile environment. 
• The aesthetic-pedagogical line: This line perceives the best in terms of the 
authentic expression of the unique individuality of the human being. Im-
portantly, this line criticizes a one-sided focus on reason as the best human 
potential, and underscores the equally important role of affective and cre-
ative capacities. 
• The historical-philosophical line: This line shares the pedagogical optimism 
of the aesthetic-pedagogical line, but focuses on humanity as a whole in-
stead of on the unique individual. This line, exemplified by the works of 
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Hegel and Marx among others, assumes an inescapable historical dynamics 
directed towards the moral perfection of the community of mankind.
Though G. Gerhardt’s categorization offers a useful instrument to group differ-
ent historical views about what constitutes the best in human beings in self-re-
alization, his account also has its limitations. It remains a bit imbalanced be-
cause he uses his historical sketch of different views, mainly instrumentally, to 
confirm his own categorization of different forms of ethics. His account lacks 
the richness and nuance provided by C. Taylor in his magnum opus Sources of 
the self. The making of modern identity (1989). On the other hand, G. Gerhardt 
(1989) does address certain relevant perspectives that are not discussed by C. 
Taylor, such as the Aristotelian, eudaimonistic view, which adds to the value of 
his work relevant to this study.
C. Taylor (1989) analyzes historical ideas of what constitutes the best in hu-
man beings in terms of moral resources for our identity. Together, these imag-
es of the best, or “hypergoods”, constitute the horizon against which we shape 
our selves, i.e., our moral identity. As elaborated in §2.3.6, C. Taylor believes 
that a conglomerate of tendencies associated with the process of modernization 
has resulted in a loss of access to these resources for modern individuals. This, 
he contends, has resulted in a moral identity crisis for late modern individuals. 
By exploring the gradual transformations of our modern self-understanding 
and the conceptualizations of the good or best that underlie it, C. Taylor strives 
to uncover fundamental identity resources that have disappeared from public 
moral discourse.
C. Taylor’s work on the moral sources of our modern identity is highly er-
udite and rich, so that it is impossible to do full justice to all the developments 
he describes in the context of the current study. However, in light of the focus 
in this section on historical accounts of what constitutes the best in us with 
relevance to self-realization, it is important to highlight one specific theme of 
C. Taylor’s analysis. This concerns his observations regarding the emergence, 
during the course of modernization, of the idea that human beings have an 
inner realm. C. Taylor perceives this development as quintessential to under-
standing the evolution of the moral sources of identity available to modern in-
dividuals. The inner realm is perceived as the seat of their selves or their “soul”, 
the source of the aspirations and capacities that guide their self-realization (see 
§4.2.1). Crucial to this development is what C. Taylor (1989) calls “radical reflex-
ivity” (p. 131). This term describes human beings as capable of taking a first-per-
son perspective, reflecting on their own life and the highest values they strive 
for. This radical reflexive first-person perspective was first introduced by early 
Christian thinkers such as Augustine, and was then carried forward in dif-
ferent directions by thinkers such as Locke, Descartes, Montaigne, Rousseau 
and Nietzsche. Ideas about radical reflexivity have profoundly influenced our 
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modern self-understanding. As C. Taylor (1989) argues, since radical reflexiv-
ity became rooted in our collective self-image, “the road from the lower to the 
higher, the crucial shift in direction, passes through our attending to ourselves 
as inner” (p. 129). Consequently, regardless of how one interprets the best in 
human beings, self-realization can no longer be conceived without taking the 
inner realm of human beings into account.
From C. Taylor’s and G. Gerhardt’s views, a catalogue of historical and phil-
osophical interpretations of what constitutes the best in human beings can be 
deduced. The selection of views discussed below certainly does not present an 
exhaustive overview. However, it illustrates that the fabric of self-realization 
discourse is rich and complex, and that its pattern is woven from different 
threads, that can be traced to their different appearances throughout philo-
sophical history. This study will argue in favor of a distinction between three 
main threads that together form the purpose of self-realization as I interpret it: 
autonomy, authenticity and virtue (§4.3.2). Although the listing below of histor-
ical-philosophical interpretations of the best that is relevant to self-realization 
remains incomplete and brief, it does provide a starting point for a discussion 
of these threads. 
1. Mastery of passion through reason: A catalogue of conceptualizations of the 
good in Western philosophy cannot escape starting with Plato. According 
to Plato (as cited in C. Taylor, 1989), human striving should be directed to-
wards the mastery of our earthly passions and desires through reason. Rea-
son is seen as our road of access to what Plato conceived as the eternal Good, 
of which our earthly goods are only incomplete adumbrations. Although 
Plato certainly did not locate the eternal Good in the individual realm, as 
C. Taylor (1989) shows, none of the later accounts of what constitutes the 
best in us can be properly understood without acknowledging the Platonic 
origins of thinking about the good. 
2. Eudaimonia: More down-to-earth than Plato’s account is Aristotle’s (as cited 
in G. Gerhardt, 1989) ethics, which is perhaps the oldest explicit represen-
tation of a self-realization-ethics in Western philosophy. Aristotle presents 
eudaimonia (or happiness) as the ultimate goal of human striving. In this 
tradition, the best life is believed to be acquired by optimally fulfilling one’s 
natural potentials as a human being. Aristotle’s virtue ethics (Ethica Nico-
machea) can be seen as the most well-known and influential approach ad-
vancing this idea. 
3. Self-forsaking and self-transcendence: Early Christian thinkers like Augustine 
(as cited in C. Taylor, 1989) and Thomas Aquinas (as cited in C. Taylor, 
1989) criticized the striving for flourishing in the context of earthly life. The 
best in human life could only be found in devotion to God. Virtues relevant 
in practical earthly contexts stressed by the Greek tradition (such as cour-
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age, justice and wisdom) were replaced by virtues believed to contribute to 
the union of the human soul with God, namely, faith, hope and love (Van 
Tongeren, 2012). Paradoxically, the road to self-realization was thus sought 
in self-sacrifice and self-transcendence, postponing ultimate fulfillment to 
the afterlife. 
4. Rational mastery of the world: Descartes’ (as cited in C. Taylor, 1989) strict 
separation between the knowing subject or cogito, and the world of objects, 
led to an ideal of rational detachment whereby human subjects, by virtue 
of their capacity for reason, acquired the status of sovereign masters of the 
world. During the scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th century, the Carte-
sian rational, detached attitude, ascribed to the subject as a sovereign locus 
of control, became imbued with the status of the best human potential. 
5. Self-preservation: Thinkers such as Locke (as cited in C. Taylor, 1989) and 
Hobbes (as cited in G. Gerhardt, 1989) saw enlightened self-interest as one 
of the strongest and most fundamental human motivations. This nour-
ished their idea of the social order being based on a “contract” between free 
and equal individual agents, installed in order to guarantee their maximal 
benefit. Striving for self-preservation by advancing and maximizing one’s 
self-interest was thus added to the catalogue of views deliberating the best 
in human beings.
6. Self-knowledge: Another appearance of the modern radical reflexivity can be 
found in the work of Montaigne (as cited in C. Taylor, 1989). He stressed 
the importance of self-investigation, which should yield us insight into our 
own deepest motivations, inclinations, thoughts and feelings. The corre-
sponding conceptualization of the best in human beings can be defined as 
the ability to view ourselves clearly and modestly, with all our limitations, 
to gain in self-knowledge; a virtue already valued by Socrates and the Stoics. 
7. Self-determination: Enlightenment thinkers, most notable of them being 
Kant (as cited in C. Taylor, 1989), claimed that the ultimate source of moral 
authority is the moral law situated within us. The best in ourselves can 
be identified here in terms of our capacities for reason and autonomy. By 
replacing heteronomy and following authorities with autonomous rational 
“thinking for oneself”, moral self-direction and self-determination become 
possible. 
8. Expression of inner nature: Rousseau (as cited in C. Taylor, 1989) and his 
Romantic heirs criticized the Enlightenment emphasis on rationality and 
autonomy, focusing on our emotions and creative capacities instead. By 
learning to follow the compass of our inner nature, and expressing our au-
thentic emotions and inclinations, our true potentials for moral agency can 
be realized. Following one’s inner voice could thus be perceived as the best 
to be strived for in self-realization. 
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9. Self-elevation: Post-Romantic thinkers such as Nietzsche (as cited in G. Ger-
hardt, 1989, and in C. Taylor, 1989) voiced their suspicion of human beings 
being self-evidently inclined to moral goodness. Instead, they perceived the 
inner realm as a dark and amoral domain. However, rather than concluding 
that self-realization as a moral striving was flawed, they saw greatness in 
transcending mediocrity by elevating oneself to a superior mode of being. 
Creative expression and authentic affirmation of one’s life and self was in-
troduced as a new and provocative conception of the best potential of hu-
man beings. 
10. Radical freedom and self-choice: Existential philosophers like Kierkegaard, 
Heidegger and Sartre (as cited in G. Gerhardt, 1989) suggested that, be-
ing “thrown” into the world, human beings optimally realize themselves 
through radically exercising their freedom, by embracing an existence with-
out any prior or intrinsic meaning. This radical freedom and self-choice 
were perceived as both inescapable fate and the highest purpose of human 
life.
11. Care: Though not discussed by G. Gerhardt (1989) and C. Taylor (1989), 
feminist ethics in the 20th century introduced a moral focus on relations of 
care and responsibility that deserves a mention here as another perception 
of the best in human beings. Although not presented in terms of self-re-
alization, the ability to care for others is seen as a very important virtue 
playing a fundamental role in maintaining human life and enabling its 
goodness (Tronto, 1993; Held, 2006). 
12. Self-appropriation: A final item in the catalogue, also not discussed by G. 
Gerhardt (1989) and C. Taylor (1989) but relevant for my purposes, is the 
view represented by contemporary self-care or art of living perspectives, 
such as represented by Foucault (1984/1992) and his followers. They em-
phasize the moral importance of appropriating oneself, for instance one’s 
purposes and motivations, without ignoring disciplining social forces. This 
approach values positive freedom, but precludes naïve assumptions about 
individual autonomy, authenticity and freedom that earlier thinkers be-
lieved in.  
4.3.2 Three threads: autonomy, authenticit y and virtue
The brief historical sketch of a selection of philosophical views about what con-
stitutes the best in us to be actualized through self-realization, suggests that 
contemporary self-realization discourse draws on a very rich and complex set 
of ideas about what constitutes the optimal life for human beings. The cata-
logue of different views about what constitutes the best in human beings can 
be grouped or ordered in several ways, for instance, by focusing on the under-
lying assumptions about the world, or by distinguishing between self-directed 
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or community-directed views, et cetera. For the purposes of this study, it is 
my contention that an ordering along the lines of thematic affiliation between 
the different conceptualizations is most clarifying. This results in the suggest-
ed distinction between three threads that weave the rich fabric of thought on 
self-realization, which are coupled to three ways of conceptualizing the moral 
agent. These threads are defined as autonomy, authenticity and virtue. 
• Autonomy: The first thread focuses on the capacity of human beings to au-
tonomously define, choose and appropriate goals, values and motivations 
that are concordant with the demands of reason. It celebrates freedom, mas-
tery and choice, and perceives the purpose of self-realization in terms of a 
self-determined life. The corresponding image of the moral agent presents 
an autonomous, rational, independent individual, who has the freedom as 
well as the moral obligation to lead a self-determined life. In the catalogue 
of philosophical views about what constitutes the best in human beings 
(§4.3.1), the ideas of rational mastery, self-preservation, self-determination, 
radical freedom/self-choice and self-appropriation all feed into the autono-
my thread.  
• Authenticity: The second thread focuses on the capacity of human beings 
to bring themselves, understood as their authentic, self-appropriated con-
ception of who they want to be, to full creative expression. It celebrates 
self-knowledge, creativity, expressivity, sincerity and moral sensitivity. 
The purpose of self-realization is perceived in terms of becoming who you 
are, i.e., realizing your deepest aspirations to become a certain person, a 
more “true” or worthier version of yourself. The corresponding image of 
the moral agent presents searching, creative individuals, striving to obtain 
self-knowledge, making contact with their inner voice and optimally ex-
pressing their authenticity, as conditional for a fulfilled life that is genuinely 
one’s own. In the catalogue, the ideas of self-knowledge, expression of inner 
nature, self-elevation, radical freedom/self-choice and in some sense also 
self-appropriation feed into the authenticity thread.
• Virtue: The third thread focuses on the capacity of human beings to develop 
their naturally given potentials into excellent character dispositions that are 
conducive to optimal flourishing, both of oneself and of the community 
one is a part of. It celebrates the practice of good habits, sociable and vir-
tuous (for instance, just, courageous, temperate) behaviors, and wisdom. 
The corresponding image of the moral agent presents a virtuous, social and 
interdependent individual, who aims to develop good habits and excellent 
qualitative character dispositions. The good life is conceived as a life with 
and for others, as members of a community. In the catalogue, the ideas 
of eudaimonia, self-forsaking/self-transcendence, self-knowledge and care 
feed into the virtue thread. 
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It is my contention that autonomy, authenticity and virtue are all valuable repre-
sentations of the purpose underlying self-realization, and should not be plotted 
against each other. The moral pluralism of late modernity requires an inter-
pretation of self-realization which acknowledges the rightful claims of each 
thread. All three of the constitutive threads in combination are required to ar-
rive at my reframed interpretation of self-realization, which aims to function as 
a resource for narratives of becoming about later life (see §3.4). Each of these 
constitutive concepts of the self-realization discourse has given rise to an of-
ten highly specialist philosophical discourse of its own, whereby the link with 
self-realization is not always explicitly made. In chapters 6, 7 and 8, the three 
threads are discussed in more detail. However, my intention in these chapters 
is not to give full philosophical accounts of autonomy, authenticity and virtue, 
respectively. Rather, my focus is on the question which interpretation of these 
concepts matches the reframed interpretation of self-realization aimed at in 
this study. It is also the contention of this study that the fundamental ills which 
the late modern interpretation of self-realization suffers from (see §2.5.1) can 
be largely attributed to its incomplete and sometimes perverted understanding 
of these constitutive concepts. For instance, late modern notions of autonomy 
have been criticized for presenting the individual as an atomistic being, only in-
strumentally engaged in relations with others, and attributed with an amount 
of rational control over the world that is not realistic for most people most of 
the time (M. Walker, 2007; see also chapter 6). On the other hand, modern 
notions of authenticity have been criticized as narcissistic and self-conscious 
(Lasch, 1979; C. Taylor, 1991; see also chapter 7). Interestingly, the eudaimonis-
tic tradition focusing on virtue seems to be underrepresented in the typical late 
modern discourse on self-realization (see chapter 8). 
As discussed in §2.5.2, these ambivalences of late modern self-realization 
discourse thrust themselves upon us when trying to apply this moral ideal to 
the context of aging. However, in my view, drawing on a self-realization dis-
course need not necessarily result in a defense of such problematic interpreta-
tions of autonomy and authenticity or a disregarding of virtue. The historical 
evolution of the self-realization discourse provides sufficient resources to gen-
erate alternative conceptualizations of these notions, which are able to under-
score the moral importance of self-realization for us, as shown in chapters 6, 7 
and 8. In combination, the critical reconsideration of existing accounts of au-
tonomy, authenticity and virtue in these chapters provide us with the building 
blocks for the reframed interpretation of self-realization. 
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4.4 self-re Aliz Ation And Aging
Before proceeding to a more in-depth exploration of the constitutive concepts 
weaving the discourse of self-realization, let me conclude the current chapter 
with some reflections on self-realization and aging. As discussed in §4.2.4, 
self-realization is an endeavor that continues throughout life, but also seems 
to gain an increased urgency with aging. Two issues merit particular attention 
however, because they may still give us pause regarding the applicability of the 
self-realization discourse to later life: 1) what are the consequences of the fact 
that the time horizon changes for older people, i.e., that their past is generally 
longer than their (perceived) remaining future lifetime? and 2) what are the 
consequences of the radicalized confrontation with existential vulnerability in 
later life? 
4.4.1 Self-realization and the shrinking of the future
No one knows how long they will live of course, but it is evident that as we 
age, the proportion of years still to be lived shrinks in comparison to the years 
we have already lived. The commonsensical intuition that has also found its 
way into classical developmental life-stage models such as Erikson’s (1997), is 
that old age is a time for looking back and evaluating one’s past life, instead of 
looking forward to future goals one wants to realize. Since the self-realization 
discourse is intrinsically teleological – it presupposes a purpose (telos) in the 
future to be strived for - the shrinking of the future that characterizes later life 
raises questions regarding the application of the self-realization discourse to 
aging. After all, if future-oriented strivings become less relevant as one ages, 
what does this imply for self-realization, which is intrinsically a future-directed 
endeavor? A number of reflections are relevant here:
• First of all, it is important to critically assess whether the often heard as-
sumption that younger and middle-aged people are predominantly pro-
spectively oriented (i.e., oriented towards the future) whereas older people 
are more retrospectively oriented (i.e., oriented towards the past) is actually 
correct or, alternatively, rests on biased ideas about old age. Baars (2012b) 
argues that what is often overlooked is that all these groups – youth, adults, 
elderly - actually live their lives in the present. As Baars emphasizes, for 
older people “it can be quite annoying that it is apparently beyond many 
people’s scope that older persons also live in the present, that these days are 
also their days, and that they might even be interested in the future” (p. 153). 
If time is perceived as a narrative and subjective category, rather than just 
a “chronometric” and (supposedly) objective one, it becomes clear that the 
experience of aging as living in time harbors a variety of individual varia-
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tions, and certainly does not exclude an orientation towards the future. The 
fact that this future is probably shorter does not have to diminish its im-
portance. As a befriended older woman once told me, it remains important 
to “have something to wake up to in the morning, even if one is 83”. This 
observation implies that the shrinking of the future that characterizes the 
life experience of older people need not derogate the value of one’s striving 
for self-realization. 
• Second, if we take into account that the approaching end of one’s life may 
give people a heightened sense of the importance of living in the present 
and of realizing one’s goals, it also follows that the teleological orientation 
of self-realization need not necessarily be in conflict with the shrinking 
time horizon of later life. The same effect is sometimes observed in people 
who have heard that they have a serious terminal illness and limited time 
left. They often report that their personal growth or moral self-development 
is experienced with increasing urgency due to their situation. It is further 
important to realize that for older people (and for others who know they 
are approaching death), attaining “closure” of certain issues in their lives 
may also be an important part of their self-realization. Even if this striv-
ing for closure indeed implies a heightened preoccupation with memories 
and people from the past, it can still constitute a purpose that fits into the 
framework of moral self-development that is presupposed by the self-reali-
zation discourse. Thus, though older people’s future is indeed shorter and 
their orientation towards the past may dominate, their preoccupation with 
self-realization is not inevitably lessened by this fact. 
• Third, although the shrinking of the future doesn’t necessarily diminish 
the importance of self-realization, it should still be considered that it may 
possibly have an impact on the type of goals that people aim for. For in-
stance, long-term goals connected with one’s own achievement may shift 
to the background in favor of goals related to transcending one’s self-di-
rectedness to contribute to the new generation, as Erikson (1997) described 
in his notion of generativity. To illustrate, it may be the aspiration of young 
scientists to become a respected authority in their field by publishing in 
high-impact journals and creating a large international network in order to 
realize these ambitions. By contrast, older or retired academics may rather 
focus on helping younger mentees find their way in academia, or, freed 
from the publication pressures, on writing books and articles that are more 
personal or unconventional, on themes they left out for instrumental rea-
sons (such as chances for publication) earlier during their career. This dif-
ference shows that our aspirations regarding who we want to be or become 
can alter during our life. Note that this suggests that the shrinking of the 
future expectedly influences older people’s aspiration fulfillment in partic-
ular (see §4.2.1).
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A difficult point in this regard pertains to the experienced necessity or pres-
sure to let go of certain long-term goals, because one becomes aware that 
they will not be reached in the time one has left, or because others commu-
nicate that aspired goals no longer suit the socio-cultural norms of one’s 
chronological age. It can be painful to feel forced to let go of deeply-valued 
aspirations. In such cases, replacing one aspiration (that is no longer con-
ceived as a realistic possibility) with another, more manageable goal can 
initially feel like a disappointment or a defeat, as if one were settling for a 
consolation prize. If, after a period of adaptation, one does not succeed in 
genuinely appropriating the replacing goal as a worthy purpose of one’s 
own, and one remains stuck in grief and resentment over what has been 
lost, self-realization will expectedly be stymied.   
The assumption that there may be a connection between the type of goals 
people strive for and their perception of the remaining time horizon of their 
lives is confirmed in research based on the socioemotional selectivity theory 
formulated by Laura Carstensen and her colleagues (Carstensen, Isaacow-
itz & Charles, 1999; Carstensen, 1991, 1992, 1995). The outcomes of this 
research strongly suggest that people who perceive the time horizon of their 
lives as shrinking tend to shift their life-orientation towards goals related 
to emotions, social relationships and existential meaning. In the words of 
Carstensen, Isaacowitz & Charles (1999), “the knowledge that time is limit-
ed has direct effects on emotional experience. Appreciation of the fragility 
of life, recognition that the passage of time cannot be stopped, and height-
ened awareness of one’s immediate surroundings directly alters the expe-
rience of emotions. We also expect that, relieved of concerns for the future, 
endings bring out the best qualities in people [...] As people approach the 
ultimate ending – death – lives are evaluated, and a search for existential 
meaning in life places emotion at center stage” (p. 169). 
• Fourth and finally, it should be noted that the whole assumption that self-re-
alization is complicated or loses importance as a result of the shrinking 
time horizon could at least partially be influenced by the limitations im-
posed by stereotypical and marginalizing cultural narratives on who people 
can strive to be or become. It has been argued before that access to cultural 
resources for identity, as well as the recognition that one is capable and 
worthy to strive for certain purposes, is quintessential for optimal exercise 
of moral agency (see §3.2.3). While growing older, I stated, people’s access 
to possible identity resources can become more limited. I suggested that 
the influence of stereotypical social positioning and lack of valued social 
roles can play a crucial role in this regard. Again, the suggested tension be-
tween self-realization and a shrinking time horizon is then not something 
that arises inevitably, but is (at least in part) a socio-culturally constituted 
problem. As Markus and Nurius (1986) emphasize in their theory about the 
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variety of “possible selves” that people may have, “the pool of possible selves 
[that an individual can create] derives from the categories made salient by 
the individual’s particular sociocultural and historical context and from the 
models, images, and symbols provided by the media and by the individu-
al’s immediate social experiences. Possible selves thus have the potential to 
reveal the inventive and constructive nature of the self but they also reflect 
the extent to which the self is socially determined and constrained” (p. 954). 
In sum, the assumption that the shrinking time horizon characteristic of later 
life should automatically reduce or problematize the importance of self-realiza-
tion, turns out to be too simplistic. Although a shift in aspirations or purposes 
one strives for may certainly appear, self-realization can still be very relevant 
for older people. Moreover, my reflections show that other factors besides a 
shrinking time horizon, such as stereotyping cultural narratives and the cor-
responding lack of recognition of moral agency, may play a more urgent role 
when self-realization is stymied in old age. 
4.4.2 Self-realization and radicalization of existential vulnerabilit y
The second issue that merits attention regarding self-realization and aging re-
lates to existential vulnerability. Existential vulnerability has been argued to be 
characteristic of human life in general, but is confronted more radically in later 
life (see §2.4.6). After all, the aging process tends to increase our vulnerability 
to all sorts of losses. Aging also strengthens our consciousness of the finitude 
of existence through the awareness that the longest part of our lives is behind 
us and death is inevitably approaching. This awareness in itself can be regarded 
as a form of confrontation with existential vulnerability. 
I have described existential vulnerability in terms of anything that might 
threaten or impede the experience of meaningfulness that one derives from 
having a satisfactory relation with the physical, social, personal and transcen-
dent dimensions of life (see §2.4.6). Existential vulnerability was distinguished 
from other, contingent and situational forms of vulnerability that pertain to 
the influence of external factors like structural and societal arrangements or 
cultural imaginaries. The effects of contingent situational vulnerabilities on 
the lives of older people deserve resolute efforts to accomplish social change 
and reduce social inequalities, in order to improve their life circumstances and 
increase their chances of experiencing a meaningful life. By contrast, I argued 
that existential vulnerability asks for a strategy of meaningful integration, since 
it is a category of vulnerability that is inescapable. It would be a misunderstand-
ing of the basic conditions of human life to treat it as an unfortunate temporary 
condition that can be kept under control. 
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The cultural decline- and age-defying narratives that were discussed in 
chapter 3 only seemed to offer two options to relate to the contingencies and 
existential vulnerabilities of later life: either passive surrender or active defense 
and/or denial. But in reality, when confronted with existential vulnerability one 
is forced to find a way to integrate it into one’s life narrative, in order to main-
tain experiencing life as something meaningful and worth living. Neither sur-
render nor denial will be of much help regaining meaning in such situations.
The fundamental question that has to be faced here is whether self-realiza-
tion, as it has been conceptualized in this chapter, is necessarily endangered or 
impeded by the confrontation with instances of existential vulnerability. Two 
issues deserve particular attention in this regard: 
• First, it is important to consider which understandings of self-realization 
and vulnerability are implied in the assumption that existential vulnera-
bility may create a problem for self-realization. The latter view implies that 
existential vulnerability compromises circumstances or capacities that are 
presumed to be necessary for self-realization. It is my contention that the 
implicit view we encounter here is based on precisely the late modern, lib-
eral conceptualization of self-realization that the current study wants to 
criticize. In this view, we may recall, moral agents are presented as atomis-
tic, autonomous individuals who independently make their own way in the 
world and strive to lead a fully self-determined life. Obviously, being con-
fronted with existential vulnerability will threaten this independence and 
self-determination, which brings Hoffmaster (2006) to the conclusion that 
vulnerability is “antithetical to the ethos of individualism” (p. 42). However, 
this assumes several things, for instance that being dependent on others in-
evitably means being less autonomous, less self-determined, and therefore 
in a less favorable condition to realize oneself. What this view disregards 
however, is the fact that existential vulnerability is a fundamental feature 
of the human condition. It may not be equally pressing in everybody’s life 
at any given moment, but we are all liable to be confronted with it. In this 
understanding, existential vulnerability by no means precludes forming as-
pirations to become a certain kind of person. Otherwise no one could ever 
aspire to self-realization, which seems an unreasonably crude assumption. 
This study defends a view in which social (inter)dependence is assumed as 
the default condition of human lives. It is argued later that this condition of 
interdependence need not be at odds with the underlying assumptions of 
my suggested reframed interpretation of self-realization. When following 
this line of thinking, growing older and being confronted with radicalized 
existential vulnerability, for instance, by experiencing physical deteriora-
tion due to senescing processes or social losses because one’s spouse or 
friends die, are not automatically detrimental for self-realization.  
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• Second, it is important to consider the possibility that not only do existen-
tial vulnerability and self-realization not exclude each other, but that the 
confrontation with existential vulnerability may even serve as a catalyst for 
self-realization. Although on the one hand some capacities traditionally as-
sociated with self-realization, such as self-determination or rational deliber-
ation, may certainly become more fragile in later life; on the other hand, the 
confrontation with vulnerability may also prompt the development of other, 
new capacities, such as moral sensitivity or empathy. For example, after the 
loss of her husband, an older acquaintance found a new source of personal 
fulfillment in leading a church support group for recently bereaved people, 
which still greatly contributes to her self-realization. 
As discussed in §4.3, the best in us at stake in self-realization has been 
conceptualized in terms of a rich variety of ways, including our ability for 
self-knowledge, moral sensitivity, receptivity, creativity or care. Aligned 
with this, MacIntyre (1999) has argued that in order to flourish, human 
beings need both virtues that enable self-sufficiency and rational delibera-
tion and what he calls “virtues of acknowledged dependence” (p. 126-127). 
The confrontation with vulnerability may teach us to (further) develop pre-
cisely those qualities associated with the latter category of virtues. Then, 
the existential vulnerability confronted in (later) life not only complicates 
self-realization in certain ways, but also offers opportunities to acquire new 
virtues that are conducive to our self-realization in later life. It follows that 
existential vulnerability is only an automatic impediment to self-realization 
when we follow the problematically limited interpretation of self-realization 
that only focuses on self-sufficiency and rational self-determination (see 
chapter 2).  
The possibility that being confronted with existential vulnerability gives 
rise to the development of new virtues and capacities does presuppose how-
ever, that we have the courage and the flexibility to reconsider our identi-
ty-constituting aspirations in situations where our previous goals are no 
longer possible. Expectedly, if we follow too strictly the strategies typical of 
age-defying narratives (§3.3.3) and make “staying young” our main purpose 
in later life, we miss out on these opportunities. We need to steer between 
the Scylla of active denial and resistance of existential vulnerability and the 
Charybdis of passive surrender to existential vulnerability, if we want to 
profit from the opportunities for self-realization that later life confronta-
tions with vulnerability may have to offer. 
To conclude, let me briefly recall the reason for this study to engage with the 
philosophical self-realization discourse. As argued in §3.4, I turned to the 
self-realization discourse to find a viable resource for the suggested narratives 
of becoming. In order to serve as such a resource, self-realization discourse 
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should be able to answer to both conditions that I have defined for such narra-
tives: the acknowledgment of the potential for growth and flourishing in later 
life, and the support of a meaningful integration of existential vulnerability. 
I believe the analysis of self-realization in this chapter has made it clear that 
this philosophical discourse indeed harbors a strong and lively conviction that 
human beings principally possess the potential for growth and development. 
Moreover, it has been argued that the moral self-development underlying 
this study’s interpretation of self-realization should engage human persons 
throughout their entire lives. Therefore, in my understanding of self-realiza-
tion, the notion of growth and flourishing, of realizing the best that one is 
capable of, is by no means restricted to young people who have all of their lives 
ahead of them. This is an important advantage in the search for cultural count-
er narratives of becoming about later life that are able to acknowledge that later 
life may also harbor the potential for growth and flourishing. 
Regarding the integration of existential vulnerability, I hope to have made 
it plausible that in this study’s suggested interpretation, contrary to the late 
modern discourse, self-realization need not be a narcissistic endeavor, aimed 
at obtaining mastery over the contingencies of life and thus at the rejection or 
conquering of existential vulnerability. Instead, I suggested in the last section 
(§4.4.2) that self-realization can also include the development of qualities that 
teach people how to find a satisfactory attitude towards these contingencies. In 
this sense, the second condition that was identified as necessary for viable cul-
tural counter stories about later life - the enabling of a meaningful integration 
of existential vulnerability – also certainly finds resonance in my suggested 
reframed view of self-realization.   
Now that we have gained an initial understanding of the philosophical dis-
course on self-realization, which has already broadened our view compared to 
the late modern interpretation of the concept, I can proceed to the reframing of 
self-realization that I argued was necessary to apply this moral ideal to the con-
text of aging. This reframing will require developing alternative understand-
ings of the constitutive concepts on which self-realization discourse relies. As 
might be expected from my argument in §4.3.2, it is particularly important to 
reframe the three threads that weave the fabric of self-realization discourse. 
Before I can proceed to an evaluation and reframing of existing views on auton-
omy, authenticity and virtue however, I first need to consider in more detail the 
themes of self-identity and moral agency, both of which are intrinsic to self-re-
alization as it has been presented in this chapter. Understanding which concep-
tualizations of identity and moral agency are presupposed by the reframed con-
ceptualization of self-realization that this study strives to develop, is conditional 
to enable further elaboration of the constitutive threads of self-realization.
Chapter 5 – Narrative identity 
and moral agency
5.1 introduction
In the previous chapter, the purpose of self-realization, i.e., the best in human 
beings that is developed in the process of realizing oneself, was conceived in 
terms of moral self-development. The latter is a process culminating in the op-
timization of one’s potential for moral agency, defined tentatively in the context 
of human practices as the expression of one’s moral identity in actions. The 
concept of moral agency has already been introduced earlier in the discussion 
of cultural counter narratives (see §3.2.3). But the notion of moral agency, par-
ticularly in the definition advanced by this study, still awaits further consider-
ation. This is provided in the current chapter. Importantly however, this study’s 
understanding of moral agency rests upon a specific view of personal identity 
that needs to be addressed first. As already mentioned in §4.2.2, a narrative 
conception of identity seems most aptly suited to the goals and assumptions 
fueling this study. However, this choice of perspective, as well as the content of 
such a narrative conception still await explanation. These are the other aspects 
covered in this chapter. 
The current chapter is organized as follows. First, I present an argument in 
favor of a narrative conception of identity (§5.2). This starts with a general in-
troduction on the narrative view of identity (§5.2.1), followed by a consideration 
of the relation between narrative and life (§5.2.2), a discussion of the complex 
theme of narrative integration or unified selfhood usually assumed to be con-
ditional for identity-constituting narratives (§5.2.3), and a justification of my 
preference for a narrative view in the context of aging (§5.2.4). Second, three 
selected philosophical interpretations of narrative identity are discussed and 
evaluated: the narrative self-constitution view by Schechtman (1996) (§5.3.1), a 
view on narrative identity as a social practice by Lindemann (2014) (§5.3.2), and 
a view on narrative identity in its relation to moral identity by Atkins (2008) 
(§5.3.3). Third, I discuss how Ricoeur’s philosophy of identity (1992) offers the 
opportunity to relate the narrative conception of identity to moral agency (§5.4). 
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Fourth and finally, I draw together the arguments that result in my proposed 
definition of moral agency as the ability to live well, with and for others, according 
to one’s deepest aspirations and best capacities, as full participating members of a 
society/community (§5.5).   
5.2 introducing nArr Ative identit y
5.2.1 Life and self as stories 
Among the varied interpretations of personal identity, the narrative view stands 
out for its rich and nuanced, yet practical conceptualization of what it implies 
to answer the fundamental question of personal identity: Who am I? Instead of 
engaging in metaphysical and rather abstract reflections about what it means 
for an entity (person or otherwise) to be identical at two distinct points in time 
(see for instance Parfit, 1984), the narrative view focuses on what is seen as a 
fundamental feature of human life, namely the ability and inclination to en-
gage in storytelling. The narrative view assumes that there exists an intrinsic 
connection between our lives, our personal identities, and the stories we tell 
about ourselves. In the process of narrating, arbitrary and unconnected experi-
ences and events are transformed into a cohesive configuration, with a plot and 
characters and an ideological setting that enables us to experience meaning 
(McAdams, 1993). By selecting and interpreting, omitting and highlighting, 
we present a more or less coherent image of ourselves that we communicate to 
others through our stories. 
Among the most interesting exponents of the narrative view of identity 
in philosophy are Schechtman (1996), Ricoeur (1991, 1992), C. Taylor (1989), 
MacIntyre (1984), Thomä (1998), Atkins (2008; Atkins & Mackenzie, 2008) 
and Lindemann (2014). Additionally, McAdams (1993; McAdams, Josselson & 
Lieblich, 2006) has provided an interesting account of narrative identity from a 
psychological point of view, whereas Gubrium and Holstein (2000) discuss the 
merits of a narrative account of identity in a postmodern context. According to 
these narrative thinkers, human beings are “story-telling animals” (MacIntyre, 
1984, p. 216). That is, they cannot help but understand and present their lives 
and selves in the form of stories. Stories are thus granted a constitutive func-
tion in our personal identities. We answer the question who we are by telling 
stories about ourselves. We make our life choices and our actions intelligible 
both to ourselves and to others by telling stories. We integrate the things that 
befall us in our lives by weaving them into our stories. All these stories can dif-
fer depending on who is listening, on the context of telling, on our socio-cultur-
al position or the life phase that we are in. Identity-constituting stories are thus 
dynamic and constantly in flux. Yet they also safeguard the sense of coherence 
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which we experience in our lives. That is, narratives enable us to see our lives 
in terms of more or less intelligible and connective unities. Following from 
this brief sketch, we can tentatively define the term narrative as a story (in the 
broadest possible sense) with a plot that brings together events and experiences 
we encounter in our lives, in a more or less ordered configuration that grants 
them intelligibility both in our own eyes as well as in the eyes of others.  
As C. Taylor (1989), MacIntyre (1984), McAdams (1993) and many others 
emphasize, the narrative view presupposes an intrinsic connection between 
the coherence that narratives provide our lives with and our ability to experi-
ence meaning. It is assumed that the stories we tell about our lives order the 
events, experiences, relationships and feelings that make up our daily lives into 
a configuration that is meaningful to us. According to MacIntyre (1984), this 
is typically a story with a beginning, a middle and an end; but his ideas about 
the encompassing integrative function of narrative have been problematized 
(see §5.2.3). Disrupting events, such as illness or loss, tend to perturb our life 
stories. In response to such events, coherence needs to be restored by integrat-
ing the event into our narratives about ourselves, in order to experience them 
as meaningful again. 
The narrative process of identity-constitution presupposes a dialogical, her-
meneutic endeavor in which we interpret ourselves and our motivations and 
choices in light of our present and (aspired) future identity. This is a multi-
voiced process in which not only our self-evaluations, but also the way we relate 
to others and the way these others position us are implicated. A narrative, as 
MacIntyre (1984) reminds us, is never solely an individual creation. Instead, we 
are only the co-authors of our own life stories. This addresses the fundamen-
tal social character of narrative identity, but it also touches upon the theme of 
agency, since, as MacIntyre (1984) states, “I can only answer the question ‘What 
am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of what story or stories do I find 
myself a part?” (p. 216). 
An important advantage of a narrative conception of identity for my purpos-
es is that it encompasses all aspects of the self of relevance to self-realization 
that have been discussed in §4.2.2. This makes the narrative view particularly 
well-suited to the reframed understanding of self-realization that this study 
aims at. Reflexivity is presupposed by the fact that in order to tell a story about 
our lives, we have to be able to distance ourselves from the immediacy of our 
experiences, look back at them and order them into a coherent narrative plot. 
Importantly, the intersubjective character of narrativity suggests that this re-
flexivity is not only a matter of the individual, but is something that arises in 
social interactions. Temporality and continuity are inherent in the very idea of 
life narratives because they stress the lifelong nature of the process of narrative 
self-constitution and focus on drawing connections between the temporal di-
mensions of past, present and future. Embodiment is implicitly covered by the 
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fact that the narrative view takes the lived reality of people as its starting point, 
instead of abstract metaphysical assumptions and hypothetical scenarios (Ben-
son, 1994). The social character of the narrative view of identity has already been 
emphasized by observing that narrative identity-constitution is something that 
engages other people as well – as listeners and co-constituters of our identities. 
Finally, as explained in §5.3.3 and §5.4, the ethical/moral aim of the self is also 
covered in the views of narrative identity that have been selected for discussion 
in this study, notably the accounts of Atkins (2008) and Ricoeur (1992). These 
views emphasize the fact that our narrative identity mediates our moral identi-
ty, and thereby enables our moral agency, through which we express this moral 
identity in our concrete choices and actions.  
A narrative conception of identity also conveniently provides opportunities 
to make a connection with the theory about cultural narratives discussed in 
chapter 3. By stressing the social processes influencing narrative identity-con-
stitution, as well as the historicity of the self and the vulnerability of its nar-
rative integration, the narrative conception of identity acknowledges the inter-
action between the individual self and its socio-cultural context. Ewing (1990) 
reminds us of the deeply social and culturally constituted character of the pro-
cess of identity construction in itself: “[...] we can observe that individuals are 
continuously reconstituting themselves into new selves in response to internal 
and external stimuli. They construct these new selves from their available set 
of self-representations, which are based on cultural constructs” (p. 258). The in-
sight that cultural narratives play a quintessential role in providing or denying 
access to identity-constituting resources is essential to understanding how our 
individual experiences of identity and meaning in life are enabled or impaired.
5.2.2 The relation between life and narrative
A particularly complicated question that has been much debated in narrative 
philosophy pertains to the relation between life and narrative. The most gen-
eral way to formulate the connection between life and narrative is by saying 
that through telling stories (narratives) we bring a certain order to the experi-
ences that make up our lives. In this process, we shape who we are by telling 
our stories. We understand our own past by interpreting it in narrative terms 
and we narratively project onto the future who we wish to become. Narratives 
enable us to place our different “possible selves” (Markus & Nurius, 1986) in 
an intelligible framework. The famous saying by Kierkegaard (2007) that life 
can only be understood backwards but must be lived forwards, expresses some 
of the complexity of this narrative process of ordering our lives into a coher-
ent and meaningful configuration that is capable of establishing our identity. 
Schechtman (1996) emphasizes the importance of the connection between life 
and narrative by stating that “the sense of one’s life as unfolding to the logic of 
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a narrative is not just an idea we have, it is an organizing principle of our lives. 
It is the lens through which we filter our experience and plan for actions, not a 
way we think about ourselves in reflective hours” (p. 113). 
Yet the supposed connection between life and narrative also raises a lot of 
questions. Do we live our stories naturally as we tell them, or are our stories 
mainly post factum constructions, bringing artificial ordering to a life reality 
that is first experienced and then told? Do our identities coincide completely 
with the stories we tell about them, or are our narratives only partially capa-
ble of expressing who we are? Is telling stories an inescapable psychological 
mechanism that all human beings use to bring order and meaning to their 
lives and to understand who they are (McAdams, 1993), or is telling stories 
just an optional activity that we can also omit? Moreover, are lives and selves 
that are narratively configured somehow better able to safeguard a meaningful 
moral identity, as authors like C. Taylor (1989) have suggested, or are both the 
psychological, factual claim and the normative, philosophical claim regarding 
the necessary and inescapable relationship between life and narrative built on 
biased and faulty assumptions about how people (should) live their lives, as 
Strawson (2004) has argued? 
Thomä (1998) has provided an insightful analysis regarding the relation-
ship between life and narrative that covers some of these questions. He de-
scribes how on the one hand, the process of telling a narrative about ourselves 
implies that we become an “object” to ourselves. It requires the capacity to view 
one’s life from a reflexive distance. On the other hand, we are, as subjects, deep-
ly interwoven with the object of our story. We tell a narrative about ourselves, 
about our lives, and in this narrative we present what is important and valuable 
to us. This suggests that our lives and our narratives are both separate as well as 
intertwined. We might say that our narrative identity represents our own me-
diation of the relation between life and narrative, which is necessarily dynamic 
and flexible. Thomä perceives the activity of self-narration to take place in the 
so-called “autobiographic triad”, a dynamic and dialogical structure which en-
gages the narrator or the author of the story, the protagonist figuring in it, and 
the person leading the life that the story is about. But the relationship between 
the self as living person, narrator and protagonist on the one hand, and the 
actual story being told on the other hand, is highly complex. 
Thomä argues that telling stories about our lives and selves not only helps 
us understand who we currently are, but that stories also express something 
about who we want to become. There is a constant tension between these dif-
ferent possible selves that our narratives try to reconcile. According to Thomä, 
we relate to this tension by engaging in a continuous narrative search for co-
herence, meaning and self-understanding. How we shape our identities and 
our lives fundamentally depends upon narrative structures, which suggests 
a strong connection between life and narrative. On the other hand, Thomä 
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reminds us not to forget that the protagonist, the main character of our stories, 
does not cover all relevant aspects of the person who is living the life that is told 
in the story. Correspondingly, life cannot be totally identified with narrative. 
The role and function of narratives in life thus has its limits. Nevertheless, nar-
ratives play an important role, since they can help us relate to the situations we 
find ourselves in and to integrate the unexpected existential events confronting 
us in our lives.
5.2.3 Narrative integration and unified personhood
Another particularly complicated and important question raised by the dis-
course on narrative identity concerns the notions of narrative integration and 
unified personhood, which are formulated by authors like C. Taylor (1989) and 
MacIntyre (1984) as ideals. For instance, MacIntyre (1984) claims that narra-
tive identity presupposes “a concept of a self whose unity resides in the unity 
of a narrative which links birth to death as narrative beginning to middle to 
end” (p. 205). But is it necessary that we integrate our experiences into such 
a full, life-encompassing coherent narrative unity? While most authors do not 
deny the importance of a certain form of narrative coherence in one’s life story 
(Strawson (2004) being one of the exceptions), the idea that our lives should, 
or even could, form fully coherent narrative  “wholes”, or that such unity is a 
necessary condition for experiencing a meaningful life, is rightly questioned. 
Thomä (1998) for instance, rejects the idea that life and identity could be cap-
tured in one overarching, coherent narrative that ascribes meaning to them. 
There are always elements in our lives escaping the context and structure of 
the narrative. We are not only agents, narratively structuring our lives, we are 
also what Ricoeur (1992) calls “patients” of action, beings “suffering” or en-
during things beyond our own control as narrative agents (p. 157). This implies 
that our lives also contain many contingent forces that disrupt or overrule the 
narrative organization of our lives. The news of a sudden illness, accidents and 
other blows of fate, confrontations with injustice, et cetera, all confront human 
beings with the limits of their agential scope of control. It can be difficult to 
integrate these experiences into our narrative self-understanding. 
This vulnerability of human lives to existential contingencies implies, as 
Mackenzie (2000) notes, that as far as we can speak about an integrated or 
unified self, this integration cannot be seen as static, although it does imply 
a certain stability. Instead, she argues that “the process of self-integration is 
an ongoing and dynamic process precisely because of inevitable tensions and 
inconsistencies within the self and because the different elements of the self 
are constantly undergoing transformation. The notion of stability does imply, 
however, that an agent who is persistently internally divided or whose sense of 
self is seriously fragmented cannot achieve the kind of reflective equilibrium 
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necessary for unified agency. By unified agency I mean the kind of practical 
unity necessary to deliberate, make decisions and choices, and act” (Mackenzie, 
2000, p. 135). It follows from these reflections that our existential vulnerabil-
ity as human beings which necessitates a flexible responsiveness in dealing 
with life’s inevitable contingencies (see also §2.4.6; §3.3.4; §4.4.2) precludes 
our ever arriving at a full life-encompassing narrative integration. Instead, 
our existential vulnerability necessitates that we find an attitude that Thomä 
(1998) has called “Selbstliebe [loving self-acceptance]”  (p. 180). This attitude is 
characterized by the acknowledgment that our lives consists of both elements 
we can consciously control and elements that need to be endured. An attitude 
of loving self-acceptance is intended to help us ask and answer the question 
which Thomä (1998) formulates as “wie man mit sich selbst auskommt [how one 
gets by with oneself]” (p. 174). This attitude implies a more modest and flexible 
interpretation of narrative integration.  When interpreted in this way, narrative 
integration is seen as a process of continuing attunement to oneself: who am I, 
how do my choices and actions relate to who I want to be, both to myself and to 
others? How do I deal with the things that befall me? How can I retain or regain 
a sense of meaning in my life in the face of adversities and existential contin-
gencies? As discussed earlier (§4.4.2), it is typically in moments of existential 
crisis, moments in which the coherence of our life stories is threatened, that 
such questions confront us most urgently. 
M. Walker (1999a, 2007) has formulated another critique against a strong 
form of narrative integration. In particular, she responds to the views of C. 
Taylor (1989) on narrative unity, Williams (1981) on constitutive projects consid-
ered to be essential for a viable identity, and Rawls (1971) on the notion of a life 
plan. M. Walker’s (2007) critical argument is that these type of ethics impose 
implicit standards of what a good life is on people whose life reality does not 
match these norms. These standards that are based on the archetypical “career 
self” associated with the dominant Western, male, white and affluent minority, 
fit “none of us at all times, and many of us at no times” (M. Walker, 2007, p. 
22). The implicit norm of narrative unity can therefore be criticized for unjustly 
denigrating or dismissing the lives of people (often women or members of mi-
nority groups) unable to live up to its unrealistically high standards. Instead, M. 
Walker pleads for more sensitivity to the local and temporary forms of narrative 
integrity that characterize most people’s life. A clarifying distinction drawn in 
this regard comes from Meyers (1989), who states that people direct and orga-
nize their lives both episodically and programmatically (p. 48). Whereas Meyers 
assumes that a coherent life plan is necessary to function as an autonomous 
agent, she also acknowledges that there are many situations in which it is not 
the overarching programmatic question how do I want to live my life that directs 
our actions, but the concrete considerations raised by a specific situation, which 
may differ from moment to moment.     
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Contrary to the strong views of narrative integration by C. Taylor (1989) and 
MacIntyre (1984) cited above, the notion of narrative integration that I would 
suggest, following the critiques by Thomä (1998) and M. Walker (1999a, 2007), 
allows for the possibility that our lives and selves are built of multiple storylines. 
Some of them cover large parts of our lives, others only short episodes. Some of 
our storylines fit together harmoniously, while others may be conflictive. None 
of these storylines encompasses the entirety of who we are, our lives “from be-
ginning to middle to end” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 205). Still, in order to contribute 
to a viable sense of narrative identity, the different storylines that figure therein 
need to interact in such a way that enough coherence emerges to “get by with 
ourselves”. Only then can narrative agents experience and present their life and 
self as a meaningful configuration. The resulting integration will always be a 
vulnerable, partial, fragmented and temporary constellation, but one that is 
nevertheless indispensable.    
We seem to be confronted with a paradox then between the striving for 
some sense of order and coherence necessarily implied by the narrative concep-
tualization of identity on the one hand, and the fact that the result will always 
be an incomplete, partial and temporary unity on the other hand. Again, the 
conclusion should be that the process of narrative identity-constitution is never 
finished and always liable to failure. As Atkins (2008) puts it, “The unity of 
one’s life is the product of a perpetual synthesis. However, narrative cannot 
guarantee a happy outcome and a coherent identity. It cannot guarantee coher-
ent identity because it is a tensive, collaborative effort that can fail” (p. 77). At 
the same time, a sense of unified selfhood is indispensable if we want to realize 
our potential for moral agency. In Atkins’ (2008) words “[...] unified selfhood 
is the condition of possibility for having a perspective from which to perceive, 
deliberate, and act. In other words, it is a condition of possibility of morality” (p. 
6). I will return to this point in §5.4.
5.2.4 Narrativit y and aging
The narrative view seems to have a natural affinity with the theme of aging. 
This affinity offers an extra argument in favor of the narrative conception of 
identity over other alternatives in the context of this study. The close link be-
tween the narrative view and aging can be recognized in the fact that a narra-
tive perspective has found particular resonance in the field of aging studies 
in recent decades. A whole new field of scholarship has arisen that can be de-
scribed as “narrative gerontology” (Kenyon, Clark & De Vries, 2001; Randall & 
Kenyon, 2001; Randall & McKim, 2008; Kenyon, Bohlmeijer & Randall, 2011; 
De Medeiros, 2014). In gerontological discourse, narrativity and aging are often 
connected because aging is associated with retrospection, looking back at one’s 
life and drawing up the balance of one’s experiences, typically in the form of 
Chapter 5 – Narrative identity and moral agency 135
telling or writing one’s life story. Classic approaches such as Erikson’s (1997) 
notion of ego-integrity, and Butler’s (1963) life-review approach draw upon the 
link between narrative retrospection and aging, as do many contemporary in-
terventions developed in narrative gerontology (Kenyon, Bohlmeijer & Randall, 
2011; De Medeiros, 2014). These approaches see reminiscence and memory as 
quintessential for our identity-constitution. It needs to be noted however, that 
this strong focus on reminiscence seems insufficiently capable of acknowledg-
ing other possibly important dimensions of the narrative view that will be dis-
cussed later. For instance, the focus on reminiscence problematically seems to 
presuppose a rather traditional, Lockean idea of identity that is based on the 
psychological continuity of memory. The narrative view of identity defended in 
this study on the other hand, presents a more embodied and socially embed-
ded image. Also, the potential that narratives offer to connect our past, present 
and future selves is not given sufficient attention when the focus is solely on 
retrospection.     
An important advantage of the narrative view in the context of aging is the 
fact that it presupposes a lifelong process of narrative self-constitution, thereby 
emphasizing the continuing potential for development in later life. This en-
compassing temporal scope is highly congenial to an approach of aging as a so-
cial-existential process of living in time (Baars, 2012a; see also §1.5). Moreover, 
it can be argued that the narrative perspective is particularly apt to address the 
dynamics of aging simply because, as De Medeiros (2014) emphasizes, “the 
more years one has, the more one has to draw on in the form of stories” (p. 
18). In addition, the narrative perspective enables a study of aging from the 
perspective of meaning that offers a welcome alternative to more biomedical or 
sociological approaches in gerontology (De Medeiros, 2014). 
The focus on meaning that the narrative view enables has two aspects that 
are relevant from the perspective of aging. First, as our lives extend through 
time (i.e., as we age), our stories also tend to get richer and more complex in 
layers of meaning. This process of enrichment ideally deepens our self-insight 
and our competency to navigate through our lives. As Randall (2011) puts it, as 
we age our stories are “continually thickening with potential for meaning” (p. 
22). Cohen (2005, 2010) even suggests that the aging brain undergoes specific 
transformations that stimulate the drive to engage with one’s life in an autobi-
ographical manner, and thereby find new and creative ways to integrate painful 
or problematic experiences into the coherence of one’s life story. Second, Ran-
dall (2011) suggests that the importance of meaning-making increases in later 
life, since “the older we get, the more meaning we require in order to cope with, 
and grow through, the losses and challenges (physical, financial, emotional) 
that later life can bring” (p. 24). The focus of the narrative perspective on mean-
ing-making therefore suggests extra relevance when it comes to the integration 
of experiences of existential vulnerability, formulated as an important concern 
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for this study’s perspective on self-realization (see §2.5.2). It is important to 
mention however, that the urgency of creating viable meaning-making narra-
tives in later life also makes us vulnerable. It has been argued that older people 
may suffer from narrative foreclosure (Freeman, 2000, 2011), a term describing 
a situation in which older people feel that their life stories are ended or stag-
nate while they are still alive. This phenomenon problematically impedes their 
experience of their life as meaningful and can result in passivity and depres-
sion. Narrative foreclosure can have many possible causes, including, of course, 
detrimental socio-cultural positioning through marginalizing cultural master 
narratives (see §3.3.4).   
A final important point to mention regarding the connections between nar-
rativity and aging concerns the recognition of later life’s potential for growth 
and flourishing, one of the points emphasized as an important condition for 
this study’s developing account of self-realization. The narrative view is par-
ticularly well-suited to acknowledge this potential. Randall & McKim (2008) 
for instance, see the narrative engagement with oneself in later life as an im-
portant source of deepening wisdom and self-knowledge. Since the narrative 
approach focuses on the particularity and biographical richness of individual 
lives, it enables us to call attention to the uniqueness and value of the lives of 
older persons (Kenyon, Bohlmeijer & Randall, 2011). An added advantage is that 
the attention to unique life stories of aging individuals can serve as an antidote 
against the adverse effect of stereotyping cultural images such as decline nar-
ratives (see §3.3.2). 
5.3 three interPre tAtions of nArr Ative identit y
In this part of the chapter, three distinct interpretations of narrative identity 
relevant to the context of this study are discussed. These three interpretations 
address, in succession, the views of Schechtman (1996), Lindemann (2014) and 
Atkins (2008). 
5.3.1 Mar ya Schechtman – Narrative self-constitution
Schechtman (1996) defends what she calls a narrative self-constitution view, ac-
cording to which “a person creates his identity by forming an autobiographical 
narrative” (p. 93). Schechtman argues that philosophical accounts of personal 
identity have a tendency to conflate two matters that should be distinguished. 
These two issues are termed the reidentification question and the characteriza-
tion question. The reidentification question is concerned with “how a single en-
tity persists through change” (Schechtman, 1996, p. 7). It takes a “time slice” 
approach to identity, in which a comparison of the person at time 1 and time 2 
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decides whether the crucial features that enable us to speak of identity are pres-
ent. The classic view of the person by Locke (1689/1979) counts as an influen-
tial example here, as does the contemporary approach of Parfit (1984). Schecht-
man (1996) criticizes the reidentification approach for its reductionist image of 
the person. She contends that according to strong commonsensical intuition, 
it is what characterizes persons as they live through time in the rich practical 
contexts of their daily lives that is essential to questions of identity, and not 
their features at isolated moments of comparison. What characterizes a person 
through time is addressed by the characterization question, which investigates 
“what it means to say that a particular characteristic is that of a given person” 
(Schechtman, 1996, p. 73). Schechtman’s own narrative self-constitution view 
provides the opportunity to address this characterization question. 
The narrative self-constitution view contends that it is characteristic of hu-
man persons (as distinct from human individuals or human beings) that they 
organize their experiences and thus their life in a narrative manner. This im-
plies that people understand and interpret their experiences by placing them 
in the context of a self-narrative, a story about their life that is able to provide 
a meaningful and more or less coherent background for their actions, choices, 
preferences, et cetera. According to Schechtman (1996), “individuals constitute 
themselves as persons by coming to think of themselves as persisting subjects 
who have had experience in the past and will continue to have experience in the 
future, taking certain experiences as theirs” (p. 94). The framework of the nar-
rative or narratives enables persons to distinguish between what is and what is 
not essential to who they are. In our stories about ourselves, we select and high-
light those experiences, choices, actions and value orientations that contribute 
most to how we perceive ourselves. For instance, if I am a person who deeply 
values freedom and independence, my life stories may emphasize how I stood 
up against the authority of my father and my teachers when I was sixteen, how 
I adventurously traveled the world on my own during my twenties, how my 
marriage is characterized by the joining of two equal partners with their own 
incomes and social lives, how in parenthood I strive to stimulate my children’s 
assertiveness and independent thinking, and how the cancer that struck me in 
my fifties did not manage to break my fighting spirit and zest for life. On the 
other hand, if I am a person who values solidarity and justice, or love and care, 
the narratives I tell about my life will expectedly accentuate rather different 
highlights and experiences. 
Schechtman (1996) emphasizes, however, that not just any narrative qual-
ifies to provide a person with a coherent and meaningful sense of identity. 
Narratives that can function as identity-constituting do have to comply with 
certain constraints. In particular, she distinguishes the articulation constraint 
(p. 114) and the reality constraint (p. 119). These constraints respectively empha-
size that it should be possible to articulate our identity-constituting narratives 
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when required, and that they should sufficiently match both the objective facts 
of our lives and the narratives that others tell about us. Moreover, Schecht-
man claims that identity-constituting narratives should have a certain form 
that matches the linear narrative structure characteristic of conventional (life) 
stories (p. 96). They should also show sufficient coherence (p. 98). Mackenzie 
and Poltera (2010) argue that Schechtman’s (1996) constraints are too restric-
tive. They think the formulated constraints unjustly assume that a self-narra-
tive must be totally coherent and unified, and that a person must fully identity 
with it, for the narrative to play a role in someone’s identity-formation. These 
demands neglect the possibility of internal conflicts, alienating experiences or 
emotional distance towards elements of the multitude of one’s past or future 
selves. However, Schechtman defends her view by stating that her constraints 
do not presuppose that one is totally transparent to oneself, or self-consciously 
working on an autobiographical narrative all the time. Her account also allows 
for a variety of narrative styles. Moreover, she acknowledges that coherence and 
intelligibility are no “all-or-nothing” conditions, but rather matters of degree 
(Schechtman, 1996, p. 98). Her view does presume, however, that one has an 
implicit narrative organization of one’s life story available. This account should 
be in accordance with reality and one should be able to articulate and clarify it 
upon request. 
Besides the formal constraints that apply to identity-constituting stories, 
the narrative self-constitution view also presupposes that a person has certain 
capacities such as consciousness, reflexivity and the use of language, that are 
needed to form a narrative identity. Atkins (2008) has called the collection of 
such capacities narrative competence, which forms the basis of our narrative 
agency (Atkins, 2008; Atkins & Mackenzie, 2008). Following Schechtman’s 
(1996) account, lacking the basic capacities that contribute to one’s narrative 
competence would mean that one does not qualify as a (full) human person 
and a narrative agent. This is characteristic of infants, for instance. They still 
need to develop the capacity to distinguish themselves from their surroundings 
and to perceive themselves as continuing entities with a recognizable identity 
encompassing a past, present and future. Lack of essential narrative capacities 
can also be recognized in adults suffering from certain pathologies. Dementia 
or Alzheimer’s disease are examples of such conditions that are acutely rele-
vant in the context of aging. Schechtman (1996) states that “those who suffer 
from dementia are robbed of precisely the ability to pull their lives together in 
a coherent story; they become terrified and confused because they cannot put 
the pieces together” (p. 147). Although Schechtman’s description of the anxiety 
and confusion that befall people who are no longer able to put the pieces of their 
lives together in a narratively ordered coherent configuration will certainly be 
familiar to anyone having encountered people with dementia, her theoretical 
claim that such people can thus not qualify as (full) persons anymore seems 
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rather bold. However, this claim may be influenced by the fact that her concept 
of the human person relies strongly on individual rational consciousness. In 
the next section, I present another view of narrative identity that takes a rather 
different standpoint in this regard. 
5.3.2 Hilde Lindemann – Narrative identit y as a social practice
Lindemann (2014) suggests a view of narrative identity that is able to recognize 
something often overlooked in mainstream philosophical accounts of identity: 
the fact that being human is an essentially interpersonal phenomenon. She con-
tends that our personal identities are conferred upon us by the way others hold 
us in our personhood. Consequently, she describes our personal identity as a 
social practice which is expressed through narrative means. What Lindemann 
describes as the social practice of personal identity consists of four interrelated 
elements: 1) someone has the basic mental activity necessary to constitute a per-
sonality, 2) this personality is expressed in a human body, 3) this bodily expres-
sion is recognized by others, and 4) these others respond to the expression. Note 
that the first criterion is very basic and not modeled on the usual philosophical 
ideas of what it means to have a personality. For instance, speech or rational 
reflection are not necessary to this account. The ability to make eye contact or 
other non-verbal, bodily expressions of humanness can be sufficient to be held 
in personhood by others. 
The focus on recognition and responsiveness in particular, distinguishes 
Lindemann’s view from other narrative accounts of personal identity. Through 
our relations with other persons that are characterized by recognition and re-
sponsiveness, we are “initiated into personhood [...] and we simultaneously de-
velop and maintain personal identities through interactions with others who 
hold us in our identities.” (Lindemann, 2014, p. x). This initiation starts even 
before we are born, as a mother develops a relationship with her unborn child, 
and the process of holding continues after our death as long as “who we were” 
is preserved in the memories of those who have outlived us. Through our en-
gagement in the social practice of identity, made up of continuous processes of 
recognition and response, a “narrative tissue” is created that expresses who we 
are, both to ourselves and to others (Lindemann, 2014, p. ix). 
Narrative identity as a social practice involves both holding and letting go. By 
holding, Lindemann refers to a social process of weaving a network of stories 
around persons, stories that express who they are and what they mean to us. 
This weaving of storylines enables their admission to the realm of human per-
sonhood. The stories provide the resources for developing their identity, which 
is understood as a concretization of their personhood that is characteristically 
“them”. Importantly, only beings equipped with the basic features of human-
ness can and should be held in personhood – the practice does not extend to 
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animals or insentient objects, even though they can be very meaningful to us. 
In principle, Lindemann (2014) argues that we are morally obliged to hold ev-
eryone in personhood who can so be held, since “letting them go casts them out 
of social and moral life, and to live outside that is to have no kind of human life 
at all” (p. 120). The same emphasis on the importance of social recognition and 
being granted a participant status in moral life is encountered here that was 
discussed earlier drawing on Honneth’s (1995, 2008) ideas (§3.2.3). 
Holding someone in personhood can be done both well and badly. Good 
holding implies supporting the person in shaping and maintaining an identity 
that leads to personal flourishing and valuable social relationships. It can be 
said that good holding is an indispensable condition for actualizing people’s 
potential for moral agency as it is defined in this study, i.e., that holding enables 
people to lead a good life with and for others, according to their own deepest aspira-
tions and highest capacities, as full participating members of a society/community. 
Bad holding, on the other hand, means that people are being held captive in 
narratives that are damaging or restrictive. This has been illustrated in our 
discussion of oppressive cultural master narratives in chapter 3.  
No matter how essential holding is, in some cases, the social practice of 
identity may require what seems to be the opposite, namely, letting go. This 
applies for instance, when a certain identity from the past (e.g., the shy girl who 
hid herself in the closet whenever someone visited) no longer matches who a 
person currently is (e.g., the self-conscious mature woman who has overcome 
her extreme shyness, although she will never become an extrovert); it would be 
an injustice and morally faulty if we persisted in holding a person in their previ-
ous identity. But letting go may also be required when people have lost all men-
tal characteristics on which their personhood could be based, such as when 
someone is in an irreversible coma or in the end-stage of dementia. Letting 
them go may then be the best possible way to honor our relationship with them. 
In Lindemann’s (2014) account, identity as a social practice need not nec-
essarily involve the first-person perspective of an individual human agent. 
In some cases, people derive their personhood and identity solely by the fact 
that others hold them in it. Lindemann illustrates this with the example of 
her younger sister Carla who was severely disabled as a result of hydrocephaly 
and lived for only 18 months. Despite the fact that Carla never possessed any of 
the first-person competencies usually thought to be indispensable to qualify as 
an agent and acquire an identity (such as language, rational reflection or sec-
ond-order desires), Lindemann argues that her sister was nevertheless held in 
personhood and invested with a specific identity from the third-person point of 
view of her parents, siblings and nurses. A similar argument could be made for 
people who do not yet or no longer possess relevant first-person competencies, 
for instance, infants and young children or people with cognitive disabilities 
such as Alzheimer’s disease. The possibility that identity could be something 
Chapter 5 – Narrative identity and moral agency 141
one-sidedly invested on human beings from a third-person point of view, with-
out an active contribution from the person itself, distinguishes Lindemann’s 
account from many other philosophical views of personal identity, including 
the narrative self-constitution view by Schechtman (1996). Although Schecht-
man’s account of narrative identity acknowledges that narrative identity-consti-
tution is not done in social isolation, her view relies strongly on a first-person 
agential perspective. The fact that Lindemann (2014) takes a different position 
makes her view particularly interesting when thinking about cases in which 
processes of senescing gradually compromise or diminish our ability to exert a 
first-person influence on the world, such as in cases of dementia. 
As seen, Schechtman (1996) problematizes the personhood and identity 
of sufferers from Alzheimer’s disease (§5.3.1). By contrast, Lindemann (2014) 
views such cases from a very different angle. She sketches a moving example of 
how caregivers hold a woman with Alzheimer’s disease in the identity that she 
can no longer maintain by herself. This is perfectly imaginable when we realize 
that we start our lives in a very similar situation, argues Lindemann (2014): 
“When she was so young that she could not yet take part in the practice herself, 
[she] was held in personhood by the people who cared for her. Then, her ability 
to express frustration, pleasure, or other mental states gave her parents and oth-
er caregivers something on which to anchor their recognition and response – 
they engaged in a one-sided practice of personhood. Now that she once again 
lacks the capacity for active participation in the practice, she may still retain 
enough mental functioning to be held in personhood by the other persons who 
touch her life” (p. 155-156). Not only are sufferers of Alzheimer’s disease held 
in personhood by others, they also keep contributing to the practice of hold-
ing themselves, albeit, as Lindemann terms it, “clumsily” (p. 125). Note that 
Lindemann’s account enables us to see how the loss of self usually associated 
with dementia and related conditions can be nuanced if this self is perceived 
as a social practice of holding and letting go. Having (or being ascribed with) 
a self is of course a necessary condition for the moral ideal of self-realization. 
But naturally, it is not a sufficient condition. The question whether being held 
in identity by others when one can no longer do so by oneself, also offers people 
opportunities for self-realization, is too complex to be addressed in this chapter 
dedicated to the theme of identity. Some thoughts on this matter are given in 
the final chapter of this study, where the merits and problems of self-realization 
discourse in the context of aging are drawn together (see §9.4.6).  
The value of Lindemann’s view is that it draws our attention to social facets 
of the practice of personhood, without denying the importance of individual 
human agency and the first-person perspective for our identities. She claims 
that the archetypical image of the self-sufficient human moral agent overlooks 
other equally relevant aspects of our identities that emerge from the social 
practices of personhood, and identities in which we are continuously involved. 
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She contends that the “chosen” (representing our agency, free choice, will and 
self-determination, et cetera) and the “given” (representing our social context, 
relationships, the historical and cultural situation in which we are born, et cet-
era) should be granted equal weight in our understanding of what it means to 
have an identity, because “other things being equal, a self-understanding that 
values both these strands is better equipped to permit each of them to serve as a 
check on the excesses of the other” (Lindemann, 2014, p. 210). This standpoint 
makes her account highly relevant to the view of self-realization developed in 
this study, which aims for a similar position.   
5.3.3 Kim Atkins – Narrative identit y and moral identit y
Atkins’ (2008) account of narrative identity stands out because of the connec-
tion she draws between our narrative identity and our moral identity. Our mor-
al identity is reflected in the value orientation that we appropriate (C. Taylor, 
1989) but it is also expressed through our relationships with others (see §4.2.2). 
Our moral agency can be regarded as the expression of our moral identity in 
practice. This underscores the importance of Atkins’ view, connecting narra-
tive and moral identity, in the context of this chapter. At first sight, Atkins’ 
account of narrative identity seems rather similar to Schechtman’s (1996) 
narrative self-constitution view, since she states that “selfhood is, essentially, 
an activity of self-constitution and self-understanding articulated narratively” 
(Atkins, 2008, p. 7). However, Atkins (2008) criticizes Schechtman (1996) for 
placing too much weight on the first-person perspective and the self-preserva-
tion of the individual agent through time. By contrast, Atkins (2008) propos-
es a more relational and phenomenological account, based on Merleau-Ponty 
(1945/1962) among others. Phenomenology emphasizes both our embodiment 
and our social embedding as fundamental to our identity. This implies that 
our identities are no individual creations, nor can they only be understood in 
cognitive or mental terms. The interventions or even sheer presence of others 
in our lives influence who we perceive ourselves to be. As Atkins (2008) puts 
it, “our interpersonal and social relations mediate our experience of ourselves 
and the world” (p. 44). 
Atkins sees our identity as a narratively constituted, embodied continuity. 
She states that “Narrative identity is not simply a first-person report but a com-
plex structure that interweaves first-, second-, and third-person perspectives 
into a semantic and temporal unity with a subject who attests to that identity 
and in doing so constitutes it as her own” (Atkins, 2008, p. 57). To this end, 
narrative competencies, i.e., late-developing cognitive, linguistic and commu-
nicative skills, are seen as indispensable, because they enable us to present and 
understand our lives as meaningful constellations of events, relationships, mo-
tives, circumstances, et cetera. According to Atkins (2008), our identity is best 
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understood as an embodied, practical “unity of first-, second- and third-person-
al concerns” (p. 87). This is a complex formula that requires some elaboration. 
Traditional accounts of identity usually depart from the assumption that we 
qualify as human agents by virtue of our ability to take a first-person perspective. 
Through our ability to perceive ourselves as an “I”, as exemplified in expres-
sions such as “I can” or “I do”, we see ourselves as the originator of actions. 
This agential self-perception is generally perceived to be a necessary condition 
for taking both practical and moral responsibility for our actions. 
Besides the ability to take a first-person perspective, traditional accounts 
of identity also presuppose the ability to take a third-person perspective. This 
implies that we are able to reflect on our own choices, values and preferences as 
if we were seeing them from the perspective of a stranger, a third person out-
side ourselves. The (critical) evaluation of one’s own motivations and choices 
that this perspective enables is traditionally believed to be essential to realize 
autonomous human agency (Frankfurt, 1971; C. Taylor, 1985a; see also §4.2.2, 
§6.2.2). The third-person perspective thus equips us to act as human agents by 
enabling us to make well-founded choices about our own actions and motiva-
tions. It also serves as a corrective to the self-deception that may characterize 
our first-person perspective. 
Generally, narrative views of identity assume some form of dynamics be-
tween the first-person and the third-person perspective in the process of nar-
rating one’s life, although Lindemann’s (2014) account suggests the possibility 
of a narrative identity being held by others in cases where a conventional under-
standing of the first-person perspective is absent. Traditionally, the first-person 
point of view represents the agent living the experiences in practice, i.e., the 
protagonist of the story, whereas the distance presupposed by the third-person 
point of view represents the narrator who organizes these experiences into a 
coherent plot. Atkins’ (2008) view also stresses the importance of the first-per-
son and third-person perspective in our understanding of identity. However, 
on two important (and interrelated) issues Atkins presents a different image of 
narrative identity that is of great relevance for the purposes of this study: 
• First, whereas the traditional views situate our ability to take a first-person 
perspective in the cognitive realm of our mind or rational consciousness, 
Atkins emphasizes the constitutive role of our embodiment. In the phenom-
enological account, our first-person perspective is rooted in our embodied 
being, through which we are pre-reflexively related to and embedded in the 
world surrounding us. In this sense, Atkins’ account seems to match well 
with Lindemann’s (2014) perspective on the basic criteria someone needs 
to answer to in order to be a participant in the social practice of identity 
(see §5.3.2). For Atkins (2008), our third-person perspective is only possible 
by virtue of our pre-reflexive embodied being-in-the-world. Although our 
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narrative competency is regarded as quintessential in the creation of our 
identities, the emphasis on embodiment makes us aware that this compe-
tency is something we develop gradually. We are not born with narrative 
competence, and our ability to acquire it is rooted in our embodied relation 
to the world that precedes our reflexive and narrative self.
• Second, Atkins claims that if we want to fully understand the nature of our 
identity we should include a second-person perspective in addition to the first- 
and third-person point of view. This second-person perspective represents 
our concrete, practical moral relations to other people, which are rooted in 
our embodied being. For Atkins, the acquisition of a third-person perspec-
tive on ourselves is necessarily preceded by the second-person relations we 
are engaged in, as is expressed in the following quote: “to arrive at a con-
ception of myself as a generalized other [i.e., the third-person perspective, 
HL], I must also be a concrete other for a concrete someone; that is, I must 
stand in a second-personal relationship. It is one’s embodiment that lays the 
groundwork for this experience” (Atkins, 2008, p. 45).
Our second-person concerns describe our intersubjective moral engagement 
with other people. Similar to Lindemann’s (2014) views discussed in the previ-
ous section, this implies that recognition and response to another person and 
their needs are seen as crucial for our identities by Atkins (2008) as well. Our 
recognition and responsiveness provide the fundamental basis for our moral re-
lationships with other people. A resemblance can be found here with the work 
of philosophers like Levinas (2003) or Buber (1958). For them too, answering 
the second-person appeal of the other, forms the beginning of morality. What 
Buber calls an “I-Thou” relationship has a transcendent character that enables 
recognition of the invaluable particularity of the other person. 
The aforementioned position suggests that the second-person perspective 
confronts us with a fundamental difference in relating to the world of objects 
and relating to another person. As Atkins (2008) underscores: “The presence of 
another person immediately affects the constitutive relations of my situation in 
ways that a mere object never does because I experience another person, not as 
an object, but as an agency within my world, a self-originating power of change 
within my world. The appearance of another person does not simply add to my 
perceptual field; he fundamentally alters the orientation of my world and the 
organization of my experiential field. [...] In this way my sense of own agency is 
affected by my interaction with another’s” (p. 51). By engaging in second-person 
relationships, we honor what the other person means to us. At the same time 
we also establish and maintain our commitment to who we want to be our-
selves. We principally open ourselves up to the possibility of being touched and 
transformed by our relationships with other people. A friend questioning my 
loyalty to her when I get too absorbed in my work calls for a practical response 
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to her needs, of course, but can (and maybe should) also make me reconsider 
my priorities in life and decide that I need to change something. Thus, how I 
choose to react to the second-person appeal that others make on me expresses 
something about the relationship between myself and the other. It also express-
es something vital about who I am and who I strive to be. My moral identity 
and my relationships with others are thus intrinsically interconnected. This 
indicates that my relationships with others exercise an imperatival force on my 
identity-constitution, and not just on my actions.
In addition to the first-person dimension and the third-person dimension of 
our identity, the second-person dimension draws our attention to the fact that 
our identities do not solely depend on our own rational choice or our ability for 
reflection; they are also created in and through our relationships with others.  
Consequently, by introducing the second-person perspective in her narra-
tive view of identity, Atkins (2008) not only acknowledges the social dimension 
of identity (which is also already partially included in the third-person perspec-
tive), but its moral dimension as well. The second-person perspective expresses 
our ability to be touched by others in an ethical sense, to take an interest in 
their well-being and to feel the moral appeal to respond to their needs. It is in 
the process of developing our narrative identity then, characterized by connect-
ing the first-, second- and third-person perspective, that we realize our agency 
as a moral agency.  
5.4 from nArr Ative identit y to mor Al Agency
So far, I have argued in favor of a narrative interpretation of identity, because 
such interpretation appears to be an auspicious match with the account of 
self-realization that is developed in this study. One element of this match per-
tains to the congeniality of the narrative view with the concept of the self that 
has been defended in §4.2.2. A second element of this match pertains to the 
opportunity that the narrative view offers of drawing a connection between 
the selves we strive to realize and, broadly defined, morality. Given this study’s 
interpretation of self-realization as a process of moral self-development aimed 
at the optimization of our potential for moral agency (see §4.2.1), this is highly 
relevant.  
So far two relevant positions regarding the connection between our iden-
tity and morality have been discussed. Both views assume that narratives play 
a vital role in constituting this connection. The first is the view of C. Taylor 
(1989), who claims that in order to know who we are, we have to be able to ar-
ticulate our position relative to the good (see §4.2.2). Importantly, this need for 
articulation is one of the reasons that C. Taylor prefers a narrative conception 
of identity. He believes that it is only through articulating our motivations and 
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experiences in the context of a coherent narrative that we gradually arrive at a 
proper understanding of ourselves and what we regard as worthy moral goals 
to strive for. The second view that was discussed regarding the relationship 
between narrative identity and morality is that of Atkins (2008; see §5.3.3). Her 
addition of the second-person perspective as an intrinsic part of our narrative 
identity draws attention to another aspect of our moral identity, namely our re-
lationships with other people. Both C. Taylor’s and Atkins’ accounts suggest an 
intrinsic connection between narrative identity and moral identity. However, a 
transition still needs to be made from these narratively mediated views of mor-
al identity to moral agency. Tentatively, moral agency has been described so far 
as the way we express our moral identities in the context of human practices. 
Only by translating our identity-constituting orientation towards a certain good 
and our commitment to others into actions (or refraining from action), can we 
complete the process of moral self-development that represents our self-reali-
zation. 
A philosopher who may help us understand the connection between hu-
man action, narrative identity and morality is Ricoeur (1991, 1992). His work is 
very rich in layers of meaning and its complexity far exceeds what can be dis-
cussed in the context of this chapter. Still, a discussion of some of his insights 
can enhance and deepen the understanding of the potential connections be-
tween narrative identity and moral agency. Ricoeur’s view, even if it can only be 
discussed briefly and incompletely here, provides an invaluable bridge towards 
my own composition of a viable understanding of moral agency in §5.5. In his 
impressive set of studies combined under the title Oneself as another, Ricoeur 
(1992) engages in what he calls a “hermeneutics of the self”. He provides a 
sophisticated account of what it means to have an identity. His account aims to 
escape the pitfalls of both the “exaltation” of the individual subject characteris-
tic of the Cartesian cogito (and its modern heirs), and the “humiliation” of the 
subject characteristic of the Nietzschean anticogito (and its postmodern heirs) 
(Ricoeur, 1992, p. 4). By suggesting a narrative view of identity that does not 
presuppose any core essential self, while at the same time stressing the ethical 
necessity of constituting a narratively unified selfhood, Ricoeur tries to find a 
middle road between these two extreme positions. 
In order to understand the value of Ricoeur’s account for the concept of 
moral agency, at least four elements of his view need to be discussed in more 
detail: 1) his distinction between identity as sameness and identity as selfhood; 
2) his thoughts about the relationship between the self and other; 3) the mediat-
ing role that narrative plays between the realm of action and the realm of ethics; 
and 4) his distinction between ethics and morality, including his definition of 
what he terms the ethical aim of human life.
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1. Sameness and selfhood
Ricoeur (1992) distinguishes two meanings in which the concept of identity 
can be used. The first is identity as sameness, or idem-identity. The second 
is identity as selfhood, or ipse-identity. Though these two meanings may 
sometimes seem to overlap, they are not the same. Identity as sameness pro-
vides an answer to the question what the individual is. By contrast, identity 
as selfhood provides an answer to the question who the person is. It is in 
particular Ricoeur’s concept of identity as selfhood that enriches our under-
standing, since it introduces an interpretation of the moral self that, though 
often overlooked in philosophical discourses of identity, is very congenial to 
the interpretation of self-realization.   
Identity as sameness and identity as selfhood overlap at the component that 
Ricoeur calls permanence in time. He argues that permanence in time can 
be understood in two distinct ways, one corresponding to identity as same-
ness, the other corresponding to identity as selfhood. The first meaning 
of permanence in time is what is manifested if we speak about someone’s 
character, defined by Ricoeur (1992) as “the set of lasting dispositions by 
which a person is recognized” (p. 121). These dispositions may be expressed 
in the habits a person has acquired, that have gained a certain “sedimenta-
tion” in the form of character traits. It is through these dispositions that the 
continuity of our identity through time is safeguarded. People recognize 
us by our character, and are surprised if we act “out of character”. What is 
manifested in this meaning of permanence in time is comparable to what 
Schechtman (1996) describes as the characterization question (see §5.3.1). 
With the second meaning of permanence in time we leave the realm of 
sameness and enter the realm of selfhood. This second meaning describes 
a very different concern than the continuity underlying our character. This 
concern is symbolized by Ricoeur in terms of “keeping one’s word” or 
self-constancy (p. 118). Whereas the permanence of character (sameness) can 
in principle be described in generalizing terms (for example, someone is 
a shy person, or a quick-tempered one), the permanence of self-constancy 
(selfhood) requires an individual answer to the question who do I want to 
be? This question is suited for the concrete practical situation, and answer-
ing it calls for practical wisdom rather than the application of moral princi-
ples. Our answer is uniquely personal and cannot be generalized.  
According to Ricoeur, our narrative identity is characterized by a constant 
dialectic between sameness and selfhood. Character and self-constancy 
stand in mutual connection and are constantly renegotiated in relation to 
one another. For example, frugality may be a defining feature of my char-
acter, something I value and something others recognize me by. But if I 
have made a promise to help refugees in need (a commitment that I need 
to honor in order to maintain self-constancy), I may be prompted to re-
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consider my own habit of frugality and generously spend my money on 
food and blankets. Both my habits and my ethical commitments are identi-
ty-concerns that deserve to be honored and taken seriously, but in the one 
case, we are dealing with identity as sameness (character) whereas in the 
other case, we are dealing with identity as selfhood (self-constancy). The 
required means to reconcile possibly conflicting tendencies in the dialectic 
between selfhood and sameness into a coherent identity is narrative. In our 
example, this may lead me to refine my narrative self-presentation in the 
sense that while I am normally characterized by frugality, I will set this 
habit aside when a cause I consider worthy requires so. Note that these 
reflections on self-constancy take us from the realm of moral identity to the 
realm of moral agency, and illustrate the intrinsic connection between the 
two. Our answer to the question who we are requires not only the ability 
to articulate our position in relation to what we regard as good (our moral 
identity), but also our commitment to live up to this moral orientation and 
act upon it in concrete practical situations (our moral agency). If we lack 
either the motivation, the ability or the opportunity to live up to our own 
ethical commitments, our self-constancy – our identity as selfhood – is in-
evitably compromised. From my perspective of self-realization as directed 
towards optimizing our ability for moral agency, this is a relevant obser-
vation. It emphasizes how important it is to be able to formulate purposes 
that represent a good life for us, as well as live up to these ideals in concrete 
practical circumstances. If there are causes that impede this striving, either 
internal or external to ourselves, these need to be overcome for us to realize 
the best within us and lead a good life. 
2. Self and other
In Ricoeur’s view, what we conceive as the good life is not an individual, 
isolated construction, but a dynamic ideal we share with others. We are 
engaged with other people in a continuing striving for a good life. Through 
our relationships with other people, we inevitably enter a moral field in 
which we aim to realize the good life in interaction with them. This is not to 
say, of course, that all our relationships are automatically morally valuable 
or beneficial. There are many possible relationships that are in fact morally 
detrimental to the people involved, such as relations between the oppres-
sor and the oppressed, or relationships characterized by indifference or ne-
glect. What is difficult to imagine following Ricoeur’s account, however, are 
relationships that fall outside of any moral field. Identity as selfhood pre-
supposes that there is always something at stake in our relationships with 
others. What is at stake, for instance, are the different forms of recognition 
(which can be either present or absent) that have been described by Hon-
neth (1995, see §3.2.3). The crucial role of recognition was also encountered 
in the views of narrative identity by Lindemann (2014) and Atkins (2008) 
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discussed above (see §5.3.2 and §5.3.3). Ricoeur (1992) too, uses the term rec-
ognition to characterize what is manifested in what he terms the dialectic 
between selfhood and otherness, another of the fundamental “dialectics” 
involved in his hermeneutics of the self (p. 296). 
It follows that our relationships can never be morally neutral and, conse-
quently, neither can our identities. Our relationships make us enter a do-
main in which we strive for what Ricoeur (1992) has called the “ethical 
aim”: “a good life, with and for others, in just institutions” (p. 172; see be-
low). Ricoeur assumes that when identity as selfhood is manifested, the 
other cannot be viewed as something external, simply that which is differ-
ent or distinct from the self. Instead, otherness should be viewed as some-
thing that is constitutive of identity as selfhood. As Ricoeur (1992) puts it, 
“the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree that 
one cannot be thought of without the other, that instead one passes into 
the other” (p. 3). In his account of self-constancy or identity as selfhood, 
Ricoeur uses the analogy of friendship to describe the ethical commitment 
rooted in our identities that underlies the dialectic between the self and oth-
er. This seems to point to an Aristotelian inspiration. For Aristotle (Ethica 
Nicomachea, VIII-IX, 1155a1-1172a15) friendship was a very important virtue. 
In particular, the analogy of friendship underscores that for Ricoeur (1992), 
our selfhood is an essentially relational phenomenon. 
Consequently, Ricoeur emphasizes that the faithfulness to our promises 
that constitutes our self-constancy is both a faithfulness to ourselves and 
a faithfulness to others. After all, self-constancy assumes that we are en-
gaged in relationships with others to whom we feel dedicated enough to 
keep our promises. In this sense, Ricoeur rejects the suggestion that a con-
cern for our own identity is a selfish concern. Instead, a concern for the 
other is always included in our concern for our own identity (as selfhood or 
self-constancy). What can be learned here from Ricoeur is that our identity 
is necessarily a moral identity, not only because of the fact that we position 
ourselves in relation to the good (C. Taylor, 1989), but also because our 
identities, in their very structure, presuppose an ethical engagement with 
the good of others that prompts us to act in a certain manner. According to 
Ricoeur (1992), the other is not an “externality” outside us, but is instead 
“enjoined as the structure of selfhood” (p. 354). 
3. Narrative as mediator between action and ethics/morality
Narrative, for Ricoeur, has a mediating function between the realm of hu-
man action and the realm of ethics and morality. Actions are ordered and 
interpreted by placing them in a narrative configuration by a process that 
Ricoeur (1992) terms emplotment (p. 141-142). Through emplotment, we can 
integrate our actions, together with contingent events, characters, motiva-
tions, et cetera into a coherent narrative that provides the foundation for a 
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unified experience of the self. As said in §5.2.3, a meaningful sense of iden-
tity requires a certain ordering of facts and events, which Ricoeur (1992) 
calls concordance. On the other hand, he acknowledges that our lives are in 
fact characterized by many forms of discordance, elements that challenge 
the continuity and coherence of our identity as sameness. Both the discor-
dant and concordant elements of our lives need to be brought together in a 
narrative structure. It is this narrative that provides us with a sense of who 
we are, a viable sense of identity that we can rely on when we navigate our 
lives. As Ricoeur (1992) puts it, “It is indeed in the story recounted, with its 
qualities of unity, internal structure, and completeness which are conferred 
by emplotment, that the character preserves throughout the story an iden-
tity correlative to that of the story itself” (p. 143).
Importantly, it follows that narrative integration or unified selfhood are, in 
Ricoeur’s view, not so much a transcendental condition of identity that de-
scribes an essential “core” of our selves or a life-encompassing whole – the 
view that rightly raises critique (see §5.2.3). Instead, narrative integration 
points towards a dynamic, unstable and fluctuating, but nevertheless indis-
pensable pragmatic condition for upholding a moral identity, which in its 
turn is required for exercising moral agency. The importance and indeed 
the indispensability of a notion of unified selfhood is expressed by Ricoeur 
(1992) through the following rhetorical question: “How, indeed, could a 
subject of action give an ethical character to his or her own life taken as a 
whole, if this life were not gathered together in some way, and how could 
this occur if not, precisely, in the form of a narrative?” (p.158). 
Through our narratives, we also articulate what constitutes a good life for 
us. From this emerges an orientation towards certain ends that we identify 
with and want to strive for. Our narratives not only hold a retrospective im-
portance, by ordering experiences after the fact, they also prospectively help 
us orient ourselves towards future goals. This orientation implicitly forms 
the guiding principle in how we choose to act in the present, which further 
underscores the mediating role of narrative between action and our ethical 
commitments. As Ricoeur (1992) puts it, “Is not the choice among several 
courses of action a choice about ends, that is, about whether they conform 
more or less closely to an ideal in life – conform, that is, to what each person 
considers his or her aim of happiness, his or her conception of the ‘good 
life’?” (p. 174). By virtue of its connections with our conception of the good 
life, a narrative can therefore never be ethically neutral, but functions as 
“the first laboratory of moral judgment” (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 140). We learn 
to distinguish between right and wrong, and formulate what is valuable to 
us, what we want to remain true to, by constructing our narrative identity 
through telling stories about our experiences and relating them to who we 
wish to become. For instance, if I have made a mistake which I regret, this 
Chapter 5 – Narrative identity and moral agency 151
causes tensions with my narrative self-image, because my action is not in 
sync with how I want to be. This situation calls for narrative repair. By ar-
ticulating (to myself or to others) what I have learned from my mistake and 
how I hope to avoid it in the future, I accomplish three things: I restore the 
coherence of my self-image that was threatened by my mistake, I transform 
a disruptive experience into a purpose for the future, and I communicate 
this intention (either to myself or to others, depending on who I address my 
narrative to) which helps me keep it. Through our narratives then, we com-
municate our ethical commitments to others and, in dialogue with them, 
participate in a lifelong continuing common striving towards a good life. 
For Ricoeur (1992) it is the narrative that enables us to make connections 
between the descriptive level of our actions and the prescriptive level of mo-
rality and ethics (p. 170). 
4. Ethics, morality and the “ethical aim” 
Ricoeur makes an important distinction between the dimension of morality 
and the dimension of ethics. Usually, in moral philosophy the term ethics 
is simply understood to describe the study of morality, or ethics and moral-
ity are even treated as synonyms. But Ricoeur takes another perspective. 
Morality as he understands it represents the domain of rules, principles 
and rights that is dominant in many contemporary approaches to moral 
philosophy, for example, in Kantian deontological perspectives. Ethics, on 
the other hand, pertains to our common concern to lead a good life. This 
matches the teleological Aristotelian tradition in moral philosophy. As 
Ricoeur (1992) puts it, ethics is concerned with “that which is considered to 
be good” while morality pertains to “that which imposes itself as obligato-
ry” (p. 170). It is ethics, then, that is concerned with the aim of a fulfilled or 
well-accomplished life, the best at stake in self-realization (§4.3). 
Ricoeur regards the ethical teleological dimension to have fundamental pri-
macy over the moral dimension. He emphasizes, however, that our ethical 
concerns and considerations should pass through the sieve of norms and 
principles of morality in order to ensure their validity. This serves to test 
the actions and intentions that flow from our ethical concerns for their mor-
al permissibility. Someone advancing an image of the good that involves 
morally illegitimate actions such as the oppression or extirpation of other 
people (as in the case of dictatorial regimes with an ideologically driven 
ideal of “racial purity”, for instance) can be argued to hold a deluded image 
of a good that is not worthy to guide people’s lives. 
Moral norms, celebrated by the deontological tradition in moral philosophy, 
should be granted their rightful place according to Ricoeur, but they can-
not have the final word. The teleological “ethical aim” is granted primacy. 
In cases where moral norms lead to impasses in solving concrete moral 
dilemmas in practice, we should take recourse to the Aristotelian tradition 
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of practical wisdom, searching for the course of action that best contrib-
utes to the realization of the ethical aim of human life. This ethical aim 
is formulated by Ricoeur (1992) as “a good life, with and for others, in just 
institutions” (p. 172). However, what this broadly and rather vaguely formu-
lated ethical aim of human life means for a particular human agent in a 
particular situation needs to be decided in the context of concrete practices, 
which have their characteristic internal good. This concretization requires 
what Ricoeur (1992) calls “moving back and forth between far-off ideals, 
which have to be made more precise, and the weighing of the advantages 
and disadvantages of the choice of a given life plan on the level of practice” 
(p. 177). Again, narrative seems to play an important role, since it is through 
narrative that we are able to make our choices and actions intelligible in 
light of our ethical commitments to what we perceive as the good life. 
According to Ricoeur (1992), there is a sort of “hermeneutic circle” between 
our ethical aim of a good life and our concrete daily life choices in the con-
text of human practice, where our actions should ideally be in accordance 
with our overarching ethical aim (p. 179). This requires a constant interpre-
tation and reinterpretation of ourselves, of what we want to be faithful to. 
Narrative is, as previously observed, the perfect mediating instance for this 
hermeneutic activity of the self. The first part of the phrase Ricoeur (1992) 
uses to describe the ethical aim, the good life, is “for each of us, the nebulous 
of ideals and dreams of achievements with regard to which a life is held to 
be more or less fulfilled or unfulfilled” (p. 179). This formulation shows 
interesting parallels with how the purpose of self-realization is described in 
this study in §4.2.1. It was argued there that the purpose of self-realization 
involves our “highest aspirations” and/or “best capacities” (compare with 
Ricoeur’s “ideals and dreams”), the successful realization of which contrib-
utes to fulfilling the “best” that is within us (compare Ricoeur’s “fulfilled or 
unfulfilled life”). The good life presupposes our identification with certain 
moral ideals, values, or aspirations, an identification that everyone is called 
to make on the level of their own individual life, against the background of a 
social and cultural horizon of meaning that provides the resources. 
The second part of the phrase describing the ethical aim, with and for others, 
points towards the fundamentally social and interpersonal character of the 
striving for a good life. In Ricoeur’s view, the good life can only be good if 
we acknowledge that it is a life of shared goods that can only be constituted 
and realized through our relations with others, which he characterizes with 
the term solicitude. This term expresses a relationship of mutual concern for 
each other, which is founded on the fact that human beings are intrinsical-
ly vulnerable beings. Solicitude is modeled on an Aristotelian understand-
ing of friendship, in particular the non-instrumental, non-hedonic type of 
friendship in which we strive with and for others for a good life. Friendship, 
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argues Ricoeur, fills a lack at the root of human existence; we need each 
other to fulfill ourselves. This implies a mutual, symmetrical relationship 
between the self and other, which does not grant primacy to either one. In 
this sense, Ricoeur’s account differs from both individualistic “egological” 
interpretations and from ethical accounts such as Levinas’ (2003) who pre-
sumes an asymmetrical primacy of the other. It is through the mutuality of 
solicitude, which describes our relationship to others under the pretext of 
the ethical aim, that we become aware of both the irreplaceable value and 
the inescapable existential vulnerability of human existence. According to 
Ricoeur (1992), “Solicitude adds the dimension of value, whereby each per-
son is irreplaceable in our affection and our esteem. In this respect, it is in 
experiencing the irreparable loss of the loved other that we learn, through 
the transfer of the other onto ourselves, the irreplaceable character of our 
own life. It is first for the other that I am irreplaceable” (p. 193). 
The third part of the phrase describing the ethical aim, in just institutions, 
brings the ethical aim to the societal plane. It gives voice to the intuition that 
a good life needs to be shared with all members of a historical communi-
ty, and should be safeguarded by just institutions, individual-transcending 
structures of living together that ensure equality for all. Thus, in the formu-
lation of the ethical aim the individual, interpersonal and societal dimen-
sion of the good life are intrinsically connected. 
5.5 conclusion: comPosing A definition of mor Al Agency
In this chapter a selection of narrative accounts of identity has been discussed, 
that may serve to clarify a specific aspect of the interpretation of self-realization 
developed in this study, namely its purpose, which I have defined as the opti-
mization of one’s potential for moral agency in §4.2.1. Let me start with a short 
recapitulation of the relevance of the discussed views for our purposes.  
Schechtman’s (1996) view put us on a specific track that emphasizes how 
our personal identity should be seen as a process developing through time, 
which defines how people can be characterized. Narrative was presented as the 
means through which we constitute this evolving identity. Schechtman’s focus 
on the characterization question is very valuable in drawing connections be-
tween self-realization and aging. After all, it emphasizes that narrative self-con-
stitution is a lifelong process that connects the different temporal dimensions 
of existence. This also facilitates ascribing the potential for growth and develop-
ment not only to youth, but also to later life. However, the fact that her account 
relies on a rather cognitive and rational image of the agent was argued to be 
problematic. Lindemann’s (2014) account helped us overcome this limitation by 
offering an alternative image of personal identity as a social practice. Her view 
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draws attention to something about our identities that appears to be so self-ev-
ident that it tends to be overlooked: the fact that we cannot form or maintain a 
personal identity without the contribution of others. If we disregard the social 
dimension of our identity-constitution and the way our self-narratives are con-
nected with the narratives of others, we risk succumbing to precisely the prob-
lematically atomistic, self-sufficient image of the human agent that this study’s 
reframed account of self-realization wishes to leave behind. Atkins’ (2008) view 
too, is sensitive to the social dimension of identity. Her account emphasizes the 
pre-narrative foundation of our human being, rooted in our embodiment. But 
even more importantly, Atkins’ view enables us to see the intrinsic connection 
between our narrative identity and our moral identity, by bringing into high 
relief our intersubjective engagement with others, through the introduction of 
the second-person perspective in addition to the first-person and third-person 
perspectives that figure in other accounts of identity and agency as well.     
Ricoeur’s (1992) view helps us raise the connection between narrative iden-
tity and the ethical or moral dimension of our lives to a different level. By intro-
ducing the distinction between sameness and selfhood he draws attention to 
an aspect of identity that could not be addressed through Schechtman’s (1996) 
characterization question. His focus on selfhood and self-constancy under-
scores the importance of what we want to be true to in our lives. Besides draw-
ing attention to our identification with certain values, aspirations or capacities 
that we regard as best or highest, Ricoeur (1992) also emphasizes that self-con-
stancy prompts us to live up to our ethical commitments in the practice of 
daily life. This extends the scope of attention to include not only moral identity 
but also moral agency. Moreover, his formulation of the ethical aim of human 
life also emphasizes the crucial connection between the individual, social and 
societal dimension that is indispensable in our understanding of a good life. 
Ricoeur’s distinction between ethics and morality is highly conducive to this 
study’s developing view of self-realization, because it offers an account of eth-
ics as fundamentally concerned with a good life, without taking a polarizing 
position towards more deontological or procedural accounts. Moral rules and 
principles are important, but they should be embedded in the broader ethical 
aim of human life. The resulting inclusive account of ethics provides a welcome 
match with the interpretation of self-realization that this study advances.  
The philosophical positions discussed in this chapter have assisted me in 
composing a definition of moral agency as the purpose of self-realization – in 
this study’s interpretation of that concept. Although moral agency is often un-
derstood as the ability to act according to the principles and rules prescribed 
by morality, I conceive it in a broader manner. Drawing on several intuitions 
and arguments encountered so far in my search for a viable reinterpretation of 
self-realization, I suggest a definition of moral agency as an ability that unites 
four distinct components: 1) to lead a good life 2) with and for others, 3) ac-
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cording to one’s deepest aspirations and best capacities, 4) as full participating 
members of a society/community. Let me consider the four elements of this 
definition in turn. 
1. First of all, making the phrase a good life central to my definition of moral 
agency expresses that this study’s view of self-realization is rooted in an 
understanding of ethics as fundamentally engaged with leading a good life, 
instead of focusing on rules, principles and procedures for legitimating 
actions (see §1.6.1). As seen, the good life also has a prominent place in 
Ricoeur’s (1992) formulation of the ethical aim of human life. Defining 
moral agency broadly as the ability to lead a good life, however, raises the 
question what a good life is. The insights discussed in this and the previous 
chapter suggest that this is not for the individuals to decide by themselves 
alone. This is because in the first place we live our lives as fundamentally 
socially embedded creatures, as argued in §4.2.2 and also confirmed by Lin-
demann (2014; see §5.3.2). A good life is a life shared with others, who have 
a say in what is perceived as “good”. In the second place, ascribing value to 
something presupposes a cultural horizon of meanings that transcends the 
individual realm, as also argued by C. Taylor (1989). 
On the other hand, my conceptualization of self-realization requires that 
maximal space is offered for individual appropriation and differentiation 
of the candidate goods that are available in a given social, cultural and his-
torical context. Self-realization in circumstances of late modern moral plu-
ralism requires that people can formulate and strive for their own deepest 
aspirations and best capacities. Being subjected to a conceptualization of 
the good that is not self-appropriated will impede one’s chances for self-real-
ization. Therefore, we should be very reticent about prescribing or imposing 
specific conceptions of the good as normative for everyone. The important 
exception to this reservation is, of course, that the individual appropriation 
of a value orientation is itself stimulated as necessary and valuable. This 
suggests a normative position in which a life with a self-appropriated orien-
tation towards the good (however its concrete interpretation!) is perceived 
as better than a life without such an orientation. This normativity is legiti-
mated in my view by the thought that it is a very fundamental feature and 
longing of human existence to aim for a good life, and that lacking any 
orientation (no matter how implicit it remains most of the time) is likely to 
undermine such striving. 
Importantly, the criterion of self-appropriation of what is good does not ne-
cessitate an atomistic image of the human moral agent as fully self-suffi-
cient. What we conceive as good in life can only truly qualify as a good if 
it can be intersubjectively legitimated. The insights in this chapter have 
highlighted that narratives play a quintessential role in this regard, because 
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they help us to articulate what we regard as good, and communicate this 
with others.   
2. The second part of my definition of moral agency with and for others, bor-
rows from Ricoeur’s (1992) formulation of the ethical aim, and underscores 
the social dimension of the self to be realized in self-realization. My for-
mulation of moral agency thereby aims to provide an alternative to the late 
modern account of the purpose of self-realization which, as we have ob-
served, tends to disregard this social dimension (see §2.2). As we have seen, 
Ricoeur emphasizes that the role of the other in our identities is not restrict-
ed to concrete other people external to ourselves, but that the perspective of 
the other is also integrated in our own identities. Emphasizing that moral 
agency not only assumes that we strive for a good life with others, but also 
for others, implies that the best in human beings (the purpose to be realized 
in self-realization, see 4.2) includes the ability to engage with the good of 
others, and through this engagement realize our own fulfillment. 
The phrase with and for others is not only meant to do justice to the social 
dimension of the self in self-realization, but also to its moral dimension, 
which has been discussed by Atkins (2008) through her introduction of 
the second-person dimension (§5.3.3), and by Ricoeur (1992) through his 
notion of solicitude (§5.4). Importantly, it seems to be this moral dimension 
that confronts us with both the inalienable value and the intrinsic existen-
tial vulnerability of our existence. In this sense, the with and for others part 
of my definition of moral agency repairs one of the shortcomings that I 
observed in the late modern discourse of self-realization, namely, its in-
ability to meaningfully integrate the dimension of existential vulnerability 
(see §2.2, §2.5). Lacking the objectifying distance of the third-person per-
spective or the agential self-sufficiency of the first-person perspective, the 
second-person ethical commitment to answer to the appeal of others makes 
us aware of the fact that we may hurt or damage other people, or be hurt or 
damaged by them. We also realize that our commitment and engagement 
with other people makes us vulnerable to losing them – and thereby losing 
something of highest value in our lives, a part of ourselves. Paradoxically, 
the ability to lead a good life with and for others thus includes acknowledg-
ing the limitations of our own scope of agency, the insight that we are not 
only acting but also suffering beings (Ricoeur, 1992). 
3. The third component of my suggested definition of moral agency, according 
to one’s deepest aspirations and best capacities, refers back to the discussion of 
the purpose of self-realization in §4.2.1, notably to Gewirth’s (1998) distinc-
tion between aspiration-fulfillment and capacity-fulfillment. The phrase ex-
presses that it is crucial for our moral agency that we have the opportunity 
to form the type of deep aspirations that are constitutive of our identities. 
As I have discussed in the current chapter, I propose an account in which 
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these identity-constituting orientations towards certain purposes and val-
ues in life are formed along narrative lines. A strong parallel can be seen 
between Gewirth’s notion of identity-defining aspirations, Schechtman’s 
(1996) self-constituting narratives, and Ricoeur’s (1992) notion of self-con-
stancy, for example. 
However, as I have observed in my discussion of the work of Ricoeur (1992), 
moral agency not only assumes that we develop aspirations and commit-
ments that guide our identity-formation, it also presupposes that we have 
the capacities to live up to them. Translating our identity-constituting orien-
tation into concrete choices and actions presupposes that we possess those 
fundamental qualities that are expressed in my definition of moral agency 
by the phrase best capacities. As has been discussed, opinions may differ 
on what our best or most crucial capacities are when it comes to self-re-
alization. Gewirth (1998) has a preference for reason as a distinctive and 
superior human quality, whereas others criticize what they regard as a ra-
tionalistic bias, and suggest capacities of care and sympathy as more funda-
mental. The views discussed in this chapter seem to suggest a central place 
for what Atkins (2008) has called narrative competence, as conditional for 
articulating our ethical commitments, and for Ricoeur’s (1992) notion of 
self-constancy as our capacity to be true to our word. These seem quintes-
sential capacities in order to realize what is best in ourselves and actualize 
our potential for becoming a moral agent.  
4. The fourth and final component of my definition describes an indispens-
able condition that needs to be fulfilled in order to optimally realize moral 
agency. The phrase as full participating members of a society/community is 
inspired by Lindemann Nelson’s (2001) views about repairing identity dam-
age and thereby enhancing people’s moral agency (see §3.2.4). This repair 
necessitates restoring people’s opportunities to strive for the lives they value 
and the purposes they appropriate. Enhancing moral agency assumes, how-
ever, that people are given maximal opportunity to participate in society as 
full and equally valued members. Without such opportunity for participa-
tion, we can expect that people experience problems with freely appropri-
ating purposes that are valuable to them, or forming the relationships with 
others that are crucial to their flourishing. 
Full participation relies on recognition on all three levels that were distin-
guished by Honneth (1995, see §3.2.3). Moreover, it also presumes the avail-
ability of what Ricoeur (1992) in his ethical aim calls “just institutions”, 
which should “govern the apportionment of roles, tasks, and advantages or 
disadvantages between the members of society” (p. 200). Depending on 
these advantages and disadvantages, our chances for full participation in 
society are decided. Thus, to realize moral agency, everyone should ideally 
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be given the support they need to articulate what constitutes a good life for 
them, and be given the opportunity to live up to what this requires. 
Optimally realizing one’s potential for moral agency as defined above is not an 
easy task. It requires enduring efforts on the part of the individual (which may 
fail), it requires the availability and accessibility of needed resources (which 
is certainly not self-evident), and it requires advantageous social conditions 
(but our relations with others are fragile and vulnerable to loss and break-ups). 
Self-realization emerges, once again, as a precarious striving which is suscepti-
ble to both contingent and existential vulnerabilities. However, it is the promise 
of a good life inherent in Ricoeur’s (1992) formulation of the ethical aim that 
prompts me to keep underscoring the value of striving to enhance our oppor-
tunities for moral agency, even though they may never be completely fulfilled.
Chapter 6 – Autonomy
6.1 introduction
In §4.3.2, I argued that three dominant threads weave the rich and complex fab-
ric of self-realization discourse: autonomy, authenticity and virtue. This chap-
ter is dedicated to the first thread, namely, autonomy. The main question here 
is how autonomy is best interpreted in order to match the reframed account 
of self-realization constructed in this study. As Holstein, Parks and Waymack 
(2011) emphasize, “How we think about the self informs our understanding of 
the nature of autonomy” (p. 22). Therefore, what I am looking for is a concep-
tualization of autonomy that is in sync with the insights on narrative identity 
and moral agency discussed in the previous chapter. These insights include the 
fundamental social embedding of human beings and their mutual interdepen-
dence, as well as the narrative, embodied and moral nature of our identities. 
Moreover, since it is the underlying goal of this study to ultimately arrive at 
an understanding of self-realization that can serve as a resource for cultural 
counter narratives about later life, this chapter also connects the philosophical 
insights about autonomy to the context of aging.  
The chapter proceeds to discuss these matters as follows. I start by intro-
ducing the philosophical debate about autonomy through a brief sketch of the 
classic historical view of Kant (1785/2002) that many contemporary views ex-
plicitly or implicitly relate to (§6.2.1). Next, I introduce one of the most domi-
nant contemporary views, which focuses on procedural conditions for quali-
fying actions as autonomous: the so-called hierarchical account by Frankfurt 
(1971) (§6.2.2). I then discuss some fundamental critiques that can be brought 
up against the Frankfurtian account (§6.3). These critiques are exemplified by 
a brief discussion of the alternative views of C. Taylor (1985a) (§6.3.1), Ekstrom 
(1993, 2005) (§6.3.2), and Meyers (1989) (§6.3.3). The final alternative account 
discussed is the relational view suggested by MacKenzie and Stoljar (2000) 
(§6.3.4), which represents the most fundamental critique and aims for a true 
paradigm shift in philosophical thought about autonomy. 
After discussing these philosophical accounts of autonomy, in §6.4 the dis-
cussion zooms in on how autonomy has been understood and criticized in the 
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context of aging. I thereby focus on three views from the gerontological realm: 
Moody’s approach based on communicative ethics (§6.4.1), Agich’s phenome-
nological approach (§6.4.2), and the approach by Holstein and colleagues based 
on relational views of autonomy (§6.4.3). I then critically evaluate the merits 
of the different accounts of autonomy in light of the purposes of the current 
study (§6.5). Drawing upon the strong points of the discussed perspectives and 
adding my own considerations to complete the picture, in the concluding part 
of the chapter an alternative “individuating” conceptualization of autonomy is 
presented that is able to match the requirements that this study’s evolving un-
derstanding of self-realization implies (§6.6). 
6.2 introducing Autonomy
6.2.1 Historical roots of autonomy discourse
The etymological origin of the term autonomy is derived from the Greek words 
autos (self, one-self) and nomos (law, rule, principle). The literal meaning of 
the word is thus best ascribed as self-rule or self-government. Feinberg (1986) 
distinguishes four closely related meanings in which the term autonomy has 
been understood. First, autonomy can be understood as the capacity to govern 
oneself; second, autonomy can describe the factual condition of self-govern-
ment; third, autonomy can pertain to an ideal of character based on the notion 
of self-government; and fourth, the term autonomy can mean the sovereign 
authority to govern oneself. In this last meaning, personal autonomy is under-
stood by analogy of the sovereignty of a political state, and intrinsically con-
nected to the notion of a right. It is important to note the different statuses that 
these four meanings of autonomy have. The first two meanings, autonomy as a 
capacity and as a condition, are both matters of degree, above a minimal thresh-
old, that vary among persons. The third meaning, autonomy as an ideal of char-
acter, indicates a dynamic developmental process that is never completed. The 
fourth meaning, autonomy as a right of sovereign authority over oneself, is by 
contrast either present or absent, and should be granted equally to all persons 
who meet the minimal threshold of the capacity for autonomy. In self-realiza-
tion discourse, autonomy seems to be most explicitly used in the third mean-
ing, that of an ideal of character. However, this use presupposes the presence 
of the capacity for autonomy in the agents involved. Moreover, self-realization 
discourse as this study understands it strives for sensitivity when it comes to 
the factual condition of self-government, which can be either conducive or im-
peding for the realization of autonomy as a character ideal. As Feinberg (1986) 
aptly puts it, “de facto self-government presupposes luck” (p. 31), i.e., the cir-
cumstances have to be favorable to exercise autonomy.  
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Originally seen as a feature of political states of communities, autonomy 
as a term describing a feature of human persons gained currency around 
1800, largely influenced by the moral philosophy of Kant. He perceived human 
agents to be capable of following their own inner moral law on the basis of their 
capacity for reason. Central to Kant’s view of autonomy is good will. It is by vir-
tue of this will that human agents are capable of setting themselves moral laws. 
Autonomy does not mean acting randomly as we please or refusing to subject 
oneself to norms; autonomy means that the norms one follows are willed freely 
because they flow from our capacity for reason (Kant, 1785/2002). Kant famous-
ly urged people to “dare to think for themselves” (sapere aude) in his treatise 
on Enlightenment (Kant, 1784/2009). This capacity for independent moral 
judgment and self-legislation is crucial to the Kantian view of autonomy. His 
ascription of the autonomous status to the human moral agent has been of tre-
mendous influence in our self-understanding as modern individuals. Since the 
Enlightenment then, we see the emergence of an increasingly dominant strand 
of thinking in moral philosophy that ascribes people with a unique potential for 
self-legislation. It is argued that reason enables people both to decide what the 
legitimate course of action in a certain situation is and to act in accordance with 
it. People’s rational capacity enables them to free themselves from the false au-
thority of conventions, traditions or other social sources of authority, and make 
their own moral judgments instead. 
Autonomy in the Kantian sense is presented as the opposite of heterono-
my – relying on the judgment of others, slavishly following conventions, being 
socially coerced into certain decisions or actions. A contemporary articulation 
of this position is voiced by Wolf (2005) when she states that an agent is au-
tonomous, and can be held responsible for his actions “when, and only when, 
his actions originate from within himself, when nothing beyond or behind his 
self is forcing him to act as he does” (p. 261). In this sense, the traditional Kan-
tian conceptualization of autonomy and its contemporary followers explicitly 
assume the typical internalization of moral sources characteristic of modernity 
(C. Taylor, 1989). 
Although the Kantian concept of autonomy as self-government and self-de-
termination was soon criticized for its optimistic reliance on human reason at 
the expense of other human faculties, it has nevertheless become a landmark 
concept in our modern Western self-understanding. The Kantian understand-
ing of autonomy has been very influential, not only in moral philosophy, but 
also in political philosophy and applied ethics, for instance. In political phi-
losophy, it infuses the very foundations of neoliberal societal theories that pre-
suppose the independent autonomous individual as their cornerstone. Also, 
the Kantian concept of autonomy underlies typical modern interpretations of 
freedom, since it suggests that any limitation of our capacity for self-determi-
nation impedes our freedom as well. Thus, for neoliberalism, guaranteeing 
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people’s freedom and autonomy means safeguarding them from unduly exter-
nal interference in their lives, unless their exercise of freedom interferes with 
that of others. This idea has famously been described by Berlin (1958) in terms 
of negative freedom. In applied ethics, neo-Kantian interpretations of autonomy 
have long occupied an almost unassailable status. This was greatly influenced 
by the “four principles” approach by Beauchamp and Childress (1984) in bio-
ethics, who interpret autonomy in the medical context predominantly in terms 
of informed consent. Among these four principles, the dominance of autonomy 
as the ethical principle of “first among equals” is often interpreted as causally 
connected to the Western dominance of individualism. As I will discuss in 
§6.4 however, this bioethical interpretation of autonomy is a poor match to the 
context of aging, particularly in long-term care (Agich, 2003; Holstein, Parks & 
Waymack, 2011; Holstein, 2015; Moody, 1992). 
6.2.2 Harr y Frankfurt: A dominant contemporar y account
Recent moral-philosophical interpretations of autonomy focus predominantly 
on the autonomy of persons with regard to their own desires, choices, attitudes, 
character dispositions, et cetera. The implicit underlying image of the person 
still resembles the Kantian rational moral agent, but most dominant contem-
porary accounts focus more explicitly on procedural criteria for autonomous 
actions. Thereby, the autonomy of a person’s actions is generally measured by 
the way in which they flow from a properly reflected and authentically appropri-
ated set of motivations (J. Taylor, 2005). Frankfurt’s (1971) so-called hierarchical 
view provides one of the most prominent examples. 
The term hierarchical pertains to the distinction Frankfurt makes between 
different levels of motivations. In order to qualify as an agent, Frankfurt con-
tends that people should be able to reflect on their initial first-order desires 
and form second-order desires, which are desires about first-order desires. To 
be autonomous, one needs to appropriate one’s second-order desires as one’s 
own, willing them to guide one’s actions. Frankfurt describes this in terms of 
(second-order) volitions. For instance, the volition to live healthy overrules the 
first-order desire to have that huge chocolate chip cookie for dessert. Thus, the 
ability to reflect on one’s desires and promote some of them to the status of 
action-guiding volitions, freely and rationally chosen to guide one’s conduct, is 
what defines the autonomy of persons and constitutes their agency (Frankfurt, 
1971). One of the advantages of Frankfurt’s approach is that it evades the discus-
sion about determinism and free will that plagues the autonomy debate. The 
criterion for autonomy is not that one is totally “self-determining” in the sense 
of “free from external determinants”, but that one identifies with one’s high-
er-order desires and wants them to decide one’s actions. Freedom of the will is 
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therefore always conditional freedom and does not presuppose independence 
from determining (for example, social or cultural) factors (Bieri, 2001). 
Frankfurt’s (1971) account of autonomy does not concern itself with the 
substantive content of motivations underlying a certain choice. A choice sim-
ply qualifies as autonomous as long as the requirements of critical reflection 
and the resulting identification with one’s action-guiding motivations are an-
swered. The moral value (or lack thereof) of a given motivation is not consid-
ered relevant to judge people’s autonomy. In this sense, Frankfurt exemplifies 
the category of what have been called procedural (as opposed to substantive) 
accounts of autonomy (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000). The majority of contem-
porary philosophical accounts of autonomy can be described as procedural. 
Within the category of procedural accounts, Frankfurt’s (1971) view represents 
a structural version, which takes what Mackenzie and Stoljar (2005) describe 
as a “time-slice approach to autonomy” (p. 15). This means that its assessment 
of the autonomy of the agent performing a certain action is based solely upon 
the occurring motivational structure at one given point in time. In contrast, 
historical versions of procedural theories argue that it is also important to con-
sider the origins of the desires, beliefs and attitudes that have led to the agent’s 
motivations. Historical versions of procedural theories have the advantage of 
enabling a developmental perspective on autonomy. 
6.3 selected AlternAtive Accounts of Autonomy 
Although hierarchical accounts such as Frankfurt’s (1971) have been very influ-
ential in the contemporary philosophical debate on autonomy, there have also 
been some serious critiques. The more formalistic of these relate, for instance, 
to the threats of manipulation of desires and of infinite regress in explaining 
the authority of higher-order desires (J. Taylor, 2005). From the perspective 
of self-realization taken in this study, it is of particular importance to discuss 
four other objections that can be raised against the structural, a-historical and 
hierarchical approaches exemplified by Frankfurt’s (1971) account of autonomy. 
All of these are illustrated below through alternative accounts of autonomy de-
veloped by different thinkers. The discussed views represent a continuum of 
critique that ranges from essential amendments to fundamental rejection of 
Frankfurt’s philosophical-anthropological assumptions about human agency. 
The first critique, represented by C. Taylor’s view of human agency (1985a), 
questions the content-neutrality of procedural accounts. It points to the impor-
tance of a normative evaluation of the hierarchy of desires that is believed to 
constitute our autonomy. The second issue, illustrated by Ekstrom’s view (1993, 
2005) addresses the a-historical nature of Frankfurt’s (1971) account. It sug-
gests positioning autonomy more in the context of a coherent set of values that 
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we identify with throughout our lives. The third issue, represented by Meyers’ 
view (1989), relates to the conditions needed for the practical applicability of 
relatively abstract criteria for autonomy. It raises the question which competen-
cies are needed to be able to execute one’s capacity for autonomy. The fourth 
issue, represented by feminist relational thinkers (e.g., Mackenzie & Stoljar, 
2000), provides a critique against the fundamental anthropological assump-
tions about what it means to be a human person that underlie the traditional 
dominant accounts of autonomy. These accounts are discussed in turn below.
6.3.1 Charles Taylor: Autonomy and the strong 
evaluation of desires
In his account of human agency, C. Taylor (1985a) takes Frankfurt’s (1971) orig-
inal hierarchical interpretation of autonomy in terms of first- and second-order 
desires and volitions as his starting point. However, he argues that this misses 
an important element which in his view is fundamental to human agency (and 
thus to autonomy). To be human agents, we do not only have to be able to iden-
tify and endorse our desires by forming volitions about them, we also have to 
evaluate and order them according to their relative qualitative value. 
Fundamental to C. Taylor’s (1985a) view about agency and autonomy is the 
distinction he makes between weak and strong evaluations. Weak evaluations 
imply a weighing of desires, and choosing which one accords most with one’s 
current preferences. Thus, for example, we can choose between having a snack 
or going for a walk. What we choose depends on our preference at that moment. 
However, our choice does not express a qualitative judgment about the value of 
snacking over walking or vice versa. Weak evaluations imply choosing between 
options that are in principal of equal value. What is missing from such choices 
however, is the evaluation of available choice options in terms of a hierarchy of 
values that motivate us. Strong evaluations, by contrast, do imply such a quali-
tative judgment, in terms of values that are perceived as indefinitely higher or 
deeper and therefore more worthy to guide our actions. C. Taylor calls these 
our “hypergoods” and regards our attempts to approach them more closely as 
essential to our moral identity formation (C. Taylor, 1989). Importantly, strong 
evaluations are coupled to certain ways of living that are considered expressive 
of who we want to be. For instance, I can choose a certain course of action, say, 
speaking up for a colleague who is being mistreated by our mutual superior, 
because I regard it as more courageous than the alternative, which would be to 
keep my mouth shut because of the risk that addressing this injustice might 
entail for my own job. My choice of action is then intrinsically connected to 
my evaluation of courage as a value. If I choose to speak up, this is an expres-
sion of my moral preference for a courageous way of living over a cowardly or 
indifferent one. In this sense, the capacity for strong evaluation is linked with 
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my identity, because my strong evaluations and the choices based on them are 
guided by who I want to be. The ability to draw qualitative distinctions and 
articulate them in a value-laden language of what C. Taylor (1989) calls “qual-
itative contrast” is thus perceived as essential to what it means to be a human 
agent exercising autonomy. 
It is important to note however, that the value-evaluations involved in mak-
ing these qualitative contrasts are no individual preferences in which “anything 
goes”. Instead, they have to be rooted in the cultural horizon of meaning that 
both embeds and transcends the individual life. The ability to make qualitative 
distinctions - and thus to exercise our strong evaluative capacity - is indispens-
able in acquiring moral identity and becoming a moral agent.   
6.3.2 Laura Ekstrom: Autonomy and the coherence 
of our value orientation
The “coherentist” view of autonomy suggested by Ekstrom (1993, 2005) counts 
as an objection against the a-historical character of Frankfurt’s (1971) approach, 
which focuses on presently existing desires and their hierarchy without con-
necting them to the broader narrative context of the person’s identity. Essential 
to Ekstrom’s (1993, 2005) view is that the autonomy of the agent relies on a sense 
of personal integration or coherence. Instead of focusing on agents’ autonomy 
with respect to their desires, as the traditional hierarchical approaches do, she 
is concerned with the autonomy of agents with respect to their preferences. A 
preference is defined by Ekstrom (2005) as “a desire that has survived a process 
of critical evaluation – in particular with respect to an individual’s conception 
of the good” (p. 148). For example, suppose I have a desire to eat fresh pineap-
ple. But I have also seen documentaries that have taught me the environmental 
burden of a Western lifestyle, and stimulated me to make more sustainable 
choices in my life. Since I realize that growing pineapples and transporting 
them to Europe is not very environment-friendly, my momentary desire for the 
pineapple may then be replaced by the decision to eat a locally-grown organic 
apple. This will cohere with my preference for a sustainable lifestyle, which 
is crucial to who I want to be. It can therefore be regarded an autonomous 
choice in Ekstrom’s account. A preference is, in other words, part of an attitude 
describing accurately one’s identity, “what one is like”, which is formed by pro-
cesses of (self-)evaluation in the context of one’s pursuit of the good. In this 
respect, Ekstrom’s view of a preference and its role in autonomy shows some 
important resemblances with C. Taylor’s (1989) idea of strong evaluation and 
the importance of situating oneself in relation to one’s hypergoods for identity. 
It also acknowledges the fact that our deepest aspirations (the ones relevant to 
self-realization) are connected to the kind of person we want to be (see §4.2.1).  
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Ekstrom (2005) states that the autonomy of a person depends on the coher-
ence of the set of preferences that is characteristic of the person’s true or most 
central self. A consistent character disposition or set of attitudes has to underlie 
and justify one’s actions in order to qualify as an autonomous agent. Having 
discussed the complications related to the idea of narrative integration and the 
concept of a unified self in §5.2.3, we could frown at this condition for auton-
omy. However, Ekstrom’s perception of coherence is relatively modest. It does 
not require an inner core self in any essentialist metaphysical interpretation, 
but only a certain amount of coherence and durability through time concerning 
the set of motivational preferences underlying one’s actions. Ekstrom (2005) 
formulates her account of a “true self” in the following terms: “the idea is that 
certain of our attitudes are more central to who we are in a moral or psycho-
logical sense than are other of our attitudes, and that it is in acting on these 
more central attitudes that we exert special direction over our lives” (p. 153). 
The preferences expressive of this true self need to be long-lasting, able to resist 
external challenges and be embraced wholeheartedly by the person. 
Importantly, Ekstrom’s approach does not deny the possibility of conflicts 
between aspirations, values and feelings that characterize most people’s lives 
and identities. Her notion of coherence, she states, must not be misunderstood 
to exclude people struggling with such internal conflicts from the realms of 
autonomous agency. Instead, she states that her coherentist account of auton-
omy provides room for inner conflict and disorder. It just states that in order 
to qualify as autonomous, a person’s motivating preferences must: 1) have un-
dergone critical evaluation in light of the person’s conception of the good; 2) be 
formed without being coerced by others; and 3) cohere with the person’s other 
preference states. Such preference states support each other, creating a relative 
stability of character through time (Ekstrom, 2005, p. 154). In a later essay ti-
tled Identification and Wholeheartedness Frankfurt (1988b) too acknowledged 
the importance for autonomy of a certain durable engagement with what we 
authentically, wholeheartedly care about. These are the kind of commitments 
that Ekstrom (2008) describes as preferences that give our identity coherence. 
Both authors hereby implicitly affirm the need for the historical, narrative con-
ception of the person and their identity as advanced in chapter 5. 
6.3.3 Diana Meyers: Autonomy and 
the conditions of its practicabilit y
Meyers’ (1989) work Self, society and personal choice provides yet another alter-
native approach to the autonomy question, which criticizes the abstract and 
de-contextualized nature of dominant structural views. Meyers understands 
autonomy in terms of the ability to act on the desires and preferences of one’s 
authentic self. She shares Ekstrom’s (2005) idea that a certain amount of coher-
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ence in one’s personal character and set of preferences is an important criterion 
for autonomous agency. However, Meyers (1989) observes that a coherent per-
sonality can still be compatible with a lack of autonomy, if one’s circumstances 
impede acting on what one really wants to do. Therefore, in Meyers’ (1989) 
words, “a tenable account of autonomy must link the abstract desideratum of 
coherence to practicability” (p. 33).     
The focus on practicability implies addressing the question of how peo-
ple become disposed to engage in the self-reflexive consultation necessary to 
distinguish autonomous from heteronymous decisions and what capacities 
are needed in order to exercise autonomy in practice. For Meyers, autonomy is 
therefore best understood in terms of an autonomy competency. Her definition 
of competency describes it as “a repertory of coordinated skills that enables a 
person to engage in a complex activity” (Meyers, 1989, p. 56). Autonomy com-
petency consists of a set of three such repertories: self-discovery, self-definition 
and self-direction. Whereas the emphasis in traditional accounts of autonomy 
usually remains limited to self-direction, Meyers underscores that self-discov-
ery and self-definition are indispensable capacities for autonomy as well. The 
three capacities cannot be separated from each other, they function in mutual 
interaction.
Self-discovery implies the capacity to learn what one’s true desires, values, 
feelings, and attachments are. I get to know myself by reflecting on my incli-
nations, reactions, judgments, et cetera. For example, I may observe in myself 
a growing unease with the materialistic, consumerist lifestyle that advertising 
tries to lure me into. I also feel moved when I see other creatures suffer as 
a result of my lifestyle choices, and appalled with what I see as the hedonis-
tic, materialistic preferences of others in my surroundings. On the basis of 
the self-knowledge acquired through such reflections, I decide who I want to 
be and envisage a life plan on that ground. In the aforementioned example, 
I may decide I want to become someone with a modest and sustainable life-
style, whose focus is on peaceful, non-harming relations with people, animals 
and the world. Such considerations about myself are implied in the capacity of 
self-definition. Finally, self-direction implies the capacity to act on the standards 
that are implicitly present in one’s life plan and self-image. In my example, 
this could mean resisting the temptation to eat that delicious steak and choose 
a vegetarian dish instead, put effort into recycling my garbage, take the train 
instead of the car, turn the heat down a couple of degrees, enjoy a homemade 
dinner with friends instead of going out, et cetera. 
Important to understand Meyers’ view is the distinction she makes between 
moral autonomy and personal autonomy. Moral autonomy can be compared to 
the traditional Kantian idea of being able to apply universal rational criteria of 
right and wrong (Kant, 1785/2002). It is thus concerned with moral permissi-
bility of actions (Friedman, 2000). However, Meyers (1989) underscores that 
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autonomy has a broader scope and should also include paying attention to the 
choices and values that constitute people’s authentic identities, which form the 
domain of personal autonomy. Though personal autonomy presupposes acting 
within the restrictions posed by the criteria for moral autonomy, it pertains to a 
different area of interest than the moral permissibility of actions, namely, that 
of people’s unique and personal choices, values and identities. In this regard, 
Meyers (2000) draws a connection between autonomy and authenticity which 
makes her account particularly relevant from a self-realization perspective, in 
which both autonomy and authenticity are important threads (see also §7.3.4). I 
should highlight that Meyers’ emphasis on authenticity makes her reluctant to 
provide substantive guidelines or norms regarding which concrete aspirations 
and capacities a person exercising autonomy competency should strive to ful-
fill. Her view remains within the realm of procedural approaches to autonomy 
in this regard. As Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) emphasize discussing Meyers’ 
(2000) approach: “Since individuals differ so significantly in their talents, ca-
pacities, character traits, values, desires, beliefs, and emotional attitudes, [...] 
there can be no blueprint for what constitutes an autonomous life” (p. 17).   
Interestingly, Meyers’ approach can accommodate both the importance of 
focusing on specific autonomy-constituting choices (as emphasized by Frank-
furt’s (1971) view) as well as the importance of a focus on the coherence of 
people’s life (as emphasized by Ekstrom (1993, 2005)). This is induced by the 
distinction she makes between episodic and programmatic self-direction, en-
countered earlier in my discussion of narrative integration (§5.2.3). Episodic 
autonomous self-direction pertains to a specific situation or episode, where 
agents confront a choice, decide what they really want to do by deliberating 
about the available options, and then execute their choice. Programmatic au-
tonomous self-direction by contrast, has a much broader scope, and requires 
deciding what to choose in light of how one wants to live one’s life in general. 
Programmatic autonomous self-direction particularly reflects Meyers’ empha-
sis on the importance of personal integration for autonomy and living in har-
mony with one’s authentic self. 
An important advantage of the notion of programmatic autonomy is that 
it offers an opportunity to grant autonomous status to choices that are made 
spontaneously, i.e., without conscious reflexive deliberation in advance as tradi-
tional procedural accounts demand. As long as the choosing self is in posses-
sion of an autonomous life plan, spontaneous actions in accordance with the 
central concerns of this life plan may also count as autonomous, provided they 
accord with the desires of one’s authentic self. The notion of a life plan that is 
crucial to the notion of programmatic autonomous self-direction may sound 
problematically static, ordered and restrictive. However, as Meyers (1989) em-
phasizes, “Life plans should not be pictured as complicated, highly detailed 
flow charts spanning a lifetime. Rather, a life plan is a largely schematic, par-
Chapter 6 – Autonomy 169
tially articulated vision of a worthwhile life that is suitable for a particular in-
dividual. Life plans provide some specific directions and a great deal of general 
guidance. Agents amplify and refine them as they feel the need to do so” (p. 51). 
Life plans are thus flexible enough to accommodate for the contingencies con-
fronted in life, for unforeseen situations and for continuous development and 
transformation of the self throughout life. It is not necessary to regularly ques-
tion them or reflect on them under normal life circumstances. Still, they play 
an important role in people’s perceptions of their authentic self. Consequently, 
Meyers argues that it is highly questionable if anyone can be called autonomous 
without having a life plan. 
Nevertheless, as a feminist thinker, Meyers is very sensitive to the context 
in which the autonomy competency is exercised and authentic life plans are 
formed. She is acutely aware of the fact that the socio-cultural context in which 
people live offers rather different opportunities to different (groups of) people 
to actually be able to become autonomous and act accordingly, which is one 
of the reasons the notion of a life plan has been criticized (M. Walker, 2007; 
see also §5.2.3). For example, being socialized in the female gender role limits 
many women’s chances to follow their own aspirations in life because - de-
spite efforts to emancipate women - in reality they are still expected to take 
more than an equal share of care responsibilities. Even though Meyers (1989) 
maintains that authentic selfhood and the corresponding notion of a life plan 
are important, she acknowledges that autonomy (-competency) is thus always 
a matter of degree and can be severely impeded by how one is socially and cul-
turally positioned (see also chapter 3 on the problematic effects of oppressive 
cultural narratives on people’s moral agency). 
6.3.4 Relational view: Autonomy, interdependence, 
socialization and power
The relational view presents the most far-reaching critique against structural 
hierarchical views of autonomy like Frankfurt’s (1971). In particular, the rela-
tional view challenges the portrayal of the individual as a rational, indepen-
dent, self-sufficient and atomistic creature that is typical for modern, neoliberal 
philosophical perspectives associated with the structural hierarchical account 
(compare also the underlying anthropological assumptions that, as I argued, 
make the late modern self-realization discourse so problematic; see §2.2, §2.5). 
Relational autonomy is in fact an umbrella term covering views with several 
nuances. Their common ground however, is more important than their dif-
ferences. In discussing the relational view, I will mainly draw upon an edited 
volume by Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) titled Relational autonomy. Feminist 
perspectives on autonomy, agency and the social self, that unites the most import-
ant relational perspectives. 
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The relational view of autonomy suggests a paradigm shift when it comes to 
the underlying notion of the person, compared to the previously discussed ac-
counts of autonomy. Importantly, Meyers’ (1989; 2000) perspective (§6.3.3) also 
acknowledges the social embedding of the person; however, whereas her view 
of autonomy remains procedural, the relational perspective discussed in this 
paragraph argues for a more substantive content to be given to what autonomy 
amounts to. This implies that normative criteria are introduced to judge wheth-
er our decisions to act in a certain manner are motivated by inescapable and 
benign forms of socialization, or instead by oppressive and harmful forms of 
socialization (therefore rendering them not truly autonomous) (Stoljar, 2000; 
Benson, 1991; see further §6.6). 
The relational view of autonomy draws upon feminist philosophical ideas 
about the social and relational embedding of human beings. In moral philos-
ophy, these ideas have been most prominently defended by the ethics of care 
(Noddings, 1986; Tronto, 1993; Held, 2006). Care has often been presented 
as a typically “feminine” value, and the origins of the ethics of care are usual-
ly located in the famous debate between Kohlberg and Gilligan regarding the 
differences in moral development between boys and girls (Kohlberg & Kramer, 
1969; Gilligan, 1982). However, the ethics of care typically objects to the idea 
that care is a feminine domain, stressing that it should instead be seen as a 
fundamental feature of human life in general, permeating our existence from 
cradle to grave. Furthermore, a particularly strong feature of the ethics of care 
is its emphasis on the political and cultural opportunities for transformation. 
Tronto (1993) states that, “The values of caring and nurturance, of stressing the 
importance of human relationships as key elements of the good life, remain 
enticing possibilities in a culture that stresses, as its bottom line, an unlimited 
concern with productivity and progress” (p. 2).
Three points are particularly characteristic of the relational view of autono-
my: 1) the relational view emphasizes that the individual is not an atomistic, in-
dependent and self-sufficient agent, but a socially embedded creature, involved 
in networks of relationships and responsibilities that highlight the fundamen-
tal interdependence of the human condition; 2) following from this relational 
conception of the individual, the relational view explicitly addresses the para-
doxical connection between autonomy and socialization; and 3) the relational 
view exhibits a strong sensitivity to the consequences of social inequalities and 
power differences based on gender, socio-economic status, age, ethnicity and 
so forth, with regard to the development and opportunities to exercise autono-
my. I will discuss these three points in some more detail below: 
1.  Interdependence
The first important contribution to the discourse on autonomy provided 
by the relational view relates to its strong critical implications for the phil-
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osophical-anthropological framework, particularly the assumptions about 
personhood, supporting traditional views of autonomy. The care-ethical 
perspective that forms the foundation for the relational account of autono-
my makes it clear that interdependence is an inescapable reality of the hu-
man condition. Its influence is much deeper and more pervasive than can 
be recognized by the supposedly atomistic, independent status of an auton-
omous agent claimed by the traditional views. The relational view stresses 
that the dominant neoliberal conception of the individual should be regard-
ed as an artificial abstraction, with only limited usefulness. It also seems 
to be a particularly Western conception, whereas the construal of the self 
in Eastern cultures seems to be more interdependent to start with (Markus 
& Kitayama, 1991). Importantly, acknowledging the reality of interdepen-
dence denies the exclusive association of care with helpless infants or old, 
fragile and disabled people. It emphasizes that (inter)dependence and the 
associated vulnerability is a fundamental feature of human life, instead of 
a shameful and deplorable state of specific vulnerable groups. This affirms 
this study’s reflections on existential vulnerability as an inescapable reality 
of all human lives (see §2.4.6). 
Despite the importance and legitimacy of the fundamental critique on tra-
ditional notions of agency and human personhood, Mackenzie and Stoljar 
(2000) argue that the feminist critique has often been directed against a 
caricature version of individual autonomy. They describe this caricature as 
“the self-sufficient, rugged male individualist, rational maximizing choos-
er of libertarian theory” (Mackenzie & Stoljar 2000, p. 5). While this par-
ticular caricature, which is deeply entrenched in the cultural imaginaries 
of modern Western societies, deserves continuing criticism, it would be 
unfair and undesirable to repudiate the whole concept of autonomy because 
of this caricature. The relational account of autonomy aims for a fundamen-
tal reframing of mainstream conceptions of personhood. This reframing 
intends to acknowledge insights about the fundamental interdependency of 
the human condition, the social nature of the self and the values of care, re-
sponsibility, solidarity, et cetera (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000; Barclay, 2000; 
Code, 1991; Held, 2006). Moreover, the relational account also strives to 
acknowledge a richer variety of relevant faculties of agents to be considered 
in weighing their autonomy. Whereas traditional accounts focus mostly on 
the rational capacities needed for critical reflection on one’s motivations, 
the relational approach stresses that agents are not only rational beings, but 
also embodied, desiring, feeling, creative and expressive beings (Macken-
zie, 2000).
2. Socialization 
The second important contribution of the relational view lies in its attempts 
to clarify how socialization and autonomy relate to each other. As we have 
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seen, in traditional views of autonomy socialization is perceived as a source 
of heteronomy, and thus something to be overcome in the development 
of autonomy. The classic freedom-determination debate typically touches 
upon this matter. While modern structural views acknowledge the fact that 
freedom cannot exist without a certain form of social conditioning (Bieri, 
2001), they still presuppose that autonomy requires being able to self-reflex-
ively distance oneself from these influences and acquire an independent 
attitude towards them. 
Through its emphasis on the social nature of the self, the relational view 
shows that socialization is inescapable and not something to be conquered 
in order to become truly autonomous and “free”. Instead, the relational ap-
proach contends that one cannot even acquire the competences needed to 
exercise autonomy without continuing processes of socialization. As Bar-
clay (2000) puts it, “the claim that social determinism undercuts the pos-
sibility of autonomy [...] is based on a misunderstanding of the notion of 
autonomy. [...] Autonomous agency does not imply that one mysteriously es-
capes altogether from social influence but rather that one is able to fashion a 
certain response to it” (p. 54). Code (1991) clarifies this point by drawing on 
a notion by Baier (1985) who stated that we are essentially “second-persons”, 
relying for our personal development on relations of dependency with oth-
ers – beginning with our caregivers in infancy and extending to a broader 
social realm throughout life. Self-knowledge and self-determination can 
only be realized by engaging in continuing, formative, dialogical social re-
lationships with these others, not by reflecting on our desires and choices 
in self-dependent isolation. The fact that other people’s values and decisions 
often differ from our own is not a threat to our autonomy. Instead, by chal-
lenging our views and actions other’s alternative views help us define our-
selves more clearly. Thus, other people play an indispensable role in what C. 
Taylor (1985b) has called our hermeneutic self-constitution.  
At the same time, feminist thinkers are deeply ambivalent about processes 
of socialization, since the latter have also had severely negative con sequences 
for the life opportunities and social freedom of women (as well as other 
groups that are traditionally disadvantaged in terms of societal power and 
influence) (M. Walker, 2007). A distinction thus needs to be made between 
necessary forms of socialization that are inevitable and should be welcomed 
to develop and exercise autonomy, and oppressive forms of socialization 
that impede this process (Benson, 1991). Consequently, Friedman (2000) 
argues that it is important to see that “socialization does not as such impede 
autonomy, whereas coercion as such does do so” (p. 37). Cultural master 
narratives that are stereotyping and marginalizing are an important factor 
in such oppressive and coercive forms of socialization given their effects 
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of depriving people of opportunities and causing infiltrated consciousness 
(Lindemann Nelson 2001; see §3.2.2). 
Oppressive socialization can impair autonomy at three different levels, ac-
cording to Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000): first, at the level of the formation 
of the agent’s desires, beliefs and attitudes; second, at the level of the de-
velopment of relevant capacities such as self-reflection, self-direction and 
self-knowledge; and third, at the level of the actual making of autonomous 
choices and performance of autonomous actions. Notice here the interest-
ing parallel with the modes of self-realization (aspiration fulfillment and ca-
pacity fulfillment) discussed in §4.2.1, as well as the recognition that self-re-
alization proceeds through acting in concrete practices (see §4.2.3). At each 
of these levels, oppressive socialization may thus impede self-realization. 
3. Power 
The third important contribution of the relational view to the autonomy 
debate is closely related to the problem of oppressive or otherwise problem-
atic forms of socialization. The relational view raises our awareness of the 
simple fact that exercising autonomy requires social opportunities, or else 
it becomes a useless notion. Relational approaches stress that moral ideals 
like autonomy are always situated in a concrete, historical, social and cultur-
al context. M. Walker (2007) emphasizes that marginalized groups can be 
denied access to the opportunities to realize certain moral ideals, because 
it is assumed that these are of no relevance to them. For example, women 
have long been excluded from higher education on the assumption that 
this would offer no added value for their typical life fulfillment as cultur-
ally perceived, namely, being housewives, mothers and caregivers. Similar 
paternalistic mechanisms stymie the aspirations of other social groups – 
including elderly people - who are not given an appropriate voice in the 
existing dominant structures of our culture and society (see §3.2.2). 
This point draws our attention to the power structures enabling and main-
taining our social and cultural world. As a result of these power structures, 
there exist profound differences in the opportunities for people to live ac-
cording to their own values, and even to formulate such values in the first 
place – what M. Walker (2007) has called their “epistemological position”. 
It is also a fundamental insight of care ethics that all moral theories and 
concepts are influenced by a context of power relationships, which need 
to be taken seriously in evaluating their content and value (Tronto, 1993). 
Suggestions from the relational perspective for remedying this situation 
include a strong emphasis on the importance of social recognition of one’s 
position as a moral agent, reminiscent of the arguments by Honneth (1995) 
and Lindemann Nelson (2001) discussed earlier (see §3.2.3). As long as peo-
ple are not recognized as (potentially) autonomous moral agents, ascribing 
autonomy to them, be it as an anthropological  characteristic or as a fun-
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damental human right, remains an empty, theoretical abstraction. Giving 
voice to marginalized groups should improve their epistemological, moral 
and social status as autonomous, relationally embedded subjects, and there-
by enhance their autonomy (M. Walker, 2007; Meyers, 2002). 
Although it is a great advantage of the relational view that it is able to ac-
knowledge the fundamental social embedding of moral agents, it has two 
crucial shortcomings that merit specific attention. The first is a certain 
vagueness about the substantial content of relational autonomy. Despite the 
important critiques that the relational approach contributes to the autono-
my debate, it seems to give far more information about what autonomy is 
not, than about what the suggested alternative relational conceptualization 
would in fact look like. The second shortcoming is that the relational view 
offers insufficient means to rethink the importance of the social practice 
of “becoming individual” for exercising autonomy (compare with the re-
flections on narratives of becoming in §3.4). Before the relational view can 
serve as a basis for an account of autonomy that fits the outlook of my con-
ceptualization of self-realization, it needs to be enriched with a more explic-
it concern for what constitutes people’s identity as selfhood, which underlies 
their moral identity and enables moral agency (see §5.4; §5.5). 
6.4 Autonomy in the conte x t of Aging
Before proceeding towards an evaluation of the discussed conceptualizations 
of autonomy and their suitability for the narratives of becoming based on the 
self-realization discourse, let me first connect the theme of autonomy to the 
context of aging. Autonomy is an often highly contested value in the context 
of aging (Polivka & Moody, 2001). Whereas some approaches to late modern 
aging  – in particular those associated with what I have termed age-defying 
narratives – treat autonomy as an important flagship concept, other views have 
pointed out the difficulties in applying the notion of autonomy to aging, in 
particular because, as Moody (1992) puts it, autonomy in the conventional un-
derstanding seems “incompatible with existential facts about old age” (p. 40). 
The fundamental critique posed against the dominant liberal conceptual-
ization of autonomy with regard to aging is, according to Holstein, Parks & 
Waymack (2011), that it “obscures the fact that we ultimately lack control over 
aging, illness, disability, suffering, and death. To admit this lack of autonomy 
is to admit that the human condition is beyond our control; to relinquish auton-
omy is to acknowledge our deep vulnerability, especially as we age” (p. 12). Be-
sides this, the tendency of traditional conceptualizations of autonomy to favor 
independence leads to an unfortunate association of dependence with weak-
ness, incapacity and loss of dignity. This has a particularly negative impact 
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on aging individuals, whose dependence on others in executing daily tasks, 
such as bathing, dressing or eating, tends to increase once they become frailer. 
An identification of autonomy with independence, rational choice and freedom 
from interference, hinders a satisfactory moral consideration of issues confront-
ed by aging people in their daily lives, especially when living in circumstances 
that severely restrict their opportunities to exercise autonomy in the traditional 
sense (Dodds, 2000). For this reason, autonomy critique in gerontological de-
bate has strongly focused on the context of long-term care (Agich, 1990, 1995, 
2003; Collopy, 1988; Moody, 1992; Polivka & Moody, 2001; Cole & Holstein, 
1996; Holstein, Parks & Waymack, 2011). 
To illustrate how ethical problems surrounding autonomy in the context of 
aging have been addressed, let me select three suggestions by authors from the 
field of aging studies that approach autonomy. These include the communica-
tive approach advocated by Moody (1992), the phenomenological approach sug-
gested by Agich (1990, 1995, 2003), and the account put forward by Holstein 
and colleagues (Holstein, 2015; Holstein, Parks & Waymack, 2011; Holstein, 
2010a, 2010b) which applies the above discussed relational view of autonomy to 
the context of aging. What all three of them have in common is that they react 
against the neoliberal view of autonomy associated with Western individual-
ization, a view that feeds into contemporary bioethical discourse in the form of 
the equation of autonomy with free choice and informed consent (see §6.2.1). 
The discussed perspectives share a deep concern about the impoverishment 
of contemporary moral discourse and the detrimental influence that this has 
on the lives of older people. As Moody (1992) states, “The irony is that we want 
to uphold autonomy for the elderly at just the time in life when their condi-
tion makes autonomy least attainable and at a time in life when other human 
needs – for care, for respect, for meaning – are more pressing. Yet the poverty 
of our moral discourse is such that we can only offer to those in the last stage 
of life more autonomy” (p. 4).  
6.4.1 Harr y Moody: The communicative approach
In Ethics in an aging society, Moody (1992) suggests replacing the dominant 
bioethical informed-consent approach to autonomy with a communicative ap-
proach. Communicative ethics is based on the influential philosophy of Haber-
mas (1984). His theory of communicative action underscores the importance 
of deriving valid decisions from an un-coerced dialogue between all involved 
agents, which should ideally lead to moral consensus. In Moody’s (1992) inter-
pretation, the communicative ethical approach suggests replacing the notion of 
informed consent by the notion of negotiated consent. Moral decisions are not to 
be made by an insular individual, but negotiated among the social network sur-
rounding the person concerned. Moody argues that this has obvious advantag-
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es over the informed consent approach in the context of aging, especially when 
people have diminished cognitive capacities, for instance, because it involves a 
dialogue about the decisions to be made that can also involve family members 
and caregivers. Such a dialogical approach also provides better opportunities to 
acknowledge the social nature of human personhood discussed in chapter 5. 
An important aspect of communicative ethics is its sensitivity to the struc-
tures of power and influence that characterize the context in which communi-
cation has to take place. Moody particularly observes that, though autonomy as 
informed consent is highly valued in theory, the practice of many care settings 
tends to lead to a structured dependency of older people, thus aggravating their 
existential reality of vulnerability and dependency. For instance, signing a con-
sent form or an advance directive means very little for people’s actual freedom 
of choice in a vulnerable situation, if the whole care setting remains implicitly 
centered around the dominant authority of professionals and their expertise. 
Thus, the traditional autonomy discourse, in Moody’s (1992) view, leaves older 
people with “a new myth promising us a fulfillment that is bound to leave 
us disappointed” (p. 40). Inevitably, Moody’s preference for a communicative 
approach to ethics calls for making concessions to the promise of universally 
applicable rules assumed by bioethics. It emphasizes the fact that moral dilem-
mas in their complexity, often escape the uncluttered framework of clear prin-
ciples suggested by bioethical approaches. However, the focus on communica-
tive principles enlarges the possibility of honoring the different perspectives of 
all those involved in a situation of moral choice. This is a big advantage when 
we want to acknowledge the social embedding and mutual interdependence of 
human beings. 
6.4.2 George Agich: The phenomenological approach
The second selected account from the realm of aging studies is formulated 
by Agich (1990, 1995, 2003) who focuses on autonomy and dependence. He 
acknowledges the political and legal relevance of the neoliberal interpretation 
of autonomy that relates it to freedom of choice, independence and non-interfer-
ence, but questions its applicability in the context of long-term care. Important-
ly, Agich observes that the neoliberal account of autonomy not only dominates 
politics and law, but has developed into a broader cultural ideal. In accordance 
with what was discussed in §2.5.2 and §3.3.4, Agich (2003) notes that the re-
sulting problem in the context of aging is that “the cultural dominance of this 
model of autonomy creates a backlash against dependence of any sort, so that 
the frail and infirm old [...] are especially vulnerable to the pejorative meanings 
associated with dependence. They are seen and frequently see themselves as 
burdensome and less than full persons” (p. 10). As an alternative to the neolib-
eral view, Agich (2003) suggests a phenomenological view in which autonomy 
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involves “a dialectic of independence and dependence that takes place within a 
social space characterized by interdependence” (p. 96). In this view, autonomy 
should be perceived in terms of a lifelong continuous process of development 
without a well-defined end-state. 
Agich (1990, 1995) makes a relevant distinction between “nodal” autonomy, 
pertaining to the capacity for informed, free choice that is the dominant under-
standing in informed consent approaches, and “actual” autonomy, which refers 
to the process of enacting autonomy in everyday life. The latter view of autono-
my seems to be the sort of autonomy that is primarily relevant to the life reality 
of people living in long-term care contexts. Actual autonomy underscores that 
autonomy can never be just about making a free choice between clearly delin-
eated alternatives at a given point in time. Actual autonomy also implicates 
questions of value, relations and meaning that represent a continuous process 
through time which helps constitute who we are. Agich’s notion of actual au-
tonomy is therefore closely related to the conceptualization of narrative and 
moral agency discussed in chapter 5.
In particular, Agich emphasizes that in order to contribute to actual auton-
omy, people should not only be able to choose, but also have options to choose 
from that are meaningful to them in the context of their personal lives, their 
relationships and their values. Most situations in which actual autonomy is 
implicated in a long-term care context may seem highly trivial, because they 
involve matters that most of us see as self-evident, for instance, having the free-
dom to decide what to eat, or having privacy in your own space. However, these 
things are far from obvious in a long-term care setting. In the liberal account, 
giving people more choice about their daily meals may be seen as an increase in 
autonomy. However, the choice between a pork chop, a sausage or clam chow-
der, for example, is hardly a meaningful, freedom-enhancing choice for people 
who have been vegetarians all their lives, or Jewish or Muslim for that matter. 
Another important point made by Agich is that actual autonomy for frail or 
otherwise dependent people can be improved if they are supported by others 
who help them formulate or carry out the choices that are meaningful to them. 
In the conventional view, such help would limit people’s self-dependency and 
thereby restrict their autonomy. However, being reticent about giving such sup-
port in a desire to respect elders’ supposed independence may have the unde-
sired result of compromising people’s actual autonomy. A clarifying distinction 
made by Collopy (1988) in this regard is that between decisional and execution-
al autonomy. Whereas the former represents the freedom of choice cherished 
by the neoliberal view, the latter expresses that one needs to be able to execute 
one’s choices in order to experience actual autonomy. If people’s decisional au-
tonomy is sufficiently intact but frailty impedes their opportunities to exercise 
it, stepping in to support people in their executional autonomy will actually 
enhance their freedom. The bottom line of Agich’s view is that dependence on 
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the support of others to realize actual autonomy need not be compromising 
one’s freedom, as long as it is conceptualized in a way that is different from the 
neoliberal account. Steering between the opposite poles of the neoliberal view 
and its communitarian critics, he proposes a contextual approach to ethics. 
This takes into account the many ways in which individuals are interdepen-
dent, socially embedded and vulnerable, without giving up the idea that their 
individuality, their choices and their aspirations truly matter and have a valid 
claim to being considered in ethical debates. 
In Agich’s phenomenological view, individuals are interdependently con-
nected as social and embodied beings that share a common moral ground. Any 
viable account of autonomy in the context of aging needs to be sensitive to what 
is happening in this shared space. Obviously, this means that the phenomeno-
logical view paints a far more complex picture than the ideal type of autonomy 
in conventional accounts, because it deals directly with the “messy incomplete-
ness and uncertainty” of the reality of everyday living (Agich, 2003, p. 92).
6.4.3 Martha Holstein and colleagues: The relational approach
Holstein and colleagues (Holstein, Parks & Waymack, 2011; Holstein, 2010a, 
2010b, 2015) suggest a perspective that applies the previously discussed rela-
tional view of autonomy to the context of aging (see §6.3.4). They share the 
previously discussed worries about the inapplicability of the neoliberal view 
of autonomy to the life reality of many older people, particularly those living 
in long-term care contexts. Holstein and her colleagues highlight three advan-
tages of a relational approach to autonomy in the context of aging that are of 
particular relevance to this study: 
• First, Holstein emphasizes that the view of the self that underlies the rela-
tional conception of autonomy is much more apt to acknowledge the fact 
that we are fundamentally embodied beings. This also includes the insight 
that reason is not the only relevant human faculty to be taken into account 
when talking about agency and autonomy. Feelings, desires, intuitions and 
imagination also belong to who we are and thus help constitute our agency. 
That we are embodied beings is true for our entire lives, of course; but when 
we get older, we tend to be more and more confronted with gradual bodily 
discomforts that make us acutely aware of how much our selves are inter-
twined with our bodies (Holstein, 1999, 2015; Holstein, Parks & Waymack, 
2011). 
Both the development of our identities and the development of our auton-
omy competency (Meyers, 1989; see §6.3.3) are tied to our bodies. There 
is a mutual process of influence between the external experiences of our 
aging bodies (as informed by cultural decline narratives or age-defying nar-
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ratives, for instance) and the internal development of our autonomy compe-
tency. The relevance of taking embodiment into account when it comes to 
autonomy is further increased by the observation that our society tends to 
approach older people, especially women, predominantly as “older bodies”. 
When older people start acting upon this implicit identification of who they 
are with their bodily appearance, it raises difficult questions regarding their 
autonomy (Holstein, 2015; Tulle, 2004). For example, if an older woman 
feels compelled to dye her graying hair or to stop wearing shorts in the 
summer as a result of the internalized cultural norm of youthfulness, the 
autonomy of this decision might be questioned.            
• Second, Holstein, Parks & Waymack (2011) emphasize that exercising au-
tonomy – even relational autonomy - highly depends on the availability of 
autonomy-enabling societal structural arrangements. However, they are 
highly critical about contemporary social institutions and public policies 
influencing older people’s lives. The way the pension and social security 
systems, or the health care system, are centered around norms of indepen-
dence and individual responsibility excludes many older individuals from 
the realm of autonomous life choices, because their vulnerability precludes 
their living up to these implicit norms. 
As Holstein argues, neoliberal societies tacitly assume that older people 
answer to the typical image of the Kantian rational man. However, this im-
age has been unmasked by the feminist, relational discourse as a harmful 
illusion. This tendency is particularly damaging for older women as well 
as minority groups (Holstein, 2015). As Holstein, Parks & Waymack (2011) 
aptly observe, “it is a long way from the paradigmatic Kantian rational ‘man’ 
to the 88-year-old woman with congestive heart failure, mild cognitive im-
pairment, and osteoporosis” (p. 256). Although this is a noteworthy obser-
vation, it need not mean that the underlying ideal of autonomy ascribed to 
the paradigmatic Kantian man is of less relevance to the frail 88-year old. 
Her situation may even urgently call for the possibility to make choices 
that are well-informed and in continuity with the value orientation that has 
accompanied her identity throughout her life. But Holstein, Parks and Way-
mack are right to suggest that a proper interpretation of autonomy needs to 
transcend the caricature that is often made of the Kantian rational man in 
order to be of value to the context of aging. 
• Third, and related to the previous two points, Holstein, Parks & Waymack 
(2011) emphasize that a viable understanding of autonomy needs to be able 
to recognize people in their diversity and particularity. This implies ac-
knowledging them not only as the vulnerable, interdependent human be-
ings that they are, but also as moral agents with a deep interest in leading a 
meaningful life. Impediments to this social recognition, both on the struc-
tural societal level and on the micro-level of the social networks surround-
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ing the individual, will disregard the fundamental moral value of their life. 
Lack of social recognition will erode people’s sense of identity, and thereby 
their opportunity to exercise autonomy, which is relationally embedded (see 
also §3.2.3).  
It follows that both formal and informal systems of care and support need 
to be sensitized to pay attention to older people’s expressions of individual 
personhood, if autonomy is to be a meaningful category in the context of 
aging. This is particularly true in situations where the capacities usually 
associated with upholding a sense of identity begin to erode, such as in 
the case of dementia. As Holstein, Parks and Waymack (2011) emphasize, 
“Self-conception, identity, and self-esteem are all, to some degree, a social 
project [...] What happens then, as dementia progresses, is that we come to 
depend more and more on others to help maintain our identity” (p. 221). 
In their analyses about the conditions of autonomy in such situations of 
dependency and fragility, Holstein, Parks and Waymack confirm my con-
tention that Lindemann’s (2014) view of identity as a social practice (see 
§5.3.2) is particularly well-suited to be applied in a reframed interpretation 
of self-realization for the context of later life. 
6.5 evAluAtion of the discussed Accounts on Autonomy
In this chapter, I have discussed a variety of conceptualizations of autonomy, 
both as developed in philosophical discourse and as applied in the context of ag-
ing studies. The question remains how these different perspectives should be 
evaluated in light of the search for a conceptualization of autonomy that match-
es the understanding of self-realization developed in this study. Recall that I 
proposed an understanding of the self that is embodied, socially embedded, 
reflexive and narratively creating a sense of continuity, against the background 
of the inescapable temporal horizon of human existence. Moreover, I argued 
for an understanding of identity and agency as fundamentally moral categories. 
This means that our identity presupposes an ethical commitment to certain 
values, aspirations and capacities that express something about who we want to 
be or become, and what we want to remain true to (see chapter 5). A satisfactory 
conceptualization of autonomy should match with these insights on narrative 
identity and moral agency.
The views of autonomy discussed in this chapter can be interpreted as con-
stituting a spectrum ranging from predominantly individualist understandings 
to predominantly anti-individualist understandings. A first and rather obvious 
conclusion we can draw is that the traditional individualist understanding of 
autonomy represented by the structural hierarchical view (see §6.2.2) cannot 
accommodate for most of the insights about narrative identity and moral agency 
Chapter 6 – Autonomy 181
described in chapter 5. The traditional individualist interpretation of autonomy 
fails to acknowledge the social embedding, interdependence and fundamental 
vulnerability of the human condition. It also lacks the life-historical scope that 
is required from a narrative perspective and pays insufficient attention to the 
identity-constituting identification with values. In addition, I share the geron-
tological critiques discussed in §6.4 that traditional individualist accounts of 
autonomy do not match the life reality of most older people.  
Despite these objections, individualist accounts of autonomy should not be 
pushed aside too easily. Their emphasis on the agent as the source of unique-
ly individual desires, aspirations, motivations, capacities and actions remains 
of crucial significance from a self-realization perspective. Yet the problems 
raised by the classical structural hierarchical interpretation need to be solved 
if individualist accounts are to be integrated in this study’s understanding of 
autonomy. The amendments made by C. Taylor (1985a), Ekstrom (1993, 2005) 
and Meyers (1989) to the mainstream interpretation of autonomy are a valuable 
start to enrich the traditional view of autonomy and adapt it to the account of 
self-realization developed here. As we have seen, C. Taylor’s account sensitizes 
our view towards the importance of an identification with strongly held values 
positioning ourselves in relation to a moral horizon of (hyper)goods, for our 
agency and autonomy. Ekstrom adds a focus on the development of our desires 
and preferences over the course of our lives, and acknowledges the importance 
of continuity that we also encountered in chapter 5. She thereby introduces a 
developmental life course perspective to the debate on autonomy that is very 
valuable, both from the perspective of self-realization and from the perspective 
of aging. Meyers, finally, contributes important considerations regarding the 
competencies that we need to practice autonomy in concrete circumstances. 
She also stresses the conditions of development of human moral agents which 
need to be beneficial in order to acquire such competencies. This addition is 
very important for this study’s reframed account of self-realization, which re-
quires sensitivity to the socio-cultural and structural factors that enable or im-
pede people’s striving towards the good life.
When combined, the views of C. Taylor, Ekstrom and Meyers, all situated 
on the individualist end of the spectrum of autonomy views, offer important 
ingredients to repair the discussed shortcomings of the structural hierarchical 
view. The relational view of autonomy, on the other hand, represents a view 
from the anti-individualist end of the spectrum. A distinct advantage of the 
relational view for this study’s purposes is that it shares many assumptions 
with the understanding of self and identity as socially embedded, embodied, 
vulnerable and interdependent. This also explains its obvious appeal for the 
context of aging as we encountered in the discussion of gerontological views. 
Therefore, at first sight, it makes sense to say that the relational view presents 
a candidate conception of autonomy that is less problematic than the individu-
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alist accounts when applied to the context of aging. However, I argue that the 
relational account as it is, needs some amendments to arrive at a satisfactory 
conceptualization of autonomy in the context of self-realization as a resource for 
narratives of becoming about later life. 
First of all, the account of autonomy that I am looking for should somehow 
combine the insights of the relational view about the social embedding of hu-
man beings with the most important benefit of individualist interpretations – 
their focus on the moral status of the agent as a source of uniquely individu-
al desires, aspirations, motivations, capacities and actions. Furthermore, this 
study’s account of autonomy ought to be able to integrate the ethical dimension 
of our personhood, discussed in §5.3.3 and §5.4. It is questionable whether ei-
ther the individualist or the anti-individualist views of autonomy that I have 
so far discussed are sufficiently capable of integrating this ethical dimension. 
What is needed then, is to formulate a conceptualization of autonomy that an-
swers to three conditions: 1) it values the moral status of the agent as a constant-
ly developing individual with uniquely personal aspirations and capacities, 2) it 
acknowledges the relational embedding of these individuals, and 3) it is capable 
of integrating the ethical engagements that are essential for our moral agency 
and thereby for the purpose of our self-realization. 
6.6 conclusion: towArds An individuAting conceP tion 
of Autonomy
Let me call this alternative view an individuating conceptualization of auton-
omy. The term individuating is derived from the term individuation that was 
originally introduced by Jung (1971). Jung describes individuation as a com-
plex psychological process of searching for your true, authentic self, coming to 
terms with the “shadow-sides” of your personality. Individuation, as elaborated 
by Jung, also implies freeing yourself from the pressures of outside conven-
tions, in order to (re)connect with the deeper spiritual values and meanings of 
life. We could say that individuation represents Jung’s perception of self-reali-
zation because it enables people to fulfill their deepest and truest potential for 
selfhood. More broadly speaking, the term individuation could be translated 
as becoming individual. It is mostly in this more general sense that I will apply 
the term when I speak about an individuating conceptualization of autonomy. 
This implies that individuating autonomy is seen as a developmental ideal that 
is part of the broader process of moral self-development. On a side note, it is 
interesting that individuation was understood by Jung (1971) to be a task partic-
ularly associated with the second half of life (see also Atchley, 2009; Hillmann, 
1999). In combination with its linkages with the discourse of self-realization 
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this association has also contributed to my choice for this particular term in the 
search for a satisfactory conceptualization of autonomy.
Though Jung seems to perceive individuation primarily as a process of in-
ner spiritual growth, I stress that individuation as it is implicated in the notion 
of individuating autonomy, is quintessentially a social undertaking. Again, I am 
obliged to the suggestion made by Lindemann (2014) who argues that identity 
should be perceived in terms of a social practice. In order to enable people to 
realize the best within them, they need, in Lindemann’s terminology, to be 
held in their identities by others (see §5.3.2). This position underscores that we 
cannot become who we are solely on our own. 
Being autonomous in the individuating account is not a state people can 
attain once and then claim to possess for the rest of their life. It presupposes 
a continuous process of moral self-development, of attaining and refining an 
attitude towards oneself, others and the world in general that is conducive to 
the realization of a good life (see §5.5). Generally speaking, the individuating 
account of autonomy that I propose is individualist because it cherishes peo-
ple’s maximal freedom to choose and identify with the life plans, purposes and 
aspirations that they regard the most valuable, and in greatest coherence with 
their constantly evolving narrative selves. The individuating account emphasiz-
es that people should be able to stand for what they value in life and act upon 
that orientation, even if it goes against convention or social expectation. At the 
same time, the individuating account is anti-individualist in its recognition that 
beneath people’s autonomous competency to form such life plans, purposes 
and aspirations lies a deeply social interdependence with others. Part of the 
attitude presupposed by the individuating account is a deep awareness and ac-
ceptance of the dimension of existential vulnerability that is characteristic of 
human existence, and an acknowledgment of the fact that this dimension can 
restrict one’s scope of self-determination.  
A further important characteristic of the individuating account of auton-
omy is an openness towards a plurality of value orientations and an acknowl-
edgment of the importance of people’s freedom in this regard. Consequently, 
the individuating account refrains from being prescriptive about which values, 
motivations and aspirations people should choose to strive for. It principally 
values individual differentiation of goods and purposes that may contribute to 
a good life. In this sense, it strives to offer an account of autonomy that is con-
genial to the late modern situation of individualization and moral pluralism. 
But as has been suggested before, there seems to be one important exception to 
this reluctance to prescribe what is good (see §5.5). After all, the individuating 
account of autonomy strongly emphasizes the importance of developing one’s 
moral identity, which is a normative criterion. Despite its appraisal of a plural-
ism of values then, we might say that there is one normative criterion that the 
individuating account of autonomy does think people should adhere to: optimal 
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moral self-development, i.e., striving to lead a good life, with and for others, ac-
cording to one’s deepest aspirations and highest capacities, as full participating 
members of a society/community.
The individuating account of autonomy requires then, that people identify 
with and appropriate a viable value orientation in life that is worthy of guiding 
their actions. What counts as a “worthy” value orientation conducive to such a 
good life is not objectively defined, but it certainly isn’t arbitrary either. What 
does and doesn’t count as worthy is seen as constantly negotiated in intersub-
jective, narrative and dialogical encounters with others about what constitutes 
a good life. These moral encounters are situated against the background of a 
cultural horizon of meaning and values that is created by humans, but tran-
scends the individual preferences of any single individual. Worthy purposes 
can, for example, be freedom, or love, or care, or creativity, or humor, or justice, 
or courage, or soberness. But wriggling one’s toes in the mud does not general-
ly qualify as a purpose worthy of a good life (C. Taylor, 1989).  
In sum, the individuating account of autonomy presupposes that it is cru-
cial that people develop themselves in such a manner that they optimally real-
ize their potential for moral agency as defined in §5.5. This calls for the appro-
priation of an ethical orientation with which they can identify, a translation 
of this orientation into action, and the development of an attitude of practical 
wisdom and loving self-acceptance towards those things in life that we have no 
agential control over. In Ricoeur’s (1992) view, which inspires me here, a viable 
approach should allow us “to reconcile the idea of autonomy with (….) receptive-
ness, passivity, and even powerlessness” (p. 275). 
We might say that when it comes to criteria to define autonomy, the individ-
uating conceptualization is a weak substantive theory. Weak substantive views 
take an intermediate position between purely procedural accounts of autonomy 
on the one hand, and strong substantive accounts on the other hand (Macken-
zie & Stoljar, 2000; J. Taylor, 2005). Let me first clarify this distinction: 
• For procedural accounts, for a decision to qualify as autonomous it suffices 
that one has followed the proper procedures to arrive at it. The substantive 
content of the decision does not matter from the viewpoint of judging its 
autonomy. So, for instance, a terrorist could make an autonomous decision 
to commit a suicide attack in a busy underground station, as long as he has 
reflected on his desire to do so and has made a free choice for this second-or-
der volition to guide his action. His decision is morally censurable, for sure, 
but in the procedural view, it can still be autonomous. 
• Strong substantive accounts, on the other hand, require that people’s ac-
tions can be judged as defensible from the viewpoint of certain objective 
moral frameworks. A strong substantive theory may grant that the crite-
ria suggested by procedural accounts are necessary conditions for autono-
Chapter 6 – Autonomy 185
my, but they do not share the idea that these procedural criteria are also 
sufficient conditions. In addition to answering the procedural criteria for 
autonomy, strong substantive theories state that autonomous decisions 
should also answer to some non-neutral normative condition. This could, 
for instance, be an objective standard of rationality and/or rational criteria 
of right and wrong behavior (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000). Importantly, the 
terrorist attack mentioned above could never qualify as an autonomous act 
in the strong substantive view because it is not rationally and/or morally de-
fensible according to these criteria. In another example discussed by Stoljar 
(2000), a woman’s decision to consciously neglect methods of reliable birth 
control cannot be autonomous when this decision to take a contraceptive 
risk is based on faulty assumptions about the value of women that she has 
internalized from a paternalistic masculine perspective. So for instance, a 
woman can be raised to believe that her value depends on her ability to give 
birth, and that her way to bind a man in a relationship is to get pregnant. 
From this perspective her decision to neglect birth control is in her own 
advantage and rationally defensible. Following the “feminist intuition” that 
Stoljar defends however, the internalized belief is wrong and harmful. Even 
though the woman’s decision to take a contraceptive risk may answer to all 
procedural criteria of reflexive endorsement of a higher-order desire, in Stol-
jar’s strong substantive account this decision nevertheless fails to qualify as 
autonomous. 
Arguments in favor of adding a substantive criterion for autonomy are gen-
erally based on concerns about how our socialization affects our autonomy 
(Benson, 1991; Friedman, 2000; Stoljar, 2000). This is a particularly press-
ing matter from the perspective of relational autonomy that underscores 
the inevitable social embedding of human agents. It necessitates coming 
up with a criterion distinguishing autonomy-enabling relationships and 
forms of socialization, which should be valued, from autonomy-impeding 
relationships and forms of socialization, which deserve rejection.   
• The intermediate position of weak substantive accounts comes down to the 
following. Just like strong substantive theories of autonomy, weak substan-
tive accounts are concerned about possible autonomy-impeding effects of 
certain (not all!) forms of socialization. They equally seek criteria to decide 
whether a decision is based on motivations that flow from an autonomy-im-
peding source (like internalization of false or oppressive views about the 
social group to which one belongs; cf. Lindemann Nelson’s (2001) notion of 
infiltrated consciousness discussed in §3.2.2). However, as Mackenzie and 
Stoljar (2000) observe, “[a weak substantive account] places constraints on 
the desires, preferences, and values that count as autonomous, [but] aban-
dons the content specificity of strong substantive theories” (p. 20). Typical 
of weak substantive criteria of autonomy is that they refer to norms that are 
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based on a healthy psychological relation of moral agents with themselves, 
instead of norms based on objective moral criteria of right and wrong. Ex-
amples of weak subjective conditions for autonomy that have been suggest-
ed include, for instance, self-worth (Benson, 1994), self-respect (Dillon, 
1992) and self-trust (McLeod & Sherwin, 2000).  
Following the categorization discussed above, qualifying my individuating view 
of autonomy as weak substantive means that it aims to set general benchmarks 
to qualitatively judge the genuineness of someone’s (claimed) autonomy that 
are based on its criterion of optimal moral self-development. At the same time, 
contrasting what would be a strong substantive view, the individuating con-
ception allows for maximal individual differentiation regarding one’s choice 
of values, aspirations and capacities. The only restriction would have to be that 
they remain within the limits of conventional morality (i.e., respect the Golden 
Rule) and can intersubjectively be judged to contribute to a good life in the 
broadest sense – what Ricoeur (1992) has called the ethical aim of human life 
(see §5.4). The question remaining then is how the weak substantive criterion 
advanced by the individuating conceptualization of autonomy is best described. 
Recall that at the end of §6.5, I formulated three criteria that a satisfying ac-
count of autonomy in the context of this study should answer to. Regarding the 
first criterion, the acknowledgment of the relational embedding of human be-
ings, we may gratefully integrate the anthropological position of the relational 
view of autonomy discussed in §6.3.4. The second criterion, the valuation of the 
moral status of the agent as a constantly developing individual with uniquely 
personal aspirations and capacities, seems to be well-covered by the amended 
versions of the individualist interpretations of autonomy by C. Taylor, Ekstrom 
and Meyers (§6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.3). What still needs to be added to my view is an 
element capable of accommodating the third criterion, i.e., the integration of 
the ethical engagements that are essential for our moral agency and thereby 
for the purpose of our self-realization. Drawing upon the argument in §5.4 and 
§5.5, let me suggest Ricoeur’s notion of self-constancy as a promising candidate 
for the weak substantive criterion that we are looking for here.  
Self-constancy or identity as selfhood has been formulated in terms of our 
answer to the question who we are or want to become. A viable answer to this 
question presupposes an ethical commitment with the aim of realizing a good 
life with and for others. The notion of self-constancy addresses the ethical di-
mension of our identity which is a crucial addition to the individuating concep-
tion of autonomy in two senses:
• First, it underscores the necessity of living up to the value orientation that is 
essential to who we want to be or become through our choices and actions 
in practice. This ethical commitment is developed and realized through our 
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identification with and appropriation of things we want to be true to, for 
instance, values like love, care, justice or honesty. 
• Second, self-constancy underscores our social embedding by sensitizing 
us to the fact that our commitment to others is an intrinsic part of who 
we are. Thus, self-constancy expresses something about our relationship to 
ourselves as well as our relationship to others. Suggesting self-constancy as 
one of the crucial elements of individuating autonomy implies that being 
autonomous requires the appropriation of an identity-guiding value orien-
tation as well as the ability to engage in moral relationships with others, 
both aspects of realizing our best potential for moral agency.    
These two senses of ethical commitment that are combined in the notion of 
self-constancy guide us in the moral choices we make and provide us with a 
durable and sufficiently coherent sense of identity. They also enable us to relate 
to others in a manner that is helpful to fulfilling the fundamental ethical aim 
of a good life with and for others. In this sense, I would argue that it truly is an 
indispensable substantive criterion for individuating autonomy.  
Self-constancy does not necessarily come easy, however. It can require over-
coming internal and external obstacles to remaining true to who we want to 
be, both in relation to ourselves and in relation to others. Self-constancy as a 
criterion of individuating autonomy calls for the development of certain vir-
tues or attitudes that are indispensable to developing ourselves as autonomous 
agents. Some of these virtues resemble the attitudes that are also often associat-
ed with the condition of autonomy in the more traditional interpretation, such 
as self-reflexivity, integrity, authenticity, self-discipline, moral independence or 
responsibility for self (Feinberg, 1986). In addition, the individuating concep-
tion of autonomy also requires virtues like courage, perseverance, social and 
moral sensitivity, flexibility, self-acceptance and practical wisdom. 
In sum then, people can be seen as autonomous in the individuating ac-
count when they satisfy the following criteria: 
• They appropriate and engage with an authentic value orientation that is able 
to constitute their identity and gives them guidelines about which purposes 
to strive for in life 
• They are able to uphold a satisfactory amount of narrative coherence in their 
set of value preferences and adapt their preferences flexibly and reflexively 
depending on what they encounter in life
• They possess the competencies and virtues that are needed to exercise au-
tonomy in practice, such as self-knowledge, self-discovery, self-determina-
tion, reflexivity, integrity, courage, practical wisdom, et cetera.  
• They are capable of acknowledging the limits of their self-determination 
that flow from the reality of human existential vulnerability, and integrate 
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what escapes their own control in their existence as autonomous moral 
agents
• They answer to the ethical criterion of self-constancy, which enables them 
to stand for their identity-constituting value orientation in concrete prac-
tical circumstances, thereby honoring their ethical commitment both to 
themselves and to others, as well as acknowledging the fundamental inter-
dependence with others that characterizes human lives 
A few important closing remarks are in order regarding these conditions, how-
ever. All these conditions should be understood in terms of a developmental 
process that continues throughout life, not in terms of a normative end-state. In 
order to count as autonomous in the individuating view, it is not necessary to be 
some sort of perfect moral exemplar. Individuating autonomy is certainly not 
intended as an elitist goal. Thus, one need not have a totally comprehensive life 
plan and value orientation, a fully coherent set of preferences, perfectly devel-
oped autonomy competencies and virtues and a spotless ethical commitment 
without ambiguities, to claim autonomy on this account. 
Matching the phenomenological orientation advanced by Agich (1995; 
2003), individuating autonomy should be regarded as a socially embedded 
practice with many imperfections, because it relates to the actual messy daily 
reality of people’s lives. It is therefore something that can never be completely 
or perfectly achieved. In principle, all human beings groping their way towards 
a good life qualify as candidates to claim individuating autonomy. As a process, 
individuating autonomy is always a matter of degree, and its successful exercise 
should be carefully assessed in light of all the relevant aspects of a concrete 
situation. What is crucial however, is that people’s lives express an enduring 
developmental orientation towards a more fulfilled personhood, and an ethical 
engagement with approaching who we want to be, to ourselves and to others. 
Self-constancy requires maintaining a vital involvement with the ethical aim of 
human life, even if this requires struggling with the contingencies and vulner-
abilities intrinsic to our existence. The ancient wisdom that it is the journey, not 
the destination that counts would certainly apply to the case of individuating 
autonomy. Stagnation, isolation, indifference, lack of commitment with one’s 
own good life or that of others, inability to engage with meaningful goals and 
social relationships, and closing oneself off from relevant learning processes, 
all represent conditions that are likely to stymie individuating autonomy. These 
cannot be united with the purpose of developing moral agency that is intrinsic 
to the discourse of self-realization advanced in this study.
Chapter 7 – Authenticity
7.1 introduction
As discussed in §4.3.2, this study considers the philosophical discourse of 
self-realization to be constituted along three quintessential and interwoven 
threads: autonomy, authenticity and virtue. After having explored the autono-
my-thread in chapter 6, sketching its background and suggesting a viable in-
terpretation in light of the intended reframing of the self-realization discourse, 
I continue with the next step in the argument by exploring the authentici-
ty-thread in a similar way. 
This chapter follows broadly the same structure as the previous one. I start 
with a general introduction of the concept of authenticity (§7.2). Next, four rel-
evant perspectives on authenticity from the history of modern philosophy are 
sketched. In §7.3.1, the view of Rousseau and his Romantic followers is dis-
cussed. Rousseau is often seen as the father of the notion of authenticity in 
Western thought. In §7.3.2, I continue with a discussion of what could best 
be called an existentialist view of authenticity. This view was exemplified by 
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard in the 19th century, with Heidegger, Sartre, Camus 
and De Beauvoir as their 20th century heirs. In §7.3.3, C. Taylor’s (1991) more 
recent view of authenticity is discussed, which aims to criticize authenticity’s 
late modern perversions and calls attention to its historical roots as a moral 
ideal. Finally, in §7.3.4 I discuss Meyers’ (2000) view connecting authenticity 
with the intersectionality framework of feminist philosophy. 
Having thus introduced different relevant positions in the authenticity de-
bate, in §7.4 I consider how the theme of authenticity has found its way into 
gerontological thought. Although gerontological authors have been far less ex-
plicitly concerned with authenticity than with autonomy, I suggest three per-
spectives on aging that apply ideas which can be related to the authenticity 
discourse. These include the spiritual perspectives (§7.4.1), the existential per-
spectives (§7.4.2) and the art of living perspectives (§7.4.3). To conclude this 
chapter, in §7.5 I evaluate the different perspectives on authenticity, and suggest 
an interpretation that is able to accommodate my reframing of self-realization 
and its underlying view of moral agency (§7.6).  
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7.2 introducing Authenticit y 
Oscar Wilde made it sound so simple: “Be yourself. Everyone else is already 
taken”. But being (or becoming) yourself raises a number of complex philo-
sophical questions. These questions have been debated for the past centuries 
under the banner of authenticity. In its most general sense, authenticity means 
that something or someone is “faithful to an original” or is “of undisputed 
origin or authorship” (Varga & Guignon, 2014). As one of the threads weaving 
the fabric of self-realization discourse, authenticity conceives the best within us 
that is to be realized in terms of being true to oneself, more particularly to one’s 
most genuine, real or essential self (Guignon, 2004). Alternatively, becoming 
who you (truly) are is also often used as a phrase describing what underlies au-
thenticity. Often, it appears to be difficult to give a direct description of what an 
authentic personality or mode of living amounts to in positive terms. Instead, 
authenticity is conceptualized as a critique against an inauthentic lifestyle that 
is perceived as untruthful and false (Golomb, 1995). In contrast to such an in-
authentic life, authenticity implies originality, truthfulness, creativity and gen-
uineness. It also assumes the development of an attitude towards life that is 
personally appropriated, instead of prescribed by one’s social position, tradition 
or convention. People can be called authentic when they have not only created 
and appropriated their own “style”, but also proudly carry the responsibility for 
it (Dohmen, 2014). In this sense, authenticity closely intersects with/depends 
on autonomy (competence) (Meyers, 1989; see also §6.3.3). 
The formulae “being true to yourself” or “becoming who you truly are” 
seem to carry a commonsensical plausibility for many of us living in an era that 
promotes living a life of one’s own as a moral ideal (see also §2.3.1 and §2.5.1). 
Beyond this commonsensical understanding, however, problems quickly arise 
if we try to fathom what underlies the moral ideal of an authentic life. After all, 
what should be understood as our “true” or “real” self? What is included and 
excluded by such a notion? Where is such a self to be found in the first place? 
Is it an essence to be discovered somewhere, or are we creating it throughout 
our lives? How can others recognize which appearance of our self is authentic 
and which is not? How can we even know ourselves? What if our true self turns 
out to include unpleasant, banal or plain evil characteristics that we don’t want 
to be associated with? And how does such a true self, if it exists, relate to the 
outside social world without losing its “essential” quality? What does it mean 
to be “truthful”, and how does this relate to different interpretations of “truth”? 
In short, the ideal of authenticity, on closer look, represents a very problematic 
discourse, and it may rightly be questioned whether it doesn’t raise more prob-
lems than it solves (Guignon, 2004).
Several authors connect the rise of authenticity as a moral ideal with mo-
dernity and its characteristic “disenchantment” (C. Taylor, 1991; Ferrara, 1993, 
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1998; see also §2.3.6). The decline of traditional sources of meaning and moral-
ity that are associated with this disenchantment, has left a void that authenticity 
is expected to fill. Although the modern interpretation of authenticity has often 
been criticized by neo-conservative thinkers as a purely aesthetic, narcissistic 
ideal, Ferrara (1993) argues that these critiques misconstrue the meaning of 
authenticity. He thinks that authenticity should instead be perceived as a moral 
ideal that offers a new reflexive value base for modern lives. During its rise as 
a characteristic modern moral ideal, authenticity also seems to have acquired 
a very specific meaning. To clarify the distinctive features of contemporary au-
thenticity discourse, it is helpful to look at Trilling’s (1971) distinction between 
sincerity as a typical early modern notion and authenticity as a typical late mod-
ern notion. Both sincerity and authenticity are concepts that touch upon the 
necessity of being true to oneself. But importantly, in the case of sincerity this 
is not perceived as an end in itself, but as a means to enable one’s reliability 
towards others. One cannot be true to one’s commitments to others without 
being true to oneself, i.e., without answering to the social expectation of being 
sincere. The evolution of the idea of being true to oneself in the modern under-
standing of authenticity, however, elevates it to an end in itself. It is no longer 
a necessary condition for one’s social functioning, but something to strive for 
independently, for its own sake. Personal authenticity thereby gains the status 
of a moral character ideal. From a social virtue in the case of sincerity, being 
true to oneself becomes a personal virtue in the case of authenticity. 
Even if one agrees on the status of authenticity as a personal virtue, many 
different interpretations remain possible. Ferrara (1998) has made some in-
teresting distinctions that may help to categorize different interpretations of 
authenticity. 
• First, he distinguishes between substantialist and intersubjective conceptions 
of authenticity, which depart from contrasting underlying concepts of the 
self. The substantialist perspectives of authenticity regard the self to pos-
sess an essential core which should ideally find expression in one’s actions 
and interactions with other agents. Social institutions and social roles are 
perceived as forces that make us betray our essential core self, by having 
us adapt to the expectations and conventions belonging to these roles and 
institutions. The intersubjective conceptions of authenticity, on the other 
hand, stress that our identity should not be perceived in terms of an essen-
tial core self, but instead as a social practice which depends on different 
forms of recognition and dialogical, reflexive deliberation. 
• Second, Ferrara distinguishes between antagonistic and integrative concep-
tions of authenticity. The antagonistic conception associates authenticity 
with breaking loose from restrictive and inauthenticating social expecta-
tions and conventions. The integrative conception stresses that social roles 
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and institutions are not necessarily restrictive but are also needed, since 
they provide the building blocks for developing an authentic identity in the 
first place.
• Third, Ferrara introduces an opposition between a centered and a decentered 
perspective on authenticity. The former assumes that it is necessary to be 
able to express one’s life in a coherent life narrative, with a hierarchical 
order of importance between the core storyline and more peripheral events 
and experiences. According to the centered conception, one’s authenticity 
depends on the ability to constitute one’s self along the lines of a unique life 
project guiding one’s choices and actions. The decentered conception, on 
the other hand, assumes that any attempt to arrive at such a unifying nar-
rative is in fact an instance of inauthenticity, because it means subjecting 
one’s life to an external artificial ordering principle. 
• Fourth, Ferrara distinguishes two different ways in which the notion of 
authenticity has been applied in political discourse. On the one hand, there 
is a nationalist perspective, which builds upon the Romantic, expressivist 
emphasis on the importance of a shared culture, history, language and tra-
dition. On the other hand, post-modern thinkers draw upon a radical notion 
of authenticity to emphasize the importance of recognizing difference. Fer-
rara himself prefers an intermediate account of personal authenticity in re-
flective terms, emphasizing the way the individual negotiates its difference 
from others relative to the common and universal aspects of being human 
that are shared with others. 
As is explained in §7.5, when examined using Ferrara’s typology, the account 
of authenticity advanced in this study is both intersubjective and reflective, but 
takes an intermediate stand between antagonistic and integrative, as well as 
between centered and decentered views of authenticity. 
Given the emphasis on being true to yourself, an authentic life is inextricably 
connected to an authentic personality. Ferrara (1998) discusses the features 
of such a personality. He derives these from a rich variety of psychoanalytical 
authors, who may have different ideas about decisive factors influencing pro-
cesses of human development, but share some fundamental ideas that point 
towards four general characteristics of an authentic or fulfilled personality. 
These are: coherence, vitality, depth and maturity. 
• Coherence stresses the importance of being able to understand the changes 
and transformations undergone in the course of one’s life in terms of a 
more or less cohesive, continuous and demarcated life narrative. It stands 
opposed to fragmentation, discontinuity and indistinctness. Although we 
have already encountered the problems associated with some versions of the 
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claim to coherence or narrative integration in §5.2.3, it is noteworthy that for 
authenticity, as well, some amount of coherence is indispensable. 
• Vitality is described by Ferrara (1998) as the experiential counterpart of au-
thentic self-realization, and defined as “the experience of joyful empower-
ment which results from the fulfillment of one’s central needs, from a sense 
of the congruence of one’s present state with the memory of who one has 
been, and from the sense of progressing toward becoming who one wants 
to be” (p. 87). Vitality presupposes a genuine involvement and engagement 
with life, and is opposed to an attitude of apathy and withdrawal.
• Depth refers to a person’s capacity to fathom, at least to some extent, one’s 
own psychic dynamism in a way that is sufficiently reflexive. That is, depth 
presupposes the ability to put the self-insight one gains to use in the contin-
uous constitution of one’s identity. The quality of depth, though indispens-
able for an authentic individual, is always a matter of degree, since obviously 
full transparency to oneself is not within the reach of most people. 
• Maturity, the final characteristic of an authentic person, describes the qual-
ity of being able and willing to come to terms with the natural and social 
reality as it is. This is achieved in full awareness of the limitations of one’s 
own control but without thereby disregarding one’s own potentials to act 
upon oneself and transform unfavorable circumstances to some extent. 
Maturity presupposes a realistic sense of one’s own strengths and limita-
tions, a flexibility towards contingencies and a healthy sense of self-worth. 
Another term that is sometimes used to describe what is manifested here 
is wisdom. 
To conclude this introductory section, it can be observed that generally speak-
ing, two related issues stand out that continue to plague the authenticity debate: 
• True self: The first set of problems that keeps returning, addresses the issue 
of how the “true” self should be conceptualized. Many interpretations of 
authenticity presuppose an essentialist view of the self, in which the true 
identity of the individual is opposed to the inauthenticity of social self-pre-
sentations. This is at odds with the idea that the self is socially constitut-
ed. In addition, the anthropocentric perspective that typically characterizes 
contemporary authenticity discourse tends to present the self as separate, 
self-sufficient and self-reliant (Guignon, 2004). However, as I have noted 
before (see §4.2.2 and §5.3.2), such an understanding of the self has been 
criticized as profoundly problematic, which has implications for this study’s 
perspective on authenticity. 
• Social influence: The second set of problems is related to the concern that 
the authenticity discourse is unable to address people’s fundamentally so-
cial nature and their need for belonging in a satisfactory way (Larmore, 
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1996). Critiques have been voiced underscoring that we cannot disregard 
the social dimension in this manner. It is possible to conceive of authen-
ticity in another manner, however. In fact, some interpretations stress that 
authenticity in fact relies on our embedding in social practices, because it 
is this social embedding that enables us to articulate and practice our iden-
tity-guiding value orientation in the first place.  As Williams (2002) aptly 
formulates this insight, “We need each other in order to be anybody” (p. 
200); and “being anybody”, of course, is conditional to the authenticity ideal 
of being true to yourself.  
The view of authenticity defended in this chapter agrees with authenticity 
thinkers who contend that neither set of problems needs to be insurmountable, 
but that authenticity needs to be carefully reformulated to accommodate the 
issues that are raised by each set (e.g., C. Taylor, 1991; Ferrara, 1998). However, 
before I can formulate a version of authenticity that matches this study’s con-
ceptualization of self-realization, we should first gain more clarity about what 
authenticity stands for as a moral ideal and discuss its origins.  
7.3 selected PhilosoPhicAl Accounts of Authenticit y
7.3.1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his Romantic heirs
Rousseau (1754/1984,1782/1996, 1762/2003) is often seen as the originator of 
the modern discourse on authenticity in the Western world. Although he does 
not use the term authenticity himself, many of the guiding ideas underlying 
this notion are present in his work (Guignon, 2004). Even though Rousseau’s 
social and political thought seems rather anachronistic to the late modern 
mind, in particular due to his boundless faith in restoring the “natural” state of 
goodness of human beings by excluding social and societal influences, Ferrara 
(1993, 1998) argues that Rousseau’s philosophy still carries high relevance for 
contemporary life. Rousseau’s philosophy teaches us that personal authentici-
ty, especially in the reflexive interpretation that Ferrara advances, deserves an 
equal status in contemporary moral debates, besides more commonly used no-
tions such as freedom, justice and equality. Rousseau’s position on authenticity 
rests on a distinction between the natural state of man and its socialized ver-
sion. While the natural state is perceived as inherently good, the socialized state 
is seen as the cause of most human, societal and moral problems. Instead of 
following the traditional Christian doctrine of original sin, Rousseau attribut-
ed any moral depravation of man to the influences of society. Due to the rise 
of a social order revolving around artificial and misguided sources of identity 
such as possession, competition and power inequalities, Rousseau (1754/1984) 
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believed that as a result of this “social man lives always outside himself; he 
knows how to live only in the opinion of others” (p. 136). Thus, socialization re-
sults in inauthenticity, an irreparable corruption of man’s natural authenticity. 
Moreover, this inauthenticity seems to coincide with heteronomy and a lack of 
free agency, because the opinions of others instead of our own convictions and 
inclinations steer our behavior. 
The natural state of man, on the other hand, is pure and true and innocent, 
and lies at the foundation of the human potential for free agency. This state 
is often compared with the being of a child, who has not yet undergone the 
social influences that make many adults so artificial and inauthentic in Rous-
seau’s eyes. He recommended turning inward and (re)gaining contact with the 
inner “voice of nature” (as cited in C. Taylor 1989, p. 357). However, although 
Rousseau claimed to present his own true and authentic self in the Confessions 
(1782/1996), he ran into problems almost immediately, because he noticed that 
his memory was flawed, his judgment clouded, and his self-insight and means 
of articulation only limited. Thus, even the father of modern authenticity dis-
course confronted a problem with the “truthfulness” of his self-account (Wil-
liams, 2002), which ultimately renders his view self-effacing. Nevertheless, 
Rousseau’s account of authenticity as the only reliable road of access to the mor-
al good, and thereby the condition for autonomy and freedom, has been highly 
influential in our modern self-understanding. 
The realization of a flourishing, authentic life by human beings requires 
a special type of education, which Rousseau describes in his famous treatise 
Emile ou l’éducation (1762/2003). The educator is supposed to let pupils discover 
their own natural potential of knowledge, morality and character, undisturbed 
by any direct disciplinary influence of teachers or other adults. If given the 
chance to flourish properly, the natural state of man supposedly guarantees a 
healthy human moral agency in which self-love and concern for others, the two 
basic tendencies of human nature for Rousseau , are perfectly balanced. 
As C. Taylor (1989) argues, Rousseau’s work can be placed in the broader 
evolution of the crucial modern idea that our inner realm is a source of mean-
ing, identity and morality. Following one’s feelings was regarded as a more 
reliable road of access to the good than cognitive reflection, although Rousseau 
did not reject the value of reason (Guignon, 2004). C. Taylor (1989) notes that 
Hume, as well as moral sense philosophers like Shaftesbury and Hutcheson 
had already introduced the importance of feelings in moral philosophical de-
bates in the 18th century. But C. Taylor claims that Rousseau’s views potentially 
go further than those of the earlier moral sense philosophers like Shaftesbury 
and Hutcheson. While these thinkers also believed our feelings enabled us to 
come into contact with the good, they still regarded this good as something 
universal and God-given. Rousseau, by contrast, provided the basis for the later 
Romantic view that the inner voice of our nature, our conscience, defines what 
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is good. This transforms our inner nature to the principal moral source to draw 
on. This move enabled the rise of a new “ethic of nature” in the 19th century, 
exemplified in Romantic expressivism (C. Taylor, 1989, p. 362). It is important 
to note, however, that Rousseau’s Romantic heirs did not necessarily share his 
optimistic estimation of the natural goodness of humans and their feelings. 
Romantic thinkers such as Herder, Schelling or Novalis, who advanced this ex-
pressivist position, are much indebted to Rousseau. Their claim is that shaping 
one’s life and identity in an authentic way can be compared to the way an artist 
creates a work of art. A crucial addition of the Romantic expressivists to the ear-
lier views drawing on moral sentiment is that they assume that the realization 
of the natural good, to which we gain access through our inner realm, takes 
place through expression of ourselves. This expression implies an articulation 
in a certain medium, making feelings or thoughts manifest. However, in addi-
tion to this, the expression is also a way of creating something new, of bringing 
something to be that did not exist previously. This combination of expression 
and creation is the crucial contribution of the Romantic expressivist account of 
authenticity to the self-realization discourse. 
The comparison of life with a work of art suggests that the chosen medium 
of expression is not solely instrumental to the work of art, or to the way of life, 
but that “being in the medium they are is integral to them” (C. Taylor, 1989, p. 
374). By emphasizing that it is up to each individual to choose their own medi-
um of expression, expressivism also adds the idea of originality: what it implies 
to be faithful to who you really are cannot be reached by following the model of 
someone else. In the end, for Rousseau and his heirs the ultimate purpose of 
self-realization is to arrive at a point of self-revelation (through self-reflection 
or through artistic expression). The self-revelation thus acquired has an almost 
spiritual meaning, because it involves recovering a sense of wholeness that was 
lost before, or creating it all anew. The true self is not perceived as a static entity 
to be discovered by rational reflection or scientific method, but is associated 
with a continuous search to unveil or create one’s original, authentic self, there-
by transcending base and inauthentic versions of oneself that result from the 
corrupting, heteronomous influence of others (Guignon, 2004). As the start-
ing point in this study’s exploration of authenticity, the account of Rousseau 
and his Romantic heirs illustrates both sets of problems associated with the 
authenticity discourse in general (see §7.2): the problem of the true self, and the 
problem of social influence. In the next section, I will explore how existentialist 
thinkers offer an alternative account of authenticity, which in particular chal-
lenges the essentialist view of the person. 
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7.3.2 E xistentialist views of authenticit y
The existentialist “pathos” of authenticity (Golomb, 1995) cannot be proper-
ly understood without taking into account the historical situation in which it 
arose. Typical of the late 19th century was the growing suspicion towards the 
optimistic promises of Enlightenment thinkers regarding the moral and sci-
entific progress of mankind. Moreover, traditional sources of moral and spir-
itual authority were increasingly perceived as being unable to meet the need 
for guidance and meaning. Nietzsche’s  famous proclamation of the “Death of 
God” was the incisive distillation of a growing sense that no reliable source of 
morality existed in the outside world (The gay science, KGW III, 3, 125). Instead, 
it was up to the individual to provide life with coherence and meaning – man 
himself was the only remaining authority that could be acknowledged in the 
“disenchanted” modern world. Note that in general the existentialist thinkers – 
in particular Nietzsche and Kierkegaard in the 19th century; Heidegger, Sartre, 
De Beauvoir and Camus in the 20th century – did not regard this process of 
developing ownership of oneself and realization of one’s human freedom as an 
easy task. Instead, human agents were perceived as condemned to freedom, 
and the only viable way to address this human fate was by trying to live as au-
thentically as possible. 
One of the main targets of the existentialist position on authenticity was the 
assumption, still present in Rousseau’s work, that there is such a thing as an 
essential self, a clear, unambiguous inner core that speaks to us and guides us 
towards truth, meaning and value. In fact, existentialism challenges the whole 
idea of an “objective” truth, which seems to be presupposed by the essentialist 
conception of the self. According to Golomb (1995), “the heart of the existential-
ist revolution” consists in “the eclipse of ‘truth’ by ‘truthfulness’, the transition 
from objective sincerity to personal authenticity” (p. 8). Despite this difference, 
the existentialist position shares with Rousseau and his Romantic heirs the 
suspicion towards social convention, which is perceived to lead to self-alien-
ation and an inauthentic way of living. Realizing one’s human potential for 
freedom requires transcending the restrictions of existing moralities and find-
ing one’s own unique path to self-realization. Thus, Golomb (1995) states that 
“authenticity is not a ‘moral authority’, for it is contrary to the nature of authen-
ticity to tell others what to do. [...] it is the mastery of one who freely creates the 
pathos of authenticity and strives to express and live it in the everyday” (p. 10). 
Below, I explore a selection of 19th and 20th century existentialist views. 
Each of these adds its own emphasis, and contributes its own perspective to the 
authenticity discourse. The selection of thinkers to be discussed opens with 
the two main 19th century thinkers who addressed authenticity: Kierkegaard 
and Nietzsche. Of the 20th century thinkers, I focus mainly on Heidegger’s 
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perspective. His view has particular relevance in the context of aging, given his 
emphasis on the relations between being and time (Baars, 2012a). 
Søren Kierkegaard – Fateful choice
In Kierkegaard’s (1843/1959) view, the quest for authenticity begins with a mo-
ment of existential crisis, particularly a crisis involving a struggle with forces 
pulling us towards an inauthentic lifestyle. Such struggles make us question 
ourselves and reflect on who we “really” want to be or become. This represents 
an often painful process. We become acutely aware of the danger of self-be-
trayal if we lack the strength to choose an authentic life and instead submerge 
into an inauthentic limbo. For example, in Either/Or, Kierkegaard (1843/1959) 
focuses on the fateful moment of choice between an inauthentic or aesthetic 
lifestyle and an authentic lifestyle (the ethical and ultimately religious lifestyle 
that he advocates). 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy is exemplary for the quintessential importance of 
choice, which is characteristic of existentialist philosophy in general. This is 
not just any choice, however; the choice at stake here is an identity-constituting 
choice: who, out of all the possible selves I could become, do I truly choose to 
be? Lacking the courage to choose, the young protagonist of Either/Or is con-
demned to a continuous hectic bustle, looking for new experiences to satisfy 
his hedonic needs, but never finding true fulfillment. His lifestyle is qualified 
as “aesthetic”. This is an existence full of unrest and the threat of dissatisfac-
tion. In stark contrast, his fatherly friend Judge Wilhelm has chosen the “eth-
ical life” of fulfilling his moral duties in the context of work, marriage and 
family life. However bourgeois this existence may sound, Wilhelm insists that 
his own choice for this specific life as his fulfillment makes it superior to the 
directionless wandering of his young protégé. Judge Wilhelm knows who he is 
and wants to be, and his life is organized accordingly. 
Ultimately, however, Kierkegaard argues that the highest and most authen-
tic lifestyle should transcend even this ethical mode of being. His ideal of au-
thenticity eventually requires the self-transcendence of a religious conversion, a 
paradoxical risking of oneself in order to become oneself most fully. Eventually, 
for Kierkegaard authenticity assumes a leap into an unknown void, without the 
certainty of being captured or the guarantee of redemption. Freedom is about 
the courage to take that existential leap without knowing what to expect. This 
implies an acute confrontation with the uncontrollable, the dimension of exis-
tential vulnerability of human life that has been discussed earlier (see §2.4.6). 
The existentialist view of authenticity thereby introduces an element that is 
highly relevant for this study’s purposes. Emphasizing the dimension of exis-
tential vulnerability as a crucial element of authenticity, suggests that finding 
a satisfactory attitude towards this dimension can paradoxically be an intrinsic 
part of self-realization. 
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Friedrich Nietzsche – Becoming who you are
Nietzsche’s view of authenticity can best be exemplified in the expression be-
coming who or what you are. This paradoxical phrase can be found at several 
points in Nietzsche’s work (for instance in Schopenhauer as educator (Unfash-
ionable observations 3), KGW I, 2, 1; The gay science, KGW III, 3, 270, 335; and 
Thus spoke Zarathustra, KGW IV, 1). As Golomb (1995) emphasizes, according 
to Nietzsche, “To become ‘what we are’ is not to live according to our so-called 
‘innate nature’, but to create ourselves freely. To that end we have to know our-
selves to distinguish what we can change in ourselves and in the external cir-
cumstances that have shaped us; we must realize what we have to accept as in-
evitable, and must do so in the heroic manner of amor fati (love of fate)” (p. 69). 
For Nietzsche, the heroism of authenticity lies in the effort to surmount our-
selves, to become masters of our lives. We have to conquer many inclinations in 
ourselves that make us slaves: narrow-minded creatures full of “ressentiment” 
towards those that dominate us. We need the courage to follow the will to power 
that drives us to reign, to strive for domination of weaker souls, as Nietzsche 
has Zarathustra describe (Thus spoke Zarathustra, KGW IV). Ultimately, it is up 
to us, and only us, how we live our lives in a way that satisfies us. Inauthenticity 
lures us into succumbing to the temptation of following false authorities. As 
Nietzsche forcefully states in Schopenhauer as educator: “No one can build for 
you the bridge upon which you alone must cross the stream of life, no one but 
you alone. To be sure, there are countless paths and bridges and demigods that 
want to carry you through this stream, but only at the price of your self; you 
would pawn and lose your self. There is one single path in this world on which 
no one but you can travel. Where does it lead? Do not ask, just take it” (Schopen-
hauer as educator (Unfashionable observations 3), KGW I, 2, 1).  
In the preface to Human, all too human (KGW II, 1), Nietzsche  sketches a 
detailed process of several stages in which one may develop what he calls the 
“great health”: a state of authentic freedom and self-mastery. This process of 
freeing one’s spirit can be read as Nietzsche’s description of self-realization. At 
the outset, one’s spirit is still firmly bound, by duties, by one’s social position 
and by convention. However, such a bounded soul may suddenly experience a 
desire to free himself, and feel the urge to go away on a journey to an unknown 
destination. In the next stage, this soul starts to revolt. He rejects everything 
familiar, all bonds, values and duties that previously decided his life. This re-
volting is compared to a disease by Nietzsche, but it is a necessary disease, since 
it provides the basis for the person to free his will, to start defining his own 
values as a self-determining agent. Inevitably, this process of freeing oneself 
results in temporary loneliness and withdrawal from the world. But this loneli-
ness and struggle is conditional for the eventual great health, the ripe freedom 
of the spirit that for Nietzsche constitutes the purpose of authentic self-reali-
zation. Through a stage of gradual return to life, the stage of great health is 
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eventually acquired. However, reaching this final stage may require years of 
wandering and healing, and only few people manage to attain the ultimate free 
and authentic life. 
Nehamas (1985) notes that according to Nietzsche, our selves should not be 
interpreted as stable entities. Instead, they are in a continuous process of change 
and development. Nietzsche (as cited in Nehamas, 1985) does not assume the 
existence of one essential or core self, ready to be authentically expressed. In-
stead, his view presupposes a multiplicity of selves, in which different selves 
may occupy the dominant position governing our choices and actions, depend-
ing on the situation. This position makes the expression becoming who/what 
you are even more problematic and paradoxical, for “if there is no such thing as 
the self, there seems to be nothing that one can in any way become” (Nehamas, 
1985, p. 172). It also raises the seemingly unsolvable question which of these 
selves is “in charge” when it comes to self-realization. Nevertheless, Nietzsche 
insists that it is possible and indeed desirable to shape the contingent variety 
of actual and possible selves into a coherent identity that can be qualified as 
expressing authenticity, a process he describes as giving style to our character. 
Giving style implies imprinting our personal stamp on the contingent and cha-
otic bundle of character features, thoughts, feelings and experiences making 
up our lives. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche urges his readers as follows: “One 
thing is needful. – To ‘give style’ to one’s character – a great and rare art! It is 
practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature 
and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art 
and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye. [...] In the end, when the work 
is finished, it becomes evident how the constraints of a single taste governed 
and formed everything large and small. Whether this taste was good or bad is 
less important than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste!” (KGW III, 
3, 290) . 
Nietzsche is well aware that giving our character style and living authenti-
cally is by no means easy. As a result, in his philosophy “authenticity is a kind of 
regulative and corrective ideal rather than a manifestly viable norm” (Golomb, 
1995, p. 81). As a regulative moral ideal, becoming who we are is a process with-
out an end. As long as we live we will always encounter new situations that ne-
cessitate revisiting our image of ourselves and possibly adjusting our strivings. 
What is of crucial importance, however, is that we learn to accept responsibility 
for all that we have become as a result of the mixture of choices, actions and 
contingent events that constitute our lives. This expresses Nietzsche’s famous 
doctrine of “eternal recurrence” and life-affirmation, which Nehamas (1985) 
summarizes as follows: “To become what one is, we can see, is not to reach a 
specific new state and to stop becoming [...] It is to identify oneself with all of 
one’s actions, to see that everything one does (what one becomes) is what one 
is. In the ideal case it is also to fit all this into a coherent whole and to want to be 
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everything that one is” (p. 191; emphasis added). As with Kierkegaard, this view 
adds a welcome element to my reflection on self-realization, since it assumes 
that aspects of purposive choice connect with aspects of contingency in the life 
reality. It is crucial that we appropriate both in order to optimally realize our 
potential for moral agency. 
Although some Nietzsche-interpreters qualify his view as aesthetic, it is 
important to note that authenticity has a strong moral importance for him. 
The way in which Nietzsche’s views could be called aesthetic can in no way be 
compared with the meaning of that term in the philosophy of Kierkegaard, for 
instance. The way of life that expresses a unique and authentic individual style 
is promoted by Nietzsche not for its aesthetic value, but because he strongly be-
lieves that it constitutes a better life, more worthy of the best human potential. 
Although Nehamas (1985) is right to observe that a “stylish life” in Nietzsche’s 
sense need not accord with what is promoted by existing moralities and may 
even contradict their rules and restrictions, it does not negate the moral signif-
icance of this ideal from Nietzsche’s perspective.  
Martin Heidegger – Being-onto-death
Heidegger’s account of authenticity is located in the context of his sophisti-
cated philosophical analysis of the ontological conditions of being, which he 
elaborates in his magnum opus Being and Time (Heidegger, 1927/1996). He 
frequently uses the word authentic (eigentlich) throughout his work. For Heid-
egger, there is a fundamental relation between authenticity and death. Hu-
mans are essentially creatures with an awareness of their own finitude; Dasein 
(Heidegger’s term for human being or individuality that is difficult to translate) 
represents “being-onto-death” (Carman, 2005). It is by virtue of the awareness 
that we cannot escape our own death, and cannot “objectify” it as we can do 
with the death of others, that we become fundamentally aware of our existential 
vulnerability. The awareness of the finitude of one’s being provokes a profound 
existential anxiety which one is inclined to flee from. The typical mode of es-
cape is to merge into the anonymous, impersonal sphere of social convention, 
or what Heidegger terms the “They” (das “Man”). The result of this immersion 
is inauthenticity and self-loss, the inability to live up to our responsibility for 
our own being in the face of death. 
By contrast, authentic being for Heidegger implies the courage to face this 
inescapable human condition. Only in the face of our own death can we investi-
gate what it means to be. As Golomb (1995) puts it, “If authenticity is the sense 
of one’s Being, in death one reaches the culmination of one’s potential for au-
thentic Being [...] Death enters life to conclude it, making possible its adequate 
explication. Each time we entertain the possibility of dying we undertake an 
assessment of our Being. In our anticipation we define our existence” (p. 106-
107). It is through this process of self-definition and gaining understanding 
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about the ontological conditions of being in time that we acquire the ability to 
fully accept our responsibility for ourselves, i.e., attain authenticity. By associat-
ing authenticity with one’s relation to one’s own finitude, Dasein as being-on-
to-death, Heidegger fails to satisfactorily acknowledge that it can also be a social 
mode of being. Although other people certainly play a role in his view, they are 
mainly introduced as part of the inauthenticating “They”. This stands for slav-
ishly subjecting oneself to conventions instead of authentically appropriating 
one’s own life in the face of one’s temporal and limited human condition. 
A characteristic of Heidegger’s account of authenticity particularly relevant 
in the context of aging is its emphasis on the temporal dimension of human 
existence (Baars, 2012b). Authenticity is a continuous struggle to create and 
secure a sense of “own-ness” by countering the threat of alienation induced by 
existential anxiety. This struggle is a process that inevitably takes place in time. 
It requires appropriating one’s past history, embracing one’s present self, and 
carrying one’s potential for authentic being into the future. If there are aspects 
of our past that we feel alienated from, that are shameful or that we would 
rather repress, this threatens our authentic being in the present as well as its 
realization in envisioned possibilities for the future. 
Ultimately, it is the future that counts in Heidegger’s account of authentic-
ity, the realm of unrealized but aspired possibilities for more authentic self-
hood. This can be compared to the discussion of Nietzsche’s notion of becom-
ing who you are, that also stresses the importance of realizing the potentiality 
for greater health that is intuitively sensed but not yet actualized. As Golomb 
(1995) puts it, “Authenticity reigns in the realm of possibilities not yet realized. 
The roots of authentic Being are in the future, because possibilities are never 
in the actual present. In other words, to Be is to be in time and history; it is to 
comport one’s self to one’s own Being in a time-consuming process of realizing 
one’s potential for authenticity” (p. 118).
We may conclude that the existentialist position offers an account of au-
thenticity that enables us to oppose the problematic essentialist assumptions 
about the authentic true self that plagued the views of Rousseau and his Ro-
mantic heirs. In this sense, the existentialist interpretation helps us to arrive at 
an interpretation of authenticity that is more in sync with the view of the self as 
constituted in narrative and social dynamic processes. However, with regard to 
the second set of problems haunting the authenticity discourse, which relates 
to the role of social influences, the existentialist account fails to offer a viable 
solution. The influence of others is still mainly presented as a source of inau-
thenticity that needs to be overcome. In the next section, I explore whether C. 
Taylor’s (1991) interpretation of authenticity is able to address the issue of social 
influence in a more satisfactory manner for the purposes of this study.
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7.3.3 Charles Taylor’s ethics of authenticit y
Of the contemporary thinkers on authenticity, C. Taylor (1991) is no doubt 
one of the most influential, erudite and nuanced voices in the choir. C. Tay-
lor acknowledges the moral value of the authentic mode of living according 
to one’s own value orientation. He pleads for an interpretation of authenticity 
that acknowledges our dependence on an intersubjectively constituted horizon 
of social and cultural sources of meaning. Importantly, he argues that contem-
porary appearances of the culture of authenticity that are criticized for their 
egocentrism and narcissism are themselves at odds with the original meaning 
of authenticity as a moral ideal. In Ethics of authenticity C. Taylor (1991) starts by 
analyzing three “malaises” that haunt modernity: 
1. The first malaise pertains to the worrisome effects of individualism. While 
individualism has enabled many of the great accomplishments of moderni-
ty, liberating people from the burdens of a life defined by the restrictions 
of traditions and community, C. Taylor argues that it has also resulted in a 
loss of self-evident access to shared sources of identity, meaning and mo-
rality. Individualism has created an ethics of self-realization that perceives 
individuals as atomistic, narcissistic and self-directed creatures, destined to 
create their own meaning in a context of value pluralism. 
2. The second malaise of modernity is described as the “primacy of instru-
mental reason” (C. Taylor, 1991, p. 5). This primacy implies that everything 
tends to be calculated in economic terms like efficiency, cost-benefit ratio or 
maximization of gain. The problem C. Taylor discusses is that the typical 
logic of instrumental reason does not remain restricted to the economic do-
main, but also pervades other areas of human life, including politics, health 
care, social science and human relationships. The primacy of instrumental 
reason results in a problematic neglect of the value dimension intrinsic to 
these domains. 
3. The third malaise of modernity discusses the implications of the first two 
malaises in the political domain, where it leads to a lack of engagement 
and a diminishing freedom. C. Taylor argues that the excesses of individu-
alism and the primacy of instrumental reason have eroded people’s sense 
of engagement with an individual-transcending whole. As a result, their 
political activity, their willingness to participate in the governing processes 
necessary for a healthy, resilient democratic society, is diminished. People 
become absorbed in their private lives, where it becomes increasingly diffi-
cult to feel connected to larger frameworks providing meaning. This devel-
opment leads to a sense of moral uneasiness, and a loss of positive freedom.
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C. Taylor (1991) notes how influential neo-conservative thinkers like Lasch 
(1979), Sennett (1992) and Bellah et al. (1996) have deplored these malaises of 
modernity. They blame the typical modern culture of authenticity, which they 
regard as narcissistic and self-contained, for ruining communal engagement 
and moral values. C. Taylor shares their concerns, but he still maintains that 
we should acknowledge the ethical force that hides behind the contemporary 
authenticity culture. Instead of pleading to abnegate the ideal of authenticity, 
we should return to its sources and restore its original moral force. In fact, 
C. Taylor argues that authenticity is actually “unrepudiable by moderns” (C. 
Taylor, 1991, p. 23). Importantly, C. Taylor’s position seems to be that nothing 
in the idea of authenticity as such necessitates its modern degeneration. On 
the contrary, he argues that the genealogy of our modern self-understanding 
shows authenticity to be a powerful source of identity, morality and meaning 
for modern individuals. For many people, the ultimate purpose of human life 
is no longer located beyond our earthly existence in some transcendent realm, 
but consists in authentic living in the present. However, as a result of moral 
relativism and subjectivism, modernity is uneasy when it comes to claiming 
the superior value of any mode of living over another. This also complicates 
acknowledging authentic living as a moral ideal. 
The most important point stressed repeatedly by C. Taylor is that the typi-
cally modern localization of the source of morality in our inner realm, that we 
already found in Rousseau’s work, does not necessitate moral subjectivism and 
relativism or an atomistic, essentialist conception of the human agent. Instead, 
C. Taylor argues that authenticity can only be a viable ideal against a broader 
horizon of meaning that precedes the individual life and extends beyond its 
duration. As C. Taylor (1991) puts it, “I can define my identity only against the 
background of things that matter. But to bracket out history, nature, society, 
the demands of solidarity, everything but what I find in myself, would be to 
eliminate all candidates for what matters. [...] Authenticity is not the enemy 
of demands that emanate from beyond the self; it supposes such demands” 
(p. 40-41). Moreover, only human beings intersubjectively related to others, 
in social bonds and communities enabling recognition and participation, can 
successfully realize an authentic life. We constitute our identities in dialogical 
relations with other people, in narrative processes of hermeneutic deliberation 
about the worthiness of the ideals we appropriate. Therefore, although authen-
ticity is a facet of modern individualism, this does not mean that it cannot be 
accompanied by a social ethics of recognition, intersubjectivity and solidarity. 
It is a profound misunderstanding that the inward turn and the focus on either 
self-discovery or self-creation that lies at the bottom of the modern culture of 
authenticity precludes social constitution of identity. As C. Taylor (1991) ob-
serves, “My discovering my identity doesn’t mean that I work it out in isolation 
but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internalized, with 
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others. That is why the development of an ideal of inwardly generated identity 
gives a new and crucial importance to recognition. My own identity crucially 
depends on my dialogical relations with others” (p. 47-48). 
Although C. Taylor’s view seems a promising candidate for a satisfactory 
solution to both sets of problems that plague authenticity discourse in general 
(see §7.2), his account fails to explicitly address the fact that people’s positioning 
in society (belonging to a dominant or a subordinate social group, for instance) 
strongly influences their chances for self-realization, as well as for their recog-
nition as moral agents with a valid claim to authenticity and freedom. The pos-
sibility that authenticity may also require standing up to and distancing oneself 
from existing cultural horizons of meaning and morality is insufficiently cov-
ered by C. Taylor’s view. In the next section, I discuss Meyers’ (2000) view of 
authenticity, which addresses these topics. 
7.3.4 Diana Meyers – Authenticit y and intersectional identit y
Meyers (2000) discusses the theme of authenticity in the context of her view 
of autonomy, for which she regards the possession of an authentic self to be a 
crucial condition. Meyers’ position regarding authenticity is characterized by a 
feminist sensitivity for the role of societal systems of domination and subordi-
nation, of power structures, and of social inequality, that we also encountered 
in her view of autonomy (see §6.3.3). Oftentimes, critiques on oppressive social 
structures are associated with a worldview that denies the viability of autono-
my and authenticity as moral ideals, and even doubts the plausibility of their 
existence. By contrast, Meyers argues that the fact that who we are is signifi-
cantly influenced by social structures does not necessarily make it impossible 
to uphold an authentic self or to practice autonomy. In fact, she claims that it is 
quintessential for human agents to form an authentic self in order to navigate 
the abundance of social influences that affect their lives in a satisfactory way. 
Thus, she defends the value of authenticity (which she regards as conditional 
for autonomy), but suggests that we should “redirect our attention – away from 
the internal structure of the authentic self and toward the process of constitut-
ing an authentic self” (Meyers, 2000, p. 154). 
Meyers situates her view of authenticity against the background of the 
framework of intersectionality. This term has been introduced by feminist 
scholars who wanted to sensitize the identity debate to the fact that different 
categories of diversity, such as gender, ethnicity, class and age, work togeth-
er in determining people’s identities. These influences cannot be studied in 
isolation from each other. Thus, one’s opportunities to practice moral agency 
do not simply depend on whether one is a man or woman, or young or old. In-
stead, they depend on the intersection of these multiple sources of identity. The 
intersectionality framework emphasizes that being a young black man with 
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a low socio-economic status is very different from being an older, well-to-do, 
white woman. It enables more fine-grained distinctions and raises awareness 
of the interconnections between these categories of difference, though it also 
complicates the analysis. Meyers argues that this intersectional positioning 
can be made a part of an authentic personality despite the fact that we do not 
choose this position freely ourselves. By successfully exercising our autonomy 
competencies (self-discovery, self-definition and self-direction) in our social 
interactions in the world, we are engaged in an ongoing and open-ended pro-
cess of constructing an authentic identity for ourselves. Ferrara (1998) seems to 
express the same insight when he states: “All identities, in fact, authentic and 
inauthentic, are equally rooted in interaction. What distinguishes the authentic 
ones is something else, namely, the capacity to express a uniqueness which has 
been socially constituted through the interplay of the singularity of the forma-
tive contexts and the singularity of our responses to them” (p. 54). 
For both Meyers (2000) and C. Taylor (1991) then, authenticity is not at-
tained by overcoming the impact of external influences on the self. But Meyers 
emphasizes that these external influences are also not something we should 
uncritically accept at face value. Instead, authenticity in the intersectional 
view requires an active, agential attitude towards the socio-cultural forces that 
co-constitute who we are. As Meyers (2000) puts it, “accepting intersectional 
identity as a feature of one’s authentic self does not entail clinging to a com-
munity of origin or capitulating to stereotypical group norms. Rather, it entails 
analyzing the social significance of one’s community of origin, disclosing to 
oneself the ways in which associated norms have become embedded in one’s 
own cognitive and motivational structure, appreciating how entrenched they 
are, and assuming responsibility for the ways in which one may enact them” 
(p. 159). 
As C. Taylor’s (1991) view suggests, we should for sure acknowledge the 
constitutive importance of our social and cultural horizon in our identity-con-
stitution. But qualifying as authentic and autonomous means that we should 
also be able to criticize and possibly transform these constitutive horizons at 
points where they may impede our own or other people’s moral agency. This is 
the point that Meyers (2000) adds. According to Meyers’ view, authenticity and 
autonomy are intrinsically connected. We develop both in the context of our 
daily social practices. They will emerge easier and sooner in circumstances that 
stimulate people’s moral agency. But as Meyers argues, this is not a necessity; 
both autonomy and authenticity can also be realized in unfavorable social situ-
ations. However, realizing “a good life, with and for others, in just institutions” 
which Ricoeur (1992, see also §5.4) formulates as the ethical aim guiding our 
moral lives, does seem to request of us to make an ongoing effort to ensure the 
actualization of a society that gives more people the opportunity to exercise 
their potential for moral agency in freedom. In Meyers’ (2000) formulation, 
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such an endeavor “would counteract moral anesthesia and motivate people to 
overcome cooptation and anomie. Apprehending one’s intersectional identity – 
that is, knowing who one is – may prompt resistance to unjust treatment – that 
is, moral and political autonomy” (p. 161).  
A final important element of Meyers’ view is the fact that she underscores 
that both autonomy competence and authenticity are lifelong learning process-
es situated in the context of concrete human practices. The result will never be 
complete or perfect, for, as Meyers (2000) emphasizes, “Piecemeal authentici-
ty, I would urge, is the best that we murky, fallible human beings can hope for” 
(p. 174). Despite Meyers’ acknowledgment of the complex and evolving charac-
ter of authentic selves however, she maintains that selves should have a certain 
amount of unity or coherence. Personalities that lack this unification, that are, 
for instance, fragmented or compartmentalized, cannot exercise autonomy; nor 
can they qualify as authentic (Meyers, 1989). In this sense, her view matches 
the view that was found in Ricoeur and Atkins (see §5.2.3, §5.3.3, §5.4), that uni-
fied selfhood is conditional for moral agency. 
7.4 Authenticit y in the conte x t of Aging
As a guiding concept for aging well, authenticity is less explicitly present in 
mainstream gerontological discourse than autonomy. However, there do exist 
some perspectives that merit attention here, since they are concerned with au-
thenticity-related notions like (spiritual) growth, ego-integrity, self-acceptance, 
et cetera. The fact that the term authenticity is not often used in these works 
does not mean that the underlying ideas do not cohere with the spirit of the 
authenticity discourse. I therefore present below some gerontological views 
which, in my opinion, defend a position related to the theme of authenticity. 
Three examples stand out in particular: 1) spiritual perspectives on aging, 2) 
existential perspectives on aging, and 3) art of living perspectives on aging. 
7.4.1 Spiritual perspectives on aging
The most frequently occurring perspectives in gerontology that draw on the 
language of authenticity can be described as spiritual perspectives on aging. 
Examples can be found, for instance, in the works of Atchley (2009), Tornstam 
(1989, 2005), and Moody and Carroll (1999). An important similarity between 
spiritual perspectives on aging and the authenticity discourse is their emphasis 
on an (inner) development towards a truer, more fulfilled self. For instance, 
Atchley (2009) draws on several spiritual traditions that claim the existence of 
a pure core self that can be actualized by engaging in spiritual exercises such 
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as meditation. This spiritual self is regarded as more genuine, more pure, and 
more true to one’s nature, than the self we tend to show to the external world. 
Spiritual perspectives understand an authentic attitude towards oneself to 
include the ability to relate to one’s own finitude and existential vulnerability 
in a meaningful way. They suggest ways in which later life can be perceived 
as a period of growth and flourishing despite, or maybe even because of, the 
confrontation with vulnerability (Laceulle, 2013). This makes the spiritual un-
derstanding of authenticity relevant in our search for a new frame for self-re-
alization that enables a meaningful integration of existential vulnerability. A 
good example of a spiritual gerontological perspective congenial to authentic-
ity discourse can be found in the theory of gerotranscendence (Tornstam, 1989, 
2005). Gerotranscendence is conceptualized as a shift in the metaperspective 
accompanying aging, which may pertain to one’s self, one’s social relations or 
the broader cosmic reality. Although empirical evidence for the claim that these 
forms of transcendence are exclusive to older people is rather thin (Tornstam, 
1994, 1997; Braam et al., 2006), the merit of Tornstam’s gerotranscendence 
theory is that it draws attention to the possibility that later life may also have 
a potential for growth and development, which is often neglected in Western 
culture (Laceulle, 2011). Gerotranscendence theory claims that later life harbors 
a specific potential for spiritual self-development. Importantly, one of the fea-
tures of this development is that people turn away from the hustle of everyday 
life and the pressures of social expectations. The assumption that one connects 
with a more true or authentic self by loosening oneself from social conventions 
shows interesting similarities with the classical perspective on authenticity, in 
particular with Rousseau’s views.
Moody and Carroll’s work The five stages of the soul (1999), which also de-
scribes a process of spiritual development typical of people beyond midlife, 
introduces an element that shows similarities with the authenticity discourse 
as well. Moody and Carroll argue that it is crucial to spiritual development that 
at some point in life one hears “the Call”; standing at a crossroad, one feels the 
awakening of a sense of urgency to change things, to re-evaluate one’s orien-
tation in life. Hearing this call is followed by the desire to answer it and go on 
a search, a journey of self-discovery with an unknown outcome. The way this 
process of hearing and answering the call is sketched shows interesting paral-
lels with the experience of crisis or “disease”, that existentialist thinkers like 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche saw as the quintessential starting point of realizing 
a more authentic existence. Interestingly, the way Moody and Carroll (1999) de-
scribe the characteristics of the searching soul also shows striking similarities 
with the features Ferrara (1998) distinguished as characterizing an authentic 
personality: coherence, vitality, depth and maturity. 
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7.4.2 E xistential perspectives on aging
The second example of the application of authenticity-related vocabulary in the 
context of aging studies is best described as existential gerontology. This term 
is not very prevalent, but it is used by some to accentuate their focus on matters 
of meaning related to later life (De Lange, 2007, 2008; Baars, 2012a). The term 
existential here solely indicates the focus on human existence and its meaning; 
its sources of inspiration are not restricted to existentialist philosophers. By us-
ing this terminology, existential gerontologists distinguish their own approach 
from predominantly biomedical or social-scientific discourses on aging that 
generally attract a lot more attention in the world of aging studies. They argue 
that aging should not just be regarded as a matter of biological senescence or 
as a demographical issue, but that more attention needs to be drawn to the ex-
istential dimension, i.e., the way people experience and give meaning to their 
own aging (Baars, 2012a; Baars & Phillipson, 2013; Kruse, 2013). 
A first relevant example of the existential view can be found in De Lange 
(2007). He aims to develop an existential gerontological perspective that tran-
scends the consumerist, activist cultural paradigm of self-invention which has 
been qualified as an age-defying narrative (see §3.3.3) in this study. Following 
Kierkegaard (1843/1959), De Lange (2007) argues that the existential reality of 
aging requires deeper and richer conceptualizations of the idea of personal 
growth or self-realization. These should be able to account for vulnerability, 
and be based on integrating and transcending limitations instead of conquer-
ing them. De Lange advocates a reading of self-realization as the “ethical en-
gagement with one’s own life course”. He concretizes this aim by developing 
a model of five fundamental conditions that are needed in order to age well. 
These conditions include meeting one’s natural needs, being a valued member 
of social communities, accepting moral responsibility for one’s life, having the 
possibility to infuse one’s life with meaning by connecting it to some high-
er dimension, and finding a satisfactory balance between all these conditions. 
The fourth condition implying a process of self-transcendence in particular, 
shows similarities with the accounts of authenticity that have been discussed 
above, with the view of Kierkegaard (1843/1959) in particular, but also that of C. 
Taylor (1991). The fact that De Lange’s (2007) view is at odds with the classical 
essentialist, anti-social perspective of Rousseau (1754/1984, 1762/2003) and the 
Romanticists, makes his perspective all the more interesting for this study’s 
purposes. 
A second relevant example of the existential perspective comes from Kruse 
(2013). He suggests an “anthropology of aging” that highlights seven themes, 
some of which are very congenial to the idea of authenticity as an aspect of 
self-realization. For instance, Kruse focuses strongly on the theme of “Selbst-
gestaltung [self-design, or self-realization]”, a term describing the motivation 
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to consciously shape one’s life and identity according to one’s own values, pur-
poses and desires. This theme is highly congenial to the underlying ideas of 
authenticity discourse such as becoming who you truly are. But Kruse adds 
important considerations that suggest that this process of authentic self-real-
ization should include finding a satisfactory relation to the dimension of ex-
istential vulnerability and the finitude of human life. This suggests a strong 
resemblance with the perspective defended in the current study, which is even 
further enforced by the fact that Kruse also emphasizes the social embedding 
of human beings, and the necessity of taking moral responsibility for one’s life. 
A third relevant example from the category of existential gerontological per-
spectives can be found in the work of Rentsch (2013). According to Rentsch, 
the typical late modern ideology of self-constitution (becoming who we are) 
requires an ongoing process of maturation and deepening self-knowledge. In 
later life, this task gains in importance because of the more acute confrontation 
with finitude. We should be careful, however, not to assume that aging – reach-
ing a higher age – in itself provides a guarantee for such character-develop-
ment. However, the life experience one has generated throughout a long(er) life 
does in principle offer chances for growth and development not always open to 
younger people. These potentials are easily overlooked by dominant cultural 
discourses about later life. 
In its emphasis on becoming who you are and the confrontation with fin-
itude, Rentsch’s view seems a close match with the existentialist perspective 
on authenticity discussed above, in particular with the views of Nietzsche and 
Heidegger. However, interestingly, Rentsch’s interpretation is different and 
more in sync with ancient Greco-Roman views about self-realization, which 
may provide an interesting bridge to the third thread of self-realization – vir-
tue – which has its roots there (see chapter 8).
7.4.3 Art of living perspectives on aging
A third relevant line of gerontological thinking that draws upon ideas acquaint-
ed with the authenticity discourse is affiliated with the recent revival in moral 
philosophy of Greco-Roman views about “art of living” or self-care. The later 
works of Foucault that focus on how we act upon ourselves through the appro-
priation and application of “techniques of the self” have been highly influen-
tial in this development (Foucault, 1984/1992; Kekes, 2002; Nehamas, 1998; 
Dohmen, 2002, 2008, 2014; Schmid, 1998). Hadot (1995) argues that in the 
Greco-Roman world, philosophy was perceived as a practice, a way of living 
centered around concrete sets of spiritual exercises. One of the important pur-
poses of these practices was learning how to die, or developing a satisfactory 
attitude towards the contingencies, vulnerability and finitude of life. 
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Lately, there have been some interesting attempts to connect these art of liv-
ing perspectives to the field of aging studies. One of the most extensive and er-
udite recent works in this category is Aging and the art of living by Baars (2012a). 
Baars argues that late modernity is in need of a contemporary “art of aging”, 
that perceives aging as a social-existential process of living in time. This art of 
aging should be perceived as an ‘extended art of life’ (Baars, 2012a, p. 201). Two 
themes stand out in such an art of living/aging: finding a satisfactory attitude 
towards the fundamental vulnerability of the human condition, and realizing 
one’s unique potential as an individual human being. The art of living/aging 
perspective suggests that there is dignity and meaning to be found in an atti-
tude of gracious and conscious acceptance of our existential vulnerability and 
our finitude, which we share with all other people. Importantly, our attitude 
towards finitude need not just pertain to (our own) death, even though thinkers 
like Heidegger (1927/1996) made a close connection between authenticity and 
consciousness of death. Baars states, by contrast, that finitude is at stake during 
our entire lifetime, a reality he describes by the term finitization. In fact, being 
aware of this may deepen the intensity with which we experience the events of 
our lives. 
Baars (2012a) interprets Heidegger’s account of authenticity as one that 
opens Dasein for its own authentic possibilities. This assumes a dynamic re-
lationship to all dimensions of time: past, present and future. In this sense, 
Baars underscores that there is a deep connection between our finitude and 
the second theme in the art of aging: the realization of our individual unique-
ness, which is a fundamental assumption of the authenticity discourse as well 
(Baars, in press). Regarding the latter, Baars underscores that aging can be 
accompanied by creativity and deepening individuality. Cohen (2005, 2000) 
makes an equally convincing empirical case for the creative potentials of later 
life based on his practice as a geriatrician. On this point, arguments from the 
art of living/aging perspective show important similarities with ideas from the 
authenticity discourse. Realizing one’s potential for creativity and wisdom is 
seen as quintessential in the search for a good life. Ultimately, an art of aging 
should acknowledge both the vulnerability and the uniqueness and diversity 
of aging, ideally resulting in “a growing sensitivity for the unique qualities of 
vulnerable life” (Baars, 2012a, p. 201).    
As a second example of the art of living perspective, Dohmen’s (2013) sketch 
for a “moral lifestyle for later life” can also be interpreted as an authenticity 
perspective applied to the context of aging. To him, the term moral lifestyle 
assumes that people equip themselves with the relevant attitudes to engage 
in a “practice of freedom”. Dohmen aims to give guidelines for such a practice 
that he believes are crucial in light of the life experiences of aging individuals. 
The dimensions of the moral lifestyle for later life that Dohmen suggests are 
the following: 
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• Reflective distance: this dimension pertains to the capability to critically 
distance oneself from the diversity of expectations, images and directives 
about aging circulating in our socio-cultural context. 
• Expropriation: this dimension pertains to the capability to recognize the 
ways in which our upbringing and socialization have disciplined us, and 
to discover and to a certain degree learn to oppose the expropriating forces 
characteristic of our particular lives. 
• Appropriation: this dimension entails acquiring autonomy (as positive free-
dom) by identifying with certain values and goals in our lives. 
• Orientation: this dimension pertains to the qualitative evaluation of our 
goals and purposes, relating them to the value horizon of the culture and 
tradition we form a part of. 
• Engagement: this dimension suggests that, since people are not isolated, 
autonomous self-realizers but fundamentally socially embedded, we should 
engage ourselves with the web of relationships and responsibilities we form 
a part of. 
• Integration and time: this dimension assumes that our moral identity, ex-
pressed in our moral lifestyle, is inherently bound to time. To connect the 
dimensions of past, present and future, a moral lifestyle requires a certain 
amount of coherence or integration. 
• Serenity: this dimension suggests that a moral lifestyle for later life encom-
passes the acquisition of an attitude of resignation and serenity towards 
tragic aspects of life that are inevitably beyond our control. 
• Finitude: this last dimension requires asking ourselves what sort of person 
we have been, what kind of life we have lived, what our value and contribu-
tion has been in light of the inevitable finitude of human life. 
In sum, I conclude that although authenticity is not a common term in geron-
tological discourse, ideas associated with it have nevertheless found their way 
into gerontological reflections on how to age well. This fact provides welcome 
support for the ambition of this study to apply the self-realization discourse to 
the context of aging in a meaningful way.
7.5 evAluAtion of the discussed Authenticit y Accounts 
This chapter has discussed a selection of authenticity accounts. The under-
standing of authenticity for the purposes of this study should cohere with the 
insights on narrative identity and moral agency that support this study’s  re-
framing of self-realization. At the beginning of this chapter, I identified two 
sets of problems with the authenticity discourse: assumptions regarding true 
selves that underlie many interpretations, and the disregarding or rejection of 
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social influences. A viable understanding of authenticity in the context of this 
study needs to provide a credible remedy for both problems. I will now evaluate 
the interpretations of authenticity discussed in this chapter for their ability to 
confront these issues. 
• As we have seen, the views of Rousseau (1754/1984, 1762/2003) and his 
Romantic followers are problematically essentialist. The authentic self is 
perceived as a natural potential hidden deep inside a person, while the so-
cial context is exclusively presented as a source of grave trouble, obstructing 
the realization of authentic selfhood. The way I have conceptualized self-re-
alization, narrative identity and moral agency does not match well with 
this interpretation. After all, I have repeatedly claimed that selves are best 
understood as socially embedded and narratively constituted, rather than 
essentialist. This view also implies that the influence of others is not per-
ceived as inauthenticating, but as constitutive of who we are. Still, a valuable 
element to be retained from Rousseau for this study’s view is his sensitivity 
to the fact that authenticity requires that we find a satisfactory relationship 
with inauthenticating influences, and that (moral) education plays a crucial 
role here. From the Romanticists, on the other hand, we can learn that our 
identity need not be seen as a given entity, but that it can be perceived as 
a creation that evolves dynamically. Although the heroic Romantic ideal of 
making an artistic creation of oneself is not how I would prefer to see au-
thenticity, the idea of self-creation is also present in a different form in the 
view that we narratively constitute ourselves. 
• The existentialist view challenges the problematically essentialist assump-
tions underlying Rousseau’s account. This makes it relevant to this study. 
Another advantage of the existentialist view is its strong awareness of the 
intrinsic connection of authenticity with a dimension of finitude and exis-
tential vulnerability. From the perspective of this study, it is highly valuable 
that the existentialists emphasize how authentic self-realization presuppos-
es finding a viable attitude towards this dimension. Moreover, the Nietzs-
chean idea of becoming who/what you are is very congenial to our purpose 
of developing a perspective on self-realization that permits us to see moral 
self-development as a lifelong process. However, when it comes to the social 
embedding of human beings, the existential views remain unsatisfactory. 
Existentialist thinkers – with the possible exception of De Beauvoir (1947) – 
generally assume an antagonistic perspective that opposes the self and the 
other. They present the individual moral agent as an atomistic, sometimes 
even solipsistic being. The individual is principally opposed to others, who 
are mainly perceived in negative terms as a cause of inauthenticity. Further-
more, though Heidegger’s (1927/1996) phenomenological account seems 
congenial to our view of identity, his perspective ultimately leads us in a dif-
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ferent direction. Instead of focusing on the importance of intersubjectivity, 
Heidegger moves towards a view of authentic existence that seems highly 
self-contained, and excludes the possibility of relationships with others that 
are advantageous, indeed indispensable, for leading a good life. 
• C. Taylor’s (1991) view of authenticity is promising when it comes to tack-
ling both the problem of an essentialist self and the problem of a negative 
evaluation of social influence for authenticity. His view of moral agents as 
embedded in a socio-cultural context that is constitutive of their moral iden-
tity shows close affiliation with this study’s suggested account of identity. 
Moreover, his insistence upon the need to relate to individual-transcend-
ing horizons of meaning and moral value matches my view that the self 
manifested in self-realization is not a solely individual construction, but is 
formed in social practices with a background of cultural norms and values 
that cannot be ignored. However, C. Taylor’s account may be questioned for 
its lack of sensitivity for the dangers of conformism to the status quo of a 
given socio-cultural horizon. Some situations may require standing up to 
existing value-frameworks and the practices that flow from them. Such sit-
uations call for moral agents who have the ability to resist their own social 
and cultural background. Importantly, this resistance presupposes that to 
some extent one separates oneself from one’s embedding in socio-cultural 
practices. This is not to occupy the independent atomistic position presup-
posed by the neoliberalist inspired philosophical perspectives which this 
study has repeatedly rejected. Instead, it is to take a critical position against 
the status quo and engage in a search for alternative practices. The impor-
tance of such strong moral agency is in danger of getting lost from sight 
if our account of authenticity focuses too strongly on the intersubjective 
constitution and socio-cultural embedding of human life, as seems to be 
the case in C. Taylor’s work. 
• Finally, a merit of Meyers’ (2000) view of authenticity is that she seems to 
remedy precisely this objection raised against C. Taylor’s (1991) view. Con-
trary to C. Taylor, Meyers shows a great sensitivity to the fact that people are 
not just positioned against the background of a cultural horizon of meaning 
and morality as a given reality, but that their positioning strongly depends 
on the social categories they belong to, and is highly influenced by power 
structures. In turn, Meyers’ view shows us that our socio-cultural position-
ing strongly impacts our opportunities to be recognized and to function as 
self-realizing, authentic and autonomous moral agents. The greatest merit 
of Meyers’ view, however, is that her awareness of the influence of social 
structures does not cause her to reject authenticity and autonomy as viable 
moral ideals. Instead, she suggests that we should conceptualize them in a 
different manner, and focus on the competencies that we need to develop 
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ourselves as authentic selves in the social and moral practices of everyday 
life.  
7.6 conclusion: towArds Authenticit y As A sociAl And  
mor Al Pr Actice 
In this final section, I attempt to provide a tentative sketch of the view of au-
thenticity advanced in this study. It is my contention that, in order to match this 
study’s developing reframed understanding of self-realization, authenticity is 
best conceptualized as a social and moral practice, a qualification that will be 
clarified below.
Let me begin by returning to Ferrara’s (1998) typology of authenticity views 
(see §7.2). I stated that my perspective on self-realization calls for an intersub-
jective interpretation of authenticity instead of a substantialist interpretation. 
Given all that has been discussed about this study’s understanding of the per-
son/moral agent in chapters 4 and 5, this choice should not be surprising. The 
same obviousness applies to the fact that the authenticity account this study 
advances should be seen as reflective in Ferrara’s typology. However, regarding 
the opposition between an integrative and an antagonistic conception, as well 
as a centered and a decentered notion of the self, I take an intermediate position 
that merits some further clarification. 
First, although this study shares the insight that our socio-cultural embed-
ding is constitutive of who we are (as in the integrative conception), a satisfac-
tory conception of authenticity should also accommodate the possibility that 
we stand up to this background (as suggested by the antagonistic conception). 
Second, as argued in §5.2.3, although the decentered view is right that narra-
tives need to be flexible and open enough to accommodate unanticipated ex-
periences, it does not mean that we can live with narratives that are totally 
fragmented and have no center. While a centered view of the self neglects the 
reality of things that escape the coherence of the narrative framework, a ful-
ly decentered view of the self may ultimately be no more than an academic 
abstraction (Guignon, 2004). Hence my contention that we should opt for an 
intermediate position between a centered and a decentered view of authenticity. 
When analyzed in terms of Ferrara’s (1998) typology, Meyers’ (2000) view 
seems to be the closest match with the account of authenticity suggested in 
this study. Her view is intersubjective, reflective, and takes an intermediate 
position in the centered-decentered and the integrative-antagonistic dichoto-
mies. However, the perspective of the current study suggests that there is still 
an element that needs to be added to my conceptualization of authenticity. This 
is not satisfactorily addressed in any of the discussed views so far, although C. 
Taylor (1991) does provide some leads. This additional element pertains to the 
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dialogical moral relationship between our self and others, which is fueled by 
our identification with an ethical aim, a value orientation to which we want 
to remain true. In previous chapters, Ricoeur’s (1992) term self-constancy was 
used to describe this dimension of our (aspired) identity (see §5.4, §6.6). 
Drawing on the notion of self-constancy may, I believe, also be helpful to 
clarify my conceptualization of authenticity as a social and moral practice. Let 
me start with how the interpretation of narrative identity and moral agency 
based on Ricoeur’s (1992) notion of self-constancy relates to the idea of being 
true to oneself which is quintessential to the discourse on authenticity. This 
can be clarified by recalling the difference made by Trilling (1971) between sin-
cerity and authenticity (see §7.2). As previously mentioned, Trilling presents 
sincerity as the early modern predecessor of authenticity. Both concepts ad-
dress the topic of being true to yourself, but importantly, in the case of sincerity 
this trueness has an instrumental social function: it is a means to assure that 
one is also regarded as reliable by others, which is important for one’s social 
position in the community. By contrast, authenticity approaches trueness as 
an end in itself, with a moral value independent from one’s relation to others. 
Our analysis of fundamental concepts of the self-realization discourse so far – 
discussing identity, (moral) agency and autonomy – strongly tends towards an 
account that emphasizes the equal and interconnected importance of the rela-
tion of agents to themselves (manifested in Trilling’s idea of authenticity) and 
the relation of agents to other people (manifested in Trilling’s idea of sincerity). 
The advantage of Ricoeur’s (1992) notion of self-constancy is that it ad-
dresses the relationship between the two forms of being true to oneself which 
Trilling (1971) discusses under the headings of sincerity and authenticity. In 
Trilling’s analysis, it is theoretically possible to be authentic but to fall short of 
being reliable to other people. It is also possible to practice sincerity and still 
be perceived as inauthentic, as Trilling (1971) and Ferrara (1998) both admit. 
From the perspective of self-constancy, however, both situations would be ex-
perienced as problematic because they raise conflicts regarding people’s moral 
identity. Self-constancy acknowledges that the self and other are engaged in a 
social and moral practice of holding each other in their mutual identities (cf. 
Lindemann, 2014, see also §5.3.2). 
The distinction between trueness as a means and trueness as an end in 
itself evaporates here; in self-constancy trueness to oneself is both means and 
end at the same time, because the self and other are seen as standing in a 
dialogical relationship to each other. The notion of self-constancy acknowledg-
es our intersubjective connectedness with others, while remaining aware of 
the importance of our status as individual moral agents: I am the one making 
commitments and I am the one ultimately responsible for answering them. Ac-
knowledging the constitutive importance of other people and of existing hori-
zons of meaning, as C. Taylor (1991) advocates, does not diminish this moral 
Chapter 7 – Authenticity 217
responsibility for our selfhood. Introducing the notion of self-constancy to the 
authenticity discourse therefore enables conceptualizing authenticity as a so-
cial and moral practice in which we strive, together with others, towards a good 
life. This view has the following implications and advantages:  
• By choosing the term practice, it is underscored that authenticity is enact-
ed in concrete life situations. Although authenticity remains a quality of 
persons and not of actions, this quality is necessarily expressed through 
actions in concrete practices. For example, I assure a friend that I will give 
her my honest opinion on an important decision that she is about to make. I 
feel confident about making this promise because honesty is an important 
part of the ideal self I aspire to be or become. To qualify as authentic in this 
situation would require that I actually do tell my friend the truth when she 
asks me. Only then would I be true to the value orientation that makes me 
commit to honesty. Following Meyers (2000), this account thus focuses on 
the process of realizing the truthfulness that is traditionally implied by the 
authenticity discourse, instead of on the state in which one has supposedly 
realized it. This has the added advantage of escaping the essentialism-ob-
jection raised against authenticity discourse.  
• By qualifying the practice of authenticity as social, I stress that qualifying 
as an authentic self depends on whether others recognize my authenticity. 
It makes no sense to make a promise to be honest if there is no one who 
cares that I will keep it. In the previous case this other is my friend, whose 
presence in my life makes me want to hold my word instead of betray my au-
thentic self. This presumes that the claim to authenticity can only be made 
and honored in the context of what I have previously described, drawing on 
Lindemann (2014), as the social practice of identity (see §5.3.2). 
• The conceptualization of authenticity as a social practice results in a per-
ception of the other that seeks to avoid the instrumental and antagonistic 
perception of others in traditional accounts of authenticity like the views of 
Rousseau (1754/1984) or of the existentialists. Although the suggested view 
of authenticity certainly acknowledges the possibility of conflict between 
the self and other (for instance, my honesty may result in tension between 
my friend and me if the opinion I expressed is not what she thought I would 
say), it has the fundamental advantage of recognizing that the self and other 
need each other, for they are engaged in authenticity as a practice together. 
• By presenting authenticity as a practice that is not only social but also mor-
al, I underscore that being an authentic self inherently touches upon the 
ethical dimension of human existence (which conveniently precludes the 
charge of aestheticism sometimes raised against views of authenticity). 
The intention to live up to my word - actually being honest in the example 
sketched above - presupposes a fundamental moral engagement with the 
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good of both myself and the other. As any interpretation of authenticity, 
this interpretation too presupposes an expression of who I truly am, as well 
as an ideal self that I strive to become. Authenticity is a moral practice be-
cause the ideal self I want to become assumes an identification with an 
ethical dimension (in this case the value attached to honesty) that I hope 
to realize or embody. What Ricoeur (1992) teaches us, however, is that my 
identification with what constitutes the good for me (the ethical dimension 
mentioned above) cannot be isolated from my engagement with the good 
of others. This underscores that in my view of authenticity, the social and 
moral dimensions are intrinsically connected.
Chapter 8 – Virtue
8.1 introduction
The complex fabric of the self-realization discourse has been presented in the 
context of this study as consisting of three interwoven threads: autonomy, au-
thenticity and virtue. Having discussed the former two in the previous chap-
ters, it is now time to explore the theme of virtue in a similar way. 
As in the previous chapters, my aim in this chapter is to find out which con-
ception of virtue forms the most appropriate match with the conceptualization 
of self-realization, self-identity and moral agency that this study wants to devel-
op. I start with a general introduction to the theme of virtue and virtue ethics 
(§8.2). Next, along similar lines as in our chapters on autonomy and authentici-
ty, a selection of different perspectives on virtue are discussed. In §8.3.1, I start 
with the view of Aristotle (Ethica Nicomachea), who is generally regarded as the 
father of virtue ethics in the history of Western philosophy. Next, in §8.3.2 the 
view of MacIntyre is discussed, whose work After virtue (1984) has played a very 
influential role in the revival of virtue ethics in recent decades. Third, in §8.3.3 
a more recent “pluralistic” view of virtue by Swanton (2003) is addressed. After 
this selective discussion of three relevant accounts of virtue, I proceed in §8.4 
to address the way in which the concept of virtue has found its way into geron-
tological discourse. As will be shown, the application of virtue-ethical thinking 
to the field of aging studies is surprisingly limited. The chapter concludes with 
an evaluation of the discussed perspectives in light of the aims of the current 
study (§8.5) and finally a reflection on the most suitable interpretation of virtue 
in the context of the reframed interpretation of self-realization (§8.6).     
8.2 introducing virtue
As discussed in §4.3.2, compared to autonomy and authenticity, virtue plays 
a rather subordinate role in the rhetoric of late modern lifestyle and “a life of 
one’s own”, which underlies the late modern understanding of self-realization 
that this study aims to reframe. However, this lack of attention in the soci-
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etal discourse is offset by the fact that moral-philosophical debates in recent 
decades have reintroduced virtue ethics as a critical perspective against pre-
vailing deontological and/or consequentialist strands of thinking. In contrast 
with the latter’s focus on rules and universalizing principles, virtue ethics calls 
our attention to the importance of character dispositions and the practice of 
good habits. In this sense virtue ethics shifts our attention away from the ques-
tion “what to do?” towards the question “who to be?” (Schneewind, 1990). This 
makes it a highly relevant perspective for a study on self-realization. Whereas 
deontological and consequentialist perspectives are alternative answers to the 
same basic question of ethics, virtue ethics, by contrast, asks a different ques-
tion (Van Tongeren, 2012). 
But what is virtue? Broadly reviewing the current literature on virtue ethics, 
there seem to exist almost as many definitions of what virtue is as there are 
virtue ethicists. In general, however, most virtue-ethical thinkers agree that 
virtue is an attitude or character disposition that strives for human excellence, 
and should result in optimal moral behavior, or at least behavior that can be 
qualified as the best given the circumstances. The development of virtuous at-
titudes is thus conceived as a process of moral self-development. In accordance 
with this, Van Tongeren (2012) qualifies virtue ethics as an ethics of self-re-
alization. The virtue-ethical tradition in moral philosophy has seen a consid-
erable revival in recent decades (for some seminal examples, see Anscombe, 
1958; MacIntyre, 1984; Foot, 1978; Hursthouse, 1991; Hurka, 2001; Slote, 1992, 
2001; Swanton, 2003). Broadly speaking, four characteristics of virtue-ethical 
perspectives can be distinguished that play a role in this renewed interest: 1) 
their critique on dominant moral philosophies that strive for universal rules 
and principles, which leads to a focus on the moral agent instead; 2) their op-
portunities to offer a remedy for the perceived “moral crisis” of modernity; 3) 
their acknowledgment of the fact that moral agents are embedded in a (complex 
and dynamic) social context; and 4) their recognition that this embedding of 
moral agency requires a responsive, flexible and context-dependent ethics. I 
will discuss these points in turn:
• First, the revival of virtue ethics is often explained as a critical reaction 
towards the two most dominant strands of moral theory since the Enlight-
enment: deontology and consequentialism (of which utilitarianism is one 
of the dominant representatives) (Crisp & Slote, 1997; Statman 1997). For 
instance, in her seminal article Modern moral philosophy, Anscombe (1958) 
argues in favor of virtue ethics because it is capable of articulating a more 
satisfying moral psychology than deontology and consequentialism, with 
their one-sided focus on rules, principles and criteria for right actions. In 
a situation of eroding traditional foundations of ethics, Anscombe argues, 
we should turn to human flourishing (eudaimonia in Aristotelian ethics; 
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see §8.3.1) as a more viable basis for morality than obligation. Consequently, 
virtue ethics focuses on moral agents and their lives, rather than on discrete 
actions (Crisp & Slote, 1997).  
We should note, however, that the distinction between virtue ethics and 
other ethical approaches is not as clear-cut as it seems. The revival of virtue 
ethics also harbors approaches aiming to formulate criteria for the moral 
legitimization of actions on the basis of virtue-ethical thinking (Slote, 1992; 
Hursthouse, 1991). To complicate things further, there are strands of conse-
quentialist as well as deontological thinking which integrate a certain con-
ception of virtue, such as Hurka’s (2001) consequentialist account of virtue 
ethics. 
• Second, the revival of virtue ethics has been motivated by concern regard-
ing the moral outlook of (late) modern societies. MacIntyre (1984), for in-
stance, saw virtue ethics as the much-needed remedy for the state of moral 
crisis he observed in modern societies. Interestingly, although MacIntyre 
criticizes moral individualism and builds his argument mainly along com-
munitarian lines, it is also possible to argue in favor of virtue ethics for 
opposite reasons. After all, the virtue-ethical emphasis on the moral agent 
and his character development also seems to offer valuable directions to 
deal with contemporary moral individualism and pluralism without having 
to reject them. 
• Third, the revival of virtue ethics mirrors the growing awareness in con-
temporary philosophy of the fundamental interdependence of human be-
ings and their embedding in a social context. Aristotle’s position on virtue, 
for instance, would be incomprehensible without taking into account his 
view that humans are fundamentally “political animals”, creatures defined 
by their membership of the community or polis (Ethica Nicomachea, see 
§8.3.1). MacIntyre’s (1984) neo-Aristotelian account equally emphasizes that 
individuals are social beings, constituted by their social surroundings and 
by the traditions in which their life is embedded (see §8.3.2).
• Fourth, virtue ethics raises our awareness of situational and contextual 
influences on our moral conduct, and underscores the need for practical 
wisdom to confront these influences. Whereas deontological or consequen-
tialist approaches depart from the assumption that morality should provide 
guidance regardless of the specific circumstances, virtue ethics emphasizes 
the importance of assessing the demands of a specific situation, and decid-
ing which action is required on the basis of this assessment. Lifelong devel-
opment and maintenance of virtuous attitudes or character dispositions is 
needed to enable this assessment and flexible responsiveness. 
The discussed characteristics suggest that virtue ethics provides a promising 
perspective to accommodate the views of human identity and moral agency 
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underlying the reframed version of self-realization developed in this study (see 
chapter 5). In contrast to ethical perspectives based on autonomy and authen-
ticity, a virtue-ethical perspective is more naturally sensitive to the social and 
contextual embedding of human life. The fact that the development of virtue 
is perceived as a lifelong undertaking also conveniently corresponds to my em-
phasis in this study on the narrative, historical and temporal character of iden-
tity. Of course, the revival of virtue ethics has also raised criticism in moral 
philosophy. Critiques include, for instance, the vagueness of the notion of vir-
tue compared to the universal rules and principles of other ethical approaches, 
the diverse and sometimes conflicting opinions of what relevant virtues are, 
or the self-centeredness that supposedly accompanies the virtue-ethical focus 
on the moral agent. Also, doubts have been raised about the ability of virtue 
ethics to provide guidance for action in concrete moral dilemmas. Moreover, 
given its concentration on long-term character assessment, virtue ethics has 
been criticized for being unable to evaluate the legitimacy of concrete actions 
(Louden, 1997). Finally, the so-called situationist critique voices skepticism 
about whether human action in fact depends on attitudes of character, or rather 
on situational characteristics (which would contradict the basic assumption of 
virtue ethics that character motivates moral behavior) (Harman, 1999, 2009; 
Doris, 1998). 
In addition to these critiques, virtue as one of the constitutive threads of 
self-realization discourse raises two additional issues that deserve special con-
sideration:
• First, some interpretations of virtue ethics harbor an image of the telos 
of human life that is rather naturalistic and essentialist. Such views are 
also often accompanied by objectivistic assumptions about truth and value, 
for example, when they assume the existence of a “common good”. These 
naturalistic, essentialist and/or objectivistic views relate problematically 
to the highly pluralistic late modern moral context sketched in chapter 2. 
Moreover, such views potentially cause tension with the social constitution 
perspective defended in this study, which regards categories like truth, val-
ue or the telos of human life not as pre-given or universal, but as social-
ly-constituted. Furthermore, these categories are seen as diverse and plural, 
although this certainly does not imply that “anything goes”. In the view of 
this study, the recognition of these goods as worthy, truthful or valuable is 
based on a constant intersubjective, hermeneutic process of deliberation 
instead of on a cosmic order or a tradition that offers “ready-made” goods, as 
it were. A viable conception of virtue in the context of this study will have to 
be able to accommodate late modern moral pluralism and the correspond-
ing diversity of goods and purposes, as well as cohere with an intersubjec-
tive, social constitution perspective on truth and value.  
Chapter 8 – Vir tue 223
• Second, the sensitivity of virtue ethics to the social and contextual embed-
ding of human moral agents is sometimes accompanied by a tendency of 
conventionalism and traditionalism. This tendency can be problematic 
when it comes to the potential for critical resistance that the theory of cul-
tural narratives and counter narratives used in this study ascribes to- and 
requires from moral agents (see §3.2.4). Thus, a viable conception of virtue 
in the context of this study principally needs to incorporate the possibil-
ity to stand up to the status quo and criticize opinions or people who are 
traditionally seen as exemplary in a moral sense.  Before I can attempt to 
formulate an interpretation of virtue that matches this study’s suggested 
view of self-realization, it will be clarifying to discuss a selection of views 
illustrating how virtue has been developed and interpreted in the course of 
philosophical history.     
8.3 selected Accounts of virtue e thics
8.3.1 Aristotle: Virtue as ‘nobilit y of the soul’
One of the most important and well-known sources of virtue ethics in the 
Western philosophical tradition is Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea. The deepest 
roots of self-realization as a moral ideal depicting the good life can be found 
here. Self-realization in Aristotelian virtue ethics is perceived in terms of a 
lifelong developmental process of acquiring a virtuous, i.e., excellent, dispo-
sition of character. The good life for human beings is believed to be realized 
through “activity of the soul in accordance with virtue” (Ethica Nicomachea I, 
7, 1098a16).  
Aristotle’s ethics and his understanding of virtue cannot properly be under-
stood without considering his conception of the world as a meaningful cosmic 
order, his metaphysical biology/anthropology, and his ideas about society as 
a political and moral community. Importantly, Aristotle’s philosophy teaches 
us that the individual striving for self-realization is interwoven with the good 
of the community – in Aristotle’s case, the Greek polis. It thus has a moral 
relevance transcending the interests of the individual. This underscores that 
self-realization is not an atomistic undertaking. Instead, practicing the virtues 
has the potential of influencing the broader social and societal context of indi-
vidual life. The virtue or excellence of an entity, according to Aristotle, is de-
fined by its contribution to its optimal functioning. A hammer is a good ham-
mer if it performs the function of a hammer well; likewise, human beings are 
good human beings if they live up to their natural function. In the worldview of 
ancient Greek philosophy, every entity – including human beings – has its own 
place in a meaningful cosmic order, from which its natural function flows. The 
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good life is perceived as that life in which the natural telos or purpose of human 
life is optimally realized. 
Aristotle thus presents a teleological ethics. The natural purpose for human 
beings, the telos strived for in the process of self-realization in virtue ethics, is 
formulated by Aristotle in terms of eudaimonia, or happiness. Eudaimonic con-
ceptualizations of happiness contrast so-called hedonic conceptualizations that 
perceive happiness in terms of pleasure and absence of pain or unpleasantness 
(Ryff & Singer, 2008; Ryan & Deci, 2001). Instead, eudaimonic views perceive 
happiness in terms of a life well lived, a flourishing existence in accordance 
with the purpose or telos inherent to human nature, an existence that rep-
resents the best realization of the agent’s potentialities. The faculties required 
for realizing eudaimonia are supposed to be potentially inherent in all beings, 
but need to be developed to become actualized. This implies a lifelong process 
of learning and maintaining virtues: excellent character dispositions, acquired 
through developing the right habits and performing good actions. For Aristo-
tle, acquiring virtues takes place in concrete daily practice; one becomes a just 
person (i.e., acquires the virtue of justice) by performing just actions. Conse-
quently, Aristotle’s ethics conveys a life course perspective: one’s virtuousness 
cannot be fully judged until life is completed. There is always the possibility 
that people who have made the right choices so far go astray in another situ-
ation, thereby compromising their virtuousness. Thus, Aristotle claims that 
“human good turns out to be the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, 
and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most 
complete. But we must add: ‘in a complete life’. For one swallow doesn’t make a 
summer, nor does one day” (Ethica Nicomachea I, 7, 1098a19). 
Aristotle also thinks that children and young people cannot be called virtu-
ous. They may have had some education, but they still lack the experience and 
training required to have developed virtuous habits. Practical wisdom, a very 
fundamental virtue for Aristotle, essential to obtain other virtues, is something 
that can only be developed in the course of maturation throughout life. These 
observations strengthen my surmise of a particular relevance of virtue ethics 
for aging. However, it should not be concluded that Aristotle automatically per-
ceived older people as the most virtuous – in his Rhetoric, he was surprising-
ly negative about the elderly (Rhetorica II, 12, 1389a-1390a; Dohmen & Baars, 
2010). Although we all grow older, not everyone manages to become mature 
and acquire wisdom; this seems to be the sensible conclusion. Thus aging ap-
pears to be a necessary, but by no means a sufficient condition for virtue. 
For Aristotle, the virtues exist in the proper mean between excess and de-
fect of a certain trait. So, for instance, courage as a virtue is the proper mean, 
while fearlessness and cowardice represent the accompanying excess and defect 
states, temperance is the proper mean between self-indulgence and insensibil-
ity to pleasure, et cetera. Importantly, Aristotle acknowledges that both what 
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counts as virtues and the concrete interpretation of their content depend on the 
context in which they are exercised. For instance, the virtue of good temper, 
which is the proper mean for the passion of anger, requires “to be angry in the 
manner, at the things, and for the length of time” that is required by the cir-
cumstances (Ethica Nicomachea IV, 11, 1125b32-1125b34). Reason is presented as 
the quintessential capacity to arrive at the proper mean in any given situation, 
for it enables thoughtful deliberation and steers our passions and emotions 
in the right direction. In this way, we ideally develop a virtuous disposition 
of character which we can rely on in future situations requiring our (moral) 
response. Note that the right mean envisioned by Aristotle is not an absolute 
mean, but a mean relative to us and to the situation. The intellectual virtue of 
practical wisdom is quintessential in deciding what a certain situation requires 
in terms of virtue as the right mean. Here, in these Aristotelian ethics, we 
strongly recognize the flexibility and context-sensitivity that is also characteris-
tic of virtue ethics in general. 
Aristotle’s focus on excellence could elicit the conclusion that true virtue 
is attainable only for an elite minority. But in fact, his ethics harbors a strong 
awareness of the imperfection that characterizes earthly life for humans and 
the many contingencies and the existential vulnerability that influence our re-
alization of eudaimonia. As Aristotle puts it, “Now many events happen by 
chance, and events differing in importance; small pieces of good fortune or of 
its opposite clearly do not weigh down the scales of life one way or the other; 
but a multitude of great events if they turn out well will make life happier 
[...] while if they turn out ill they crush and maim happiness; for they both 
bring pain with them and hinder many activities. Yet even in these nobility 
shines through, when a man bears with resignation many great misfortunes, 
not through insensibility to pain but through nobility and greatness of soul” 
(Ethica Nicomachea I, 11, 1100b23-1100b33). Thus, what Aristotelian virtue ethics 
suggests is finding the right attitude to deal with vulnerability, which relates 
significantly to this study’s aim of composing an understanding of self-realiza-
tion that is able to integrate existential vulnerability (see §2.5.2). 
Crucial to the Aristotelian conception of virtue is making the right choices 
and doing the right thing based on the right, i.e., excellent attitude. But for 
people who cannot fully live up to this perfectionist standard, it still remains 
meaningful to strive for virtue and keep aiming to bring their passions un-
der the control of their reason. There are many people, according to Aristotle, 
who know what is the right thing to do and struggle to make the right choic-
es, against their emotional inclinations to do the opposite. Such people are in 
possession of “continence” rather than virtue. But this is still to be morally 
preferred over people failing to do the things they know are right, because they 
are unable or unwilling to control their wrong inclinations. Thus, everyone 
should be able to take part in the good life and reach a degree of eudaimonia 
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that fits their capacities and situation. This part of Aristotle’s view can serve to 
mitigate the supposed perfectionism his ethics has sometimes been criticized 
for, although his standards for true or “full” virtue remain quite high.       
In sum, Aristotle’s perspective on virtue has much to offer that is relevant 
in light of the account of self-realization developed in this study. In particular, 
its understanding of the moral agent as a socially embedded creature, its con-
text-sensitivity, its life-course perspective and its suggestions for finding a sat-
isfactory attitude towards inescapable existential vulnerability stand out in this 
regard. However, the question might be raised whether virtue-ethical ideas like 
Aristotle’s are at all applicable to our lives in the complex world of late moder-
nity. Isn’t speaking about virtue these days rather archaic and strange? Doesn’t 
it require the relatively ordered and organized context of the Greek polis, the 
context in which Aristotelian virtue ethics arose, and the corresponding meta-
physical assumptions about the place of humans in a meaningful cosmic order 
that provides them with their natural telos? In the next section, I discuss the 
neo-Aristotelian view of MacIntyre (1984), who gives an account that defends 
the application of virtue ethics to the context of modernity. 
8.3.2 Alasdair MacInt yre: 
Virtue as a remedy for the modern “moral crisis”
In §2.3.6, MacIntyre’s (1984) dramatic estimation of the moral outlook of the 
modern world was already discussed. His remedy for what he perceives as the 
severe uprooting and moral crisis of modernity is a return to a neo-Aristotelian 
virtue-ethical perspective. This revival should restore our connection with the 
traditional sources of our moral intuitions and help us escape the modern dan-
gers of relativism and emotivism. In MacIntyre’s view, the process of modern-
ization led to the loss of precisely those shared conceptions of common goods 
of the community and the individual that formed the basis of the traditional 
virtue ethics, together with the idea of a telos of human life. Admittedly, virtues 
have been reformulated in modern terms, but not in very helpful ways accord-
ing to MacIntyre. On the one hand, modernity has conceptualized virtues in 
terms of their contribution to authentic self-creation, opposing the restrictions 
of conventional morality. This, for instance, is the view underlying Nietzschean 
philosophy, pleading for a strong, authentic, self-loving agent transcending the 
limitations of narrow, common morality (see §7.3.2). On the other hand, virtues 
have been regarded as those dispositions that help people conform to the moral 
rules. This conformism is perceived as necessary to guarantee people’s moral 
behavior in a world characterized by the unending struggle between atomistic 
human actors securing their self-interests and survival. This view underlies 
a wide variety of philosophical views, from Hobbes to contemporary commu-
nitarians. In both cases, however, MacIntyre observes that the context that 
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originally provided virtues with meaning has disappeared. MacIntyre’s own 
approach therefore defends a return to traditional Aristotelian virtue ethics, 
where individual virtuousness presupposed a context of shared goods, and the 
good of the individual automatically coincided with the good of the community. 
MacIntyre (1984) defines virtue as, “an acquired human quality the posses-
sion and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are 
internal to practices and the lack of which prevents us from achieving any such 
goods” (p. 191). His account of virtue rests upon three important conceptual 
ideas: the concept of a practice, the narrative unity of human life, and the moral 
tradition. I will discuss his ideas about these concepts in turn.
• Practice: MacIntyre’s (1984) understanding of virtue presupposes the con-
text of a practice in which virtues are exercised. A practice is a mode of 
human activity in which certain common goods are at stake, goods that 
virtues help us to realize. However, not just any activity qualifies as a prac-
tice. The concerned activity has to be a social and collective undertaking 
forming a coherent unity which is meaningful to those involved. It has to 
aim at the realization of a certain good that is internal to the practice, a stan-
dard of excellence flowing from the practice itself. An illustration of a prac-
tice relevant to the context of aging might be caring, in which virtues like 
compassion, patience, helpfulness, modesty, kindness, thoughtfulness and 
generosity are exercised (Tronto, 1993; Held, 2006; Blum, 1994). Typically, 
a practice transcends the existence of the individual agent. It precedes the 
individuals involved in it, and will continue to exist after they are no more. 
Moreover, engagement in a certain practice requires the subordination of 
purely individual preferences to the authority of the history and tradition of 
the practice, and to those already experts in it. It involves a willingness to 
learn and to realize one’s potentials in service of the realization of the com-
mon goods that are inherent in the practice.
• The narrative unity of human life: Although practices provide the necessary 
context for any virtue according to MacIntyre (1984), a practice does not in 
itself offer an overarching criterion to rank possibly conflicting or incom-
patible requirements posed by different virtues in the context of multiple 
practices. We thus need to choose between conflicting demands of a certain 
situation and decide which virtues will help us realize the overarching goal 
of a good life. Yet according to MacIntyre, our lives cannot qualify as good 
if they lack a unifying framework of meanings and values. Such an overar-
ching picture of what matters most to us in our lives should help us make 
the proper choices and bring order into the demands at stake in a given sit-
uation. MacIntyre understands this framework of meaning in terms of an 
integrated unifying narrative. The problems associated with such a notion 
of narrative integration or unity have been encountered in §5.2.3.   
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MacIntyre’s assumption that life needs to be experienced as a unified whole 
is based on the Aristotelian premise that a virtue is a disposition that is 
supposed to be consistently present in one’s actions throughout life, not 
just contingently exercised in a particular situation. Only in light of the nar-
rative unity of our lives can we apply a hierarchical ordering to our values 
and strivings, and experience our lives as sufficiently coherent to count as 
meaningful. Although this view implies a strong emphasis on the narrative 
competence of the moral agent, it is important to note that MacIntyre per-
ceives moral agents as only the co-authors of their own narratives, and not 
independent, self-determining authorities. Our lives are always embedded 
in a context (social, historical, cultural) and shaped by the tradition to which 
we belong. 
• The moral tradition: According to MacIntyre, we can never decide solely as 
individuals what is the good life for us, or exercise the virtues in pursuit 
of such a life. Who we are and what we value and strive for, is mediated by 
social and cultural moral traditions. It matters for our own conduct and 
life choices whether we are born in a culture that values familial honor and 
loyalty over individual self-realization, or in a culture that values hard work, 
frugality and modesty, or in a culture that celebrates individual freedom. 
Our placement in the socio-cultural context in which we are born provides 
our individual life with its moral starting point. Our individual existence 
forms the embodiment of a social and moral identity (or several identities 
in different contexts) which has (or have) been shaped by the traditions that 
form the background of our lives. For MacIntyre,  virtues play a key role in 
sustaining vital traditions that provide our lives with historical context and 
with the relevant common goods to be strived for.   
MacIntyre is well aware that his view regarding the role of moral tradition 
is strongly at odds with the dominant individualism pervading our modern 
societies. He states: “From the standpoint of individualism I am what I my-
self choose to be. I can always, if I wish to, put in question what are taken 
to be the merely contingent social features of my existence” (MacIntyre, 
1984, p. 220). This individualist standpoint is something MacIntyre strong-
ly denies. We cannot detach who we are from our social and historical roles 
and the background of our moral tradition. We cannot even be called selves 
without acknowledging the fact that we are bearers of that tradition. 
In sum, MacIntyre (1984) provides an account of virtue that is “modernized”, 
insofar as it no longer presupposes Aristotle’s metaphysical framework, which 
has become an anachronistic curiosity to the modern mind. His emphasis on 
practice is interesting, since it enables a concretization of how virtue is devel-
oped and sustained in human lives. However, his focus on the moral tradition 
and the quest for narrative unity are still relatively conservative and monistic, 
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which makes a connection to the reality of late modern moral pluralism more 
problematic. I therefore proceed to discuss a view of virtue ethics that aims to 
accommodate moral pluralism. 
8.3.3 Christine Swanton: Pluralistic virtue ethics
According to Swanton (2003), modern virtue ethics has been “rightly praised 
for taking seriously the richness and complexity of the moral domain, for its 
sensitivity to context and situation, and for its skepticism about the codifiability 
of ethics” (p. 9). Nevertheless, Swanton believes modern virtue ethics should 
enlarge its scope by incorporating pluralism in several ways. Swanton advocates 
a pluralistic understanding of the virtue concept itself, but her pluralism also 
extends towards an attempt to integrate insights from other strands of moral 
philosophical thinking that are usually perceived as mutually exclusive. The 
pluralism of her view seems promising when it comes to adapting virtue ethics 
to the context of late modernity. Four elements of Swanton’s view merit particu-
lar attention for this study’s purposes: 1) her focus on the responsive character of 
virtue; 2) her preference for a realistic rather than an idealistic or perfectionistic 
account of virtue; 3) her focus on pluralism at multiple levels; and 4) her sugges-
tion of theoretical resources for the integration of existential vulnerability. I will 
discuss these aspects in succession: 
1. Responsiveness and virtue
Swanton (2003) defines virtue as, “a good quality of character, more spe-
cifically a disposition to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field 
or fields in an excellent or good enough way” (p. 19). In this definition, we 
see the notions of responding and acknowledging occupying a central place. 
The field(s) of virtue is (or are) interpreted in a broad way as the situation(s) 
requiring a moral response. Swanton argues that the good life has both 
“prudential” components, which pertain to personal flourishing and sat-
isfaction, and components of “moral meritoriousness”, which pertain to a 
“consistent appropriate responsiveness to the demands of the world” (Swan-
ton, 2003, p. 59). These two types of components may be in tension, and the 
criterion for a virtuous life is that it succeeds in harmonizing the tension 
between the “demands of the self” and the “demands of the world”. How-
ever, Swanton emphasizes that the gap between the two will not be closed 
completely.
A certain situation may require several, sometimes conflicting virtues at 
the same time. For instance, experiencing one’s partner suffering from 
Alzheimer’s disease places older people in a situation where multiple vir-
tues are called for: care, patience, trust, respect, but also self-care and as-
sertiveness. Some of the demands raised by this situation flow from the 
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needs of the other or the outside world, others flow from the needs of the 
self. Both types of demands need to be acknowledged in order to arrive at 
the desired virtuous attitude in confronting a given situation. In Swanton’s 
view, the criterion for virtue is an appropriate response to the demands of 
the world as well as the demands of the self. The adequacy of the response 
cannot be captured in any universal guideline for action, for it depends on 
the situation and needs to be decided upon in an intersubjective process of 
attunement requiring much moral sensitivity for the needs of others and 
of the self.
By emphasizing that the self is a relational entity, involved in a social world 
of multiple bonds and responsibilities that require a proper response, Swan-
ton’s (2003) analysis accords with my reflections on the role of socializing 
influences on identity (see §4.2.2; §5.3.2). Our relations with others enable 
the process of development of virtue, but they can also stand in the way by 
placing contradictory demands or strains on the individual. Importantly, 
Swanton argues that the way in which we respond to the demands made 
by a situation defines who we are as an agent. The virtuousness (or lack of 
virtue) of our character disposition is manifested in the way we respond to 
the demands of the situation. This understanding of virtue related to iden-
tity echoes the previously discussed view that our moral identity and moral 
agency presuppose the desire to remain self-constant, i.e., to live up to our 
commitments to others and thereby to ourselves (Ricoeur 1992; see §5.5). 
Swanton’s (2003) analysis seems consistent with this analysis, because she 
underscores that our virtuous response to a certain situation is an expres-
sion of our motivation to be a certain person. As I understand it, this mo-
tivation defines what Swanton describes as the demands of the self. These 
demands need to be answered, but this process of self-realization has to be 
combined with a proper response to the demands of the world. 
In the example sketched above, where someone is confronted with a part-
ner diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, this person may be dedicated to 
the promise to care for her partner “till death parts them”. Expectedly, this 
commitment defines her identity and thus poses demands on her to hon-
or it. But the situation may also make other demands; adult children, for 
instance, can argue that they have a shared responsibility to assure proper 
care for both parents, that motivations of protection or safety should prevail 
and that the sick parent should therefore be placed in an institution. More-
over, the demand to take into account the perspective of the sick partner/
parent and the need to respect his autonomy as far as possible also deserves 
to be reckoned with. Whereas the concerns of the patient and the children 
may be at odds with the demands of the self of the wife/mother, it is clear 
that they present legitimate demands that should be answered as well, if the 
situation is to be handled virtuously.
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Although Swanton (2003) emphasizes the importance of a virtuous moti-
vation in moral agents, her account differs from the agent-centered account 
of Slote (2001), who argues for excellent motivation as the basic criterion 
of virtue. Swanton (2003) wishes to incorporate other factors besides mo-
tivation in her view, thereby aiming to do some justice to the situationist 
critique mentioned earlier (§8.2). In Swanton’s view, the criterion for moral 
rightness of action is whether the target of the relevant virtues is appropri-
ately met. What the situationist critique teaches us, in Swanton’s view, is 
that an excellent motivation is not the only relevant factor to be taken into 
account to assess virtue, because situational influences can sometimes out-
weigh motivations. The fact that in a practical context of action our virtuous 
motivation is vulnerable to being overruled by situational circumstances, 
however, need not deny the value of virtue ethics as such. Swanton just 
advocates a more modest and realistic view of how virtuous motivation and 
situational influences both decide how our moral behavior will turn out in 
a specific situation. 
2. Realism and constraints on virtue
Since Swanton is well aware of the many difficulties people can meet in 
their search for virtue, she strives for a realistic, rather than perfectionist 
account of virtue. Generally speaking, Swanton advocates a view in which 
the criterion of virtue is seen as relative to the situation and the capacities of 
the agent. This has the advantage that no one is principally excluded from 
the realm of virtue; virtue is not something restricted to moral “saints” or 
“heroes”. Swanton (2003) suggests a “threshold conception” of virtue (p. 
63), in which the criterion is not some high idealistic standard of perfec-
tion, but the adequacy of the response to the demands at stake in a specific 
situation. What qualifies as virtuous and what is regarded as good may thus 
vary considerably depending on the context, according to Swanton’s view. 
Life circumstances, expectations, value orientations, social relationships, 
external conditions, et cetera, all influence what can be called good in a 
certain situation. One of the interesting consequences of this view is that it 
allows for life-phase specific (constellations of) virtues and goods, which is 
a relevant point from the perspective of aging. Swanton herself points out 
that what is virtuous behavior for a younger person may not be so for an 
older one, and vice versa.
Swanton’s realism implies that acquiring and exercising virtue can be com-
plicated by many different factors. These factors include structural features 
of one’s cultural and societal context, or parameters set by the social roles 
one is expected to fulfill, or a person’s psychological outlook. For example, 
it would be more difficult to enact the virtue of generosity if one is not per-
ceived by one’s social and cultural surroundings as the kind of person who 
has something valuable to offer. Likewise, standing up against an injustice 
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may require different types and expressions of courage from the position of 
a member of an oppressed minority than from the position of a well-mean-
ing outsider. Finally, being very self-centered would complicate acquiring 
virtues like magnanimity or care. 
Although Swanton argues for a realistic and context-dependent account 
of virtue, her view is not relativistic in the sense that any disposition can 
count as a virtue. Swanton suggests the application of a “constraint” on 
virtue, in which only agents showing a sufficient amount of psychological 
health and stability can qualify as virtuous. In her view, most contemporary 
accounts of virtue fail to offer a satisfactory understanding of the role of 
psychological factors in attaining virtue. She thus advocates an account of 
virtue that is based on acknowledging the complexity of human psychology. 
In order to accomplish such an account, Swanton suggests that virtue ethics 
should adapt to contemporary insights on psychological health and pathol-
ogy. Swanton draws her inspiration for the criteria of psychological health 
which a virtuous agent in her view should possess from several psychoan-
alytic thinkers such as Winnicott (1965) and Horney (1950), but also from 
Nietzschean philosophy. These sources provide a much more complex and 
nuanced understanding of human nature than Aristotle’s traditional natu-
ralist metaphysical view, which is an advantage when it comes to adapting 
virtue-ethical thinking to the reality of late modernity. 
Among the criteria for psychological health formulated by Nietzsche and 
post-Nietzschean psychologists that Swanton (2003) applies are, for in-
stance, a realistic image of one’s own strengths and weaknesses, the ability 
to maintain meaningful social relationships, the ability for life-affirmation 
and a sense of self-love. The latter is particularly important in Swanton’s 
view, because she argues that a healthy form of self-love should be a part of 
the profile of every virtue. Swanton’s “constraint on virtue” holds that, if an 
attitude or motivation does not spring from a sufficiently healthy psycho-
logical outlook along these lines (for instance, if it is associated with a nar-
cissistic personality disorder, chronic resentment and hostility towards the 
world, or a pathological desire to harm others), it cannot qualify as a virtue.
3. Pluralism
Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of Swanton’s account is her dedi-
cation to pluralism on multiple levels. In contrast to the classic eudaimonic 
view of (neo)-Aristotelianism, which regards the promotion of flourishing 
to be the sole and quintessential purpose of a virtuous life (see §8.3.1), Swan-
ton believes other goods besides human flourishing are relevant for virtue 
as well. Importantly, this means that Swanton aims to enrich her virtue-eth-
ical perspective with insights from other moral philosophical approaches 
(such as Kantianism or Nietzschean ethics) that are usually perceived as 
conflicting or mutually exclusive. Though her focus remains virtue-ethical, 
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she nevertheless wants to acknowledge the rightful claims of other moral 
theories. Any monistic conception of ethics is thus criticized by Swanton. A 
monistic conception of ethics bases what counts as right or virtuous on one 
single rationale, be it maximal promotion of value (in consequentialism), 
love or care (in forms of relational ethics), respecting moral status (in Kan-
tian approaches), expression of authentic moral strength (in Nietzschean 
approaches), or contribution to human flourishing (in eudaimonic virtue 
ethics). Swanton’s pluralism affirms my earlier statement that the three 
forms of ethics – universalist, personalist, particularist – distinguished by 
Gewirth (1998) (see §4.2.1), with their corresponding goods, all deserve to 
be given their proper due in my reframed interpretation of self-realization. 
In contrast to monistic theories, Swanton’s (2003) view emphasizes that a 
virtue-ethical theory should not only be pluralistic regarding the goals to be 
strived for, i.e., bases of moral responsiveness, but also regarding the modes 
of moral responsiveness. In eudaimonist approaches, the only mode that 
seems to be acknowledged is promotion (of human flourishing). However, 
Swanton argues that a pluralism of goals also calls for a pluralism of viable 
modes of responsiveness. Depending on the characteristics of the situation 
drawing the response, other modes of moral responsiveness may be in or-
der, such as respecting or honoring moral status, loving or being receptive 
of affective bonds, or expressing creative engagement with one’s life. Every 
virtue has a complex profile, a constellation of multiple modes of moral 
responsiveness that are relevant to the situation. 
An important implication of the pluralism Swanton advocates in her ap-
proach to virtue is that a good life does not automatically equal a flourishing 
life. The fact that other goods and strategies are also acknowledged to play a 
role in a virtuous life implies that life need not be (fully) flourishing to qual-
ify as good (as eudaimonism implies). In fact, many situations in our lives 
may restrict our chances for flourishing. However, even a non-flourishing 
life can still qualify as meaningful or admirable, for instance, and therefore 
qualify as good. In the example of the woman whose partner suffers from 
Alzheimer’s disease, her own well-being and self-realization are likely to 
suffer from the unfortunate condition of her husband, which will result in 
a less than flourishing life. But because she honors the demands of love and 
care constituted by her relationship with her husband in an excellent way, 
in Swanton’s account her life can still be seen as virtuous. 
4. Virtue and existential vulnerability
Swanton’s sensitivity to the complications that confront moral agents striv-
ing to lead a good life makes her view particularly apt to offer a perspective 
on self-realization that acknowledges and integrates existential vulnerabil-
ity. In formulating the point of departure of her account of virtue ethics, 
Swanton underscores right away that many possible obstacles threaten the 
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ideal-type of virtue usually presented in moral philosophy. In this light, she 
argues that “[...] due to evil, catastrophe, and vulnerability, strategies for 
attaining the goals of personal self-realization and meeting the demands of 
the world cannot be assumed to coincide” (Swanton, 2003, p. 14). Swanton 
thus seems acutely aware of the way our lives are inevitably imbued with 
what I have termed existential vulnerability, which is inherent in human 
existence (see §2.4.6). In my interpretation, her view rightfully acknowl-
edges that moral agents are living in a world full of complexities and con-
tingencies. Their striving for self-realization is fundamental to their good 
lives, but the demands of the world may complicate or impede this striving. 
Swanton’s doctrine that virtuousness requires realizing a healthy equilib-
rium between seemingly opposing poles, suggests that living a virtuous, 
moral life is always a complicated balancing act. We cannot change or deny 
the fact that our lives are liable to existential vulnerabilities and other situ-
ational influences, but we can maybe develop an attitude that helps us deal 
with them in a satisfactory way. 
Returning to my earlier example, being confronted with a diagnosis of Alz-
heimer’s disease certainly qualifies as an instance of existential vulnera-
bility, both for the person involved and for his partner or children. There 
are many emotional states that are possible in initial response; “negative” 
states such as denial, anger, sadness, despondency, but also more “positive” 
ones such as love, care, dedication, et cetera. It is likely that these states will 
all be experienced along the way of accepting and integrating the situation 
in one’s life. What seems to matter is which states and inclinations define 
our response to this instance of existential vulnerability in the long run. It 
seems obvious that remaining stuck in anger or denial is not going to lead 
to a viable way of dealing with the situation. Yet, if we succeed in finding a 
livable balance between sadness, anger, injustice, care, love, acceptance of 
the inevitable, et cetera, this is likely to contribute in a positive way to our 
experience of the quality and meaning of life. This expectedly facilitates 
an “excellent or good enough”, i.e., virtuous, way of responding to the de-
mands of the situation. Having developed a virtuous character disposition 
may thus significantly increase this possibility, although no guarantees can 
be given of course. 
In sum, Swanton’s work suggests that virtue consists in finding an excel-
lent or good enough way to respond to the demands placed by a situation. 
Her realistic perspective offers a welcome differentiation from Aristotle’s 
supposed “perfectionism”. Her acknowledgment of a diversity of goods, 
moreover, seems more capable of accommodating the reality of late mod-
ern moral pluralism than the more conservative approach of MacIntyre 
(1984) that presupposes a hierarchy of shared common goods delivered by 
the moral tradition. Nevertheless, an omission in her perspective is that it 
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gives relatively little attention to the importance of a life-course perspective, 
and shows little sensitivity for the relation between our virtuous character 
disposition and the narrative coherence of our lives and identities. A satis-
factory conception of virtue in the context of this study would do well to re-
tain these two aspects from the views of Aristotle and MacIntyre, which are 
especially relevant from the perspective of aging, yet combine them with 
the realistic and pluralistic orientation of Swanton’s account.    
8.4 virtue in the conte x t of Aging
Throughout this chapter, I have repeatedly suggested that a virtue-ethical per-
spective has a specific relevance in the context of aging, given its focus on a 
life-encompassing process of self-realization and the openings it offers for in-
tegrating existential vulnerability in our lives in a meaningful way. Surprising-
ly, however, gerontological research applying the language of virtue to aging 
well, seems relatively scarce. I will focus on three examples here. The first is a 
chapter by May (1986) in the volume What does it mean to grow old? Reflections 
from the humanities (Cole & Gadow, 1986). The second is a chapter by Ruddick 
(1999) in the volume Mother time. Women, aging and ethics (Walker, 1999). The 
third example is the quite extensive body of wisdom-literature in gerontology. 
Although not explicitly focused on virtue, this field of research can also be 
interpreted as congenial to the virtue-ethical discourse. 
1. May (1986) discusses the virtues and vices of the elderly. He argues that 
older people should be taken seriously as full members of the communi-
ty, which implies that they should also be treated as moral beings whose 
behavior may be approved or reproached in a moral sense. Although this 
may seem like an obvious statement, it is not. Particularly in the context 
of professional care, where there is an inevitable power imbalance between 
professionals and clients, all too often older people are consigned to the 
status of a passive recipient of caring services, rather than as full-fledged 
moral agents with an active responsibility for their own lives. This has an 
alienating effect, for the power imbalance between professionals and cli-
ents is not easily redressed, and can even be reinforced by what May calls 
‘the professional ethical ideal of philanthropy’ (p. 45). 
Instead of trying to secure the moral status and dignity of the elderly by 
proclaiming the importance of respecting their autonomy, ethicists and 
gerontologists should focus on questions of character and virtue instead, ac-
cording to May. His argument for this is similar to the one about existential 
vulnerability advanced above; precisely because the elderly face ‘the ordeals 
of sickness [...] infirmity, and fading powers’ (p. 49), they need strength of 
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character to endure them. Relevant virtues discussed by May include cour-
age, patience, simplicity, benignity, integrity, wisdom, and finally, hilarity. 
The last mentioned virtue may sound odd and a little out of place given the 
‘ordeals’ mentioned earlier, but describes a type of ‘humored detachment’ 
that can emerge in people who have been through a lot. May emphasizes, 
however, that none of these virtues develop automatically in the process 
of aging or are exclusive for elderly. Rather, they require perseverance and 
often struggle. But the effort of acquiring the virtues pays off because it en-
ables people to address life’s challenges, not as instrumental problems to be 
managed, but as existential events to be integrated in their life narratives.  
2. Ruddick (1999) raises the question which virtues may be of relevance in the 
context of aging. This question could elicit two kinds of answers: it could 
be argued that some “classical”, general (Aristotelian) virtues, such as tem-
perance, courage, friendship, or practical wisdom, obtain a specific inter-
pretation or substance in later life; or it could be argued that there are some 
special virtues that acquire relevance particularly in the context of aging. 
Ruddick argues in favor of the second option. 
The concept of virtue that Ruddick uses is rather inexplicit. She only states 
that her conception of virtues is relational. This qualification implies that 
virtues are not seen as individual character dispositions, but believed to 
emerge from relations between interdependent and principally vulnerable 
people. Ruddick’s view is based upon feminist insights about the funda-
mental importance of care relationships – such as those between mother 
and child – in human life. It remains unclear, however, how this view re-
lates to the assumptions about individual self-realization and maturation 
that underlie most traditional conceptualizations of virtue ethics. 
Ruddick highlights two examples of virtues that she perceives as particu-
larly valuable from an aging perspective. The first is the capacity to forgive 
and let go of bitterness and regret, which she connects to the importance of 
“life review” and the Eriksonian goal of ego-integrity, or acceptance of how 
one’s life has turned out. The second is the capacity for what she calls wise 
independence. This includes both upholding one’s self-directing capacities 
and acknowledging one’s limitations in this regard, and being able to ac-
cept needed assistance with an attitude of graciousness. Apart from these 
two virtues, Ruddick also mentions curiosity, capacity for pleasure and de-
light, concern for others, (self-)acceptance, appreciation, hopefulness and 
“energetic anger” as virtues that have a special or heightened importance 
for aging individuals. Importantly, Ruddick refutes the idea that it is overly 
demanding to expect virtuousness from older people. She does recognize, 
however, that virtues of older people commonly valued by others, such as 
productivity, independence or self-sufficiency, mirror the problematically 
stereotypical and ageist understandings of later life, also discussed in the 
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context of cultural narratives in §3.3.4. Ascribing these virtues to later life 
may have detrimental consequences for aging people, forcing them into a 
framework of productivity, health and activity that is burdensome for those 
unable to live up to its standards. 
Ruddick also denies that age-related deterioration, a reality for many older 
people, makes it problematic to speak about virtues in the context of aging. 
While severe mental retardation can impede the capacities that make ex-
ercising virtue possible, this is only an expression of a vulnerability that is 
intrinsic to the human condition as such. The risk of diminished capacities 
thus threatens potentially all agents striving for virtue, not only older peo-
ple. Moreover, mental incapacity connected with the aging process usually 
only endangers the efforts to exercise virtue slowly and gradually, which 
still makes it possible to speak of virtues in the context of aging. 
3. Given the fact that the Aristotelian virtue-ethical tradition already saw 
(practical) wisdom as one of the most predominant virtues, it seems logical 
to present wisdom studies in gerontology as an application of virtue-ethical 
thought to the domain of aging. This field of study draws on a long history 
of ideas that associates wisdom specifically with later life. The connection 
between wisdom and old age occurs in different cultural, philosophical and 
religious traditions throughout the world. A notable example voicing this 
standpoint in the Western philosophical tradition is Cicero’s De Senectute 
(1467/2002). However, it is generally agreed that aging (reaching a higher 
chronological age) as such does not provide any guarantees for wisdom. 
As Aristotle argued with regard to virtue, old age and in particular the life 
experience accompanying it should be seen as a necessary, but by no means 
a sufficient condition of wisdom.
Definitions of what wisdom amounts to are either based on (historical) ex-
emplary figures that in most people’s opinion could be considered wise, 
such as Jesus or Buddha, or extracted from a variety of wisdom traditions 
existing in human history, or constructed by probing people’s opinion on 
what wise conduct would be in a particular (hypothetical) situation. Char-
acteristics associated with wisdom that most conceptualizations have in 
common include, for instance, the capacity for tolerance, the capacity to ac-
cept uncertainty, the capacity for empathy and compassion towards one’s 
fellow (human) beings, and the desire to transcend self-interest and con-
tribute to the common good (Edmondson, 2015). These characteristics lend 
themselves easily to interpretation in virtue-ethical terms, since many of 
them are derived from classic virtue-ethical traditions like the Aristotelian. 
Much of contemporary wisdom research in gerontology has been done from 
a psychological perspective, for instance, by Baltes and his colleagues in the 
Berlin Wisdom Project (Baltes, 1991; Baltes & Smith, 1990; Baltes et al., 1990; 
Baltes & Staudinger, 2000), or by Ardelt (1997, 2003, 2011) who developed 
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a three-dimensional wisdom scale consisting of cognitive, reflective and af-
fective dimensions of wisdom. Generally speaking, these studies see wis-
dom as a personality characteristic rather than something that might vary 
from one context to the next. Wisdom is also treated as an ideal-type that in 
its full form is not expected to occur very frequently in practice. The studies 
by Baltes, Ardelt and their colleagues seem predominantly oriented towards 
measuring the psychological characteristics that individuals possess or may 
develop throughout life, which enable them to act in a manner that is con-
sidered wise. It is an important merit of the discussed approaches that they 
emphasize wisdom as a capacity that need not diminish with age, and may 
in fact even increase. However, the focus in psychological approaches to wis-
dom lies predominantly on improving the sophistication of measurement 
instruments, rather than on philosophical reflection about wisdom and its 
associated virtues.    
By contrast, the perspective on wisdom that is presented by Edmondson 
(2009, 2015) seems to show more congeniality with the philosophical vir-
tue-ethical perspective I have discussed. Edmondson (2015) conceives of 
wisdom in traditional Aristotelian terms as a set of “interlocking ethical, 
emotional and social practices, both tacit and explicit, making possible re-
sponses to other people, to oneself and to profound problems of human 
existence; questions without predetermined answers” (p. 91). Edmondson 
suggests a social understanding of wisdom in which it is not perceived as an 
individually measurable personality characteristic, but as something that 
emerges from a social, hermeneutic process in which people share their in-
sights and life experiences to reflect on what would be wise to do in a given 
situation. Like MacIntyre (1984), she contends that wisdom is something 
that is embedded in human practices of daily life from which it cannot be 
isolated. This view has implications for her approach to wisdom research, 
which does not include measurement scales, but ethnography, observation, 
and listening to older people’s life stories. 
Edmondson’s (2015) socially embedded conceptualization of wisdom pres-
ents it as something modest instead of spectacular, flexible instead of fixed, 
something that emerges from social interactions in the daily lives of peo-
ple. Her view of wisdom is practical and dialogical, and strongly focuses 
on processes of deliberation. Acknowledging this wisdom that many older 
people have to offer, despite its modesty, could potentially have profound 
societal, cultural and even political implications for the position of older 
people. Such recognition could enhance the general status attributed to old-
er people in our society, and give them the opportunity to participate fully 
as moral agents in the community. In this regard, Edmondson’s perspective 
on wisdom and meaning in later life has much to contribute to the develop-
ment of moral agency-enhancing cultural counter narratives.  
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8.5 evAluAtion of the discussed virtue Accounts
This chapter has discussed the third thread that weaves the fabric of self-re-
alization discourse, namely, virtue. A selection of three different accounts of 
virtue(-ethics) have been covered. In this section, I evaluate the merits of these 
different approaches to virtue, to come up with an account that accommodates 
the reframed view of self-realization advanced by this study. As in the previous 
two chapters, this study’s account of virtue will have to be able to fit the outlines 
of the view of narrative identity and moral agency on which my suggestion for 
a reframed account of self-realization relies. As mentioned in §8.2, generally 
speaking, views of virtue are well-equipped to match the socially embedded, 
embodied, reflexive and narrative conception of the self that this study has 
taken as its underlying anthropological framework (§4.2.2; §5.3). As observed 
in §4.3.2, the concept of virtue is undervalued in late modern self-realization 
discourse, with its one-sided focus on (problematical interpretations of) auto n-
omy and authenticity. Virtue therefore has a particularly relevant contribution 
to make in light of my attempt to reframe the late modern understanding of 
self-realization. In particular, virtue-ethical views are more sensitive than tra-
ditional autonomy and authenticity views to the socially embedded nature of 
human existence. This means that the conceptualization of virtue needs less 
adaptation on that point to match the perspective of the current study. Further 
advantages of virtue-ethical thinking for this study’s view are its flexibility and 
context-sensitivity, and its emphasis on a life-course perspective in ethics. A 
final important point to mention is that virtue-ethical perspectives appear to 
offer particularly important resources for an account of self-realization that is 
capable of integrating existential vulnerability in a meaningful way, another 
requirement I have formulated for the current study’s interpretation. 
Despite the merits of the virtue-ethical perspective, however, two potential 
problems with virtue, identified in §8.2, need to be remedied for a satisfactory 
account of virtue in the context of this study. First, some interpretations of 
virtue ethics harbor a problematically essentialist, naturalistic and/or objec-
tivist understanding of the purpose of human life and of the (common) good. 
Second, some accounts of virtue can give rise to conventionalism and tradi-
tionalism, whereas the view advanced by this study necessitates a perspective 
in which the given socio-cultural and moral horizon, the “status quo”, can be 
critically encountered and, if necessary, resisted by moral agents striving for 
self-realization (see also §7.3.4, §7.5). Let me now evaluate the three selected ac-
counts of virtue for their strengths and weaknesses along the discussed lines. 
• Aristotle, it was said in §8.3.1, provides my account of virtue with a valuable 
starting point, given his focus on moral agents who, embedded and situated 
in a moral community, strive all their lives towards realizing what, given 
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their nature, constitutes the best life (Ethica Nicomachea). By virtue of its 
emphasis on the social embedding of moral agents, Aristotle’s interpreta-
tion of self-realization offers an important argument against the critique 
that self-realization discourse implies a solipsistic self-absorption and is 
therefore unable to address moral issues. Aristotle’s sensitivity to context 
is also shown in his emphasis on the right mean that separates the virtues 
from excesses and defects, which he sees as dependent on the practical cir-
cumstances in which the virtue is exercised. Moreover, his virtue ethics 
clearly has a life-encompassing scope, which as mentioned is important 
given this study’s focus on aging and its narrative conception of identity. 
Perhaps the most important contribution of Aristotle to the concept of vir-
tue advanced in this study, however, is his view of how virtues can help us 
relate to the inevitable existential vulnerability of life. In my reading, what 
Aristotle suggests is a manner of relating to inevitable existential vulnera-
bility in a way that is different from both denial and rejection (characteristic 
of age-defying narratives, see §3.3.3) and passive surrender (characteristic 
of decline narratives, see §3.3.2). “Nobility and greatness of soul” (in other 
words, virtue) apparently help people to endure adversities with gracious-
ness without losing their soul or (in more modern terms) their character 
or selfhood. This suggests an opening towards finding a satisfactory way 
of integrating existential vulnerability in one’s life, without compromising 
or having to give up on self-realization: namely, that developing and main-
taining relevant virtues, as a way of self-realization, can be of assistance in 
this regard. 
What distances Aristotle’s virtue account from the view of virtue I am envi-
sioning is of course his premodern metaphysical worldview, which means 
that the application of his views suffers from the first problem that I have 
identified above. He assumes that self-realization takes place in a cosmical-
ly ordered world, in which human beings have their naturally predefined 
place that defines the best possible life or highest moral purpose for them. 
An account of virtue presupposing such a naturalistic and pre-given con-
ception of the good seems a poor match with the reality of the late modern 
world. After all, in late modern circumstances, what is considered good 
has become individualized. Moreover, people live in a situation of moral 
pluralism where the good has to be constantly intersubjectively negotiated, 
without a self-evident authoritative meaning-framework or moral tradition 
to fall back on (see §2.3.2). A satisfactory conceptualization of virtue in the 
context of this study will have to be able to take these points into account, 
but Aristotle obviously cannot assist us here.   
• MacIntyre’s (1984) view, not surprisingly given his intention to revive Ar-
istotelian ethics in a modern context, shares many of the valuable charac-
teristics of Aristotle’s account. MacIntyre’s rejection of the dominant mod-
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ern view that presents individuals as the autonomous, self-determining 
sculptors of their own lives shows close similarities with my own critique 
against such an atomistic self-concept (see §2.5). By acknowledging the im-
portance of social, contextual and historical embedding of the individual, 
MacIntyre’s view seems to be concordant with the perception of identity 
that this study advances (see §4.2.2, §5.2, §5.3). 
Furthermore, for my purposes, MacIntyre’s emphasis on the narrative uni-
ty of a life provides a particularly useful angle to interpret the development 
of virtues. By focusing on the narrative coherence of a life, which he sees as 
a requirement for the development and exercise of virtues, MacIntyre’s view 
seems a natural match with a view of aging as a lived experience through 
time (Baars, 2012a). Though his interpretation of narrative integration 
seems problematically oriented towards culmination, a view I would like 
to nuance (see §5.2.3), his focus on the relation between the identity-con-
stituting and meaning-making function of narrative on the one hand, and 
virtue on the other, remains noteworthy. Also, MacIntyre’s (1984) notion 
of a practice, although too complex to do justice to in my brief discussion 
of his view, has important merits for this study’s purposes. His concept of 
practice in particular underscores that self-realization, as was also argued 
in §4.2.3, should be situated in the context of concrete human activities, 
which together form a meaningful framework that suggests which good to 
strive for in life. 
Despite these strengths, however, MacIntyre’s account suffers from both 
general problems that were identified above, which suggests that what this 
study’s conceptualization of virtue may retain from his view needs to be 
complemented with other insights. First, with regard to the issue of essen-
tialism/naturalism/objectivism, MacIntyre’s idea of an intrinsic common 
good to be strived for in virtuous practices raises questions. For MacIntyre, 
like Aristotle, what constitutes a good is to a large extent given by something 
that transcends the individual. Granted, MacIntyre substitutes Aristotle’s 
premodern idea of a cosmic order of the universe with the more modern 
idea of the moral tradition as the primary provider of the good. However, 
in an era that celebrates autonomy and authenticity as guiding moral val-
ues, a view of virtue that makes the (common) good dependent on a giv-
en cosmic order or tradition, seems to become increasingly problematic. 
Such a view seems to leave insufficient room for the good to be defined on 
the basis of individual aspirations and self-appropriated value orientations. 
The latter view, however, is an important premise underlying the autonomy 
and authenticity threads I have discussed in chapter 6 and 7. This study’s 
envisioned account of virtue should be able to acknowledge the value of 
this premise. However, MacIntyre perceives individualism and individu-
alization primarily as a danger to the moral outlook and social cohesion 
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of society, not as something that could also potentially be valuable. In this 
sense, his account of virtue ethics is unsatisfactory for my interpretation of 
self-realization, since the latter also wants to do justice to the intuitions of 
the autonomy and authenticity threads (see chapters 6 & 7). 
One might raise the objection that MacIntyre’s notion of a moral tradition 
as the provider of the good can also be perceived in intersubjective rather 
than objectivistic terms. This view would imply that moral agents engage 
in constant deliberation and dialogue about what constitutes the good for 
them. Although this interpretation is certainly more in sync with the view 
advanced in this study, and MacIntyre’s view in principle does not rule out 
such an interpretation, in the end his account still remains problematically 
prone to moral monism instead of moral pluralism. There is another possi-
ble counterargument to my charge that MacIntyre’s view does not acknowl-
edge the valuable intuitions of the autonomy and authenticity threads: 
namely, that MacIntyre’s critique seemingly only targets the essentialist, 
narcissistic version of authenticity that has been rejected in this study (see 
§7.2; §7.5). But even when authentic personhood is conceived as a social and 
moral practice (as this study suggests, see §5.3.2 and §7.5) it seems hard to 
combine with MacIntyre’s view that only the moral tradition, and not the 
individual as well, can be the source of moral good(s). 
The second general problem concerns the charge of conformism or tradi-
tionalism. Because of his emphasis on the formative role of moral tradi-
tion, MacIntyre’s view shows a lack of attention to the possible necessity of 
challenging or transforming the status quo of one’s existing socio-cultural 
context. For this reason, the value of resistance against oppressive forms 
of practices that constitute our social identities, which is emphasized in 
Lindemann Nelson’s (2001) theory about cultural (counter) narratives (see 
§3.2), is difficult to combine with the virtue account that MacIntyre (1984) 
suggests. My critique of MacIntyre’s position in this sense echoes the one 
against C. Taylor’s (1991) view of authenticity (see §7.3.3; §7.5), which also 
seems to underestimate the dangers of conformism. 
• Compared to Aristotle (Ethica Nicomachea) and MacIntyre (1984), Swan-
ton’s (2003) view of virtue seems to offer a more useful point of departure 
when it comes to escaping the problems of essentialist, naturalistic and/or 
objectivistic interpretations of the good. Admittedly, Swanton develops a 
rather dense and sophisticated theoretical argument, which makes it diffi-
cult to assess the concrete consequences of her view in practical situations. 
Nevertheless, her argument that a viable conceptualization of virtue can be 
combined with a plurality of goods conveniently suggests that virtue need 
not be in conflict with purposes of self-realization that are suggested by 
autonomy and authenticity. For example, her view lays a strong emphasis 
on the basic importance of self-love for virtue, which can accommodate the 
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Nietzschean value of self-affirmation ascribed to authenticity (see §7.3.2). 
Also, the fact that in her view this self-love should always be interpreted in 
conjunction with an equally valued concern for the other (called “universal 
love” by Swanton), supports my reflections about the necessity of self-cons-
tancy as a weak substantive criterion for autonomy (see §6.6). Swanton’s 
sensitivity to other goods and values, including those underlying authen-
ticity and autonomy discourses, makes her view more favorable in compa-
rison to MacIntyre’s, whose conceptualization of virtue seems inimical to 
these discourses. Modeling my conceptualization of virtue on the pluralis-
tic outline advanced by Swanton should therefore make it easier to arrive at 
a view of self-realization in which the threads of autonomy, authenticity and 
virtue all occupy an equally valued place. 
As seen in §8.3.3, another advantage of Swanton’s pluralism is that her rec-
ognition of a variety of goods besides optimal human flourishing enables us 
to see how lives that, due to confrontation with existential vulnerability, are 
not (currently) flourishing may still be called good or virtuous. This is an 
important merit because it suggests the possibility of an account of self-re-
alization in which existential vulnerability is recognized and integrated as 
part of a good life. It also implies that Swanton’s view could be particularly 
relevant when applied to aging. Her focus on a diversity of goods opens the 
possibility that an old age that is not “successful” in the conventional way 
may nevertheless be meaningful or admirable. In this sense, applying her 
ideas to the conceptualization of virtue and self-realization helps strength-
en the critique against age-defying cultural narratives with their superficial 
and one-sided notion of success in aging (see §3.3.3). 
Regarding the issue of integrating existential vulnerability, Swanton’s view 
has another (related) merit, which she shares with Aristotle. This is the fact 
that the realism and modesty of her view enables a great sensitivity for the 
uncontrollable contingencies and existential vulnerability we are confront-
ed with in life. As discussed, she argues that virtue implies constantly re-
fining our ability to respond in the most fitting manner to the demands of a 
given situation. This feature of her view is valuable because it suggests that 
a virtuous middle road can be found between the options of passive surren-
der to existential vulnerability (suggested by decline narratives) and denial 
or rejection of existential vulnerability (implied by age-defying narratives). 
The emphasis on responsiveness in Swanton’s account of virtue may thus 
be a useful entry to a view of self-realization that enables a meaningful in-
tegration of existential vulnerability.  
When it comes to the problem of conformism, Swanton’s account remains 
too theoretical and abstract to properly judge her position in this regard. 
What seems important though, is her emphasis on how virtue-ethical 
self-realization can never solely be about the self and its inner states. Her 
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view implies, in my interpretation, that we are inevitably engaged in a social 
practice with others. This embedding urges us to involve ourselves in a con-
stant process of negotiation between demands of the self and demands of 
the world. What Swanton (2003) therefore advocates is a virtue-ethical form 
of “dialogic” ethics (p. 266), where constant deliberation among agents is 
required to decide how the demands of a situation are most virtuously met. 
It seems to me that such a dialogic ethics principally includes the possibil-
ity of conflict and resistance, which would provide at least some safeguard 
against the dangers of conformism and traditionalism. 
Despite the valuable resources that Swanton’s view offers for modeling my 
suggested conceptualization of virtue, it should be emphasized that com-
pared to Aristotle and MacIntyre her view lacks the sensitivity for narrativi-
ty and life-course temporality that is highly important from the perspective 
of aging. In particular, it remains unclear how she perceives the develop-
ment of virtues over time, which is an important aspect for my purposes, 
since I have presented self-realization as a lifelong process of moral self-de-
velopment.   
8.6 conclusion: towArds virtue As 
At titudinAl concre tiz Ation of mor Al Agency
After evaluating the merits and limits of the accounts of virtue, the time has 
now come to reflect on which conceptualization of virtue would be most suited 
to the reframed understanding of self-realization and its constitutive concepts 
developed in this study. Based on what has been discussed so far, the account of 
virtue that I propose should have at least the following characteristics: 
• The understanding of virtue should retain the premise that moral agents 
are socially embedded, which is shared by all discussed accounts of virtue. 
This view also implies that the self-realization of moral agents is not seen as 
a self-centered, narcissistic undertaking but as a process shared with others 
and taking place in the context of social practices.
• The account should emphasize the fact that virtuous living implies a life-
long process of moral self-development, that acquires guidance from the 
value orientation underlying the narrative of a human life (as MacIntyre 
(1984) points out) and requires continuous attention and maintenance 
through practice (as Aristotle (Ethica Nicomachea) underscores). Virtue in 
its ideal-typical form is thus regarded in terms of a lifelong process of mat-
uration and acquiring (practical) wisdom.  
• It should offer room for a plurality of goods that are acknowledged as rele-
vant for a virtuous, i.e., good life, including those associated with the auto n-
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omy and authenticity threads of this study’s conceptualization of self-reali-
zation. Monistic and perfectionist accounts of virtue should be replaced by a 
pluralistic and realistic interpretation, for which Swanton’s (2003) approach 
offers welcome theoretical backing. 
• The account should perceive virtue in a responsive manner (inspired by 
Swanton), which implies that self-realization should be conceived as a pro-
cess of constantly refining our way of responding to the demands confront-
ed in a situation. Virtue is then interpreted in terms of finding the right 
attitude towards whatever may cross one’s path, including contingencies 
and instances of existential vulnerability. 
• It should not answer the question of what is right or good by the applica-
tion of any naturally given or objective standard. Instead, what is right or 
good should be context-dependent, and perceived as constantly negotiated 
and reflected upon in a hermeneutic, dialogical process. This hermeneutic 
process should either take place between moral agents or through self-re-
flection and internal dialogue within moral agents themselves. 
• The understanding of virtue should acknowledge the moral value of indi-
viduality, while remaining aware of the fact that this individual is socially 
embedded. By insisting on the moral primacy of the individual, the deeper 
roots of the liberal spirit that gave rise to modern interpretations of self-re-
alization are given their proper acknowledgment. At the same time, a virtue 
interpretation that acknowledges the moral value of individuality still re-
mains able to criticize – in line with MacIntyre (1984) – liberalism’s modern 
aberrations. 
• Integrating the moral value of individuality in this suggested view of 
virtue includes valuing the particularity and uniqueness of each mor-
al agent and their life story, recognizing and respecting their room for 
self-realization, and their authentically appropriated value orientation, 
which ideally finds its concrete expression in autonomous action.  
• Acknowledging the moral value of individuality also implies taking into 
account that the relation between the individual moral agent and their 
socio-cultural context may be full of tension. In the view this study sug-
gests, a virtuous life should include the possibility of distancing oneself 
from one’s social embedding, of criticizing or rejecting the status quo of 
a given moral tradition and emancipating oneself from one’s context by 
challenging the rules and norms of one’s moral community.   
What image of virtue can be extracted from the outlines of this envisioned view 
summed up above? It becomes clear that virtue, in the context of my reframed 
conceptualization of self-realization, is best regarded as the attitude, or set of 
attitudes, that people ideally develop throughout their lives which helps them 
realize the purpose I have defined for self-realization: the optimal fulfillment 
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of our potential for moral agency, i.e., the enactment of our moral identity in 
practice. It thus seems most viable to advance an account of virtue as the con-
cretization in practical attitudes of our striving for moral agency; the dispositions 
we develop to help us realize a good life, with and for others, in accordance with 
our highest aspirations and best capacities, as full participating members of a 
society/community.  Developing virtuousness would then be seen as a process 
creating strong and resilient moral agents, able to confront the complexity and 
uncertainty of life, instead of being perplexed and impotent in the face of it. 
What could such a conceptualization of virtue mean for aging? How could it 
contribute to the narratives of becoming advanced in this study? It is tempting, 
perhaps, to try to formulate a set of later-life virtues: an orderly catalogue of atti-
tudes that one should develop throughout life in order to increase one’s chances 
for aging well. It would not even be all too hard to suggest candidate virtues for 
such a catalogue, as Ruddick (1999) has attempted to do for instance (see §8.4). 
Practical wisdom would probably score high for many people (including my-
self) as a virtue relevant for later life, as would loving self-acceptance, generativ-
ity, patience, equanimity, vital involvement, et cetera. However, the conception 
of virtue as the attitudinal concretization of moral agency, as defended in this 
study, should make us hesitant to formulate any such catalogue. The emphasis 
on responsiveness and pluralism that my account draws from Swanton (2003) 
implies that what is virtuous is ultimately decided in the context of a concrete 
situation that calls for our appropriate response. What the relevant virtues for 
later life are, cannot be decided by drawing up a catalogue, for without the 
context of a specific life situation to which an individual moral agent should re-
spond, such a catalogue would always remain somewhat arbitrary. Defending a 
dialogic, hermeneutic form of virtue ethics, wherein what constitutes the good 
is constantly negotiated in an intersubjective process of deliberation, implies 
that the virtues that contribute to the practice of aging well in a given situation 
can only be decided by sensitively probing the characteristics of that person 
and that situation. Thus, how the suggested account of virtue as the attitudinal 
concretization of moral agency could work out can only be clarified by illustra-
tive case examples, in full awareness that other case examples could emphasize 
other virtues, and that no definitive set of virtues for later life can be settled 
upon. Let me conclude with one such case example.  
Imagine a woman who has struggled with the societal norms of feminine 
appearance all her life. Her mother taught her that taking good care of one’s 
appearance was a sign of self-respect. As an adolescent, she was an introvert 
and insecure about her looks. She would always try to adapt as much as possi-
ble to how her peers dressed, spending a lot on clothes and make-up. During 
college, this pattern continued, although she grew increasingly uneasy about it, 
a feeling she could not put into words at that time however. She fell in love with 
a young man and after some time, they got married and started a family. When 
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her children grew older she went to nursing school and started working as a 
nurse. Throughout adulthood, she kept putting great efforts into managing her 
physical appearance, which ensured her feeling of self-worth. At the same time, 
she developed a growing interest in feminism, which made her critical about 
the societal norms prescribing women to subject themselves to the dictates of 
the “male gaze”. In her work, she decided to specialize on adolescent girls with 
eating disorders, whom she saw suffering from the pressures of societal beauty 
ideals. Under the influence of her engagement with feminist groups, she devel-
oped an increasing desire to devote less attention to her appearance and value 
herself (and be valued by others) for her other qualities. Yet in her relationship 
with her husband, she could not bring herself to lower her efforts regarding 
her looks. This caused conflicting feelings within herself that she found diffi-
cult to share with her husband or friends. When physical signs of senescence 
started to appear – wrinkles, spots, dry skin – these were hard for her to accept, 
even though she reproached herself for her own disgust of them. One day, she 
discovered a new spot on her skin, which proved to be a melanoma. Due to 
the medical treatments that followed, she developed severe facial neuralgia. 
Because of the pain, she could no longer cover up stains and wrinkles with 
facial creams and make-up. This initially made her feel uneasy and ashamed, 
but when she realized that other people did not approach her differently for it, 
she gradually learned to accept the situation, joke about it and relativize her life-
long preoccupation with beauty products. Interestingly, her relationship with 
her husband also changed following her illness. They were able to exchange 
thoughts and feelings that were of deep importance for them, which they had 
never spoken about before. She felt a deeper connection with her spouse than 
she had in many years. 
From my perspective, this story can be seen as the enactment of a narrative 
of becoming at the level of an individual life, in which the three threads of 
self-realization as (re-)conceptualized in this study – individuating autonomy, 
authenticity as a social and moral practice, and virtue as the attitudinal concret-
ization of the striving for moral agency - can all be detected. We encounter a 
woman who throughout life, in interaction with her social surroundings, strove 
to live in accordance with what she has gradually appropriated as valuable (a 
condition for both individuating autonomy and authenticity as a social/moral 
practice). Her value-horizon was in continuous development, however, and in 
each new life phase, context and situation, she had to navigate the demands 
placed upon her anew and find the best way to respond (which calls for virtue as 
the attitudinal concretization of moral agency). She encountered difficult con-
flicts between the good she endorsed (a well-cared for physical appearance as a 
sign of self-respect, emancipation and freedom from oppressive male norms, 
care for the victims of societal norms in her work with anorexic girls, et cetera.). 
The socio-cultural context in which her life was situated both restricted her 
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moral self-development (for instance, through the norms of beauty she found 
it difficult to withdraw herself from) and enabled it (for instance, through the 
insights and reflections evoked by her work and her engagement in feminist 
groups). As a result of the existential vulnerability she encountered in her ill-
ness, she was stimulated to further explore what was of true importance for 
her, which led to an unexpected but pleasant transformation of her relationship 
with her husband and her friends. 
Interpreted from the virtue-ethical perspective elaborated in this chapter, 
the crucial element of this story is how her striving to live a good life, in ac-
cordance with the aspirations and value orientations she gradually appropriat-
ed, depended on the disposition she developed in responding to what she was 
confronted with. In other words, what was crucially important for her living 
a good life with and for others was her attitude, towards herself, towards her 
(social) environment, and towards the broader socio-cultural context in which 
she lived. Inasmuch as she succeeded in her striving for self-realization, this 
occurred as a result of practicing and thereby constantly further developing 
virtues like self-knowledge, loving self-acceptance, attunement with others, as-
sertiveness, independent thinking, mildness, humor, the ability to put things 
in perspective, et cetera. These virtues enabled a lifelong process of becoming 
herself.     
To conclude my reflections in this chapter, let me recall that the initial pur-
pose of creating a reframed interpretation of self-realization was to provide a 
viable resource that could support the creation of more satisfactory cultural 
narratives about later life. These cultural counter narratives are supposed to 
enhance people’s moral agency (see §3.2.4). In order to do so, it is important 
that older people are ascribed with the status of full moral personhood, so that 
they will be given the opportunity to participate as full and equal members 
of our society or community instead of estranged bystanders, as Honneth’s 
(2008) theory about reification helped to underscore (see §3.2.3). Realizing this 
participation is conditional on our perceiving older people as members of our 
moral community. This, however, is complicated by problematic cultural mas-
ter narratives about later life that result in a dynamics of “othering”, placing 
older people outside the realm of “normal” adulthood (see §3.3.4). The focus of 
virtue ethics on the interplay between the self and the world conveniently em-
phasizes the mutual interdependence of individuals in creating and maintain-
ing a moral community. Incorporating older people as full members in such a 
community will greatly enhance their ability to realize their potential for virtue. 
It is my contention that this will not only benefit the lives and experiences of 
meaningfulness of the older people themselves, but also help society to make 
better use of the now often underused potentials older people have to offer. 
This relevance of the virtue-ethical thread of self-realization discourse in 
the context of this study is beautifully illustrated by the following quote from 
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Agich (2003), whose phenomenological account of autonomy was discussed in 
§6.4.2. He states: “If frail or incapacitated elders appear powerless, they can be 
empowered precisely by acknowledging them as responsible persons. Taking 
elders seriously as members of the moral community of persons entails un-
derstanding their obligations and responsibilities as well as respecting their 
rights. Failure to criticize elders may subtly remove them from the realm of 
persons; unlike very young children who are not usually held accountable for 
their actions, elders are morally mature. To respect elders as moral agents, 
then, requires that we acknowledge and support the virtues and character traits 
appropriate to being old. Virtues involve not only the habits that allow us effec-
tively to exercise our agency in the world, but comprise the strengths that grow 
out of adversities and sustain us through them” (Agich, 2003, p. 79). 
In sum, in the attempt at remedying the shortcomings of the late modern 
self-realization discourse, and reframing this discourse so that it may serve as 
a valuable resource for much-needed moral agency-enhancing cultural counter 
narratives about later life, I contend that we would do well to integrate insights 
from the virtue-ethical discourse. The conceptualization of virtue I have sug-
gested is able to contribute to both required conditions I formulated for such 
narratives: it lays strong emphasis on the potential for growth and maturation 
throughout life, and it suggests a viable way of dealing with existential vulnera-
bility without succumbing to passive surrender or denial and rejection. 

Chapter 9 – Conclusion 
9.1 introduction
Every philosophical project, I presume, starts with surprise or wonder. One 
encounters a situation, observes its features, and asks oneself: how can this 
be so? Why and how did the current state of affairs come about? How can I 
analyze this in a fruitful way? What concepts and ideas help me improve my 
understanding? 
As discussed in chapter 1, the initial experience of wonder fueling my inter-
ests in this study, began when I encountered the paradox between the negative 
cultural associations about later life during my first tentative exploration of the 
socio-cultural discourse on aging, and my own experience that older people 
often represent valuable exemplars of life experience, virtue, insight, resilience 
and wisdom. I was struck by the fact that on the socio-cultural level, late mod-
ern society seems to associate aging predominantly with physical or mental 
decline and the inevitable nearing of death, a period causing nothing but trou-
ble both for individuals and for society at large. Where, in the existing cultural 
narratives and imaginaries that I encountered, were the possibilities for growth 
and flourishing in later life that I sensed in abundance in the older people that I 
knew personally? The absence of acknowledgment for the possibility of growth 
and flourishing in later life seemed even more pressing given how late moder-
nity, as I knew it to be observed by many thinkers, tends to place such strong 
emphasis on a moral ideal of the good life relying on self-development and 
personal growth – the moral ideal that I have described in terms of self-realiza-
tion in this study. Why, I asked myself, did the dominant moral self-realization 
discourse of late modernity not extend towards the cultural perception of aging 
and later life? Why were older people excluded from this dominant moral ideal 
of the good life? And, more importantly, could the late modern self-realization 
discourse be usefully reframed to serve as a moral ideal for later life, thereby 
possibly contributing to a remedy for this adverse socio-cultural positioning 
of older people? These were the questions that initially gave rise to this study. 
What followed was a journey through philosophical and gerontological resourc-
es, a journey which sometimes resulted in exciting discoveries and insights, 
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and at other times led to frustrating bumps in the path and unexpected turns of 
the road. Having come to the final chapter of this study, it is now time to draw 
up the balance of this journey. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, a short recapitulation of the line of 
argument presented in chapters 2 through 8 is given (§9.2). Second, the con-
clusions that can be drawn in order to answer the questions raised in the prob-
lem statement in §1.3 are discussed (§9.3). Importantly, this study has predom-
inantly been oriented towards making a case in favor of (a reframed version 
of) self-realization. However, the self-realization discourse in general tends to 
raise some diverse and important objections and critiques. Though these objec-
tions have implicitly been addressed at several points throughout the previous 
chapters, they deserve some more structured and explicit attention before the 
close of this study. Therefore, the chapter goes on to summarize six of the most 
dominant critiques (§9.4), namely the elitism/demandingness objection (§9.4.1), 
the self-centeredness objection (§9.4.2), the social justice/social structure objection 
(§9.4.3), the Western/masculine bias objection (§9.4.4), the moralism/paternal-
ism objection (§9.4.5), and the cognitive ability objection (§9.4.6). As any sci-
entific and philosophical endeavor, this study too, leaves important questions 
unanswered, asking for further attention from researchers in the future. Some 
of the most pressing of these unanswered questions are also discussed (§9.5). 
The chapter closes with some final, more personal reflections on the theme of 
aging, self-realization and cultural narratives about later life (§9.6).  
9.2 recAPitul Ation of the Argument
This study started with the guiding question: Can the late modern discourse 
of self-realization be reframed in such a way that it can serve as a resource for 
meaning-generating cultural narratives about later life in late modern circum-
stances? (see §1.3). This phrasing indicates the broad concern of this study with 
a combination of four themes: self-realization, aging, cultural narratives and late 
modernity. 
In the process of philosophically investigating this question, several related 
sub-questions and issues had to be unraveled, discussed and answered. 
• In the first place, a proper clarification of the guiding themes of this study 
was needed. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 were predominantly dedicated to the task 
of answering both descriptive and interpretative questions about these 
guiding themes. 
• Second, it was necessary to provide sufficient underpinning for the claims 
assumed in the guiding research question and furthered in this study. The 
first claim, discussed in chapter 2, was that the late modern interpretation 
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of self-realization needs reframing on some crucial points, in order to be 
adapted to the context of aging. The second claim, discussed in chapter 
3, was that cultural master narratives about aging and later life fall short 
of providing people with satisfactory identification-models and need to be 
complemented with viable counter narratives.  
• Third, the intended reframing of self-realization and its constitutive con-
cepts had to be substantiated by exploring philosophical discourses about 
these themes, and clarifying and criticizing their limitations in the context 
of this study, thereby providing suggestions for better-matching alternative 
interpretations. This was by far the most complex and extensive task in this 
study, undertaken in chapters 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
• Fourth and finally, my philosophical investigation needed to provide a vi-
able argumentation regarding the claim that the suggested reframing of 
self-realization and its constitutive concepts can indeed serve as a resource 
for the meaning-generating cultural narratives about aging and later life 
highlighted in the problem statement. Chapters 3 through 8 have tried to 
provide the building blocks to underpin this claim. This concluding chap-
ter will now draw the argument together in its final form (see §9.3).   
Importantly, these four sets of tasks had to be undertaken in conjunction with 
each other, because it was not always possible to separate them. Let me now 
briefly summarize the course of the argument developed during the investi-
gation.
Chapter 2 sketched the background context of late modernity against which 
this study is situated. In particular, it attempted to clarify the characteristics of 
late modern living and aging, as well as the typical features of the late modern 
interpretation of self-realization. Late modernity was typified as an era advanc-
ing an interpretation of self-realization that focuses on the mastery that self-de-
termining actors strive to exert over their lives, in order to arrive at the optimal 
realization of their self-chosen goals and purposes. Correspondingly, I argued 
that the good or successful life in late modern circumstances is identified with 
a life according to one’s own choices and value orientations. The process of 
identity-constitution consequently gains heightened importance when it comes 
to infusing life with meaning. However, as was mentioned, late modern living 
is liable to all sorts of complex socio-cultural dynamics and influences, which 
makes the striving for self-realization a highly ambivalent and problematic 
undertaking. Subsequently, it was highlighted that in a context of individu-
alization and de-traditionalization, individuals are thrown back on their own 
resources to search for sources of meaning and identity. 
Chapter 3 explored the theme of cultural narratives that also forms one of 
the main elements of the overarching research question. Aided by Lindemann 
Nelson’s (2001) philosophical theory about cultural narratives and counter nar-
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ratives, I discussed the impact of these narratives on the agent’s identity-consti-
tution, which proved to be both inescapable and potentially damaging. Impor-
tantly, we learned that repairing the identity-damage inflicted upon people by 
oppressive and stereotyping cultural narratives requires the creation of cultural 
counter narratives that optimize people’s potential for moral agency. Next, I pro-
ceeded to apply the theory on identity-effects of cultural narratives and counter 
narratives to the context of aging. A dichotomy was suggested between two 
dominant cultural narratives in late modern Western culture with regard to 
aging and later life: decline narratives and age-defying narratives. I also discussed 
how these cultural narratives might impact people’s (aging) identity. Eventu-
ally, I argued in favor of a third category of cultural narratives about later life 
that should be able to remedy the shortcomings of decline- and age-defying 
narratives. The category of narratives of becoming was presented as this study’s 
preferred alternative account of what it means to age well in the late modern 
world. In particular, narratives of becoming were argued to aim at two import-
ant goals: acknowledging the potential for growth and flourishing that later life 
may harbor, and providing people with the resources for a meaningful integra-
tion of inescapable existential vulnerability - resources that were argued to be 
lacking in existing cultural narratives about later life. 
From chapter 4 onwards, the discussion transitioned to more directly ad-
dress the main aim of this study: reframing self-realization and its constitutive 
concepts so that a discourse emerges that escapes the problems of the late mod-
ern interpretation of self-realization. Importantly, this endeavor was undertak-
en specifically to explore whether the self-realization discourse could provide 
possible resources to feed into the suggested alternative cultural narratives of 
becoming. Given the goal to reframe self-realization in a certain direction, the 
first step needed was to gain more clarity about the philosophical history and 
background of the concept, in order to enrich our understanding of self-realiza-
tion beyond the late modern discourse introduced in chapter 2. The philosoph-
ical exploration in chapter 4 presented self-realization as a process of becoming 
the best that is in you, a process of moral self-development aimed at optimizing 
one’s potential for moral agency. It was discussed that what constitutes this best 
in human beings has been interpreted in quite diverse ways during the course 
of Western philosophical history. This richness and diversity of interpretations 
conveniently provided leads for the reframing of self-realization undertaken in 
this study. Eventually, I argued that the self-realization discourse can best be 
understood as a rich and complex fabric of three interwoven threads: autonomy, 
authenticity and virtue. All of these deserve to be given their due importance in 
this study’s reframed account of self-realization.
Before zooming in on each of the three constitutive threads of self-real-
ization in chapters 6 through 8, in chapter 5 I focused on first exploring a 
satisfying conceptualization of personal identity – the expression of the self un-
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derlying self-realization – and formulating an understanding of moral agency 
matching the purpose of this study. Moral agency arose as a quintessential top-
ic both in the discussion of cultural counter narratives in chapter 3, and in the 
discussion of the purpose of self-realization in chapter 4. Consequently, it was 
important to explore this theme in more detail and define a position matching 
the orientation of this study. My first step in chapter 5 was to argue in favor of a 
narrative conceptualization of identity. Expressing this preference for narrative 
views of identity can be seen as part of the reframing of the late modern self-re-
alization discourse. After all, the narrative view provides a welcome alternative 
for the underlying anthropological assumptions of the late modern view that 
were analyzed to be problematic in chapter 2. Choosing a narrative interpreta-
tion of identity proved to have several advantages, since it enabled acknowledg-
ing the social and contextual embedding of our identity, its temporal character, 
its reflexivity and its embodiment. In this study, I have particularly focused on 
those narrative views that helped to illustrate the connections between narra-
tive identity and moral identity. It was therefore crucial to substantiate this link 
between identity and morality, given the conceptualization of self-realization as 
a process of moral self-development as presented in chapter 4. The next step in 
chapter 5 was to connect my reflections on narrative identity and moral identity 
to the theme of moral agency, perceived in this study as the concretization of 
our moral identity-constituting value orientations into our actions. Using in-
sights of Ricoeur (1992) and other discussed thinkers, I composed a complex 
definition of moral agency as the ability to lead a good life, with and for others, 
according to one’s deepest aspirations and best capacities, as full participating mem-
bers of a society/community. 
Having thus delineated my own view of moral agency and its connections 
with narrative identity and moral identity, I could proceed to discuss in suc-
cession the three constitutive threads of self-realization discourse identified in 
chapter 4 in the following chapters: autonomy (chapter 6), authenticity (chapter 
7) and virtue (chapter 8). In each of these chapters, the discussion of the thread 
in question followed broadly the same structure. After a general introduction, 
a selection of relevant philosophical views were discussed and then evaluated 
in light of the reframing purpose of this study. The chapters also explored how 
each of these threads has been translated to the context of aging by gerontolog-
ical thinkers so far. Finally, I suggested an interpretation of each thread in the 
context of this study that tried to remedy the identified troubles with existing 
accounts. In particular, I argued in favor of an individuating account of autono-
my, a view of authenticity as a social and moral practice, and a virtue-ethical ac-
count that perceives virtue as the attitudinal concretization of our striving for mor-
al agency in practice. Importantly, these conceptualizations attempt to refute 
certain problematical connections that are assumed as self-evident by more 
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traditional interpretations, such as that between autonomy and independence, 
between authenticity and anti-sociality, or between virtue and traditionalism.    
• Regarding autonomy, the discussion in chapter 6 showed how dominant 
structural hierarchical accounts tend to disregard several facets of auton-
omy that are important given our conceptualization of moral agency. In 
particular, the narrative and contextual embedding of autonomous agents, 
their identification with a certain moral orientation and their relations of in-
terdependence were suggested as vital additions to the autonomy discourse, 
particularly in the context of aging. The interpretation of individuating au-
tonomy proposed eventually aims at combining proper acknowledgment of 
the relational and contextual embedding of the moral agent with a valuation 
of their “becoming individual”, i.e., acknowledging the importance of moral 
self-development for autonomy. Ricoeur’s (1992) notion of self-constancy 
provided a concept uniting both the acknowledgment of our moral relations 
to others, and of the importance of living up to our identity-constituting 
moral engagements. Both were argued to be crucial for a person in order to 
qualify as autonomous. 
• Regarding authenticity, the discussion in chapter 7 identified two general 
problems confronting the authenticity discourse in general: its essentialist 
assumptions regarding the existence of an original “true” self that serves 
as the source of meaning and morality, and its negative attitude regarding 
social influences on our identity-formation. The interpretation of authentic-
ity proposed in this study suggests we retain the valuation of the individual 
moral agent as a source of meaning and morality from classical views of 
authenticity, but reinterpret the authentic self in terms of a social and moral 
practice. Also, it underscores that authenticity requires both the acknowl-
edgment of one’s contextual embedding and social constitution, and the 
ability to criticize and distance oneself from social influences that are not 
beneficial to one’s good life. 
• Regarding virtue, the discussion in chapter 8 showed how virtue ethics pro-
vides a view of self-realization that acknowledges our embedding in social 
practices and communities. Moreover, it was underscored that virtue-eth-
ical perspectives advance the development of certain attitudes in life, for 
instance, by focusing on practical wisdom. The emphasis on the right at-
titude towards what confronts us in life offers convenient possibilities for 
the meaningful integration of existential vulnerability, which is one of the 
focal points for this study. A potential shortcoming of the virtue-ethical 
discourse, however, proved to be a tendency towards conformism and tra-
ditionalism in some interpretations. The interpretation of virtue forwarded 
in this study aims to focus on a lifelong process of moral self-development, 
striving with and for others towards a good life. A plurality of goods is ac-
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knowledged to be valuable in this account, and its focus lies on the recog-
nition of the moral value of individuality, while this individuality is still 
perceived as fundamentally socially embedded.  
9.3 AdvAncing older PeoPle’s mor Al Agency
This study has been a search for an alternative to the late modern conceptu-
alization of self-realization that forms a better match to the context of aging. 
In order to arrive at such an alternative conceptualization, I have been trying 
to reframe our understanding of self-realization and its constitutive concepts. 
I have intended to do this in such a way that the underlying moral ideal that 
fuels the self-realization discourse in general, presenting the good life in terms 
of realizing the best in oneself, remains intact, but is combined with a greater 
sensitivity for the social and contextual embedding of human lives and for the 
fundamental existential vulnerability of the human condition. 
In order to evaluate the results of this study in terms of a reframing of the 
self-realization discourse that can serve as a resource for meaning-generating 
cultural narratives about aging and later life, it is useful to recall the desired 
conditions formulated for: 1) the suggested account of self-realization in the 
context of aging, and 2) the suggested cultural counter narratives of becoming. 
Regarding the conditions for a reframed account of self-realization suitable for 
the context of aging, I argued in §2.5.2 that the late modern interpretation of 
self-realization needed to be adapted so that: 
• The characteristic atomistic anthropology of the late modern discourse 
would be replaced by a view that acknowledges the contextual embedding 
and social constitution of human persons, as well as their fundamental in-
terdependence with other people
• The problematic denial or rejection of the dimension of existential vulnera-
bility typical of the late modern discourse would be replaced by an attitude 
enabling a meaningful integration of existential vulnerability
The exploration of philosophical discourses on self-realization and identi-
ty in this study suggested that there are more possible interpretations of the 
self-realization discourse than just the late modern interpretation. During the 
argument in chapters 4 and 5, I hope to have made it clear that the idea of 
self-realization can in fact be made compatible with an understanding of the 
moral agent as a socio-culturally embedded being, inevitably involved in in-
terdependent relationships with others, its identity co-constituted by a variety 
of social (i.e., relational, societal/structural/systemic, cultural and other) fac-
tors. Moreover, the argument in this study has repeatedly contended that the 
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striving for self-realization need not be in conflict with the reality of existen-
tial vulnerability that we are increasingly radically confronted with in aging. 
Contrary to the late modern interpretation of self-realization which suggests a 
strategy of gaining mastery and control over one’s life, I have claimed that the 
philosophical discourses of self-realization, in particular the virtue-thread and 
some interpretations of the authenticity-thread, provide ample opportunities to 
present the development of a satisfactory responsive attitude towards inescapable 
existential vulnerability as an intrinsic part of the striving for self-realization. 
Such an attitude, which I hope this study has shown to be plausible, provides 
us with valuable resources that are needed for a meaningful integration of ex-
istential vulnerability.  
Regarding the suggested conditions for narratives of becoming, I argued in 
§3.4 that these counter narratives about aging and later life needed to:
• Avoid both the equating of aging with decline (typical of decline narratives), 
and the equating of aging well with staying young (typical of age-defying 
narratives)
• Acknowledge both the potential for growth and flourishing that later life 
harbors, and its radicalized confrontation with existential vulnerability
• Provide resources for a meaningful integration of existential vulnerability 
in one’s biography, so that the sense of coherence of one’s life narrative(s) is 
restored and vital involvement with life remains possible 
The question that remains to be answered is whether the suggestions for re-
framing self-realization and its constitutive concepts in the way described earli-
er are indeed capable of providing us with resources or insights that support the 
creation of narratives of becoming about aging and later life answering these 
three conditions summed up above. Not surprisingly, perhaps, given the line of 
argument followed in this study, I contend that the reframed interpretation of 
self-realization it offers can indeed be helpful here, which means that the guid-
ing research question of this study can be answered in an affirmative manner. 
I will summarize my reasons for this contention below: 
• First, the purpose of self-realization in my reframed articulation (i.e., a pro-
cess of moral self-development aimed at the optimization of one’s potential 
for moral agency), in combination with the emphasis on self-realization as 
a lifelong process of development, strongly underscores that growth and 
flourishing are morally relevant throughout our entire lives. The typical 
rhetoric of becoming who you are symbolizes this emphasis on continu-
ous further self-development. The focus on moral self-development implies 
that my reframed articulation of self-realization is both capable of acknowl-
edging the potential for growth and flourishing in later life, and of refuting 
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the idea that aging should predominantly be seen as a phase of decline. 
Both features can be expected to be conducive to the creation of narratives 
of becoming, because they enable older people to access a dominant cultur-
al ideal of the good life (i.e., self-realization) that remains closed to them 
when we follow dominant cultural master narratives.
• Second, the interpretation offered by this study presents the vulnerability 
of later life not as something to be remedied or rejected, but as something 
that can be integrated in our lives. The idea of self-realization as a process in 
which we strive for a good life with and for others is coupled with a narrative 
and moral account of identity, which emphasizes the importance of integ-
rity, coherence and appropriation of an ethical orientation for a meaningful 
life. This combination implies that the approach to self-realization taken in 
this study enables a sensitivity for the importance of restoring coherence 
and vital involvement with life after being confronted with experiences of 
existential vulnerability. Restoring coherence and vital involvement is sup-
portive of a meaningful integration of existential vulnerability in one’s life, 
which I have defined as an important condition for narratives of becoming. 
• Third, following from the previous point, this study perceives finding the 
proper responsive attitude towards existential vulnerability as quintessential 
to self-realization. Particularly the interpretations of virtue and authenticity 
defended in this study emphasize finding a satisfactory responsive attitude 
towards what confronts us in life. As a result, my reframed articulation of 
self-realization not only acknowledges existential vulnerability as an intrin-
sic part of the reality of living, but also perceives the confrontation with it 
as a potential catalyst for moral self-development, for instance, by increas-
ing our self-knowledge and resilience or deepening our relations to other 
people. This study argues that with such an acquired responsive attitude, 
being confronted with existential vulnerability may in the end even contrib-
ute to one’s growth as a human being, and, if not to one’s flourishing, then 
at least to one’s resilience. Of course, there is no guarantee that this will 
happen, but my reframed self-realization account certainly intends to keep 
this possibility open. In this sense, it also helps refute the idea that aging 
well is only possible within a framework of youth-related values, because it 
insists that value can also be derived from meaningfully dealing with those 
inevitable vulnerabilities and losses that our culture tends to associate with 
aging.
Together, these reflections illustrate the crucial importance of developing and 
maintaining the right attitude for the interpretation of aging well based on 
the self-realization discourse advanced in this study. Regarding the potential 
of growth and flourishing, emphasis is laid on the importance of an attitude of 
vital involvement with our own moral self-development and the identifications 
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and orientations underlying it. It is also emphasized how our involvement with 
our good life should be translated into our concrete choices and actions, in our 
engagement with the ethical aims we have identified with, and in our concern 
for the good of others with whom we are interdependently connected. With 
regard to the meaningful integration of existential vulnerability, on the other 
hand, the emphasis has been on the importance of an attitude of resilience 
towards whatever confronts us in life, an attitude that escapes both passive sur-
render and active denial/rejection. 
During the course of the argument, I have inserted illustrative case exam-
ples suggesting the value of specific attitudes and virtues like loving self-ac-
ceptance, mildness, hopefulness, independent thinking, modesty, self-respect, 
et cetera. In contrast, stagnation, indifference, intolerance and lack of engage-
ment have been mentioned as counterproductive for realizing the purpose of 
aging well. Importantly, however, I have argued against the prescription of a 
catalogue of virtues that sets the standard for the desired attitude in any situ-
ation regardless of the context. Prescribing one specific attitude as a criterion 
for aging well would contradict the hermeneutic, dialogical ethical principles 
advanced in this study. Rather, what constitutes the “right” attitude in a given 
situation is decided in intersubjective hermeneutic practices involving continu-
ous deliberation and attunement, both to one’s own needs and to the demands 
and needs of others involved in the particular situation. 
That said, however, the reframing of self-realization and its constitutive 
concepts advanced in this study does suggest a general direction in which the 
intended attitude for self-realization can be sought. I suggest describing this 
direction with the Aristotelian notion of practical wisdom, as an overarching 
virtuous attitude that helps us develop insight into ourselves and sensitivity to 
our situation, which in turn strengthens the hermeneutic deliberative qualities 
that we need in order to decide our response, and helps us seek the middle 
way between unwanted extremes in our reactions. Supported by the practical 
wisdom we ideally acquire in our striving for self-realization, we can hope to 
optimally realize our personal potential for growth and flourishing, as well as 
integrate experiences of existential vulnerability in our lives, without disavow-
ing their reality and denying the pain they cause, but also without falling prey 
to a permanent loss of vital involvement in life. 
What do these reflections imply for the actual formation of narratives of 
becoming about aging and later life? It means, most importantly, that the lan-
guage of self-realization should be more explicitly welcomed and more actively 
applied in discourses where reflection on aging and later life takes place. These 
discourses, however, are highly varied and manifold. We can, for example, dis-
tinguish the following relevant aging discourses:
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• individual interactions and conversations between people where personal 
expectations and experiences regarding aging are exchanged. These social 
exchanges can either take place amongst the elderly themselves, or between 
individuals of different generations
• social positioning of older people, in which certain roles and possibilities are 
strengthened and affirmed while others are excluded. Examples of such po-
sitioning can be found, for instance, in implicit images of older employees 
by employers, norms regarding clothing or sexuality for older women, ste-
reotypical expectations of dependence and complacency in fragile Fourth 
Agers, et cetera 
• media representations of older people and their experiences, for instance, in 
the way newspapers and television report about them, or the way they are 
pictured in advertising
• artistic representations of older people and their experiences, for instance, in 
films or documentaries, novels, (auto)biographies, painting or sculpture, 
et cetera
• scientific representations of older people and their experiences, as illustrated 
by scientific papers and books, conference presentations, et cetera, but also 
exemplified in the subjects chosen as the dominant research focus by ger-
ontologists and in the allocation of research funds (for example, favoring 
research on healthy aging, active aging, et cetera).
• political and societal representations of older people and their experiences 
exemplified, for instance, in policies regarding pensions or care-arrange-
ments
All these discourses (and others not mentioned here) have their own way of pre-
senting the reality of later life and thereby framing the lives of older people. The 
distinguished discourses are often interconnected or mutually influence each 
other. In their interaction, they decide which dominant images and meanings 
our culture recognizes as valid and credible cultural narratives about later life. 
Thus, following the terminology of this study, the dominance of decline- and 
age-defying narratives relies on a focus on certain themes (and not others!) in 
the variety of late modern aging discourses. Depending on the narrative, these 
themes may include illness, loss, dependence, anti-aging, activity, travel and 
consumption, et cetera. The combination of a certain set of themes mutual-
ly strengthens each other and enlarges the influence of the cultural narrative 
in question. For example, when gerontology focuses strongly on frailty, media 
predominantly show us pictures and stories about dependent older people in 
deplorable situations, and politicians and care-directors simultaneously warn 
about the costs of eldercare rising sky-high, these representations in combina-
tion strengthen (in this case) the force that decline narratives exert on the lives, 
minds and souls of older individuals. 
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Consequently, the effort to challenge and replace adverse cultural mas-
ter narratives by moral agency-enhancing counter narratives (see chapter 3) 
requires adjusting the aging discourse on multiple levels, targeting all of the 
relevant sketched discourses about later life in their mutual interactions. This 
effort to transform existing discourses, as may be expected, is by no means 
an easy process. However, experiences with social groups whose moral agency 
suffers from adverse positioning through cultural master narratives show that, 
while the result may never be completely satisfying or finished, the effort to 
challenge existing cultural master narratives and replace them by more viable 
counter narratives certainly isn’t useless or doomed to fail either. Importantly, 
it is where master narratives show cracks and inconsistencies that the chanc-
es lie to confront them. Such confrontation should lead to the replacement of 
negative elements of the narrative by more satisfactory ones, a process of trans-
formation that can ultimately lead to a strong counter narrative contesting the 
status quo (see Lindemann Nelson, 2001 for some interesting case examples).  
In my view, we should be realistic, but nevertheless hopeful about the op-
portunities to transform existing problematic cultural narratives about aging 
and later life in the direction suggested by my plea for narratives of becoming. 
But given what has been discussed above, this will require substantive efforts 
on multiple levels. After all, multiple discourses have to be made aware of the 
merits of using the language of self-realization (in the reframed interpretation 
proposed here, of course) to arrive at a more viable image of aging well in late 
modern circumstances. It depends on which of the aging discourses we tar-
get, I presume, what the most promising strategy is to influence them. Gen-
erally speaking, the goal is to enrich existing ideas and meanings about aging 
with the ideas and meanings derived from the philosophical self-realization 
discourse advanced in this study. How precisely this should be done and what 
strategies will be successful are questions that can unfortunately not be an-
swered here. In this study, I have just aimed to provide a (hopefully sufficient-
ly convincing) philosophical underpinning for the relevance of my reframed 
version of self-realization. Its translation into practice has to wait for further 
research (see also §9.5). 
In anticipation of the results of such further research, it seems to me, how-
ever, that inspiring examples and role models, as well as good practices of how 
older people’s moral agency can successfully be enhanced are relevant and 
needed at all levels of discourse. We thus need pioneering individuals and prac-
tices that teach us new and previously unthought-of options to enhance older 
people’s opportunities to live “a good life, with and for others, according to their 
deepest desires and best capacities, as full participating members of society/
community” – in other words, we need exemplars of moral agency that show us 
the way towards the creation of  narratives of becoming that strive to optimize 
moral agency for the rest of us. 
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From the recapitulation of the argument of this study in §9.2, advancing 
and optimizing people’s potential for moral agency emerged as a shared central 
purpose for both the account of self-realization as well as the account of narra-
tives of becoming suggested in this study. The concept of moral agency is thus 
a kingpin of my argument. Based on the analysis in this study, I can now for-
mulate four crucial conditions to enable the optimization of moral agency. The 
first two of these conditions, identification and orientation place emphasis on 
efforts undertaken by the individual person to become a moral agent, whereas 
the other two, recognition and participation require efforts on the socio-cultural 
and/or societal level to facilitate individuals in their striving to become (and re-
main) moral agents.      
• First of all, I have repeatedly emphasized the need for moral agents to iden-
tify with a certain image (or rather a dynamic set of images) of who they 
want to be or become. This identification with a “possible self” or set of 
selves is essential for our identity as selfhood and our self-constancy, to use 
the terminology of Ricoeur (1992) that has inspired my view of moral agen-
cy (see §5.4; §5.5). Following from the view of identity I have defended in this 
study, the identification of relevance here does not result in a static fixation 
of oneself on one predefined image of identity, but is a dynamic process that 
gradually and organically takes shape in our lifelong evolving narratives 
about ourselves, narratives that are intersubjectively co-constituted in our 
relationships with others. 
• Second, this identification both enables and relies on a moral orientation, 
a positioning of oneself relative to a horizon of values, as C. Taylor (1989) 
puts it. This orientation enables us to form our aspirations and articulate 
our purposes. The orientation we have appropriated is also what guides 
us when we define for ourselves what we want to remain true to in our 
lives, which is where our orientation interconnects with the identification 
discussed above. The truthfulness to our identity-constituting orientation, 
as encountered particularly in the discussion on authenticity, is an indis-
pensable ingredient of self-realization and therefore crucially important for 
moral agency. 
• Third, arriving at a viable identification and orientation presupposes that 
we are socially positioned as able and worthy moral agents. That means 
that our moral agency crucially relies on processes of social recognition, as 
underscored earlier in the discussion of Honneth’s (1995) views (see §3.2.3). 
The context in which we live our lives should harbor persons, practices, 
systems and structures that are willing and able to acknowledge our valid 
claims to love, respect and solidarity (the values at stake in Honneth’s three 
levels of recognition), which are indispensable for the ethical aim of a good 
life with and for others that underlies moral agency. A context in which 
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one or more of the forms of social recognition is (are) absent or flawed will 
expectedly be an obstacle to the optimization of the development of moral 
agency. 
• Fourth, because self-realization also pertains to the actual translation of the 
value orientations one has identified with into practice, moral agency also 
requires that people are engaged in society and granted the opportunity to 
participate as full members of the communities to which they belong. The 
discussion of Honneth’s (2008) views about reification (§3.2.3) taught us 
how important it is that people are treated not as mere bystanders in their 
own lives. Instead, they should be treated as participants in a shared prac-
tice of striving for a good life together with others. As participants, they are 
granted the ability to influence their own lives, which is crucial in order for 
their potential for moral agency to come to full bloom.   
In conjunction, identification, orientation, recognition and participation form 
the necessary conditions for moral agency, and thereby for the understanding 
of self-realization defended in this study. In order to contribute to the creation 
of viable counter narratives, we should thus strive to influence the opportuni-
ties for moral agency in all four of these domains. Importantly, identification 
and orientation are individual tasks, the success of which rely for an important 
part on the opportunities for recognition and participation that precede their 
exercise. Therefore, initiatives and projects undertaken to optimize older peo-
ple’s moral agency would perhaps be most efficient if they start out by improv-
ing the chances for recognition and participation first. 
9.4 objections to the self-re Aliz Ation discourse
There are several objections that can be directed against the self-realization 
discourse in general. These objections need to be briefly discussed here, in 
order to evaluate whether this study’s reframed conceptualization of self-re-
alization is able to answer them in a satisfactory manner. Six main objections 
to the self-realization discourse are discussed below: that it is elitist and overly 
demanding, only attainable for the “happy few” (§9.4.1); that it is self-centered and 
overly individualistic (§9.4.2); that it neglects the fact that a good life is highly 
dependent on how social structures organize our lives, and whether or not the 
society we live in harbors a practice of social justice (§9.4.3); that it is biased by 
Western and male-oriented values (§9.4.4); that it is moralistic and paternalis-
tic, prescribing individuals a specific moral lifestyle instead of respecting their 
own choices and preferences (§9.4.5); and that it advocates an ideal of the good 
life that presupposes mental health and cognitive ability, thus excluding people 
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who experience disability in this regard, for instance, people with dementia or 
Alzheimer’s disease (§9.4.6). 
9.4.1 Elitism/demandingness objection 
The elitism/demandingness objection accuses the self-realization discourse of 
defending a “high bar” moral ideal, which is believed to be only relevant to a 
minority elite. Thus, only people who are healthy and wealthy, reflexive and 
intellectually highly developed, can afford to engage themselves in activities 
that are conducive to self-realization. Along similar lines, this objection argues 
that self-realization is too demanding for “ordinary” individuals. After all, it re-
quires many capacities (reflexivity, autonomy competencies like self-direction, 
self-knowledge, et cetera) that – it is assumed – are not normally found in the 
majority of people. 
In response to this objection, I would like to emphasize first of all that the 
suggestion that self-realization is not suitable for “normal” people has always 
sounded slightly condescending to me – indeed, the elitist objection seems to 
occupy an elitist position itself in this regard. Though I grant that most people 
would probably not formulate their engagement with existential questions and 
their search for meaning and a good life in terms of an abstract philosophical 
concept like self-realization, this does not mean that the underlying concerns 
expressed by this discourse do not concern them. A basic assumption underly-
ing this study is loosely inspired by existentialist philosophy, which states that 
people have no other option but to engage themselves in a lifelong search for 
meaning and a good life, even if it is acknowledged that the universe they live 
in is not intrinsically meaningful itself. Consequently, what is fundamentally at 
stake in the moral discourse of self-realization – a good life with and for others, 
according to one’s deepest aspirations and best capacities, as full participating 
members of a society/community – is considered relevant for all human beings. 
I should grant those who raise the elitism/demandingness objection, how-
ever, that self-realization discourse makes significant demands on individuals 
which some people in some situations may be unable to answer. However, if 
we consider what is at stake – a good life in the broadest sense of the term – it 
should not really surprise us that the demands are high. After all, a good life is 
something that requires effort, at least if it is conceptualized as transcending 
a superficial sense of “well-being” in terms of positive affect, as used in some 
hedonistic conceptions of the term (Ryan & Deci, 2001). In this study, by con-
trast, a good life is considered to be a complex process of self-development, as 
has also been underscored in eudaimonic conceptions of well-being (Ryff & 
Singer, 2008). The interpretation of the self-realization discourse advanced in 
this study, in particular the virtue-ethical thread, therefore implies a process of 
continuous development and practice. It is fully acknowledged that the striving 
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for self-realization takes place in a complex and imperfect context. What counts 
is that the result of one’s strivings to respond to the demands of the situation 
is optimal given the restrictions of the situation. This criterion should serve to 
illustrate that according to my proposed reframing, though self-realization in-
deed makes demands on people to further their development and continuously 
strengthen their moral agency, it is nevertheless within the reach of many more 
people than the elitist objection would have us believe. 
9.4.2 Self-centeredness objection 
The self-centeredness objection fears that focusing on self-realization will lead 
to moral egoism or a narcissistic self-centeredness, whereby individuals are 
only concerned with creating the circumstances that further their own flour-
ishing. Consequently, it is argued, there is a lack of attention to moral questions 
that require our engagement with the interests of others. This objection there-
fore considers the self-realization discourse to be insufficiently capable of ac-
knowledging the fundamental relational embedding of the human condition, 
by focusing exclusively on the individual capacities for growth and flourishing. 
The self-centeredness objection is addressed at the supposed underlying 
anthropological assumptions of the self-realization discourse. However, as seen 
earlier, the reframed discourse on self-realization that is advanced in this study 
is equally critical of the image of the self-sufficient, atomistic human agent. It 
follows that in my suggested reframing, the agent striving for self-realization is 
never solely concerned with the self, because this self is situated in a social and 
cultural, historical context. Moreover, as I have argued in chapter 5, this study 
defends a view of identity which is intrinsically moral in two senses. First, I 
have claimed, following C. Taylor (1985a, 1989), that our identity presupposes 
the appropriation of a value orientation relative to the moral horizon that forms 
the inescapable background of our lives. Second, following Ricoeur (1992), I 
have claimed that our identity as selfhood always intrinsically presupposes an 
ethical engagement with the good of others. Both arguments make it clear that 
the self-centeredness objection is refuted by the way this study has reframed 
the late modern interpretation of self-realization, to which the objection more 
rightfully applies.  
9.4.3 Social structure/social justice objection
Related to the self-centeredness objection, but addressing it from a different 
angle is the social structure/social justice objection. It argues that our moral 
concern should not be primarily directed at the individual self, as is assumed 
by the self-realization discourse. How could we legitimize a focus on individual 
flourishing, when the world around us is on fire and requires structural mea-
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sures to remedy gross injustices and inequalities? Doesn’t self-realization seem 
an insignificant, self-absorbed and elusive undertaking compared to solving 
“real world problems”? Shouldn’t morality be concerned with the question how 
social justice can be furthered, inequality diminished, and solidarity created, 
thus improving the life conditions of the less privileged in society? 
This objection has a legitimate point, insofar as the self-realization dis-
course indeed places moral primacy on the individual moral agent. This does 
not mean that matters of social justice or the potentially damaging influence 
of social structures are considered unimportant, however. As has been repeat-
edly discussed, this study’s reframed interpretation of self-realization strong-
ly emphasizes the socio-cultural constitution of the individual person, and its 
embedding in a social, historical, cultural and societal context. Hence, this 
account is perfectly capable of acknowledging the importance, indeed, the 
necessity, of creating favorable circumstances under which people are able to 
strive for self-realization, as the emphasis on recognition and participation also 
illustrates. 
Nevertheless, it remains true that the principal focus of the perspective de-
fended in this study is on the development of individual moral agency, not on 
changing social structures. In defense against the charge that the self-realiza-
tion discourse has faulty priorities, however, I argue that the focus on moral 
self-development is legitimized based on the following line of thought. Chal-
lenging and transforming social structures that damage or impede people’s 
chances to lead a good and fulfilling life are rightly underscored as important 
moral goals by the social structure/social justice objection and deserve to be 
taken seriously. However, realizing any social change or transformation re-
quires people who take the lead. Structures are created by people, and can only 
be changed by people. The desired transformation in the direction of more 
humanizing social structures and arrangements requires first of all that people 
are willing to engage with ideals that are representative of the desired “better 
world”. In order to do this, they need to be capable of appropriating an identi-
ty-guiding value orientation and act upon it. It is exactly this process of identi-
fying with a value orientation and expressing this moral identity in actions that 
was argued to be the foundation of moral agency. 
Thus, in order to change and transform damaging social structures, we 
need strong moral agents. Only strong moral agents can unite forces to chal-
lenge adverse social structures, unjust practices and oppressive cultural nar-
ratives. The perspective focusing on social structures tends to reduce moral 
agents to powerless pawns subjected to the overwhelming force of systemic 
powers. I believe this does a fundamental injustice to the potential of human 
persons, paradoxically a potential that is vitally needed to reach the very goals 
the social structure-perspective aims at. The reframed interpretation of self-re-
alization proposed in this study emphasizes precisely the development of the 
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potential for moral agency in individuals that is a “sine qua non” of social 
change.
9.4.4 Western/masculine bias objection
This objection states that the self-realization discourse is based on values and 
capacities that betray a bias towards Western, masculine values. The bottom 
line of this objection is that the self-realization discourse pretends to represent 
a moral perspective with a universal value, while in fact its assumptions are 
based upon the life reality of Western, male, white and upper class persons. 
Consequently, it is argued, the situation of this minority group gains a norma-
tive status, while there are many other people whose lives have very different 
features. The latter’s claim to a good life is denied or marginalized because it 
supposedly does not match the criteria of self-realization.  
The background against which the argument about self-realization in this 
study is situated is the context of late modernity. This undeniably presumes a 
Western, individualized context, since the features that are characteristic of 
late modernity do not apply to more traditional or community-oriented societal 
contexts. In this sense, it is fair to say that the moral discourse on self-reali-
zation advanced here is predominantly applicable to the Western context, and 
therefore, in a sense, biased. Expectedly, however, the experience of aging itself 
will also be very different in other cultural contexts, mainly because different 
cultural narratives about aging abound there. It seems to make little sense to 
try to formulate one overarching moral ideal that could accommodate all these 
very different experiences of aging. The reframing of self-realization advanced 
in this study therefore does not claim universal validity, but aims to provide a 
foundational concept that is capable of stimulating the creation of more nu-
anced and richer cultural narratives about later life in a Western, late modern 
context. 
With regard to the accusation of a masculine bias, it is important to empha-
size that this objection seems to be directed mainly against the late modern 
interpretation of self-realization, which has also been criticized by this study. 
By contrast, my proposed alternative conceptualizations of identity, autonomy, 
authenticity and virtue explicitly strive to accommodate the feminist critique 
regarding the negative influence of neglecting the relational and vulnerable 
dimensions of human existence. Since the interpretation of moral agency that 
is advocated in this study does not resemble the more traditional accounts of 
agency that have been accused of a masculine bias, I believe this study’s re-
framed interpretation of self-realization largely escapes this objection. 
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9.4.5 Moralism/paternalism objection 
The moralism/paternalism objection touches upon a very deep and fundamen-
tal critique that can be made against all normative philosophical projects. It 
is intrinsic to a normative philosophical project that a certain way of living or 
a certain understanding of the good is presented as superior to others. The 
moralism/paternalism objection questions the legitimacy of such superiority 
claims on principled grounds: it argues that there is no good reason to impose 
the particular preferences of one philosopher or one philosophical orientation 
on others, for this will restrict their freedom to choose for themselves. The 
moralism/paternalism objection accuses the self-realization discourse of im-
posing moral self-development on people as a criterion to measure the moral 
quality of their lives. This normative prescriptiveness is perceived as undesir-
able paternalism, which paradoxically also contradicts the fundamental under-
lying principles of the self-realization discourse itself. After all, this discourse 
highly values making one’s own authentic life choices and stimulates one’s 
own reflexive appropriation of an identity-constituting value orientation. 
In a way, the moralism/paternalism objection is understandable and maybe 
even partially legitimate. After all, the self-realization discourse does explicitly 
promote a certain lifestyle aimed at moral self-development and optimization 
of moral agency. Such a life is perceived as ranking higher on the continuum 
between admirable and flawed lives than a life with no moral focus or direction. 
However, as I already suggested in defense of this study’s preference for nar-
ratives of becoming over decline- and age-defying narratives (see §3.4), taking 
a normative stand can be prescriptive in weaker or stronger degrees, which 
influences its susceptibility to the moralism/paternalism objection. This study 
defends a weak substantive normative view (see §6.6), which promotes that 
people strive to form an authentic moral orientation and act upon it, without 
prescribing in detail what this value orientation should precisely aspire to-
wards. Within certain constraints that are suggested by the moral horizon of 
our culture (such as the so-called Golden Rule that restricts the aspirations and 
purposes that are morally acceptable to strive for; see §5.5) this study makes a 
principled choice to advance maximal freedom for individual choice between 
different identity-constituting values, and for the appropriation of an authentic 
lifestyle in correspondence with what the individual agent values most deeply. 
Defending a weak substantive normative position assumes a focus on tran-
scendental conditions of self-realization, instead of on the prescription of con-
crete, strong substantive value orientations. For instance, the self-realization 
discourse presupposes that leading a good life requires certain basic competen-
cies, such as identification with a moral image of who we strive to become, or 
appropriating a certain value orientation. When we assume that leading a good 
life is, in principle, of interest to all human beings, for it would be self-effacing 
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for them to strive for anything that is not good, the “prescription” that people 
acquire the necessary competencies that enable such a good life acquires legit-
imacy. Following this, however, people ought to have the freedom to “individ-
ualize” their self-realization trajectory in their own autonomous, authentic and 
virtuous manner. Consequently, my suggested (re)interpretation of the self-re-
alization discourse is indeed, in a sense, moralistic, but this need not lead to 
paternalism that forces a specified conceptualization of the good upon people, 
as would be the case in a strong substantive approach. 
9.4.6 Mental/cognitive abilit y objection 
The mental/cognitive ability objection expresses doubts whether people are al-
ways capable or in possession of the necessary capacities to engage in self-re-
alization. This objection is of particular relevance when it comes to applying 
the self-realization discourse to the context of aging. If basic cognitive abilities 
start to fail, for instance in the case of Alzheimer’s disease, is it still credible to 
speak about self-realization – or even about the presence of a self?  It cannot be 
denied, of course, that Alzheimer’s disease and other such forms of cognitive 
impairment deeply affect abilities we tend to regard as essential to human per-
sonhood. If we would follow the more traditional accounts of human identity, 
we would have to take the standpoint that people whose cognitive abilities are 
deteriorating lack the constitutive capacities for identity, and thus the indis-
pensable preconditions for moral agency. Consequently, people with cognitive 
impairment would be denied access to the moral ideal of the good life that is 
represented by the self-realization discourse, since the latter strives for optimi-
zation of moral agency. Ultimately, we would then fall back upon the decline 
narratives that we wanted to challenge in the first place by suggesting self-real-
ization as a resource for counter narratives of becoming. We would be forced to 
conclude that in this case, self-realization discourse cannot provide the desired 
perspective on later life, able to integrate both the potential for growth and the 
fundamental existential vulnerability of the human condition, of which Alzhei-
mer’s disease presents an unsettling example.
As argued in §5.3.2, however, the view of identity as a narrative, social prac-
tice endorsed in this study enables upholding the idea that people with Alz-
heimer’s disease, despite their cognitive deterioration, still qualify as persons 
with narrative identities, because they are so held by their social surroundings 
(Lindemann, 2014). In this account, when people lose the capacity to keep their 
own narrative going, it does not mean that their identity-constituting life story 
ends. Others too can help people tell their life story; they can conserve valuable 
memories that slip away from the person originally possessing them. People 
can be recognized for the valuable roles they have played in the past, or be 
supported in occupying or maintaining other social roles in the present. Their 
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social networks can engage in dialogical processes aiming to secure, as much 
as possible, the acknowledgment of who they used to be and who they are now, 
and can strive to help them organize their lives correspondingly.  
Naturally, this will remain an imperfect and incomplete process. This im-
perfection and eroding cohesion of identity is surely one of the losses that cog-
nitively impaired people and their social surroundings will have to deal with. 
But perceiving identity in a wider sense than the strictly individual cognitive 
perspective enables us to see that, though some fundamental capacities under-
lying the personhood sadly disintegrate in the process of Alzheimer’s, other 
identity-constituting elements remain intact, such as the embodied, affective 
or social dimensions of identity. If we view identity as a social practice, these 
elements can provide enough basis to grant people suffering from Alzheimer’s 
disease a continuing narrative identity. 
Yet, claiming that people with Alzheimer’s disease can still qualify as hu-
man persons or selves does not automatically mean that they are capable of 
self-realization as well, of course. It is deeply problematic and may even be per-
ceived as presumptuous to describe the lives of older people surrendered to 
progressive mental deterioration in terms of moral self-development or the op-
timization of moral agency. After all, doesn’t applying the language of self-real-
ization in this case negate the life-reality of people who suffer from Alzheimer’s 
disease, as well as the experience of their loved ones who have to watch them 
“fade away”, as it were, progressively loosing grip on life and on everything 
that used to constitute their identity? I do not deny these problems. Still I wish 
to contend that it would be wrong and unjust to use them as legitimization 
to automatically exclude people with Alzheimer’s disease (or other cognitive 
disabilities) from the realms of self-realization completely. The following two 
reflections elaborate on my reasons for this contention:
• First of all, the narrative conception of identity as a social practice suggests 
that our self-realization does not only rely on our first-person ability to up-
hold an identity or our third-person ability to reflect on who we are. Oth-
ers can assist us in upholding our identities and help us strive for what 
is important for us from their second-person narrative engagement with 
who we are and have been throughout our lives. Importantly, the view of 
Atkins (2008) (see §5.3.3) has taught us that an interaction between first-, 
second- and third-person perspectives is characteristic of everyone’s identity. 
For people whose first- or third-person perspective is weaker, the balance of 
the narrative identity-work underlying the striving for self-realization could 
be covered to some extent by a larger contribution from the second-person 
perspective. 
People with Alzheimer’s disease have a lifelong history of relationships and 
commitments that have made them who they are. They often have a his-
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tory of moral self-development which we can draw on to decide the best 
direction in which to further their chances to lead a good life with and for 
others. It takes great creativity and engagement from family, friends and 
caregivers to figure out which purposes or aspirations are valuable for pa-
tients of Alzheimer’s. But if we take the time and effort to involve ourselves 
in their life narratives, we will probably be able to learn a lot about who 
the person is, and what choices, roles and activities would be most consis-
tent with who they are. Further, we could help them practice these roles 
and activities, adapting our strategy through trial and error if it turns out 
that the chosen road is not advancing people’s experienced quality of life. 
This implies that there are still possibilities to continue a lifelong process of 
self-realization and exercise moral agency even in conditions where people 
suffer from mental or cognitive disabilities. In fact, I think this is precisely 
what many family-members, friends and caregivers try to do in practice, in 
order to include their loved one in the shared practice of striving for a good 
life as long as possible. 
• Second, it is important to reflect on the four conditions of moral agency 
that I have discussed before (identification, orientation, recognition and 
participation) in light of the objection that mental/cognitive deterioration 
automatically diminishes the chances for self-realization. It appears to me, 
namely, that there is much to be improved when it comes to enhancing the 
social recognition and chances for full participation for people with Alzhei-
mer’s disease or other age-related vulnerabilities in contemporary late mod-
ern societies. Anecdotal evidence from my own experience and the stories I 
have heard from caregivers suggests that more often than not, people with 
Alzheimer’s disease are prematurely denied moral agency, for instance, 
by being treated like children or not being spoken to or consulted directly 
about their wishes and aspirations. Also, the cases in which we see people 
with Alzheimer’s disease participating in valued social roles in “normal” 
social life are worryingly scarce. Investing in securing valued social roles 
for these people (or even creating new valued roles for them) would greatly 
enhance their opportunity to exercise moral agency, even if they are increas-
ingly dependent on the support of others for their identification and orien-
tation in the social practice of upholding a moral identity. I suspect that, 
with sufficient time and effort, with an ethical commitment to honor and 
preserve the uniqueness and diversity of people’s life narratives, and with 
some creative out-of-the-box thinking aimed at enabling a more inclusive 
society in which everyone can fully participate according to their own as-
pirations and capacities, there would be many more possibilities for people 
with (cognitive or other) impairments to realize moral agency than is usu-
ally assumed. This should at least nuance the claim of the mental/cognitive 
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ability objection that as soon as mental deterioration sets in, self-realization 
sadly becomes a closed book. 
9.5 unAnswered questions
As any scientific and philosophical study, this study too leaves many important 
questions unanswered. I will summarize some unanswered questions below 
that, in my view, would be valuable research domains for future investigators:
• Although the current study provides plausible philosophical underpin-
nings for the claim that the suggested reframed self-realization discourse 
might serve as a valuable resource for narratives of becoming about aging 
and later life, the question of how such counter narratives can be effective-
ly created still remains open. This calls for interdisciplinary, explorative 
empirical work tracking down the characteristics of good practices and ex-
emplars of moral agency that contribute to challenging existing dominant 
cultural narratives. 
• While the primacy of the moral agent is defended with full conviction on a 
theoretical level, the actual voice of aging/older moral agents is missing in 
this study. Given the complexity of the philosophical argument I was unable 
to include their perspective in the study, with the exception of some anec-
dotal illustrations from my own experience with older people. Nevertheless, 
I strongly feel that the project of this study remains unfinished as long as 
it has not been brought into much closer connection with the living narra-
tives of older people striving for a good life, with and for others, according to 
their deepest aspirations and best capacities, as full participating members 
of a society/community. This calls for narrative research connecting the in-
dividual life narratives of aging individuals to my theoretical/philosophical 
argument. Interesting questions to pursue would be, for instance: How do 
older people experience existing dominant cultural narratives about aging 
in practice? Which virtues and values do older people cherish and strive for? 
How does their autonomy take shape in practice? How have they searched 
for authenticity in their lives? How do they deal with existential vulnerabili-
ty? Which obstacles and dilemmas confront them in their search for a good 
life? These and other questions deserve more attention, from age scholars 
and narrative ethicists alike.  
• I have argued above that remedying the troubles identified with existing 
cultural (master) narratives about later life through the creation of narra-
tives of becoming requires that the multiplicity of existing aging discourses 
is sensitized to the vocabulary of the self-realization discourse. It would be a 
valuable direction for future research in a more practical or applied setting 
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to develop and test concrete interventions based on such vocabulary in the 
context of elderly care or specific domains of policy aimed at older people, 
for instance. One could think of interventions using artistic means to make 
care professionals and managers aware of the potentials for growth and 
flourishing among their elderly population, or projects raising awareness 
in organizations of the underused potentials and experiences of their older 
employees.  
• On a more theoretical level, more research is called for on the relations be-
tween individual, cultural and societal/structural factors that impact peo-
ple’s striving for moral agency or self-realization. The focus in the current 
study was mainly on the interaction between individual and cultural iden-
tity-constituting factors. The impact of societal and structural factors has 
been indicated in chapter 2, but has further remained in the background 
during the main argument of the study. It would be important to devote 
more time and thought to how societal and structural arrangements influ-
ence the process of moral agency-development as conceptualized in this 
study, both on the meso-level of organizations and institutions, and on the 
macro-level of politics and economy. 
• The focus of this study on social recognition and participation in a society/
community as crucial conditions for moral agency suggests a certain so-
cietal ideal, that has remained largely untheorized in this study and thus 
deserves further exploration in future research. I would suggest that theo-
retical and practical perspectives focusing on the need to realize an inclusive 
society can be a valuable road to explore in this regard, both in theoretical 
and practical or applied research projects (compare for instance, my refer-
ence to social role valorization theory in §3.2.3). The ideal of an inclusive 
society pleads for equal participation opportunities for all people regard-
less of their social, cultural or ethnic background, their gender, their age, 
their health status, et cetera. In my perception, the ideal of an inclusive 
society could provide a valuable match with my reframed interpretation of 
self-realization and its constitutive concepts in this study. In particular, the 
advanced view of moral agency, the view of identity as a social and moral 
practice and the suggested interpretations of autonomy, authenticity and 
virtue seem to accord very well with the ideal of an inclusive society . 
9.6 finAl thoughts
I have come to the end of this study connecting the themes of self-realization 
(including moral identity/moral agency), aging and cultural narratives about 
later life. In a normative philosophical endeavor such as this, it seems less un-
common then in other realms of scientific investigation to include a personal 
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note; so let me end with a few personal reflections that pertain to my own, I 
now dare to admit, ambivalent relation to the concept of self-realization. Among 
philosophers, I have often heard the joke that we tend to choose as our pro-
fessional focus precisely those themes that we struggle with in our personal 
lives. I must admit that I am no exception. The task to lead a good life (what do 
I consider good?), with and for others (which others do I reckon with? what if 
significant others die or disappear from my life? how can I mean something 
for others?), according to my deepest aspirations and best capacities (what are these 
in my case? and how can they be meaningful to myself and to others?) as full 
participating member of a society/community (to which community do I want to 
belong? and what if I am by nature hesitant to participate?) has often puzzled 
me deeply.
Yet the fact that I keep asking myself these questions, that I keep struggling 
with them in my personal life, is also proof of my authentic engagement with 
the moral ideal of what I have called self-realization in this study. Apparently, 
I have some important personal issues to digest relating to the theme of moral 
self-development, which I have been discussing from a comfortably detached, 
theoretical perspective in this study. Of course, it is precisely my struggle with 
these questions and with my own self-realization that has fueled my scholarly 
engagement with these matters in the first place. 
I will not return to the arguments in favor of the self-realization discourse 
discussed in the more formal part of this study, for they have hopefully been 
made sufficiently clear above. I will end instead with two reflections regarding 
the meaning of self-realization that arise from my personal point of view:
• First, what is the use of striving for self-realization in light of the transiency 
of everything in human life? If you don’t believe – as I do not – in an ulti-
mate purpose for your life, in some gratification for earthly struggle to be 
acquired after one’s death…. If life has made you aware – as happened to me 
- of the fact that who and what you love most is never here to stay “forever 
and always”, then why take the trouble to keep striving for self-realization? 
To return to the gardening metaphor introduced in chapter 4 when clarify-
ing what is at stake in self-realization: why put in all the effort to strive for 
a flourishing garden, if eventually everything that was blooming withers 
away and dies? Feinberg (1992) has made this point in a more sophisticated 
manner by pointing out that the whole undertaking of self-realization may 
seem intrinsically pointless and absurd, comparable to the ancient myth of 
Sisyphus, pushing his rock to the top of a hill ad infinitum only to see it fall 
down again on the other side. 
Despite these thoughts, however, I have eventually come to the conclusion 
that for me there is value in the striving for self-realization after all. My own 
experience and confrontation with existential vulnerability has convinced 
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me that eventually, we human beings cannot help seeking meaning and 
fulfillment in our lives. We will always long for the joys of a flourishing 
garden, no matter how far away this goal may seem at moments of despair. 
To me, the value of the self-realization discourse and its focus on a conti-
nuous process of moral self-development is therefore that it sensitizes me 
to the importance and intrinsic worth of activities in the here and now, 
which are undertaken with dedication, attentiveness, care, enthusiasm and 
determination. Striving for self-realization against all odds enables me to 
keep feeling a vital involvement with life even at times when this seems 
most difficult. 
• Second, one of the reasons for my personal ambivalence towards the theme 
of self-realization is that oftentimes, who I am, my “self” that I am supposed 
to develop according to the self-realization discourse, seems rather like a 
burden to me. I can be deeply dissatisfied with myself – with my insecurity, 
my laziness, my anxiety, my workaholic tendency, et cetera – and I am quite 
sure I am not the only one. But what my struggle with the theme of self-re-
alization in this study has taught me, an insight that has deeply contributed 
to my eventual appreciation of this discourse, is the indispensable need for 
a loving acceptance of who I am, with all my imperfections. Importantly, 
self-love and self-acceptance also imply struggling with the feeling that I 
have not chosen to be this particular person. Feinberg (1992), again, puts 
this into words in a way that resonates with my own feelings by stating 
that, “self-identity can be conceived as a kind of arranged marriage (I did 
not select the self that was to be me) that in a stable person ripens into true 
love, but in an unstable one sours into rancor and self-destruction” (p. 326). 
This self-love, the incomparable value of which I have come to appreciate 
through my involvement with the self-realization discourse, is not of the 
heroic kind advanced by Nietzsche, however, but of a rather more modest 
type. This self-love or loving self-acceptance is a virtue of realism regarding 
my own strengths and weaknesses, an attitude that couples an intention to 
make the best of myself in life with a certain mildness and forgiving atti-
tude towards my faults and vices, and to the many moments at which I fail 
in my strivings. Without an attitude of loving self-acceptance, I feel like my 
striving for self-realization becomes an insurmountable burden. But with 
such an attitude, the task of “becoming who I am” seems less daunting and 
even – dare I say so? – attractive to pursue. 
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